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3PREFACE
THE IDEAL AND THE REAL
"The feminist interrogation of autonomy is at the theoretical edge of a
movement that is literally remaking the social identities and historical self-
interpretations oflarge numbers ofwomen and some men."l
"In rethinking the idea of autonomy...we are led to a rethinking of consent itself
in both broader terms and ones which assume a mutuality of relationship and
responsibility.l"
Commentators in legal, political and moral theory have long since established
the significance of consent as the primary medium for the articulation of self-
determination. Consent, and the capacity to give consent, have heralded such
attention because of their centrality in the accrediting of the human being with
the status of serious and rational agent. The capacity to give meaningful
consent, or to have one's refusals of consent seriously accredited, establishes a
benchmark in terms of the satisfaction of requisite standards of rational
competence and self-awareness. What's more, it holds symbolic relevance in
terms of establishing those wielding consent to be 'fully' human and therefore
deserving of the attendant levels of respect and integrity.'
Since the heyday of the social contract tradition, the legal and ideological
reverence afforded to the notion of consent has become even more pronounced.
With thinkers as diverse as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau heralding the concept
of consent to be the only mechanism of self-determination sufficiently strong to
support the establishment of the state and social institutions which we continue
to know today, the occupancy of consent within the heart of traditional political
and legal theory has been well-cemented."
1 Fraser, N , "Michel Foucault - A Young Conservative?" (1985) 96 Ethics, p.182
2 Lacey, N., Unspeakable Subjects- Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory (1998) Hart
Publishing, p.121
3 Fletcher, G., Basic Concepts ofLegal Thought (1996) Oxford University Press, p.l09-117
4 Hobbes, T. Leviathan (ed. MacPherson, G.B.) (1968) Penguin
Locke, J. Two Treatises ofGovemment (ed. Laslett, P.) (1963) Mentor
Rousseau, J. J. The Social Contract and Discourses (ed. Cole, G.) (1968) Dent
4Although today debate over the legitimacy of the social contract tradition
continues to rage,5 and although thinkers within the tradition have suffered from
internal disagreement," what has been questioned far less often is the legitimacy
of the notion of consent itself. A formulation of consent heavily influenced by
the pre-occupations of the day, namely individual personhood and the
establishment of regimes for the protection of private property, has informed the
writing within this tradition. In their clamour to challenge the historical
viability and philosophical legitimacy of the social contract itself, commentators
in political and legal theory have all too often left untouched the dangerous
assumptions inherent in the very notion of consent that operates as the
foundation of the contract. Preoccupation with critique of the notion of the
social contract has allowed the individualistic and rationalistic model of consent
implicit within it to become cemented within the dominant liberal ideology.
The ethos of liberalism within which legal discourse has established its
foundations reifies both rationalism and individualism as inherent prerequisites
of human subjectivity. The primary means of expression of subjectivity is
through the exercise of agency, and consent is the mode of communication of
that exercise. In accrediting the articulation or refusal of consent with this
ideological significance, the liberal legal model assumes that agency is
exercised in an abstract, rational and self-serving framework. At the level of
experience, however, this is counter-intuitive. This thesis claims that the
rhetoric of liberalism acts to disguise the realities of the operation of consent
and to obscure the extent to which the agency of the human subject is curtailed
to comply with this artificial framework.
This thesis proposes to examine the mechanisms employed to encourage this
process of construction and curtailment of agency, at both the practical and
5 See Pateman, C : The Sexual Contract (1988) Polity Press and Pateman, C. & Brennan, T., "Mere
Auxilliaries to the Commonwealth - Women and the Origins ofLiberalism" (1979) Political Studies
27
6 As between Hobbes and Rousseau, for example, in regard to the question of to whom the consent in
question is given - for Hobbes, the recipient of popular submission is the sovereign Leviathan; for
Rousseau, people submit their individual consent only to each other through submission to the
provisions of the rule of the general will.
5theoretical level. Within its confines, it would, however, be impossible to
embark upon a catalogue of the obstacles to the establishment of unfettered
agency facing human agents who seek to rely upon the vehicle of consent in the
myriad contexts in which it now plays a central role. Although a general trend
of curtailment and construction may be isolated, in each context a variety of
social imperatives and normative expectations may be relied upon to render a
specific form of constructionism. That said, however, an examination of the
nature of the constructive imperatives that operate to structure choice in some of
these specific contexts is a necessary prerequisite to the development of a more
substantial critique of the disparity between the legal ideal of unfettered and
individualist consent and the experiential reality of its operation.
Over the ensuing chapters, therefore, the thesis will focus primarily upon a
critique of some of the most observable methods of curtailing the autonomy of
the female agent through a specific examination of the contexts of rape and
maternal-foetal conflict. The feminist critique of the notions of autonomy and
rationality considered inherent in many aspects of liberal legal ideology
represents a promising starting point from which to commence this project.
However, there are many significantly more acute, intricate and puzzling
aspects involved in the operation and conceptualisation of consent than can be
brought to light through an exclusive focus on the allegedly inherent 'maleness'
of its demands. Hence, although the primary concern of this thesis is to
establish a critique of the operation of consent in regard to the female legal
agent that attends to the pragmatic aims of the feminist agenda, it is hoped that
the thesis also offers a far wider spectrum of interest and a broader range of
applicability.
It is perhaps worth stating at the outset the nature of that feminist agenda
referred to above. It would be misleading to suggest that a single, unified
feminist agenda can be identified within the diverse frameworks of feminist
thought. However, certain common concerns do unite feminist theory and to
that extent a skeletal agenda can be asserted. Within the confines of this thesis,
6the accepted definition of that agenda is one framed by Alison Jaggar. Jaggar
has alleged that the self-professed aims that unite disparate feminist theories are,
"first, to articulate moral critiques of action and practices that perpetuate
women's subordination; second, to prescribe morally justifiable ways of
revisiting such actions and practices; and third, to envision morally desirable
alternatives that will promote women's emancipation."?
This offers a fair articulation of the feminist agenda that is to be served by a
more meaningful conception of subjectivity, agency and consent. In the
discussion over the following chapters, when reference is made to the
compatibility of theory with the feminist agenda, it is to these self-professed
aims of the feminist movement that attention is being directed.
The critique of consent to be developed within the confines of this thesis deals
specifically with an examination of two particularly problematic aspects of the
concept. This by no means presents an exhaustive account of the issues in
regard to consent that should demand our attention as critical theorists.
However, it is submitted that the areas dealt with bring to light many of the
most significant downfalls of the prevailing concept of consent and make good
ground for a more detailed examination of other inadequacies in line with the
concerns of other projects.
The first problematic aspect of the prevailing concept of consent to be dealt with
within the confines of this thesis relates to the actual operations of consent in
the legal arena. Detailed analysis will be afforded to the role played by
stereotype and cultural expectation in constructing an ideal image of the female
agent. This abstract ideal presents a standard against which the conduct of
particular women is judged in the legal arena. As will become evident through
ensuing examination of this comparative process, its outcome has a profound
effect upon the credibility that is afforded to the agency of the participants
involved.
7 Jaggar, A. "Feminist Ethics" in Becker, L. & Becker, C. (ed.) Encyclopedia ofEthics (1992) Garland,
p.361
7By adopting the theoretical position of Michel Foucault in regard to the nature
of power in modem society.f the thesis alleges that modernity is characterised
by an increasingly insidious operation of normalisation techniques upon the
individual. These techniques of normalisation constitute a peculiarly modem
form of power that acts to construct the human subject into a pre-selected and
artificial identity. The proliferation of such 'disciplinary techniques' and their
increasing incorporation within the forms of law represent a significant obstacle
to the realisation of the free and unfettered form of self-determination conceived
of in the model of consent assumed by prevailing ideology. The liberal
assumption remains one involving a perception of consent as a medium of
communication and desire expression that takes place between equally free and
self-determining individuals. However, the Foucaultian thesis of modem power
establishes the artificiality· of this perception and provides the theoretical
grounding for a more detailed examination of the nature of the constraints and
constructions under which real people struggle to make themselves heard.
Building upon the Foucaultian assertion that one of the prime sites of the
operation of these modem, disciplinary power constructions has been upon the
female body and her sexuality, the thesis will examine the constructions and
stereotypes that have been imposed upon the female agent by the forms of
modem power. In particular, we will examine the operation of that process in
the specific contexts of the legal treatment of consent in rape and maternal-
foetal conflict cases.
Catharine MacKinnon among others has argued that the idea of consent
assumed in the treatment of rape trials is inadequate because of its assumption
that the agents involved in the pre-consensual negotiations commence from an
equal footing." According to her radical thesis, this is fundamentally unrealistic
because women exist as oppressed victims of a male power that expresses clear
dictates upon the importance of sexuality and translates the exercise of female
sexuality as a mechanism for survival rather than an issue of legitimate choice.
8 Foucault, M. Power / Knowledge - Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77 (Ed C. Gordon)
(1980) Pantheon
8In many respects this is a powerful critique. However, it is also a difficult
critique to maintain alongside a contemporary feminist project of transcending
the determinism inherent in much radical feminist thought." Without going to
the radical extremes of MacKinnon's thesis, therefore, the notion implicit in
Estrich's distinction between 'ideal' and 'real' rape l l , will be developed to
support the argument that social imperatives (or disciplinary techniques to use
the Foucaultian terminology) operate in the legal sphere to construct an ideal of
female behaviour as weak and passive. What's more it will become apparent
from examination of the treatment of specific claims about consent within our
legal institutions that those women who fail to comply with these demands find
themselves without the protection of law, and without the ability to refuse their
consent to sexual intercourse. 12
The existence of similar inconsistencies in terms of the operation of consent in
the context of maternal-foetal conflict can also be established. Analysing the
discourses that are prevalent within this complex arena of medical and legal life
establishes the existence of a regime of compulsory motherhood that shares
many of the characteristics of the regime of compulsory heterosexuality
established by Adrienne Rich13. Essentially the demands of this regime have
dictated that women are not only required to fulfil 'natural' maternal instincts as
part of their development of true femininity, but also that in the realisation of
that maternality, woman should occupy the role of altruistic and selfless mother
assumed by social ideals. Through a brief examination of the stereotypes
involved in the social imperatives of good mothering, it will become clear that
demands of altruism are highest on the agenda.!" Circumstances involving
maternal-foetal conflict are often seen to represent a quite serious departure
from this ideal. Once again, in examining the manner in which courts have
9 MacKinnon, C. Feminism Unmodified (1987) Harvard University Press
10 Finley, L. "The Nature of Domination and The Nature of Women : Reflections on Feminism
Unmodified" (1988) 82 Northwestern University Law Review 352
11 Estrich, S. Real Rape (1987) Harvard University Press
12 Brown, B, Burman, M. and Jamieson, L (ed.) Sex Crimes on Trial (1993) Edinburgh University
Press
Temkin, 1. Rape and the Legal Process (1987) Sweet & Maxwell
13 Rich, A. "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence" (1980) Signs, in Evans, M. The
Woman Question, (1994) SAGE, p59
14 Diduck, A. "Legislating Ideologies of Motherhood" (1993) 2 Social and Legal Studies 461
9tended to interpret and deal with the situation where women refuse their consent
to medical treatment indicated for the foetus, it will become apparent that these
women have had their claims to self-determination consistently over-ruled when
the decision matters. IS
This presents an anomaly to a legal culture within which every other competent,
adult human subject is permitted to consent to, or refuse, any medical treatment
upon any grounds.16 However, when we recognise the existence and
significance of the social power forces operating upon the pregnant woman in
this context, the anomaly is no longer a puzzling one. The interpretation of
consent in both the rape and maternal-foetal conflict context is 'rigged' towards
the realisation of one idealised identity and one prioritised choice. Having
uncovered the reality that the interpretation of consent employed in the legal
arena operates under the burden of powerful and effective normative
stereotypes, the thesis questions the feasibility of continued liberal claims
regarding the assumption of consent as the neutral vehicle for the articulation of
free and self-determined human choice.
Recognition of this disparity between the ideal conception of consent as a
liberal medium for the expression of self-determination and the reality of its
operation as heavily curtailed by the imposition of cultural expectations of what
constitutes 'proper' conduct paves the way for analysis of the second
problematic aspect of the notion of consent. The target of this second level of
critique pertains less to the manner in which consent is interpreted in its
operation in particular contexts, and more to what have previously been referred
to as the 'dangerous assumptions' that lie behind the prevailing conception of
legal consent. More specifically, the critique of the latter stages of the thesis
will be concerned with an examination of the relationship between consent as a
15 Legal authority suggests that these decisions are often overruled upon appeal. Nonetheless, trends
suggest that courts of 1SI instance tend to consistently demand surgery against the mother's wishes.
Changing the decision after the event may help eradicate the inconsistency between the law in the
statute book and the ideas of dignity and integrity central to our legal system, however, it does nothing
to alleviate the violation already experienced by the pregnant woman and appears to do little to affect
the law at the level of 1st instance practise.
16 Re T (1992) 4 All ER 649
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medium of self-determination and the assumption of the characteristics of the
selfwho lies behind that determination.
One of the most damaging aspects of the prevailing conception of consent lies
in the uncritical acceptance it adopts in favour of the perception of human
subjectivity as inherently individualistic. Taking its point of origin from the
social contract tradition, the conception of consent prioritised today continues to
be one which assumes consent to be a medium for the communication of
agreement between mutually distinct and disinterested human agents. The
ongoing gravitation of legal theory towards this conception of consent can in
many respects be explained by the continued reverence afforded to the work of
Immanuel Kant within contemporary analysis.V A strong proponent of the
quest for Enlightenment rationalism, Immanuel Kant has developed his own
peculiar species of humanist and Enlightenment theory that takes its inspiration
from the contractarian work of Rousseau.f Adopting a paradigm of human
subjectivity as inherently individualistic and rationalistic, Kant develops a
theory of the self and of self-determination that has become the focus of
substantial critique. Within the confines of this thesis, we will examine the
legitimacy of such critique of Kantian subjectivity and will propose alternatives
to this model that offer an improved medium for self-determination no longer
constrained by the abstract individualism inherent in the Kantian conception.
Taking on board well-established feminist critique of the abstraction and radical
individualism inherent in Kantian subjectivity and prevailing notions of consent,
we will develop potential alternatives to this ethical model of agency that
accommodate the concerns and requirements of feminist theory and practice
advocated above. In so doing, however, we will examine not only pre-existing
feminist critiques of liberal individualism and agency, but also like-minded
critiques developed by critical theorists unconnected to the feminist school. All
too often, purely feminist critiques have implied a syllogism between the
17 Friedrich, W. The Philosophy ofKant-Immanuel Kant's Moral and Political Writings (1949)
Modern Library
18 Friedrich, The Philosophy ofKant - Immanuel Kant's Moral and Political Writings, Supra. Note 17..
For a further discussion of the relationship between Kant and Rousseau, See Chapter Four.
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individualism implicit in legal standards and an alleged male experiential
position of separation to suggest that the deficiency of liberal legal standards
lies in their embodiment of male standards that prioritise separation over
connection.l" This correlation between men and separation and women and
connection is too simplistic, however, and tends to uncritically accept the
dominant perceptions of gendered identities. Recognising the shortcomings of
such critique, particularly in terms of the achievement of a satisfactory feminist
politics, this thesis will disassociate itself to a large degree from such over-
arching and totalitarian assertions and instead focus more critical attention on
the creature of liberalism itself.
To illustrate the potentially liberating effect that this shift in emphasis may
produce, the thesis will examine the successes heralded by previous feminist
attempts to transcend this radical dichotomy.i" These attempts have sought to
build upon the insights of more 'mainstream' critiques of liberalism to produce
a feminist critique of individualism that, although still gender-sensitive, is no
longer fundamentally gender-specific. Within the confines of the thesis,
particular attention will be paid to an examination of the successes and failures
that can be claimed by feminist attempts to incorporate the critiques of
liberalism developed by poststructuralist and communitarian commentators.
In charting the path of a feminist theory that builds upon the poststructuralist
critique of the Kantian subject, particular attention will be paid to the work of
Judith Butler. Butler's work has been hugely influential in establishing the
possibility of cooperation between feminism and poststructuralism in their
mutual desire to reconceptualise subjectivity and agency." However, as we
shall see, problems of radical fragmentalism inherent in Butler's prescriptive
thesis render the possibility of consolidating women in furtherance of group
aims remote. This has significant ramifications upon feminist politics and the
19 West, R. "Jurisprudence and Gender" (1988) 55 University ofChicago Law Review I
20 For Example, Butler, J. Gender Trouble - Feminism and the Subversion ofIdentity (1990)
Routledge
21 Butler, J. Gender Trouble, Supra. Note 20 & Bodies That Matter - On the Discursive Limits ofSex
(1993) Routledge
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notion of group self-determination (in the sense of groups through affinity rather
than essentialist unity ofnature) that is imperative to that political project.
Turning attention to the communitarian critique of the Kantian individualist
subject, we will examine the celebrated attempt made by Martha Nussbaum to
develop a feminist ethics on the back of the Aristotelian framework that forms
the foundation ofpremodern communitarianism.P Again, however, a wholesale
feminist embrace of communitarian theory will also be established to be
problematic. The difficulty here lies less in the theory's being over-critical to
the point of political self-extinction but rather in the theory's serious failure to
challenge the notions of community which form its foundation. Particularly in
light of the Foucaultian critique of power formations, this uncritical adoption of
the notion of community presents conceptual difficulties and political dangers
for the feminist position.
While an exclusive reliance upon neither poststructuralism, nor
communitarianism proves adequate to the task of establishing a theory of the
subject and of consent which meets the demands of the feminist agenda, the
potential benefits offered by a selective appropriation of such theory should not
be underestimated. This thesis will, therefore, present the possibility of
developing a hybrid theory of subjectivity and agency that selectively
incorporates the most promising aspects of poststructuralist and communitarian
theory alongside those feminist theories of selfhood that have historically
proven most fruitful to the feminist academy. Fusing a combination of
poststructuralist and communitarian insight alongside a considerable reliance
upon the less problematic aspects of the Gilligan-inspired model of an ethics of
care,23 promotes a 'contextual' conception of selfhood" The contextual self
who emerges from this process is neither entirely socially constructed nor
entirely self-determining. It develops its identity within an affective and
22 Nussbaum, M. The Fragility ofGoodness (1987) Cambridge University Press
Nussbaum, M & Sen, A. The Quality ofLife (1993) Clarendon Press
23 Gilliagn, C. In a Different Voice - Psychological Theory and Women's Development (1982) Harvard
University Press
24 The kind of collaborative process behind this contextual selfhood has been advocated by Hekman, S.
Moral Voices, Moral Selves - Carol Gilligan and Feminist Moral Theory (1995) Polity Press
13
emotional framework of relationship and responsibility, but with a capacity for
critical reflection upon social imperatives that renders it more credible than the
'social dupe' ofrival theories.
Providing an agenda for the realisation of a more experientially appropriate
account of the nature of the self who occupies the space behind the medium of
self-determination through which its intent is articulated permits a remit for re-
evaluation of the prevailing notion of consent. Requiring a fluid form of self-
determination that seeks serious recognition of the situated, embedded and
embodied nature of human reality, the emerging contextual self offers an
agentic framework, application of which will meet the requirements of the
feminist project. In demanding proper concern for the life circumstances and
peculiar struggles under which the agents involved have issued their decisions,
it promotes the kind of extension of our concern to the concrete reality rather
than the general abstract of human life that feminist criticism has repeatedly
found to be lamentably lacking in the prevailing operation of consent standards.
The emergmg disparities between the ideal conception of consent and the
realities of its operation, that it is the project of this thesis to uncover, can in
large part be attributed to the characteristically modernist attempt to achieve
generalised and abstract philosophical and legal positions. Seeking theoretical
claims of such broad applicability actively misrepresents the realities of our
existence and of the categories through which that existence makes sense.
While resisting, therefore, this modernist temptation to make grand statements
either about the exact nature, or effects, of contextual agency, we will return in
the fmal chapter to the specific arenas of rape and maternal-foetal conflict to
offer a particularised analysis of the operation of contextual agency in these
specific legal arenas. This localised form of analysis permits an illustrative
argument for the potential advantages of the contextual model without any
pretence towards grand theory. In so doing, the benefits to be gained in these
arenas both in terms of the operation and interpretation of consent will be
established, and the 'dangerous assumptions' that lie behind the concept itself
will successfully be drawn from outwith the shadow ofprevailing rhetoric.
14
The critique of the concept of consent lodged within the confines of this thesis
seeks to highlight two related yet distinct inadequacies inherent in its current
form. Firstly, it highlights those inadequacies invoked by the incorporation of
discursive nonnativity into the actual operation and interpretation of standards
of consent. Secondly, it challenges the assumptions of individualism that lie
behind the conception of consent privileged by our legal tradition. Both levels
of critique are, however, united through their implicit and explicit demands
upon the law's honesty. In both contexts, the concern lies in the tendency of the
law and of legal standards to legitimate the incorporation of erroneous
stereotypes and abstract individualism under myths and false pretensions.
The primary call of this thesis asks the law to be more honest in its application
of the concept of consent. It asks judicial officials and law-makers to recognise
that people live under the dominance of forms of social imperatives which seek
to construct and categorise behaviour and identities. What's more, perhaps as
an extension of that request, it asks those same judicial officials to recognise
that people do not live in a realm of abstract individualism, framed by dictates
of rational self-interest. These assertions are in themselves far from
controversial. However, in the legal arena, these assertions are frustrated and
marginalised. This thesis asks that the law revise its stance on these realities of
social life and develop a legal system that reflects the realities of social living,
rather than the idealised mythology of individual indifference and rational self-
determinism.
If law is to perform its function as a means of social control, it must do so
legitimately. The society which legal consent standards currently presuppose is
not the society within which we live. Legal standards must accept that reality
and its implications. The law can no longer seek refuge behind false assertions
of individualistic and unconstrained self-determinism,
15
CHAPTER ONE
CONSENT, LAW AND DISCOURSE
"The notion of consent ... is a chameleon, fluid and changing as between
offences and in this capacity, it creates the possibilities of differential
disciplining as between genders, sexualization, and sexual orientations."!
One of the most striking aspects about the social contract tradition, and the
conception of consent writers within that tradition espouse, lies in the
relationship that is established between law and consent. If, as contractarian
theorists have argued, it is the case that our collective consent has established
the social and institutional framework from which all modem law emanates,
then logically it must be the case that consent is the master of law. In making
the assumption that consent is the master of law, however, the significance of
mechanisms through which law operates to construct consent have often been
neglected. Writers from within the contractarian tradition up till contemporary
times have often assumed a one-dimensional vision of law, as something which
is issued by an identifiable sovereign, through a vehicle of command or
prohibition, to a collective who have accepted their position under legitimate
authority. It is not surprising, therefore, that alongside this juridical conception
of law has been a conception of consent as a medium which structures law,
because of its original role in the establishment of legitimate authority. In
conceiving the operation of power (and legal power in particular) as manifest
singularly in the dictates of sovereign command, the dominant contractarian
model has lent to liberalism the presupposition that areas of social living
unregulated by prohibitive power are areas of social living within which the
human agent has a free and unfettered remit for self-determination.
However, more contemporary analyses of the dynamics of power and law have
begun to challenge the dominance of this contractarian perception by suggesting
that law's power is more omnipotent than one-dimensional, that it infiltrates at
deeper levels, and operates through construction more than prohibition. This
16
alternative VISIOn of law offers a very different conception of consent - a
conception that rests upon a more dialectical interchange with the dictates of
law. It is a conception within which the constructive ('disciplinary') power of
law is used to differentially structure the operation and interpretation of consent
in ways that have been disguised by the unilateral version of law assumed by
traditional theory. Where traditional theory perpetuates the myth of libertarian
free space within which the agent is free to determine their choices from an
unconstructed and unconstrained remit of options, this emerging conception of
legal power emphasises the artificiality of this notion of free space within a
society in which power increasingly pervades the most intimate aspects of social
living through constructive and disciplinary mechanisms. In tum, this emerging
conception demands a re-evaluation of the prevailing notion of consent to
highlight the artificiality of this image of unfettered self-determinism and to
replace it with a more realistic account of the highly constructed operations of
choice within specific human contexts.
In this chapter, we will examine in some detail the nature of this alternative
conceptualisation oflaw's power and its implications in terms of our analysis of
the legal model of consent. Most specifically, we will draw attention to the
extent to which the traditional juridical conception of sovereign legal power has
failed to attend to the more subtle and manipulative operations of power (both
legal and otherwise) that have increasingly become incorporated into the
networks of modem life. Illustrating the proliferation of nonnative discourses
that characterise modernity, our examination of the power manifest by such
discourses will highlight the pervasiveness of power within the frameworks of
individual choice. Building upon that premise, we will illustrate the extent to
which the imperatives of these nonnative discourses have been incorporated
within legal frameworks to ensure the increasing operation of legal power
through mediums of construction rather than prohibition. Introducing a central
claim of this thesis, it will be argued that removing the unilateral juridical
1 Duncan, S. "Law's Sexual Discipline: Visibility, Violence and Consent" (1995) 22 Journal of Law
and Society 326-45, p.344
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facade of law's power that has dominated analysis to date is a necessary
prerequisite to the realisation of this more complex and experiential articulation
oflegal power. Such realisation in its tum is crucial to determining the extent to
which consent, rather than being the unfettered medium of self-determination
assumed by prevailing theory, is in actuality differentially construed in its
various contexts and between its gendered agents.
Over the following chapters this analysis will be employed to highlight the
extent to which the incorporation of discursive expectations into legal
frameworks, that is characteristic of the emerging operation of power, has
curtailed the legal agent's ability to issue or refuse consent in specific contexts.
Recognition of the role played by modem power in the curtailment of the
capacity for agency in this regard requires recognition of the artificiality of the
concept of consent that prevails within dominant legal discourse. In later stages
of this work, that realisation will provide the impetus for a detailed examination
of alternative methodologies for the self-determination of concrete and situated
human agents that recognise the constructive and disciplinary role undertaken
by legal power.
The Emerging Conception ofDisciplinary Power
"The exercise of power is not simply a relationship between partners,
individuals, or a collective; it is a way in which certain actions modify others.
Which is to say, of course, that something called Power, with or without a
capital letter, does not exist. Power exists only when it is put into action, even
if, of course, it is integrated into a disparate field of possibilities brought to
bear upon permanent structures.'?
This quote from Michel Foucault illustrates the central contention involved in
this emerging conceptualisation of legal power. Taking his lead from the
thought of other critical theorists (most notably Neitzsche), Foucault has been
the most vociferous in his elucidation of the terms of this peculiarly modem
2 Dreyfus, H. & Rabinow, P.,Michel Foucault-Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (1982)
Harvester Wheatsheaf, p.219
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form of power. On that basis, our excursion into the modus operandi of this
'disciplinary' power will be one largely charted by Foucault himself in his
works The Archaeology of Knowledge, Lectures in Power/Knowledge and The
History ofSexuality, vol.I?
Throughout his discussion of power dynamics within these works, Foucault
does not use the term 'power' to refer to a group of mechanisms that coerce the
citizen into subservience as contractarian theorists have done. Nor does he use
it in the more traditional sense to refer to a model of subjugation that has the
form of a rule or a general system of domination extended by one group over
another." On the contrary, Foucault has proposed that these traditional
perceptions of the nature of power and the dynamics of power relationships are
somewhat outdated within modem society. Rather than seeking to maintain his
model of power within the juridical realms of state institution and state-
approved legal regulation, Foucault draws our attention to the complex and
interconnected network of 'disciplinary techniques' through which power
operates in what he calls 'modem, disciplinary society'.
While he is willing to accept that many more traditional forms of sovereign
power have remained intact in modem society, he suggests that a considerable
amount have gradually been taken over and are now ultimately sustained on the
basis of power relations that operate on an entirely different scale and in an
entirely different manner. In other words, the operation of sovereign power has
become gradually dependent on a more regulatory, disciplinary and societal
power. In an interview with lL. Brochier, Foucault describes this modem
focus,
"When I think of the mechanisms of power, I think of its capillary form of
existence, of the extent to which power seeps into the very grain of
3 Foucault, M. The Archaeology ofKnowledge (Trans. A. Sheridan) (1972) Harper Colophon
Foucault, M. Power / Knowledge - Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77 (Ed C. Gordon),
Supra. Preface, Note 8
Foucault, M. The History ofSexuality, Volume I (1976) Penguin
4 Foucault, M. The History ofSexuality, Supra. Chapter One, Note 3, p. 92
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individuals, reaches right into their bodies, permeates their gestures, their
postures, what they say, how they learn to live and work with other people.?'
The fundamental assertion that Foucault seeks to make in relation to power is
that, contrary to prevailing perceptions, power is not simply an oppressive force
imposed systematically and uni-directionally from 'above'. Rather, power is a
social presence that exerts itself in all aspects of life and in all directions. The
traditional analyses are over-simplistic and fail to recognise the important
interplay of the micro-politics ofpower that operate at a more personal level. In
The History of Sexuality, Foucault puts the point most plainly when he states
that,
"Power comes from below; that is, there is no binary and all-encompassing
opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations...Power
relations are both intentional and nonsubjective.:"
This conception of power stands in stark contrast to the traditionally advocated
proposition. While most social analysts have tended to regard power in an
essentially negative manner, as a regulatory force operated by the elite with the
ultimate purpose of maintaining current social hierarchies, Foucault replaces
this one-directional construct with a conception of power as a constructive force
that permeates at all levels of society. Power in this more positive fonn
infiltrates and creates a variety of different relationships, other than those within
the domination-subordination dynamic of traditional conceptions.' Where the
traditional approach speaks solely in terms of regulation by the state of the
other, by means of overt prohibition and regulation through the medium of
sovereign-issued commands, this alternative approach perceives of power as all-
pervasive within social life.
This is not, however, to imply that the Foucaultian approach seeks to deny the
existence of this more traditional form of power. It does not seek to deny the
phenomenon of repression altogether. It does, however, refuse to continue to
5Sheridan, A. Michel Foucault- The Will to Truth (1980) Tavistock, p.217
6 Foucault, M. The History ofSexuality, Vol. I, Supra. Chapter One, Note 3, p.94
7 McNay, L. Foucault - A Critical Introduction (1994) Polity Press, p.90
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adopt the model of repression as being paradigmatic of power relations. The
repressive model is recognised as being only one form among many in the
effects generated by the interplay of power relations in society. This peculiarly
modem conception of power is seen to penetrate all social relations. Hence, no
stark distinction can be drawn between those wielding power and those subject
to it, because once the veil of the idealised traditional construction of power
relations has been lifted, we see more clearly the reality that we are all of us
subject to the operation ofpower regimes.
This changing perception ofpower has implications both for law in general, and
for our legal conception of consent in particular. Not only does it challenge the
dominant perception of legal power as operating exclusively through the
medium of prohibition and sovereign regulation, it also challenges the dominant
perception that various areas of social life exist that are not the concern of legal
power. In positing modem power as a pervasive force that infiltrates in all
aspects of social living through the invocation of normative expectations and
discursive discipline, Foucault contradicts the liberal contention and highlights
the artificiality of the notion of unregulated social space. In so doing, he also
challenges the legitimacy of the attendant liberal contention that individuals
have a free and unfettered remit for self-determination within these confines. In
the following sections, we will go on to examine the nature ofFoucault's claims
in this regard in more detail and we will devote specific attention to the
discursive formations that he suggests have played a crucial role in proliferating
these modem forms ofpower.
Before we go on to examine the implications of this critique in terms of our
uncritical acceptance of the traditional conception of consent, however, it ought
to be noted that the application of Foucaultian perceptions of power to the
phenomenon of legal power advocated within this thesis is far from
uncontroversial. Many commentators have questioned the legitimacy of
applying Foucault within the field of legal criticism. In the following section,
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we will examine the nature of the concerns voiced by such commentators and
will illustrate the potential retorts available to those who wish to defend the
possibility of a Foucaultian approach to legal power in the face of such
concerns.
Legal Power as Disciplinary Power
Although Michel Foucault himself was never specifically concerned with the
place of law within his overall theory, the implications, and indeed the
possibility, of a Foucaultian approach to legal theory have been hotly disputed
with the dominant body oflegal commentary on the subject adopting a generally
sceptical approach. Confusion over the exact nature of the Foucaultian stance
on law has further complicated the situation. It has been generally accepted that
Foucault's approach, both to his theory and to his writings, is consciously
cautious of attempts to devise holistic and cohesive frameworks. The
implications of this for subsequent development of and commentary upon his
theory are severe, and have led many to dismiss the possibility of a Foucaultian
legal analysis too lightly, on the basis of what may superficially appear as over-
simplifications and internal inconsistencies within his work.
The most common summation of Foucault's approach to law has been
encapsulated in the claim that he regards law as a medium of power relations
that has become out-dated within the modem disciplinary network. Many have
interpreted his thesis that we should abandon the traditional juridical conception
of power wielded by the state through the governing mechanism of legal
sanction as intimating that we must also abandon our interest in the role of law
in society. There have indeed been several indications in Foucault's writings
that have seemed to support the adoption of such an interpretation. Certainly,
the traditional dynamic of institution-state-law does pre-date the era of
modernity in which truth (as grounded in discourse) has become the dominant
mode ofknowledge, and this latter period has been the main focus of Foucault's
concern. Many have alleged, therefore, that Foucault is reluctant to bring his
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analysis of power into the legal realm because he sees the legal realm as being
obsessed with, and centred around, a different notion of power - one which is
more in line with the traditional one-dimensional construction of authority. 8
Foucault's demand that we 'cut off the head of the king' has been interpreted as
a demand that we break away from this Austinian-esque conception of power as
a commodity held by the oppressors, allowing them to rule by command and
authoritarian decree. Only by doing so, it is alleged can we begin to appreciate
the power dynamics that operate at all levels, behind the state and its apparatus.
This is an interpretation of Foucault that there is no need to challenge.
Certainly, Foucault has demanded that, "we must construct an analysis of power
that no longer takes law as model and code." This shift in analysis of power
dynamics is of central importance to his thesis and underlies his ideological
claims introduced in the preceding section. However, it is only a very
superficial reading of such statements that permits the claim that Foucault has
dismissed the mechanism of law from playing an integral part in the power
regimes ofmodernity.
As intimated above, Foucault himself was never particularly interested in the
question of law and its role in modem, or indeed classical, society. Perhaps,
then, the first question to be addressed is whether it is even appropriate that we
apply Foucaultian ideology within the field of legal theory. One of the most
clear-sighted arguments in favour of the utilisation of Foucault in legal analysis
has been provided by Carol Smart in Feminism and the Power ofLaw] 0. In this
book, Smart harks back to a basic Foucaultian assertion that when something
makes a claim to be a science (and therefore to be an authoritative statement
within a discursive field), it elevates itself to a superior level of knowledge and
thereby makes a claim to power. Accepting this premise, Smart applies a
similar analogy to the functioning of law and to the claims made by legal
8 Foucault, M. The History ofSexuality, Vol. I, Supra. Chapter One, Note 3, p.88-9
9 Foucault, M. The History ofSexuality, Vol. I, Supra. Chapter One, Note 3, p.90
10 Smart, C Feminism and the Power ofLaw, (1993) Routledge
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doctrine. Despite aforementioned problems of periodicity (which are of more
concern to Foucault as an historian and a genealogist, than they are to Smart as a
legal theorist), a similar process can be seen in operation within the legal field.
Armed with its own specialised language and methodology, the law is able to
set itself apart from other discourses and other fields of knowledge in a similar
fashion to science. Although Foucault's analysis confines itself to power which
is realised through a particular 'truth' making a claim to scientificity, Smart
proposes a broader spectrum of possibilities through which a 'truth' can make
its claim upon the conscience of the individual." Law sees itself, and is seen by
others, as having the means to establish the 'truth' of events based on legal
methods that have been taught to its agents through a specific legal education".
Given Foucault's averred interest in the mechanisms through which 'truth' is
constructed, and through which in tum the individual conscience is directed, it
seems only logical, according to Smart, that the Foucaultian approach be
applied also to legal analysis.
Whether or not we stand convinced by the argument from Smart that legal
procedure operates via a self-defined power of legal imperialism, there remain
other justifications for the need to examine the Foucaultian position on law
more closely than perhaps Foucault himself takes the time to do. The essence of
Foucault's overall thesis makes fundamental claims about the status of
indisputable 'truths', about the interplay between networks of power and the
individual, and about the construction of the individual in the face of all-
encompassing power relations. Such concerns centrally involve the need to
examine the role of law within society. As we have seen, and will continue to
see elsewhere, the fact that Foucault does not devote specific attention to a
particular implication ofhis thesis, does not imply that there are no implications
to be laid bare, nor that he considers the implications negligible. Foucault
II Smart, C. "Law's Power, the Sexed Body and Feminist Discourse" (1990) 17 Journal ofLaw and
Society 194-210, p.197
12 A detailed examination of the operation of these legal methodologies and the support which they
lend to the legal claim to 'truth' is provided by Mossman, M. in "Feminism and Legal Method - the
Difference it Makes" (1986) Australian Journal ofLaw and Society 103-21
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continually asserted his reluctance to attempt any over-arching and all-
encompassing theory. The fact, therefore, that Foucault appears to deal lightly
with the question of law does not preclude the need for a subsequent detailed
consideration of the issue.
Until fairly recently, the most common approach to a Foucaultian analysis of
law has been framed negatively. In one ofthe most influential books examining
the possibility of a Foucaultian legal theory, Hunt and Wickham" conclude that
Foucault's assimilation of law with the notion of commands backed by threat
provides an overly-simplistic analysis which had long since been dismantled by
H.L.A. Hart in his critique of Austin." They note that the most prominent
theme in Foucault's writings on law involves the constant juxtaposition of law
and discipline and suggest particularly that Foucault displays a marked trend of
linking law with the negative conception ofpower that he seeks to renounce. In
Two Lectures, for example, Foucault states that
"In short, it is a question of orienting ourselves to a conception of power that
replaces the principle of the law with the viewpoint of the objective, the
principle of prohibition with the viewpoint of tactical efficiency, the principle
of sovereignty with the analysis of a multiple and mobile field of force
relations, wherein far-reaching but never completely stable effects of
domination are produced. The strategic model, rather than the model based on
law.':"
Through their examination of statements such as this one, Hunt and Wickham
argue that Foucault equates law only with the traditionally Austinian notion of
law as rules commanding behaviour by the threat of coercive sanction. Hunt
and Wickham recognise that this definition of law has indeed played a central
part in the history of positivist legal thought. However, in a contemporary echo
of the assertion made by Hart, they argue that this represents only one aspect of
law in its actual operations. Alleging that Foucault has restricted his attack on
law only to this narrow definition of the concept, Hunt and Wickham are critical
13 Hunt,A & Wickham, G. Foucault and Law - Towards a Sociology ofLaw as Governance (1994)
Pluto
14 Hart, H.L.A. The Concept ofLaw (1961) Oxford University Press
15 Foucault, M. "Two Lectures", in Gordon, C. (ed.) Power/Knowledge, Supra. Preface, Note 8, p.102
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of the viability of a Foucaultian theory of law. They are sceptical of the
possibility of his analysis yielding any more than a highly over-simplistic
syllogism between law and sovereignty. In positing this command based
definition oflaw as being fundamental to Foucault's theory, Hunt and Wickham
go on to illustrate the extent to which Foucault continually sets up law and
disciplinary techniques as mutually opposing, and yet dual processes. They
draw attention to Foucault's proposal that disciplinary technologies are to be
found in operation on the underside of law and they propose that Foucault's
ultimate project of redirecting the study of power and of exposing the part
played by the disciplines in modem government has, as one of its distinctive
effects, the displacement oflaw. In Foucault's own words,
"the analysis .. should not concern itself with the regulated and legitimate
forms of power in their central locations...On the contrary, it should be
concerned with power at its extremities...with those points where it becomes
capillary...one should try to locate power at the extreme points of its exercise,
where it is always less legal in character.':"
Asserting that "the primary theme that emerges from Foucault's treatment ofthe
origins of the modem state and disciplinary society is one which casts law in the
role of a pre-modem harbinger of absolutism"," Hunt and Wickham devote a
significant part of their book to criticism of this approach. They note with
disapproval that this approach stands in fundamental opposition to the major
drift of twentieth century legal thought that has tended to invest law with an
increasingly central role in modem society. Foucault's general equation of law
with pre-modem forms of power is heralded as the root cause of the debilitation
ofhis overall theory.
More recently, however, a defence has been lodged in the name of Foucault
which seeks to argue that commentators such as Hunt and Wickham are
mistaken in their belief that Foucault seeks to make any such over-simplific
equation between law and command. The trend of this counter-movement was
16 Foucault, M. The History ofSexuality, Vol I, Supra. Chapter One, Note 3, p.96-7
17 Hunt, A. & Wickham, G. Foucault and the Law, Supra. Chapter One, Note 13, p.59
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vociferously cast by Francois Ewald in 1990.18 The essence of this counter-
claim seeks to draw a distinction between the terms 'law' and 'juridical' in
Foucault's analysis to establish that discipline is not in fact counterposed to
'law', but only to the 'juridical'. Hunt and Wickham have dismissed such
arguments on the grounds that both ancient and modem law exhibit such
'juridical' characteristics, and while the form oflegal discourse is of undoubted
significance, it does not serve any useful role in distinguishing traditional and
modem forms oflaw. Given the importance that Foucault himself has grounded
in the signification of meaning through discourse, we must question, however,
whether the answer proffered by Hunt and Wickham is sufficient to render the
counter-claim inadequate. Through a closer examination of the details of this
pro-Foucaultian claim, this chapter will seek to establish both the inadequacy of
Hunt and Wickham's somewhat dismissive response, and the possibility of a re-
examination of the relevance oflaw to Foucault's overall thesis.
One of the most contemporary statements in this on-going academic dialogue
over the role of law in Foucault's ideology has been proffered to advance the
counter-claim premised by Ewald. In "Between Governance and Discipline",
Victor Tadros has lodged a significant criticism of the traditional interpretations
of Foucault figure-headed by Hunt and Wickham.19 Motivated by a concern to
re-establish the importance of Foucault's work for an overall understanding of
the way in which modem law operates within society, Tadros suggests that
essentially there have been two interpretative claims made by those who
challenge Foucault's understanding of the law. The first claim, exhibited
strongly in the work of Hunt and Wickham, implies that Foucault's contrast
between 'juridical power' and 'disciplinary power' reduces the law to the simple
formulae of a command theory. This is the case despite a well-established
contemporary consensus that such a command theory represents an inadequate
description of the nature and operation of law in the modem world. The second
18 Ewald, F. Norms, Discipline and the Law (1990) 30 Representations, in Post (ed.) Law and the
Order ofCulture (1991) Univ. of California Press
19 Tadros, V. "Between Governance and Discipline - The Law and Michel Foucault" (1998) 18
Oxford Journal ofLegal Studies, 75-103
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claim, which Tadros attributes specifically to Boaventura de Sousa Santos,"
proposes that although Foucault does well to highlight the role which
disciplinary power has played in modem society, he underestimates the
closeness of the relationship between disciplinary and juridical power. For our
present purposes, the important point to note is that a common factor unites both
fields of criticism- namely, both claims equate Foucault's use of the term
'juridical power' with that of 'legal power'. This is an equation that Tadros, and
Ewald before him, seek to resist. Both Hunt and Wickham, and Santos, propose
that the term 'juridical' refers directly to law. Despite internal differences in
other aspects of their approaches, therefore, what unites them is their belief that
by analysis of the term 'juridical' and by examination of the uses to which that
term is attributed, they will develop a full understanding of the Foucaultian
stance on law.
Tadros suggests, however, that a careful reading of Foucault will show that it is
not his intention to equate these terms. Such a careful reading will establish that
the term 'juridical' is intended to refer to the conception ofpower relations that
one may call Austinian. This is not, however, to imply that all law is
necessarily 'juridical' in the Foucaultian sense of that word, nor that the only
way in which juridical power can manifest itself is within the legal arena."
Foucault insists that the juridical conception of power relations fails to accord
with the realities of power in modem society. The juridical notion of power as
possession in the hands of the sovereign may well still be in place, however, it is
no longer adequate of itself to describe the multiple ways in which power is
made manifest in modernity. When we recognise the distinction that Foucault
seeks to establish between the two notions of the juridical and the disciplinary, it
becomes increasingly difficult to accuse him of reducing law to the Austinian
conception of rules and sanctions. Indeed, it becomes apparent that this
command model exemplifies the very mode of operation of power that Foucault
proposes has been superseded. As Tadros notes, "this suppression has resulted
20 Santos, B. Towards a New Common Sense - Law, Science and Politics in Paradigmatic Transition
(1995) Routledge
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not only in the proliferation of disciplinary power, but also in the transformation
of law?". Hence, the critique that Hunt and Wickham establish in regard to
Foucault's 'expulsion oflaw, becomes questionable.
If we accept the potential, then, of an inherent distinction between 'juridical
power' and 'legal power', we can begin to appreciate the implications of
Tadros' claims. Most particularly, for our purposes, it allows us to recognise
that the arguments which Hunt and Wickham lodge against Foucault's treatment
of law are derived, in large part, from statements which Foucault has made
about the 'juridical'. In order to clarify the interpretation of Foucault that
emerges from the realisation of this distinction, we must be able to identify the
nature of the divide between the juridical and the legal more clearly.
Unfortunately, however, the meaning of the term 'juridical' in Foucault's work
is often illusive and complex. He seems to use the term to refer both to a
discursive understanding of power that could be either modem or more
traditional, and also to a particular network of power relations connected
together in a particular form. Ewald has tended to suggest that Foucault uses
the term to refer simply to the discourse through which power articulates itself.
This, according to Tadros, is a little misleading" and what's more it allows Hunt
and Wickham to make a simplistic and dismissive response to what may be a
highly problematic consideration. In The History ofSexuality, Foucault talks of
the juridical system of law as being in some sense armed and therefore not
simply a discursive vehicle of articulation. The exact relationship between these
two definitions of the 'juridical' is clarified a little by Tadros' examination of
Foucault's statement in Two Lectures24 where he talks of the disjunction
between the operation of disciplinary powers and the juridical code that masks
them. Foucault calls the code by which power is described juridical, whereas
the actual mechanisms ofpower are referred to as disciplinary.
21 Tadros, V. "Between Governance and Discipline", Supra. Chapter One, Note 19, p. 76
22 Tadros, V. "Between Governance and Discipline" Supra. Chapter One, Note 19, p.77
23 Tadros, V. "Between Governance and Discipline" Supra. Chapter One, Note 19, p.81
24 Foucault, M. "Two Lectures" in Gordon, C. (ed.) Power / Knowledge, Supra. Preface, Note 8.
Referred to in Tadros, V. "Between Governance and Discipline" Supra. Chapter One, Note 19, p.82
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The juridical network appears to leave libertarian space within which personal
freedom can be employed. Foucault has suggested, however, that in reality
disciplinary power operates to fill the apparent gaps of indifference that the
juridical network does not account for. During the classical era, Foucault
suggests that the disciplinary network operated alongside the juridical network
enforcing what he terms a 'discipline-blockade'. Towards the end of the
classical period, however, the mechanisms of state and law themselves began to
evolve. Although many of the legal forms that are characteristic of the juridical
model remained intact, the law began to operate primarily through mechanisms
more compatible with the emerging modus operandi of discipline. This new
model has become encapsulated in Foucault's notion of 'governmentality'.
Governmentality, as the new means of state operation, concerned itself
fundamentally with issues of population and economy control. It became
concerned with the disposal of people and things towards the achievement of
particular goals, rather than with the delineation of lines of transgression. The
law did not become redundant as a result of the emerging political technology,
however, the juridical model no longer provided an accurate description of its
operation. Recognition of this evolution in political technique allows
appreciation of the differences between modem law and the juridical conception
of power. Power, in the guise of the juridical understanding, is predominantly
exercised as a means of punishing those acts that have transgressed previously
delineated standards of conduct. Conversely, modem law, facilitated by the
introduction of governmental technology, has been concerned primarily with the
adjustment of the relationships between individuals qua individuals.
According to Tadros, then, once we recognise that Foucault never intended his
readers to conflate the terms 'juridical' and 'legal' within his analysis, we are
able to re-establish the place of law within Foucault's overall theory. Tadros
suggests that the law itself has undergone considerable evolution in the primary
methods of its operations. However, these changes have not been translated into
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the juridical form of discourse that tends to mask the underlying legal
methodology. Although the origins of the law in the classical era may well have
been accurately described by the vocabulary of juridical discourse, changes in
legal methodology have been brought about by a gradual increase in the role of
disciplinary techniques. This renders the juridical conception of power an
increasingly inaccurate depiction of the reality of the operation ofmodem law.
If we are to accept this claim, there remains one final question that must be
addressed - if the position of law in modem society is one prioritising individual
discipline over juridical coercion and punishment why is it that the juridical
conception of power continues to inform prevalent legal discourse? The answer
to this question, it seems, lies in application of Foucault's overall thesis on the
strategies of power at work in society, i.e. that "power is tolerable only on
condition that it masks a substantial part of itself'?" By continuing to assert
political criticism in juridical terms, the actual points at which power is
exercised remain invisible. According to Tadros,
"This is why, whilst both sides of the juridical machine have become infested
with more productive operations of power, the juridical code has flourished,
and nowhere has it flourished more than in legal discourse.'?"
The crux of the debate regarding the place of law within Foucault's works
centres upon the construction that we afford to the terms 'juridical' and 'legal'.
At first glance, it certainly appears to be the case that Foucault is guilty of
having simplistically adopted the command definition as being paradigmatic of
the operation of law. If we accept this position, and thereby accept that
Foucault uses the terms legal and juridical synonymously, the possibility of an
effective theory of law being developed from within Foucaultian theory seems
highly remote. In essence, Foucault's theory would remain premised upon a
distinction between legal and disciplinary technologies that is arbitrary and
artificial, leaving us little option but to dismiss wholesale the role of law in
modem society. However, thanks to the inspiration of Ewald and the
25 Foucault, M. The History ofSexuality, Vol I Supra. Chapter One, Note 3, p. 86
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subsequent development by Tadros, legal scholarship is increasingly coming to
see that this is not the only possibility. By recognising that the term juridical
refers to the discursive formation behind which is hidden the operation of
various mechanisms of power (legal and otherwise), and that the term legal
refers to mechanisms that could be characterised equally as non-juridical than as
juridical, we are able to examine anew the role of law in modem society.
Certainly, adoption of this approach seems to lend coherence to the discussions
entered upon by Foucault in other areas of his work in relation to
govemmentality. Inherent in the acceptance of the juridical as a discursive
formation that is placed superficially over the actual operations of power is the
possibility of a continued place for law within the conceptions of power and
discipline that we have addressed previously.
Distinguishing the legal from the juridical, we can now appreciate the continued
role of the legal. We can appreciate that Foucault has not asked us to abandon
our concern with the operation of law in society. He has asked only that we try
to shake off the juridical discourse that tends to frame such operations in order
to allow us to better understand the reality of the dynamics that bear upon the
individual. The juridical discourse of which Foucault speaks is indeed
paradigmatic of the command-theory conception of law. Foucault does not
seek to propose that law itself is a power dynamic of the past, only that the
juridical conception of it is no longer appropriate. His demand that we abandon
the juridical conception of power relations requires nothing more than that we
free ourselves from the shackles of the highly artificial discursive formation that
is superimposed upon the real dynamics of legal operation. Given the
condemnation which Hunt and Wickham voice towards theory which associates
law exclusively with command, it seems that in this light Hunt and Wickham
are not so different from Foucault after all.
26 Tadros, V. "Between Governance and Discipline" Supra. Chapter One, Note 19, p.101
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Armed with this distinction between the legal and the juridical, it becomes
apparent that Foucault has not demanded an expulsion of law from modem
social analysis. Rather, he has demanded that the veil of the juridical be lifted
from that analysis to allow a truer apprehension of the operation of legal power.
The implications of this realisation in terms of the project of this thesis are
significant. What the preceding discussion has established is not only that
Foucault has not abandoned the concept of law, but also, and more importantly,
that a substantial amount of the power that law wields operates in the mode of
disciplinary technique rather than juridical prohibition. It is Foucault's
argument that law (in terms of the legal text and the legal system) has been
increasingly incorporated into a network of regulatory apparatuses which
themselves exercise power quite differently from the centralising notions of the
juridical medium. These regulatory apparatuses exercise power through what
Foucault calls the 'devious and subtle mechanisms' of disciplinary techniques,
relating to the "growing importance assumed by the action of the norm, at the
expense of the juridical system of Iaw.''" Through operation of disciplinary
power, the law is enabled to undertake a normalising function through which it
defines, constructs and imposes what is considered 'normal' and 'acceptable'.
In real terms, then, recognition of the disciplinary power of law necessarily
paves the way for a more critical examination of the role of law in constructing
individual desires and identities. The normalising power now infused into our
legal analysis dictates that law operates in infinitely more complex ways than
has hitherto been anticipated. In terms of the project of this thesis, this implies
that law plays an operative role in constructing and constraining the choices of
the individual. This in tum presents significant ramifications for the boundless
and unfettered conception of consent that has been privileged in western
tradition since long before the articulation of the notion of social contract.
27 Fouacult, M. The History ofSexuality Vol. I, Supra. Chapter One, Note 3, p.86
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Given the centrality of the disciplinary mechanism within the functioning of
modem law, it becomes crucially important that legal analysis seek to develop
its terms in a manner capable of articulation outwith the shadow of the juridical.
Within the confines of this thesis, we will attempt to draw out the conception of
consent from within that shadow. Before we can hope to do so with any
success, however, we must examine in some more detail the manner in which
these disciplinary mechanisms operate their power upon the legal subject to
construct identity development towards the realisation of privileged norms. The
constraining implications of these mechanisms in terms of the realisation of
self-determination will become a crucial concern of this thesis.
Discourse and Embodiment in Law
"In a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there are manifold
relations ofpower which permeate, characterise and constitute the social body,
and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated,
nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and
functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power without
a certain economy of discourses of truth which operate through and on the
basis of this assumption.'?"
The shift in the modus operandi of modem power discussed above has been
facilitated by a change in the manner in which modem society as a whole
operates. Modernity is characterised primarily by its employment of extensive
strategies ofnormalisation. As Foucault has suggested,
"In modem society, the behaviour of the individual is regulated not through
overt repression, but through a set of standards and values associated with
normality which are set into play by a network of ostensibly beneficent and
scientific forms of'knowledge.?"
This idea of the disciplinary power of modem society as a normalising, rather
than repressive force, lies at the heart of Foucault's assertion that power is a
positive phenomenon. Control of the individual in modem society is ensured,
not through the direct repression of the individual by the state, but through the
more invisible strategies of normalisation. These strategies of normalisation
28 Foucault M., quoted in Kelly, T. (ed.) Critique and Power- Recasting the Foucault I Habermas
Debate (1994) MIT Press, p.31
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encourage individual self-regulation through a constant striving to meet
prioritised social norms.
Discourse is the medium within which, according to Foucault, these constructs
of power and normativity interconnect. Foucault defines discourse as a form of
power that circulates in the social field. It is free to attach both to strategies of
domination, as well as of resistance, but most importantly for our purposes, it is
primarily through the medium of discourse that disciplinary techniques find
their normative power. The proliferation of discourses (most notably scientific
and quasi-scientific discourses) characteristic of modem society has facilitated
the shift in the modus operandi of power illustrated above. Foucault identifies
those fields of discourse most closely associated with the body and with the
psyche as being a source of particularly powerful mechanisms for tying the
demands of power inextricably to personal desire and attachment. These
particular genres of discourse have increased the power of the individual while
simultaneously rendering the individual more docile. In so doing, they have
established what is recognised to be a peculiarly powerful mechanism of
control, which Foucault refers to as 'bio-power'.
Through disciplinary mechanisms in general, the effects of power in modem
society "circulate through progressively finer channels, gaining access to
individuals themselves, to their bodies and their gestures, and all their daily
actions.,,30 The mechanism of bio-power is the paradigm manifestation of this.
Bio-power does not simply take the acts of transgression of the population as a
group as its object. Rather, and more specifically, it asserts itself against the life
(and the body) of each individual. Bio-power is thus peculiarly effective in the
extent to which it focuses upon the human body as the centrepiece of important
struggles between various different power formations. The body subject to bio-
power becomes both shaped and re-shaped by the different power forces acting
29 MacNay, L. Foucault-A Critical Introduction, Supra. Chapter One, Note 7, p.95
30 Diamond, I. & Quinby, L. Feminism and Foucault (1988) Northeastern University Press, p.79
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upon it. In terms of our analysis, this means that in order to best study the
mechanics ofpower in modem society, we must
"rather than ask ourselves how the sovereign appears to us in his lofty
isolation, ...try to disclose how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively,
really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces
and energies.'?'
What would be brought to light by such a study would be the realisation that all
people, in all social classes, and of all sexual orientations, are constructed by
prevailing discourses and are striving for ultimate conformity with the norms
which society has heralded as appropriate. This is not to dismiss the possibility
of resistance, for as Foucault notes whenever there is a power relation, there is a
possibility of resistance. The importance of this analysis stems, however, from
its revelation that the power of modem society lies in the ability to create and
promote propositions to the status of indisputable truth and pervasive norm,
This realisation has tangible implications for our analysis of consent by
illustrating from the outset the limited credibility that can be afforded to the
notion of unfettered individual self-determination that forms a pillar of the
juridical conception of agency and consensual capacity.
In analysing the law's disciplinary power, it is necessary to employ an
appropriate methodology that will operate effectively outwith the shadow of the
juridical. In real terms, that demands that we focus our concern upon the
mechanisms of disciplinary techniques, upon the discursive mediums through
which they generate support within the social field, and upon the resultant
effects upon the embodied subject of modem power. We have noted above that
Foucault has defined the body as a political field and has expressed his concern
that we analyse the material and discursive effects on embodied subjectivity
perpetuated by disciplinary techniques. One of the prime arenas within which
the mechanisms of bio-power have proven most fruitful has been identified by
Foucault as pertaining to the 'hysterization ofthe female'. Certainly, this is not
the only arena highlighted by Foucault (for example, he is also keen to examine
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the role of bio-power in terms of childhood sexualisation,etc.). However, the
insinuation by Foucault that the female body has been a source of particular
mechanisms ofbio-power has given pause for fruitful thought to many feminist
commentators.
Within the confines of this work, it would be impossible to give senous
treatment to the myriad manifestations of constructionism brought to bear at the
hands of networks of bio-power upon differentially situated and embodied
agents. In what follows, therefore, our analysis will be restricted to
consideration of the effects of bio-power in particular, and law's disciplinary
power more generally, upon the female body. It is more than interesting to note
the trend in our cultural history towards an assimilation of the female with the
confines of her embodiment. It can barely be disputed that this is a
phenomenon that has been significantly less observable in the context of male
embodiment (although this is not to say that similar assimilation has not
occurred in particular contexts). For this reason, Foucault's proposals in regard
to bio-power have particularly observable implications for what is not
necessarily a feminist analysis, but certainly an analysis of the disciplinary role
played by law (through its use of consent) upon the construction of the female
agent and her relationship to the parameters ofher corporeal manifestation.
Feminism and Law's Disciplinary Power
The notion of power as grass-roots and all-encompassing established above
stands in stark contrast to the perception of power dynamics which has
traditionally been advocated by radical feminist analysis. Prominent
commentators within this species of legal criticism, most notable perhaps
Catharine MacKinnon, have asserted that power is a commodity held firmly in
the hands of patriarchy and systematically denied from the ownership of
women. Hence, where MacKinnon and her followers herald patriarchy as the
31 Foucault, M. quoted in Gordon,C. (ed.) Power / Knowledge, Supra. Preface, Note 8, p.97
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most pervasive system of power ever to take hold of society, Foucault's more
fluid thesis concerns itself with the proposal that -
"power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as
something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised
here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or
piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like
organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they
are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this
power. They are not only its inert or consenting target, they are also always
the elements of its articulation."32
MacKinnon and her radical feminist contemporaries have devoted considerable
amounts of academic energy to constructing exactly the sort of sharp them/us
dichotomy in terms of control of power that Foucault's analysis seeks to
undermine as outmoded and inappropriate to the workings of modern society".
In Towards Feminist Jurisprudenceri Mackinnon explains her position most
lucidly when she suggests that,
"male dominance is perhaps the most pervasive and tenacious system of power
in history...its point of view is the standard for point-of-viewlessness, its
particularity the meaning of universality. Its force is exercised as consent, its
authority as participation, its supremacy as the paradigm of order, its control
as the definition of legitimacy.?"
MacKinnon develops this deterministic thesis to argue that the law sees and
treats women as a group the way that men, as a group, see and treat women.
"The liberal state coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order in
the interests of men as a gender, through its legitimizing norms, relation to
society, and substantive policies. It achieves this through embodying and
ensuring male control over women's sexuality at every level, occasionally
cushioning, qualifying or de jure prohibiting its excesses when necessary to its
normalization. ,,36
This provides a very totalitarian critique. While Foucault is also critical of the
methodology of the liberal state, his suggestion remains in far more fluid terms.
32 Gordon, C. (ed.) Power / Knowledge, Supra. Preface, Note 8, p.98
33 MacKinnon, C. Feminism Unmodified, Supra. Preface, Note 9
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Foucault too has recognised that the allegedly 'libertarian free space' left
unregulated by the liberal state is a myth ofjuridical political theory, because in
reality these arenas are simply demarcated as arenas within which the exercise
of power is communicated through the medium of disciplinary techniques.
However, where Foucault diverges from MacKinnon is in the assertion that
MacKinnon makes that the directors of these techniques are necessarily male,
and they are necessarily exercising the power they 'possess' to further the
perceived interests of their gender. We have seen that Foucault is highly critical
of the suggestion that is inherent in the MacKinnon model of power as a
commodity held in the hands of one group who act to oppress all others by
virtue of that ownership of power. MacKinnon seeks to maintain a strictly
dichotomous perception of power relations which proposes that even at points
where it may superficially appear that power is being exercised to further the
interests of women (for example through the provision of better contraception),
this only serves to mask the true motivation behind the action which always
remains to serve male interests (in this case by ensuring increased freedom of
sexual access to women). In contrast, Foucault seeks to avoid the assertion of
any such over-arching framework within the field of power dynamics. He seeks
a fluid notion of power as a force that bears out its effects on every social agent
rather than as a commodity to be wielded in the interests of the socially
privileged to maintain the on-going derision of the socially subordinate.
The benefits which feminism can derive from such Foucaultian analyses are
striking. Most striking of all perhaps is the centrality afforded within the
framework of disciplinary power to the role of discourse as a medium for
normalisation, both within and outwith law. Incorporation of the significance of
discourse into an analysis ofpower in the manner that has been proposed above
rests well alongside a feminist political and epistemological project that has
long since developed mechanisms such as consciousness-raising and practical
reasoning to enable the critical questioning of the assumptions of discourse. As
Diamond and Quinby have noted, both the Foucaultian and the feminist school
36 MacKinnon, C. "Towards Feminist Jurisprudence", Supra. Chapter One, Note 34, p.644
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of theory have identified the "crucial role of discourse in its capacity to produce
and sustain hegemonic power and (both have) emphasised the challenges
contained within marginalised and / or unrecognised discourses.'?" Adopting an
analysis of power along more fluid lines than that hitherto presented to the
feminist academy by commentators such as MacKinnon would permit of a more
serious analysis of the role of discourse in the perpetuation of power relations.
This holds particular relevance for feminist analysis, not only because feminist
theory itself represents a marginalised from of discourse, but also, as we shall
see, because the female subject has often been peculiarly tied to the dictates of
discourse (particularly those circulating in the medical field over the terrain of
sexuality).
Of course, many feminist analyses of the radical genre have always taken the
role played by discourse in the construction and perpetuation of power
relationships seriously. However, despite the importance of their recognition of
the significance of this aspect of phenomenological experience, some of the
more radical feminist positions on the issue of discourse have stood in
contradiction to the essence of the analysis provided by Foucault. Such a
radical feminist proposal has been codified in the works of Luce Irigaray who,
in Ce Sexe qui n 'est pas Un,38 proposed that western cultural discourses are
univocally masculinist. Irigaray alleges that there is no place for women to
speak within these discourses, except insofar as they speak in terms and on
terms which patriarchy has pre-ordained. While Foucault does not wish to deny
that there are still large-scale structures of power in operation in society, unlike
this radical feminist approach, he refuses to conceive of the relationships formed
within them as being hierarchically imposed upon a dynamic of oppressor -
oppressed. In further contradiction to the thought of Irigaray which has been
hugely influential on much traditionally radical feminist thought, he rejects the
insinuation that the power of patriarchal discourse is totalitarian and absolute
37 Diamond, 1.& Quinby, L. Feminism and Foucault, Supra. Chapter One, Note 30, Intra. x
38 lrigaray, L. Ce Sexe qui n 'est pas Un (1977) Minuit Press
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because for him, discourse must of necessity be plurivocal and ambiguous."
The relationships resulting from these power dynamics are explained not as the
outcome of overarching systems of complete domination, but rather as the
outcome of the ways in which
"infinitesimal mechanisms of power... have been - and continue to be -
invested, colonized, utilised, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended, etc.
by ever more general mechanisms and by forms of global domination.?"
Hence although Irigaray adopts a reminiscent concern for the role of discourse
in the construction of power dynamics, her essentialist thesis that depicts the
female subject as eternal other in all discourse contradicts the essence of the
Foucaultian claim that the power inherent in discourse is fluid and complex.
We have noted at length above Foucault's refusal to adopt the traditional view
ofpower as operating in a unidirectional manner. In opting for a perception that
posits power as an ongoing struggle between mutually engaged individuals,
Foucault uncovers the reality of the operation of systems of social regulation
less as one-dimensional constructs and more as 'an endless play of
domination' .41 By de-emphasising our focus upon hierarchy and absolute
domination in power relations, it may appear that Foucault has done little to
help the feminist project. In fact, it may appear more appropriate to argue that
he has frustrated their cause by eliminating the very platform from which
feminist analysis seeks to speak. Certainly, this may be the case should feminist
commentators seek to nestle within the confines of the radical feminist critique
of the past. However, a more complex feminist analysis is possible outwith the
essentialist dichotomies that have often plagued the radical critique. When this
more complex analysis is elucidated and coupled with the Foucaultian
recognition of the importance of power relationships outwith the shadow of the
juridical, the possibility of future alliance seems more promising.
39 Sawacki, J. Disciplining Foucault - Feminism, Power and the Body (1991) Routledge, p.l
40 Foucault, M. Introduction to Herculin Barbin: Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs ofa 19th
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Once we have divested ourselves of the notions of power as dichotomous
commodity inherent in the radical critique, it becomes apparent that there is
much in Foucault's analysis of power relations that remains in other respects in
line with the modem face of feminism. Despite the high rhetorical value that
can be attached to the more radical analysis of MacKinnon and her ideological
comrades, many contemporary feminists have become increasingly
uncomfortable with this determinist vision. At the level of experience, many
feminists have alleged that this dichotomous model of oppressor-oppressed is
counter-intuitive and alienating for women. What's more, it provides
ideological grounding for perpetuation of the traditional conception of woman
as the essential victim." In recognition of this, many feminists have begun to
seek a more fluid theory of power relations that can take account of the
microcosmic operations of power forces that operate to structure the intimate
levels of individual experience. This has led an increasing number of feminists
to align themselves with a Foucaultian approach to gender-power relations,
recognising in this model the remit to examine more subtle dynamics of power
and to establish the extent to which we are all structured by power forces.
Such an alliance between feminism and Foucault has been advocated by Jana
Sawacki," who notes that Foucault's analysis of the dimensions of disciplinary
power, which operate outwith the confines of the political realm of the modem,
liberal state, can provide helpful analytical tools for those feminists already
engaged in uncovering the 'micropolitics' of 'private' life. Foucault's analysis
of the capillary nature of modem disciplinary power could be, and indeed
subsequently has been, executed very effectively by feminists to help them
explore the dynamics of power at the most intimate levels of family life.
Sawacki herself, for example, has employed a considerable amount of
42 Finley, L. "The Nature of Domination and The Nature of Women: Reflections on Feminism
Unmodified", Supra. Preface, Note 10
43 Sawacki, J. "Feminism, Foucault and 'Subjects' of Power and Freedom" in Hekman, S. (ed.)
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Foucaultian ideology in her discussion of the disciplinary techniques employed
in the normalising forces imposed upon the female body."
The link between disciplinary technology and the construction of female
embodiment becomes still more pertinent when we examine the nature of the
scientific and quasi-scientific discourses developed within the nineteenth
century - the discourses to which Foucault attributes the means and origins of
much of the disciplinary power in existence today. The majority of the
discourse identified by Foucault in this respect pertains to issues within the field
of medicine. This begs the question, however of whether it is legitimate for our
current project to seek to attribute the assumptions of medical discourse also to
legal discourse. It has been a central tenet of Foucault's thesis that ideology
framed within the confines of one discursive field remains fluid and perfectly
capable of being transferred, either in its totality or selectively as appropriate, to
furnish also the discourse of another genre. Commentators have long-since
traced the existence of exactly such interplay of meaning between medical and
legal discourse. Carol Smart, for example, in linking medical and legal
discourse, has claimed that both have been mutually supportive in legitimating
the control which society exercises over the female body. Indeed, Smart
dedicates her article entitled "Penetrating Women's Bodies - the Problem of
Law and Medical Technology" to an examination of the means through which
women's bodies have become signifiers of negative attributes in the field oflaw.
In making this analysis, she notes that
"it is of course essential to recognise the extent to which law and medicine
interweave in this project, law often becoming extremely dependent upon
medical discourse to fashion its own mode ofregulation and imagery.'?"
In fact, therefore, it seems to be of considerable importance that if we are to
look at the law's treatment of the female agent, we should develop a clearer idea
of how this regulation and imagery are constituted in the realm of medical
44 Sawacki, J Disciplining Foucault - Feminism, Power and the Body, Supra. Chapter One, Note 39
45 Smart, C. "Penetrating Women's Bodies" in Abbott & Wallace (ed.) Gender, Power and Sexuality
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discourse. Excursion into the realms ofmedical discourse is especially pertinent
given Foucault's assertion that it has been peculiarly through the proliferation of
such discourse that disciplinary techniques have become operative upon the
female body. As we have seen, these disciplinary techniques are operative
through a variety of mediums, including the legal mechanisms that interpret
issues of consent.
Discourses ofFemale Embodiement
"Since neither the theory nor the practice of law, nor the theory or the practice
of medicine, are truly impartial processes, an examination of the diverse
sexual ideologies interposing in and thereby influencing the deployment of
discretion in the decision-making process becomes a central concern.'?"
Since the time of Freud, it has been asserted that 'biology is destiny' .47 The
unshakeable conviction articulated by Freud that the physical differences
between men and women are only the corporeal manifestations of more
significant differences in terms of emotion and intellect has perpetuated a long-
standing belief that the body is the determining factor upon human behaviour.
This has led to a climate within which increasing deference is being afforded to
the claims of medicine and human science, particularly as their discourses
become increasingly immersed in scientificity.
Nonetheless, Foucault has remained highly sceptical of the legitimacy of these
claims. It has been one of his central contentions that medical discourse has
produced a wealth of misunderstandings about the human body and human
sexuality." Throughout the nineteenth century, legal practice became
increasingly influenced by medicine, especially gynaecological precepts of
sexuality. It comes as no surprise, then that the most powerful discourses
around which the demands of bio-power have been erected have involved
elaboration of medical interpretations of the issue of sexuality. In identifying
46 Edwards, S. Female Sexuality and the Law (1981) Martin Robertson & Co., p.1
47 Mitchell, 1. Psychoanalysis and Feminism (1975) Vintage Press
48 Edwards, S. Female Sexuality and the Law, Supra. Chapter One, Note 46, p.l3
44
this preoccupation within medical discourse, Foucault has noted that this
'hysterization of women's bodies' has been the lynch pin of the unity of power
and knowledge through which women and their sexuality are, and historically
have been, controlled. In the History ofSexuality, he notes that around the time
of the rise ofmedical discourse
"the feminine body was analysed - qualified and disqualified - as being
thoroughly saturated with sexuality; whereby it was integrated into the sphere
ofmedical practice, by reason of a pathology intrinsic to it.,,49
Medical discourse, as it concerned itself with gynaecological concerns and their
psychoanalytical underpinnings, provided an extremely powerful and effective
legitimation for the prohibition of various social and sexual activities from the
female agent. As the dominant ideology, it made claims to truth that entrenched
the subordination of women, legitimating this by recourse to their physical
limitations and psychological instability. Such was the strength of this medical
legitimation that during the century, any possible deviation from the appropriate
social or sexual role of the feminine, for example, smoking, laughing aloud,
sexual relations for pleasure (within or outwith marriage), were frequently
considered the result of some gynaecological disorder.
Discourse pertaining to the subject of sexuality abounded during the era of
medical scientificity highlighted by Foucault and even today normative
ideology encapsulated in discourse about sexuality remains a central element in
the cultural identification of the feminine role. Throughout history, discursive
strategies over sexuality have played a central role in the construction of power
relationships between male and female agents. For that reason, it is necessary to
examine the dictates of that discourse in some detail in order to allow us to
formulate some general understanding of the implications of discourse upon
personal desire and identity. Of course, any external force that impinges upon
personal desire and identity formation has significant implications upon the
credibility that can be attached to our so-called unconstrained exercise of self-
49 Foucault, M. The History ofSexuality, Vol. I, Supra. Chapter One, Note 3, p.l04
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determination through the medium of consent. Lorraine Code has put the point
most lucidly -
"Women often have difficulty claiming the authority they require to take
responsibility for their lives, in the face of the intransigence of institutionalised
structures of power-knowledge, which define their subjectivity for them, and
are stubbornly deaf to criticism. Enmeshed in such structures in innumerable
aspects of their lives, women are commonly thwarted in their efforts to
achieve the cognitive and moral autonomy that is crucial to the development
of effective agency. In consequence, women too often live as self-fulfilling
prophecies, adhering to the restricted options constructed for them by experts
who claim to know them better than they could hope to know themselves.'?"
Concern regarding the role of discourses about sexuality unites both Foucault
and all genres of feminism, although as we shall see the treatment of issues
brought to light by examination of such discourse may vary. At the most radical
end of the spectrum of feminist analysis, it has been suggested that sexuality is
especially important because "it is specifically through sexuality that the
fundamental oppression, that of men over women, is maintained.'?" Fighting
against the biological determinism prevalent since the popular rise of
Freudianism has become the primary preoccupation of many feminist
commentators, radical and otherwise. Amongst the most celebrated attempts is
that initiated by Betty Friedan in her work, The Feminine Mystique." Within
this work Friedan adopts the infamous proposal of Simone de Beauvoir that one
is not born a woman, but rather becomes a woman through subscription to
nonnative gender categories." This notion has been adopted by Friedan in her
discussion of the inability ofwomen to fit comfortably into their predetermined,
and gendered, social roles. Although the insight contained within this argument
may well be legitimate, much subsequent discomfort has been aroused amongst
more contemporary feminists by Friedan's subsequent arguments that have
implied the necessity of a crusade for androgyny."
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Along similar lines, an argument developed which concerned itself more with
the cultural imposition of sexuality than with the cultural imposition of
gendered roles. In her article in Signs, Adrienne Rich made the controversial
suggestion that heterosexuality is enforced on women as a means of ensuring
the continuation of male rights of physical, economic and emotional access to
the female body. She postulated the existence of a regime of 'compulsory
heterosexuality' that operated in a manner akin to the political system of
capitalism. This sexual regime was likewise designed to produce a class of
inferior status that could be exploited for the benefit of the ruling class and can
be maintained by the operation of forces ranging from physical violence to false
consciousness". This proposal also provoked its share' of opposition and even
anger within the feminist camp because it was interpreted as a political call to
tum all feminists into lesbians. This, however, would surely only have
subverted the dynamic without reaching at the more fundamental problem at
issue, namely the intrinsic relation which was being uncovered between
prevailing social power and the deployment of sexuality and gender roles.
An alternative way of fashioning ideas of gender and sexuality has been posited
by the 'new French feminist' school, their most prominent advocate being Luce
lrigaray. In Ce Sexe qui n 'est pas un." she proposed that women are not merely
female embodiments ofhuman sexuality, as has traditionally been supposed, but
rather, they comprise a completely different sex. What lrigaray seeks to
illustrate by this is the falseness of the same / other binary which dominates
discussions of sexuality. In her view, both the 'same' and the 'other' are
masculine because the 'other' is but the negative elaboration of the masculine
subject. This has resulted in the complete non-representation of the female sex.
This has been a difficult proposition for many women to accept, although many
of the ideas inherent in lrigaray's proposal have proven more palpable. As
Whitford noted in her work Luce Irigaray : Philosophy in the Feminine,
55 Rich, A. "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence" (1980) Signs, in Evans, M. The
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"for Irigaray, sexuality is not a raw, primitive and untouched territory which is
somehow private, 'outside' conceptualisation uncontaminated by patriarchy
and unstructured by the paternal genealogy. On the contrary, the links
between sexuality, conceptualisation, 'knowledge' and social organisation are
intrinsic.,,57
Michel Foucault has displayed a similar position in his suggestion that sexuality
is an entirely socially constructed concept. In positing the artificial nature of
current categories of sexuality, however, Foucault does well to point out that
part of the very construction of sexuality employs the notion that sexuality
consists of overwhelming urges and uncontrollable needs. Hence its social
construction cleverly becomes that it is uncontrollably natural. Foucault
conceives of 'sexuality' as an historically imbued system of discourse and
power which has produced the notion of 'sex' as part of its strategy to conceal,
and hence to perpetuate power relations." In The History ofSexuality, he notes
that,
"Sexuality must not be thought of as a kind ofnatural given which power tries
to hold in check, or as an obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually to
uncover. It is the name which can be given to a historical construct ; not a
furtitive reality that is difficult to grasp, but a great surface network in which
the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to
discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls
and resistance, are linked to one another in accordance with a few major
strategies ofknowledge and power.'?"
This idea of sexuality as being socially constructed has been well received by
feminist academia. Catharine MacKinnon, for example, has been keen to
concur with this insight. In Feminism Unmodified." she states that sexuality is
a social construct of whatever the given society eroticises at the time.
MacKinnon considers sexuality to be 'the 'lynch pin' of gender inequality'. She
holds it up as a fundamentally social and relational construction that has men as
its principal authors, constructing its normative fashionings under prevailing
conditions ofmale dominance. Hence, for MacKinnon,
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"Feminism is a theory of how the erotiziation of dominance and submission
creates gender, creates woman and man in the social form in which we know
them."?'
Foucault has placed great emphasis on the need for a detailed study of the
relationship between power and sexuality. In The History of Sexuality, he
suggests that in studying the effects of power, we ought to devote particular
attention to the myriad of bodies that have been constituted as peripheral
subjects because of the operations of disciplinary power upon their sexuality."
He contends that it is through a specific location of prohibition and regulation of
sexuality within the discursive practices of law and medicine, for example, that
control over female behaviour is secured. In his work, he encourages us to think
of our bodies as elements in the articulation of power. His theory perceives of
sexuality not only as a group of statements, prohibitions and regulations, but
also as a power-index illustrative of the underlying structures of ideology. This
linkage between perceptions of gender and sexuality with the pervasive social
power structures has been re-iterated in the words ofMacKinnon,
"Sexual objectification is the primary process of the subjection of women. It
unites act with word, construction with expression, perception with
enforcement, myth with reality."?'
Hence, although their conceptions of the nature and operation of power may
differ markedly, both Foucault and MacKinnon have sought to illustrate the
fundamental connection between social power dynamics and the operation of
sexuality within society. The problem that Foucault identifies in relation to this
feminist conception of the 'deployment of sexuality', however, stems from the
fact that feminist analysis tends to take the category of sex (and therefore,
according to him, the binary restriction on gender) as its point of departure. In
contrast, Foucault understands his own project to be one of inquiring into how
that category of 'sex' is constructed within prevailing discourse as an integral
61 MacKinnon, C. Feminism Unmodified, Supra. Preface, Note 9, p. 50
62 Foucault, M. The History ofSexuality, Vol. 1, Supra. Chapter One, Note 3, p. 106
63 MacKinnon, C. "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State" (1982) Signs 528, p. 541
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aspect of bodily identity." This more essentialist Foucaultian approach has
been celebrated by some feminists, for example Winifrid Woodhull has
proposed that
"Foucault's analysis of power as a process that produces particular forms of
sexuality and implants them in the body confirms and throws new light on the
feminist contention that sexuality and sexual relations are social constructs."?'
Foucault suggests that the deployment of sexuality originated not so much from
the enslavement of one class (as MacKinnon would suggest) as from the self-
affirmation of another class. The process originated via a strengthening and
exaltation of one class that eventually became extended to others, thence
becoming a means of social control and political subjugation." What this would
seem to suggest then is that the deployment of sexuality is linked less to a
patriarchal desire for domination and more with a celebration of phallocentrism.
Society has become structured to meet the demands of the male imperative,
rather than primarily to ensure the subjugation of women. The ultimate end
may be the same, but the mechanisms and motivations employed to reach that
end are not those that the traditional feminist camp tends to presuppose.
Throughout history, our male-based culture has encountered considerable
difficulty in dealing with the issue of female sexuality. As we have seen, in the
nineteenth century, women engaging in extra-marital sex were often considered
to be mentally abnormal, and many were incarcerated in mental institutions.
During the Victorian period, a definite division was constructed between good
(i.e. asexual) women and bad (i.e. sexual) women. Underlying this dichotomy
is the structural concern to protect the virginity of women. This is a concern
that informs the very core of the control exercised over female sexuality, and it
is a concern that Edwards" has suggested is a feature of the sexual mores of
64 Butler, J. Gender Trouble, Supra. Preface, Note 20, p.96
65 Woodhull, W. "Sexuality, Power and The Question of Rape", in Diamond, I. & Quinby, L.
Feminism and Foucault, Supra. Chapter One, Note 30, p.168
66 "What was formed was a political ordering of life, not through an enslavement of others, but through
an affirmation of self' : Foucault, M. The History ofSexuality, Vol.J, Supra. Chapter One, Note 3,
p.l23
67 Edwards, S. Female Sexuality and the Law, Supra. Chapter One, Note 46
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most societies. Medical writings of the Victorian era illustrated this by their
suggestion that as a general rule, a woman seldom desires any sexual
gratification for herself. Any women who failed to conform to this restriction
were considered 'nymphomaniacs' and were cured by excision of part of their
genitals." This general unease with the notion of an operative female sexuality
has been traced through our social and legal structure, and continues to
dominate present times, manifested in notions suggesting that women somehow
desire to be raped, etc. This notion has been met with scathing and indignant
denial from many women, but the doctrinal authority given to the thoughts of
psychoanalytical 'experts' who have proposed that the essence of femininity is
masochism has made it exceptionally difficult to shift thIS presumption."
The relational character of power that Foucault posits allows a shift in emphasis
away from the traditional concern of MacKinnon et at with power's repressive
function, towards a larger concern with the productive function of power which
allows it to create and perpetuate new forms of 'truth'. We have seen how
Foucault has sought to illustrate the relationship between constructions of
sexuality and prevailing dynamics of power. Foucault builds upon this premise
to make the even more fundamental assertion that there is an intimate link
between that deployment of sexuality and the very identity that we adopt and
experience as our own. Furthermore, he proposes that this relationship does not
exist outside of, or prior to language and culture, but rather, it is actually
brought into play by invocation of discursive strategies and ideology. In
"Feminism, Criticism and Foucault", Biddy Martin surmises from this assertion
that
"Sexuality and identity can only be understood, then, in terms of the
complicated and often paradoxical ways in which pleasures, knowledges, and
power are produced and disciplined in language and institutionalised across
multiple social fields."?"
68 Edwards, S. Female Sexuality and the Law, Supra. Chapter One, Note 46, p.8l
69 The implications of this notion in the determination of the issue of consent in the rape trial will be
examined in more detail in Chapter Two
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Hence Foucault suggests that to fix upon attempts to give voice to our supposed
sexuality and identity as 'gendered beings' (as has been the overpowering
concern of traditional feminist crusades) as presenting a path to liberation is
inappropriate. It is inappropriate primarily because it fails to recognise our own
history as arbitrarily gendered beings, subject to the prevailing power's
deployment of sexuality. He proposes, then, that the feminist enterprise, like all
others, must refrain from the temptation of attributing some pre-existing
doctrinal authority to the prevailing binary dichotomy that operates to control
and confine sexuality.
"Foucault denies that his own discourse is free of power relations without
despairing about the possibility that it can have a liberatory effect. This is not
liberation as transcendence of power or as global transformation, but rather
freeing ourselves from the, assumption that prevailing ways of understanding
ourselves and others, and of theorising the conditions for liberation, are
necessary, self-evident and without the effects of'power.?"
At a more fundamental level, he sees a problem with the traditional feminist
methodology of anchoring feminist discourse within a demand for 'control over
one's own body' because he is wary of such attempts to unify feminists through
the rallying cry of sexuality and its control. MacKinnon has proposed that
sexuality is the lynch pin of male power. Foucault also appreciates the
centrality of sexuality, or more specifically the deployment of sexuality, to the
maintenance of current patterns of power. However, his reluctance to fix too
much attention on the body in an attempt to liberate it suggests that he would be
cynical of the wholesale embrace of sexual identity that MacKinnon advocates.
Doubtless, Foucault would express concern that MacKinnon's proposal to
produce a feminist political theory purely through an analysis of sexuality may
in actuality render women more vulnerable to the ill effects of the deployment
of sexuality by their implicit acceptance of the prevailing belief of the broader
culture that sex is the sole measure of identity and the sole instrument of truth.72
70 Martin, B. "Feminism, Criticism and Foucault" in Diamond, 1.& Quinby, L. Feminism and
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This suggestion is implied in Foucault's statement in "What is Enlightenment?"
that
"I prefer the very specific transformations that have proved to be possible in
the last twenty years in a certain number of areas that concern our ways of
being and thinking, relations to authority, relations between the sexes, the way
in which we perceive insanity or illness.'?"
Foucault has been heavily preoccupied, then, less with the ill-effects of sexuality
as it is currently construed and more with the discursive and strategic
mechanisms which operate to deploy these constructions and tie them so closely
to the individual's conception of self. He has in this way been far less
concerned with theories that presuppose current definitions of sexuality as
intrinsic. Instead, he has sought to analyse the deployment of sexuality at a
more fundamental leveL In doing so, he has done more than any other
contemporary social theorist to direct attention towards the body, and towards
how it is that the individual body is constructed in line with dictates of power.
In his attack on liberalism, for example, he replaces the traditional
preoccupation with self-conscious subjectivity with a concern for how it is that
one's embodied identity has been constructed to legitimate various regimes of
domination throughout history." According to Foucault, the body has become
the prime site for the operation of modem forms of power. Once we recognise
that modem power is characteristically elusive and productive, we can begin to
appreciate the modem dynamics of 'bio-power' that operate to make the body
the primary object ofprocesses of discipline and normalisation.
Foucault's concern to theorise about the body has been a welcome development
in social theory. Some have criticised him, however, for his failure to note the
specific differences that characterise the embodied experiences of male and
female. Bartky, for example, in "Foucault, Feminism and the Modernisation of
Patriarchal Power?", has argued that although Foucault does well to call
73 Foucault, M. "What is Enlightenment?" in Rabinow, P. The Foucault Reader (1986) Penguin, p.46-7
74 Davis, K. Embodied Practices - Feminist Perspectives on the Body (1997) SAGE, p. 3
75 Bartley, S. "Foucault, Feminism and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power" in Diamond, I &
Quinby, L. Feminism and Foucault, Supra. Chapter One, Note 30, p. 63
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attention to the disciplinary practices that operate to produce the 'docile bodies'
of modernity, his arguments cannot be adopted wholesale by the feminist
school, because he tends to assume that the bodily experiences of men and
women are the same. This makes him blind to those disciplines which operate
exclusively on the female body, and
"to overlook the forms of subjection that engender the female body is to
perpetuate the silence and powerlessness of those upon whom these disciplines
have been imposed.'?"
Perhaps this criticism has over-exaggerated the extent of Foucault's oversight.
Certainly, he does not pay specific attention to those disciplinary forms that
operate uniquely on the female body. We must not forget, however, that a
feminist critique was quite far removed from a central concern of Foucault's
work. Feminist theorists should not to expect to find all of their answers within
the theorising of a man whose primary concern in The History ofSexuality was
to construct a philosophical justification for homosexuality. Indeed, Foucault
does draw attention to the specific process of the 'hysterization of the female
body' ,77 although he does not develop this idea much further. This may well
have been a project to be dealt with at a later time. Such speculation aside,
however, this omission does certainly provide scope for some necessary
supplementary feminist critique on the body as a site ofpower struggle.
This challenge has indeed been taken up by some contemporary feminist
commentators who have focussed not only on sexuality, but also more
fundamentally on the effects of discourse upon the body itself. Much of this
attention has focussed upon a critique of the historical fact of scientific
indifference towards the female body. This has been analysed, not as a mere
academic oversight, but as a product of the dualism inherent in the Cartesian
thought that heavily influences modernist science, with its ultimate goal of
rationality and objectivity. This dualism divides human experience into either a
76 Bartky, S. "Foucault, Feminism and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power" in Diamond, 1. &
Quinby, L. Feminism and Foucault, Supra. Chapter One, Note 30, p.64
77 Foucault, M. The History ad Sexuality, Vol. I, Supra. Chapter One, Note 3, p.l04
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bodily or a spiritual realm. Within contemporary society, the female body has
become a signifier for the side of the dualism that connects with embodiment
and emotionality. The female body has become a metaphor for all that needs to
be controlled by the implicitly (dis)embodied, objective male."
A similar emphasis on the body has been re-vitalised in the works of Judith
Butler. In Gender Trouble." she establishes an influential distinction between
biological bodies and the socially constructed gender differences that are
imposed upon them. Building on this premise, she proposes that the distinctions
drawn between male and female bodies are in themselves arbitrary, nothing
more than an artefact of a social order organised by normative heterosexuality.
In drawing a similar conclusion to Simone de Beauvoir, Butler concludes that
women are neither born, nor made; rather they appropriate the cultural
prescriptions society demands of their sex."
The concern to link women's embodied experiences to practices of power has
been fairly unanimous within all feminist work in this area. The appeal of
making this connection is obvious when we note, as Davis has," that women's
bodies have historically been subjected to processes of exploitation,
inferiorisation, exclusion, control and violence. However, the conceptualisation
of the body may vary with the conceptualisation of power and this has caused
some difficulty within the feminist camp. Initially, as we have seen in the
works of MacKinnon et al, power was conceived of as a fairly straight-forward
matter of male domination and female subordination under conditions of male
patriarchy. In this light, women were conceived as the victims of oppression,
and their bodies became interpreted as the primary mechanism through which
masculinist power operated. The focus in feminist theory has subsequently
shifted, however, from an emphasis on women's experiences of oppression
towards a concern with how images of women's bodies are implicated in power
78 Davis, K. Embodied Practices, Supra. Chapter One, Note 74, p. 5
79 Butler, J. Gender Trouble, Supra. Preface, Note 20
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relations. Drawing upon the Foucaultian analysis of modem, disciplinary
power, the female body has become a cultural manifestation of the nexus of
gender/power relations. Feminist concern for commonality in women's bodily
experiences has been replaced by a concern with the particular and with the
myriad cultural interpretations that can be attributed to the female body."
Although such critique seeks to replace the 'old' oppressor / oppressed imagery
of power with a more sophisticated understanding of the dynamics of power, it
seeks to do so while simultaneously maintaining a concern with the systematic
elements of modem body cultures. Shifting focus away from a primary concern
with patterns of domination, enables a clarification of the nature of women's
engagement with their own bodies. This in turn permits the introduction of
notions of agency and subversion into contemporary feminist agendas by
offering a remit for study of the ways in which individuals have challenged the
limitations of their bodily experiences. Dorothy Smith, for example, in Texts,
Facts and Femininity83 has posited the notion of women as 'secret agents'
acting behind the gendered discourses of femininity, making their bodies a
potential site for mundane acts both of compliance and of rebellion.
Foucault's work has received such a large amount of feminist interest because
ofhis insistence that the body is an historical and culturally specific entity. This
has served as a stark contrast against the works of other poststructuralist
theorists, such as Derrida, who have argued that the body is a metaphorisation of
the more general philosophical problems of difference." This latter form of
theory has proven unacceptable because it allows the theorist to bypass
altogether the question of sexual difference and how it relates to the experiences
of women." Whether or not we agree with the criticisms lodged at Foucault
regarding his oversight of the specifically female forms of disciplinary
81 Davis, K. Embodied Practices, Supra. Chapter One, Note 74, p.10
82 Davis, K. Embodied Practices, Supra. Chapter One, Note 74, p.10
83 Smith, D. Texts, Facts and Femininity - Explgoring the Relations ofRuling (1990) Routledge
84 Derrida, J. Writing and Difference (1978) Routledge
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technology, what is clear is that his theory has the advantage for feminist
critique of at least leaving open the scope for potential examination of this
question in a way which preceding theories have failed to do. The insights
originating from Foucault's work do hold considerable relevance for feminist
theory in general. However, what Foucault fails to do, and what feminism must
do, is look closely and critically at the issue of freedom where it concerns
women's responses to structural inequality and male violence. Feminists must
devote additional attention to the inner processes that condition women's sense
of freedom and choice, alongside their examination of the external
manifestations ofpower and dominance. Afterall,
"women's bodily constructions take place within a network of ideological
power relations so complicated and subtle, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
escape indoctrination...not only disciplines relegated to the so-called
subjective sphere of taste, but also the disciplines of medicine, economics, and
legality, serve to put woman in her proper place.'?"
Advancement towards an analysis of such inner processes conditioning our
senses of freedom and choice will be the main concern of this thesis. In
examining the dictates of the discourse of sexuality, we have begun to highlight
the existence of gender-specific assumptions of corporeal normativity that
infiltrate into the desires and preferences of the embodied self. It has been
suggested above that any external ideological force that impinges upon
individual character formation necessarily also has an adverse affect on the
subject's ability to exercise the kind of unfettered choice that is assumed in the
liberal and contractarian fantasy. Over the next two chapters, we will examine
the implications of this ideology more specifically in the context of legal
decision-making to highlight the obstacles to credible consent afforded by the
normative power of discursive strategies.
While these gender-specific concerns are legitimate and important, we must also
exercise a degree of caution to ensure that our analysis of the disciplinary
techniques that operate specifically upon the female body does not develop into
86 Hekman,S. Feminist Interpretations a/Michel Foucault, Supra. Chapter One, Note 43, p. 140
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an absolute polarisation. After all, the development of the female body may
hold some different characteristics from the development of the male body, but
it does not constitute a separate history. We have seen that the problem of
conceptualising the sexualised body without positing an original sexual
difference is one that has plagued feminist attempts to build on Foucaultian
theory. Although the body is clearly of central importance to any feminist
critique (it being the fundamental site upon which the social differences between
men and women are legitimated), caution must be exercised to prevent the
affirmation of the patriarchal logic that defines women by reference to their
biology. While it should still be recognised that gender is socially and
culturally constructed, the woman of contemporary analysis is less a victim of
oppression, whose body has become the prime site for the operation of male
power, and more an agent whose body has been implicated in power relations
and constructed by cultural expectations. As McNay explains-
"Although the oppression of women is based on the appropriation of their
bodies by patriarchy, it does not follow therefore that oppression derives from
the body or sex, or that the notion of a natural sexual difference can be used to
explain gender inequalities. Rather, the natural body must be understood as a
device central to the legitimation of certain strategies of oppression."?
With this caveat in mind, it remains legitimate, however, to furnish detailed
examination upon the peculiarly gender-specific forms of discipline that target
the female agent. The focus of the following two chapters therefore will be on
the ideology imposing upon the operation of consent in the specific contexts of
rape and reproduction. These contexts, although not without relevance for the
male agent, hold particular relevance to the life-experience of the female as
embodied and signified agent. What's more, in dealing centrally with issues
pertaining to bodily integrity, these contexts also offer the opportunity for a
more extensive analysis of the manifestation ofbio-power that Foucault isolates
as characteristic ofmodernity.
87 MacNay, L. Foucault and Feminism, Supra. Chapter One, Note 85, p..21
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Conclusion
At the outset of this chapter, we noted the centrally important place accredited
to consent, as the medium through which individual self-determination is
exercised and given meaning in various contexts, the paradigmatic context being
in the establishment of state and society through the social contract. Inherent in
this reliance upon the notion of consent is the implication that those agents who
give their consent do so against a background of freedom and unfettered choice.
Within the confines of this chapter, the suggestion has been made that the reality
of the exercise of consent is somewhat different from the contractarian illusion.
This is an argument that will flow throughout this thesis in various guises. The
particular concern of this chapter has been to introduce this line of critique by
suggesting that within our traditional assumptions about the nature of law and
power as one-dimensional authority has been disguised the existence of various
disciplinary mechanisms of power. These disciplinary mechanisms operate in
infinite ways to construct and constrain the spectrum of choice available to the
consensual agent.
Upon lifting the veil of the juridical, it becomes apparent that legal power (like
other forms of power in modem society) operates both at the juridical and
disciplinary level. It has been the concern of this chapter to examine the nature
oflaw's disciplinary operation, most specifically its utilisation of the medium of
discourse to infiltrate the life and identity of the legal agent with normative
imperatives of conduct.
Building upon the Foucaultian premise that the ultimate disciplinary technique
is constituted by a network of power dynamics which operates upon the
individual through its corporeal manifestation ('bio-power'), we have noted the
historical tendency to connect the female more closely to corporeality than the
male. This has been conceived as a significant aspect in the regimes of bio-
power of modernity, and in the latter part of this chapter, this has provoked an
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analysis of the most significant discourse of bio-power functioning upon the
body, namely sexuality. In examining the disparate manner in which the
demands of sexuality have been constructed between agents, it has been the
contention of this chapter that male and female sexuality has been constructed
and constrained in gender-specific yet significant ways. In terms of the focus of
our analysis, the multiple discourses of sexuality have constructed the female
agent towards the realisation of the ideal of submissive and self-abnegating
sexuality.
Within the confines of the chapters that follow, we will examine more closely
the nature of the demands of that ideal, and the implications that flow from it in
terms of the female agents inability to meaningfully 'consent' to roles that do
not conform to the ideal. What this chapter has established is the more general
proposition that in any case where an ideal model of desire, preference and
identity is imposed upon the human agent as a normative expectation, it
becomes artificial to assume that the agent's choice remains as unfettered and
unconstrained as the standard assumptions of the notion of consent imply.
The original notion of consent that we have inherited from the social contract
conception assumes a cultural backdrop of boundless freedom and
unconstrained choice. This assumption can only be supported, however, on the
basis of a notion of law and authority that has consent as its originator and
master. When we abandon this notion of legal power in favour of the more
complex analysis discussed within this chapter, it becomes apparent that
reliance upon consent does not lie above social imperatives. On the contrary,
the operation of consent is heavily curtailed by the influence of the normative
discursive strategies implicated in modem disciplinary techniques. By
constructing the subject who 'chooses' conformity within the confines of the
socially prescribed, the force of disciplinary techniques lies in the undermining
of the very legitimacy of that choice.
60
CHAPTER TWO
CONSTRUCTED IDENTITIES AND THE POSSIBILITY
OF FEMALE NON-CONSENT IN RAPE
"The rhetoric ofbodies and pleasure...can be said to be useful for exposing and
opposing, in highly dramatic fashion, the undue privilege modem western
culture has accorded subjectivity, sublimation, identity and the like."!
Foucault's work on modem power has posited the body as the surface upon
which the rules, hierarchies and commitments of a culture are inscribed and
maintained. His analysis, discussed in the previous chapter, of the disciplinary
power wielded by discursive strategies involving female sexuality has given
feminism a useful theoretical framework for conceiving of the body as a site of
political struggle. Building on the Foucaultian assertion that the sexual body is
both the principal instrument and effect of modem disciplinary power, many
contemporary feminists have illustrated how various strategies of normalisation
focussed upon the female body have been central to the maintenance of
prevailing social relations. In our foregoing discussion of such approaches, we
have noted the advantage that they hold over those of more traditional radical
feminist analyses that have tended to submerge consideration of the manner in
which women actively engage with their own bodies within gender-specific
dichotomies of power distribution. In encouraging a perception of the body as a
contingent entity, the Foucaultian approach to power illustrated in the previous
chapter has provided feminist analysis with a useful theoretical tool to counter
the problems of essentialism and biological determinism that have traditionally
plagued it in its approach to the body.
Foucault's challenge to us is to fight back with our bodies by finding new
meanings for them, new ways of understanding our selves and our culture.'
However, a necessary prerequisite to the achievement of that prescriptive
agenda lies in re-evaluating the legitimacy of the prevailing standards for
1 Fraser, N. Unruly Practices - Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Theory, Polity (1989)
P.62
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autonomy, agency and self-determination that are manifest within the juridical
conception of one-dimensional consent. Throughout discussion in the preceding
chapter, the legitimacy of liberal rhetoric claiming unfettered and unconstrained
self-determination was repeatedly called into question by the recognition of
disciplinary normativity embodied within the discursive fields applicable to
modem legal power. Upon lifting the dominant veil of juridical analysis, the
extent to which we live in a social world fuelled by discourses that purposefully
perpetuate stereotypical sexual identities as a means of restricting conduct and
choice must be recognised. This recognition, in its tum, ought to demand a re-
evaluation of the notion of consent to take into account the significance of these
impinging social disciplines.
Through the duration of the next two chapters, we will look in more detail at the
exact nature of the culturally constructed identity and gendered role that is
imposed on the female agent in society. In so doing, we will seek to illustrate
the means through which law and legal discourse operate their dynamics of
disciplinary power to impose a myth which renders the female agent incapable
of giving serious and operative non-consent. By a specific examination of that
legal construction within the contexts of rape and enforced foetal therapy, the
impossibility of female non-consent will be established and the artificiality of
liberal presuppositions regarding unfettered and unconstrained self-determinism
will be highlighted.'
The arenas of rape and maternal-foetal conflict illustrate these arguments
particularly effectively because they invoke issues of control over a very
intimate element of female existence, namely access to the body. Furthermore,
they also invoke concern regarding the interplay between power and property
concerns. Developing from an historical origin where the wrong of rape lay in
its deprivation of the husband's or father's property rights in the victim, the
modem legal approach to rape prosecution exhibits traces of a concern to treat
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women as progeny by curtailing their actions to protect property interests.
Similarly in the maternal-foetal conflict situation, legal concerns interact with a
debatable ethical concern to protect perceived property interests in the foetus,
thus providing a mechanism for the curtailment of maternal autonomy where it
is felt necessary to ensure the birth of a healthy child.
Both contexts provide a particularly apt demonstration of the part which legal
discourse has played in the on-going struggle for ultimate bio-power that
Foucault proposes is characteristic of the interplay of power dynamics within
modem, disciplinary society. Operating their disciplinary power networks
increasingly insidiously within the intimate confines of individual life,
normative social conceptions of appropriate gendered conduct (whether within
the role of lover or mother) have been incorporated into legal discourse and
legal practice. Masked behind the facade of legitimacy conferred upon the
'objective, rational knowledge' of the legal realm, these inherently inegalitarian
and artificial constructions have remained unchallenged by mainstream legal
critique. The purpose of the critique lodged within the confines of this chapter,
and the one which follows, is to draw attention to the existence of such identity
politics and to begin to illustrate the highly debilitating and prejudicial effect
which these normative conceptions have upon the freedom and credibility
assigned to agents who fail to conform to appropriate standards.
Sexual Stereotyping and Cultural Inscriptions ofFemale Sexuality
"Rape trials can be seen as a barometer of ideologies of sexual difference, of
male dominance and female inferiority. Rape can be seen as a metaphor for
women's right to self-determination, their right to say 'no', whether in regard
to giving birth, having sex, or making other choices."
Feminist authors have commonly expressed fundamental dissatisfaction with
judicial attitudes to rape and more radical feminist critics, such as Catharine
3Radical feminist expression of similar concerns can be found, for example in Dworkin, A.
Pornography-=-Menfossessing_Women, (1981) Women's Press, p.205
4 Lees, S. CarnalKnowledge - Rape on Trial (1996) Hamish Hamilton
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MacKinnon, have gone so far as to allege that the legal treatment afforded to the
victim of rape serves as categorical evidence of systematic male bias. In
analysing trends within rape prosecutions, it has become apparent that a person
who presents herself as a victim of a rape will commonly be forced to undergo
meticulously detailed questioning on various intimate matters, including her
sexual life. Many feminist commentators have suggested that this inquisitorial
format finds its roots in a culture that is not only highly sexist but is also highly
suspicious of female sexuality per se. 5 For them, the entire trial process simply
adds a further level of 'secondary victimisation' to the injury because in
undergoing the courtroom experience, the victim is required to relive the
original violation in public view. At each stage of the investigative and judicial
process, the woman is the subject of procedures over which she has no control
and this provides an experiential reaffirmation of the feelings of powerlessness
experienced by the victim in the initial assault.6
On reporting the offence, empirical evidence suggests that the rape victim's
statements are significantly more likely to be questioned and challenged than are
the statements of the victims of any other crime? In the unlikely event that the
case proceeds to a full court hearing, Mossman's critique of the adversarial
court structure clearly illustrates its failure to furnish the complainant with the
opportunity to tell her story in her own way. Rather she is forced to give a
legally scripted account of the events, in the restrictive format of answers to the
questions directed at her by counsel". Frequently, the focus of court attention
becomes the victim rather than the assailant, yet the complainant remains
without legal representation. In fact, recent figures suggest that in
approximately two-thirds of rape cases that proceed to trial, the victim has not
5 Brown, B., Burman, M. & Jamieson, L. Sex Crimes on Trial, Supra. Preface, Note 12, p.16
6 Brown, B., Burman, M. & Jamieson, L. Sex Crimes on Trial, Supra. Preface, Note 12, p.17
Allison.T, & Wrightsman, L. Rape - The Misunderstood Crime (1993) SAGE
7 Chambers, G. and Millar, A. "Investigating Sexual Assault" (1983) HMSO, Scottish Office Central
Research Unit Study, Edinburgh
Chambers, G. and Millar, A. "Prosecuting Sexual Assault" (1986) HMSO, Scottish Office Central
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even been introduced to the Prosecution Advocate or Barrister before entering
the courtroom."
Standards used in rape laws and trial procedures tend to exemplify an
orientation that makes the victim's behaviour, and not the defendant's, the
subject of evaluation. Women are, and have been, conditioned to distinguish
between rape and experiences of sexual violation on the basis of the propriety of
their own conduct. What's more, this is a presumptive distinction that the legal
system has actively encouraged and perpetuated by its continued admission of
evidence regarding the previous sexual history of the complainant. Admission
of this evidence has been premised upon the pervasive moralistic standpoint
which divides women through the social obsession with what Edwards has
called 'the virginity requirement' into dichotomous categories of madonnas and
whores." Given the discussion in Chapter One of the restrictive social mores
that have historically been imposed on feminine conduct and the patent unease
with which society continues to deal with operative female sexuality, it becomes
easy to conceive of situations where non-conformist behaviour could be
construed as sufficient to render the victim unworthy of legal protection.
Incorporation of normative expectations regarding the proper role of the
feminine within the disciplinary operation of legal power has perpetuated an
expectation within the deliberation of the rape trial that women who fail to
conform with its demands of passivity and submissiveness, for example by
dressing provocatively or flirting with the assailant, cannot legitimately expect
to incite the sympathy of the court.
It was a similar assumption which informed the Victorian presupposition that
abandonment of the prevailing social mores of female conduct, which required
docility and complicity, represented a manifestation of mental illness, to be
treated only by incarceration of the unruly female agent, or by removal of her
genitalia. I I While it may have been hoped that such restrictive social ideology
9 'Dispatches' Documentary - Thursday 16th March 2000, Channel 4.
10 Edwards, S. Female Sexuality and the Law (1981) Supra. Chapter One, Note 46
11 See previous discussion in Chapter One - 'Discourses of Female Embodiment'
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would have long-since fallen into desuetude, it seems that modem
manifestations of the same social imperatives continue to inform the normative
institutions ofmodem society.
Research conducted by Brown, Burman and Jamieson in Sex Crimes on TriaZ12
into the prosecution of rape trials within the Scottish criminal justice system
found that a majority of legal professionals still consider evidence in relation to
a recent history of sexually interested or provocative behaviour on the part of
the complainer towards the accused (e.g. drinking, dancing together, intimate
conversation, cuddling, etc.) to be relevant because it suggests that sexual
intercourse could reasonably be construed by the man as a natural conclusion of
events.
This remains the case despite superficial attempts at statutory restriction of the
admissibility of much of this victim-centred character evidence. Set up to
examine issues relating to the admissibility of previous sexual history evidence,
the Helibron Committee found that most of such evidence is largely irrelevant.
What's more, the committee recognised that courtroom discussion of it was not
only traumatic and humiliating for the victim, but also 'inimical to the fair trial
of the essential issues'." The Committee (which had jurisdiction only over
England and Wales) recommended, on this basis, that admissibility of such
evidence should be firmly regulated. The strong position advocated by the
Committee, however, was not adopted by subsequent legislative amendments.
Instead, s.2 of the 1976 Sexual Offences (Amm) Act was passed which,
although it did place a general embargo on the use of sexual history evidence in
the courtroom, provided considerable scope for the defence counsel to apply to
the court for leave to include such evidence. The statutory provision left the
decision regarding admissibility at the mercy of recognised powers of judicial
discretion to determine whether exclusion of such evidence would have a
prejudicial effect upon the defendant. Hence, it replaced the common law
12 Brown,B., Burman,M. & Jamieson,L., Sex Crimes on Trial, Supra. Preface, Note 12
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discretion of the judiciary in relation to admissibility of evidence with a
statutory authority to exercise that discretion on exactly the same grounds.
This legislative provision has been largely ineffective." Research carried out by
Adler in Rape on Trial subsequent to its introduction in England and Wales
suggested that over 75% of applications made under s.2 in rape trials heard at
the Old Bailey between 1978-9 were successful on the basis that the evidence
was relevant to the issue of consent. IS What the judges in this study found to be
relevant considerations does give scope for concern and seems to contradict
fundamentally the original intention of the Helibron Committee - for example,
in one case evidence that a complainant aged 17 was no longer a virgin was
considered relevant." Adler also found evidence that in many cases, defence
counsel simply by-passed s.2 altogether and made references to the
complainant's sexual history without troubling to apply to the leave ofthe court.
Ten years later, legislation with a similar motivation came into effect in
Scotland via the Criminal Procedures eSc) Act 1975, s.141 and s.346.17 The
Scottish legislation did not seek to place an embargo on previous sexual history
evidence but rather it laid down specific conditions and procedures for its
introduction. An important (and indeed promising) feature of the Scottish
legislation was its purported capacity to exclude evidence not only in relation to
the complainant's previous sexual history with third parties (as was the limit of
the Sexual Offences Act), but also with the accused. The fact that the Scottish
legislation poses the threat of such wide exclusion, however, does not
necessarily imply any intention to disallow evidence in relation to the accused
upon application by defence counsel. The legislation itself allows some broad
13 Helibron Committee (Advisory Group on the Law of Rape) HMSO (1975) Crnnd. 6352
14 Jennifer Temkin notes in her discussion of evidentiary requirements in the Scottish jurisdiction that
"the experience in jurisdictions elsewhere mostly suggests that the discretionary method is ineffective
in controlling the use of sexual history evidence." : Temkin, J., "Evidence in Sexual Assault Cases-
The Scottish Proposal and Alternatives" (1984) 47 Modern Law Review 623 @p. 635
15 Adler, Z. Rape on Trial (1987) Routledge & Kegan Paul
16 Cited in Temkin's discussion of the Adler report - Temkin, J., Rape and The Legal Process, Supra.
Preface, Note 12, p. 121
17 As inserted by the Law Reform (Misc. Prov.)(Sc)Act 1985, s.36
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exclusions from its general principles - most importantly, in situations where it
would be contrary to the interests ofjustice to exclude the evidence. In practice,
this provides "a significant loophole that acts to entirely defeat the purported
purpose of the legislation.?" The aim of the law reform was to minimise
unnecessary investigation of the complainer's sexual life while continuing to
admit all the evidence necessary to allow justice to be done. However, the
research carried out by Brown, Burman and Jamieson (in relation to the Scottish
criminal justice system) mirrors the findings of Adler's English study." Both
conclude that the two pieces of legislation fall markedly short of achieving their
averred aims - overall, complainers continue to be asked questions about their
sexual conduct in about half of jury trials and much of the evidence thus
adduced is clearly contrary to the original spirit and aims of the legislation.
In 1997, a two week survey of rape cases appearing before courts in England
and Wales was undertaken. Transcripts of the victim's evidence in half of those
cases were studied in detail. Despite the legislative requirements established
above, the victim was asked direct questions about her previous sexual history
in over half of those cases. Furthermore, considerable attention was also
focussed by defence counsel on more general aspects of the victim's lifestyle,
including any evidence of previous drinking habits, flirtatious behaviour, and
even of having undergone prior periods of depression." This latter focus of
concern clearly illustrates the centrality of victim-centred character evidence to
the construction of a defensive position. In a modem society increasingly
characterised by the operation of disciplinary power, the actions of the female
agent are increasingly subject to intimate regulation. The inclusion of evidence
regarding the victim's general behaviour and character encourages a
comparative process whereby the victim will be measured against the
stereotypical ideals of feminine conduct. Furthermore, discussion in the
preceding chapter regarding the increasingly pervasive role of that discursive
18 Field, D. Tie Law ofEvidence in Scotland (1988) W. Green & Sons, Edinburgh, p.218
19 Brown, B., Burman, M. & Jamieson, L. Sex Crimes on Trial, Supra. Preface, Note 12
20 'Dispatches' Documentary, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 9
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ideal of femininity suggests an increased potential for the introduction of this
more general victim-centred character evidence in future prosecutions.
Evidence ofprevious sexual contact both with the accused and with third parties
continues to be regarded as relevant to the issue of consent by a majority of
legal professionals who argue that because a complainant has previously
consented to sexual relations, it becomes more likely that they have consented
to sex on the occasion in question." This assumption has received tacit support
from the judiciary despite having met with stark condemnation from critics who
allege that it gives credence to the rationally unfounded premise that a woman
who has had previous sexual relations thereby gives up the right to refuse her
consent to sexual relations with other men, or even with the same man on a
different occasion. In a recent report published by the Home Office on the
investigation and prosecution of rape in the 1990s, one judge expressed the
tenaciousness of this judicial attitude in his statement in regard to the relevance
of previous sexual history evidence to the issue of consent, that "if you were
sitting on the jury and that was the issue - in the back of the car, did she consent
or did she not - would you not want to know whether she had slept with the last
five men that she went to the dance hall with?,,22 This view is wholly dismissive
of the subjective reality that consent to intercourse has to be re-negotiated on
each and every occasion.
In their work on the controversial subject of date rape, Husak and Thomas have
developed a more dilute position that nonetheless shares many of the
connotations implicit in this argument. In an article entitled "Date Rape, Social
Conventions and Reasonable Mistakes"23, they cite psychological courtship
rituals whereby women give non-explicit encouragement to the sexual advances
of men to establish the existence of social conventions through which women
21 Stewart, M., Dobbin, S. & Gatowski, S. "Definitions of Rape: Victims, Police and Prosecutors"
(1996) 4 Feminist Legal Studies 159
22 Harris, J. & Grace, S., "A Question of Evidence? Investigating and Prosecuting Rape in the 1990s"
(1999) Home Office Research Study 196, p. 40
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express agreement to sexual relations. The use of these rituals is considered
understandable because of the social pressure placed upon women to be sexually
passive. According to Husak and Thomas, therefore, the solution is not to
subvert the socialisation of women into passivity, but rather to narrow the focus
of law to operation within the dynamics of how behaviour between the genders
is currently patterned. This approach, which may superficially appear to present
a welcome air of pragmatism into this legal arena, is in reality not only
distortive of experience, but is also dangerous. Even if it may be reasonable for
a man, observing that a woman's behaviour falls within a certain convention, to
believe that she would consent to sex, it is not justifiable for him to believe that
her behaviour is consent since there is no convention to that effect.
Furthermore, as Archard" points out, Husak and Thomas fail to acknowledge
the possibility that men and women may attribute different meanings to the
same behaviour. Whether responsibility for this lies with innate socio-
biological differentiation between the genders, or with cultural processes of
gendered socialisation, psychological research has established that men
consistently read behaviour in more sexual terms than women.
Both the implicit logic of the judiciary and legal practitioners, and the explicit
arguments of Husak and Thomas, attempt to draw conclusions from alleged
operation of general conventions. Inherent in these attempts, however, is an
irreducible tension between the generality of conventions and the particularity
of each and every sexual interaction. We may be able to accept that general
conventions exist which confer implicit meaning upon the behaviour of sexual
agents, and that these may even imply the likelihood of ongoing sexual relations
where there has been a previous sexual history. However, this far from renders
legitimate the reliance of men solely upon their subjective interpretation of such
conventions in particular sexual interactions, and legal critique must resist the
temptation to legitimate socio-sexual inequality under the guise of arbitrary
social convention.
23 Husak, D. & Thomas, G. "Date Rape, Social Conventions and Reasonable Mistakes" (1992) 11 Law
and Philosophy 5-126
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Rape requires mens rea ofwhat a reasonable man should have understood in the
circumstances. The problem with that is that the injury of rape lies in the
meaning of the act to the victim, but the standard for its criminality lies in the
meaning of the act to the assailant." The legal system's continued cognisance
of the ideology advocated by the legal profession with regard to previous sexual
history evidence and victim-centred character evidence implies acceptance of
the draconian insinuation that if a woman flirts with a man, or otherwise strays
from the sexually passive role, she cannot expect to be taken seriously when she
refuses consent to intercourse. In her article in the Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies, Mcf.olgan" lodges a scathing criticism of the prejudicial effect which
introduction of this sort of evidence has on the course of a rape trial. She
suggests that where evidence of sexual experience or unfeminine character is
allowed into the picture, the image of the 'ideal' rape envisaged by our male-
informed legal system is necessarily departed from.
This notion of the 'ideal rape' has met with violent criticism from many
feminist advocates, most notably perhaps Susan Estrich. In her book entitled
Real Rape", Estrich has proposed that this notion posits a highly artificial
construction of the real life rape experience. Effectively, it operates to exclude
the victim from her right to fair treatment unless she has been 'fortunate'
enough to meet the criteria the model demands - namely, that she is a middle-
class, respectable, virginal girl, who has been violently raped by a stranger,
ideally of a lower-class. This presents a highly artificial representation of the
dynamic of the majority of real rapes," yet it is the operative imagery of rape
that informs our legal process. Some judicial officials are so heavily influenced
by this abstract ideal, for example, that they have suggested that those real rape
24 Archard, D. Sexual Consent (1998) Westview Press, p.34
25 Smart, C. Feminism and The Power ofLaw, Supra. Chapter One, Note 10
26McColgan, A. "Common Law & The Relevance of Sexual History Evidence" (1996) Oxford Journal
ofLegal Studies 275
27 Estrich, S Real Rape, Supra. Preface, Note 11
28 Within the confines Harris, J. & Grace, S., "A Question of Evidence?", Supra. Chapter Two, Note
22, for example, it was found that in 82% of the cases studied there had been some degree of
consensual contact between the parties prior to the attack, and in 25% of cases, the complainant had
had prior sexual relations with the accused.
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experiences that do not conform would best be considered constitutive of a
lesser crime. This attitude has been expressed most clearly by one judge,
"I wonder whether the serious type of rape of a stranger. .. .in a public place or
whatever at night, should not be a rather separate offence than, if I can put it at
the other end of the scale, the misunderstanding between two people who
know each other.'?"
As McColgan has pointed out, introduction of evidence relating to the previous
sexual history of the victim promotes a necessary departure from this ideal
image. Once this is achieved, a doubt is sewn in the mind of the juror as to
whether the experience that the victim describes can properly be defined as rape.
In a legal climate that demands proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the
implications of this for the rape victim are significant. The doubt that is sewn
does not relate to the defendant's guilt in terms of the actual rape charged
(which is in reality the essential point at issue), but rather relates to his guilt in
respect of the illusive 'ideal' rape. Nonetheless, the practical implication
remains that the complainer is punished for her inability to make her rape
conform to this preconceived and highly artificial construction of the 'ideal'
rape. The end result is a dramatic reduction in the real chances of conviction.
As McColgan surmises :
"Admissions of sexual evidence allow the defence to feed into anachronistic
cultural assumptions about women and sex. The focus is shifted from the
question of whether the complainant has been raped on this occasion, to the
question ofwhether she is a 'rapeable' woman.?"
When the question is rebounded back onto the woman in this way, we are
encouraged to make judgements on the propriety of her conduct. This in turn
leads us to employ some form of comparison between the particular woman's
conduct in the particular circumstances of her experience and the prevailing
social mores which, based upon anachronistic assumptions about female identity
and female sexuality, embody what is perceived as 'appropriate' female
conduct. We are skilfully manoeuvred back into a position, in Foucaultian
terms, of deference to the power that facilitates the claims to 'truth' of these
29 Harris, J. & Grace, S., "A Question of Evidence?", Supra. Chapter Two, Note 22, p. 35
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social stereotypes. As Estrich notes, the legal system's continued belief in the
relevance of previous sexual history evidence reflects the law's punitive
celebration of female chastity and its unwillingness to protect women who lack
its version of virtue. Simultaneously, however, courts have been unwilling to
allow similar inquiries into the sexual history of the male defendant precisely
because of the prejudicial effect that this may occasion in the minds of the
jury!"
Throughout social history, our culture has encountered considerable difficulty in
dealing with the issue of female sexuality. As has been suggested by Foucault's
analysis of the deployment of sexuality by formative discourses of the 18th and
19th centuries, women found engaging in extra-marital sex have historically
been considered mentally abnormal and have often been confined to
incarceration in a mental institution." The Victorian era's construction of a
definite dichotomy between good (i.e. asexual) women and bad (i.e. sexual)
women persists today and is, as we have seen, manifested in the continued
admissibility of evidence regarding the victim's previous sexual history.
Women who are 'good' and who conform to the demands which society makes
upon them in terms of their role and identity will be cherished and protected.
Conversely, women who are 'bad' and who abandon these shackles, even
through exercise of the simplest liberties (such as choosing to accept the offer of
a drink from a man) cast themselves out from the protective umbrella of society
- deserving what they get because 'they were asking for it' .
This notion that women are somehow 'asking for it' is a paradigmatic
manifestation of the general unease that the notion of an operative female
sexuality provokes within our social and legal structures. The proposal that
women desire to be raped has received prominent psychoanalytical support in
the work of Helena Deutsch, who, in 1945, asserted that the essence of
30 MacColgan, A. "Common Law & The Relevance of Previous Sexual History Evidence", Supra.
Chapter Two, Note 25, p.287
3\ Estrich, S. Real Rape, Supra. Preface, Note 11
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femininity included masochism", It is alleged that by a detailed examination of
the operation of the female subconscious, a process that has been restricted to
within the specific scientific discourse of psychoanalysis, we can discover that
women secretly long for the violence and violation of rape. The suggestion that
has flowed from this, then, is that we cannot hold the male assailant culpable for
fulfilling the subconscious desires of the female, especially given that the
central element of the crime ofrape is her non-consent.
"The paradox of rape law is that reason is part of the construction of the male
speaking subject but in the sexual encounter, that subject is not obliged to be
reasonable. The law seeks to establish not whether the defendant believed in
the woman's consent at the level of rational conscious subject but at the level
of the unconscious 'logic of desire' ."34
It seems to be of no relevance to this school of thought that, even if we accept
this proposal, these masochistic desires operate at a subconscious level and
surely cannot act to infer the consent of the female agent when she herself has
not given credence to them. Despite this inherent paradox of logic, and despite
a vociferous condemnation of the essence of the proposal itself (most of which
has been lodged by women, whom one would assume would be the best
authorities on the operation of the female subconscious), this notion that women
not only invite but also enjoy sexual aggression persists today.
In the context of a rape trial, male sexuality and its satisfaction tend to provide
their own justification. Being a sexual predator is regarded as a norm for men.
Pressing women until they submit is a natural pastime and rape trials seem
reluctant to allow criticism of this. Rousseau celebrated this in Politics and the
Arts when he wrote
"to win this silent consent is to make use of all the violence permitted in love.
To read it in the eyes, to see it in the ways in spite of the mouth's denial ... If
he then contemplates his happiness, he is not brutal, he is decent.,,35
32 Foucault, M. The History ofSexuality, Vol. I, Supra. Chapter One, Note. 3
33 Deutsch, H. The Psychology ofWomen (1947) Research Books
34 Duncan, S. "Disrupting the Surface of Order and Innocence - Towards a Theory of Sexuality and the
Law", Supra. Chapter One, Note 1
35 Rousseau, J. Politics and the Arts (1986) (Trans. Bloom) Quoted in Temkin, J. Rape and the Legal
Process, Supra. Preface, Note 12, p.75
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We have already noted in our discussion of modernity's deployment of
sexuality (in Chapter One) that it is an intrinsic element of the social perception
of sexuality that it is uncontrollably natural. This has given further credence to
the identification of the male with the sexual hunter. We have discussed in
some depth the system of social conventions that operates to constrain the
sexuality of the female, in order to render her sexually complicit. The female
agent must either conform to this gendered identity as sexual prey, or present
herself as an anomaly to our dominant culture. By choosing the latter option,
however, she necessarily excludes herself from the legal protection of her peers
and supplants herself firmly in the category of 'bad' women.
Female sexuality, when it cannot be controlled by prevailing techniques of
normalisation, becomes a mystery to our heavily disciplined legal culture. This
in tum facilitates the survival of the allegation that female sexuality is
whimsical. It is alleged that there is no united front of female sexuality because
women do not know what they want, not (as logic and history would seem to
suggest) because women have not been allowed to have what they want. In
direct contradiction, the conceived face of male sexuality is firmly united. The
male is predator, and if the male is not predator he is not heterosexual (and by
implication not fully male). Man is a sexual animal who knows what he wants,
and it is his role to convince woman that she wants the same, whether by the
issue ofnormative codes, by intimidation, or by violence.
Operation of such perceptions in the interplay between male and female
sexuality can be illustrated by the extracts of statements of convicted rapists
collected by Scully and Maralla in their work entitled Convicted Rapists
Vocabulary of Motive - Excuses and Justifications which includes comments
such as-
"she led me on but wouldn't deliver,...I have a male ego that must be fed."
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"rape is a man's right. If a woman doesn't want to give it, the man should take
it. Women have no right to say no.?"
This suggestion of an illicit male authority to 'guide' the female into a better
realisation of her own sexual identity has profound effects on the operation of
legal judgement in rape cases. The jury must find the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, but in a legal process that re-affirms the general conception of
women as sexually whimsical, it becomes increasingly impossible for a
woman's account to achieve this level of certainty. Sometimes, the reluctance
to label coercive behaviour as criminal takes more visible and alarming forms.
In a case involving a brutal sex assault by a guardsman (discussed in Pattullo's
Judging Women), for example, Judge Slynn stated that""':
"It does not seem to me that the appellant is a criminal in the sense in which
that word is frequently used in these courts .... Clearly he is a man who, on the
night in question, allowed his enthusiasm for sex to overcome his normal
behaviour.'?"
With this summation and a mild reprimand, the accused was considered
appropriately punished for his overzealous sexual pursuit and a line of highly
prejudicial and borderline misogynistic judicial precedent was reinforced.
MacCahill, Meyer and Fischman in The Aftermath ofRape38 noted that one of
the most striking results of their study of defence counsel arguments in rape
trials, was the extent to which stereotypes of what constitutes typical female
behaviour were marshalled to discredit the testimony of the complainant.
Commonly perceived myths about how women are supposed to act in certain
social contexts are brought forward and, once compared unfavourably against
the actions of the particular complainant, are used to 'prove' that her behaviour
under the circumstances should rightly be viewed as suspect.
Sue Lees, in Carnal Knowledge, cites the example of the 1993 case of Austen
Donnellan. This provides an illustrative example - Donnellan, a student
36 Scully, Do & Marolla, J. "Convicted Rapists' Vocabulary of Motive - Excuses and Justifications"
(1984) 5 Social Problems 530
37 Pattullo Po Judging Women (1983) NCCL, po19-20
38 MacCahill, To,Meyer, L. & Fischman, A., The Aftermath ofRape (1979) Lexington Books
76
charged with rape, was acquitted; the victim having testified that she had drunk
so much as to have passed out and was barely even aware of the sex to which it
was alleged that she had consented. Through the duration of the case, much was
made of the fact that earlier in the evening she had behaved in an 'abandoned'
way because of her drinking - she had been dancing and kissing the accused.
The press gleefully sensationalised the (debatable) police forensic opinion that
"from the amount she had drunk - three pints of cider, a vodka, and two
drambuies - although her alcohol level would not be enough to induce a coma,
drink was an aphrodisiac, and she would have been 'very, very drunk and very,
very sexy'"." Seeking to justify the relevance of this kind of evidence into the
trial deliberation, one police officer has suggested,
"It is a judgement call, these people are sitting in their jury room and they
think that some of them are blokes and they have gone out at a night on the
town and they have had a few beers and they chatted up a girl and they have
made a pass at her and got a brush off, but thought oh my goodness, what
would I have done if and that is the area where people do think do I really
put this nice bloke from the students union into prison for this for rape when,
you know they were both drunk as skunks, etc.etc.?"
Similar stereotypes were marshalled in the famous 'hitch-hiking case' of 1982
where Judge Richards decided, contrary to all principles of criminal law, that
the victim's contributory negligence was a relevant factor and accordingly
imposed a fine of £2,000 on the perpetrator by way of punishment."
The stereotypes employed in such cases invariably portray women as demure,
dependent and passive. These are the 'truths' of women's existence that have
been perpetuated by the pervasive epistemological imperatives of the discourses
of modernity. They are truths that operate not only to bind women to a
painfully restrictive gendered identity, but also to bind the truth of the
experience to the highly artificial construction of the 'ideal rape'. The further
either agent is placed from conformance to the social imperatives constructing
and constraining their conduct, the less likely it becomes that the woman's
39 Lees, S. Carnal Knowledge, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 4, p.81- Daily Mail (19th October 1993)
40 Harris, 1. & Grace, S. "A Question of Evidence?", Supra. Chapter Two, Note 22, p. 37
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testimony will be credited and that the accused will be found guilty.
MacCahill's study concluded that there could be no doubt that use of such
stereotypes in the trial proved highly damaging to the complainant's self-
confidence, not to mention the effect which perpetuation of such stereotypes
holds for all women." By thus promoting the restriction of women's choices
and conduct, prevailing legal discourse operates to confine women to
conformity with a highly constructed and counter-intuitive gendered role. As
Duncan Kennedy has noted in his study into the symbolic significance of 'sexy
dressing' and its relationship to the phenomenon of sexual abuse -
"Watching women victims victimised again in the legal process, or just in the
media, teaches men and women that redress for sexual abuse is conditional on
being, or appearing to be, a 'perfect' victim, and that means conforming to
patriarchal norms.?"
A Scottish Office study conducted in the 1980s by Chamber and Millar44 found
evidence of stereotyped assumptions being employed in the treatment received
by rape victims from police departments and agents of the criminal justice
system as a whole. Despite the lack of evidence to support any such
assumptions, it was generally considered that women, particularly those who are
promiscuous, are prone to untruthfulness and to the lodging of false allegations
of rape. A 1975 edition of Police Review contained advice from a detective
sergeant to fellow officers in relation to the treatment to be afforded to
complaining victims of rape:
"It should be borne in mind that except in the case of a very young child the
offence of rape is extremely unlikely to have been committed against a woman
who does not immediately show signs of extreme violence. If a woman walks
into a police station and complains of rape with no such signs of violence, she
must be closely interrogated. Allow her to make her statement to a police
woman and then drive a horse and cart through it. It is always advisable if
there is any doubt of the truthfulness of her allegations to call her an outright
liar...,,45
41 Report and Comment in The Times January 6,7,8,11,& 12 (1982)
42 MacCahill, T., Meyer, L. & Fischman, A. The Aftermath ofRape, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 38
43 Kennedy, D., Sexy Dressing, etc. - Essays on the Power and Politics ofCultural Identity (1993)
Harvard Uni. Press, p.153-4
44 Chambers, G. and Millar, A. "Investigating Sexual Assault" (1983) HMSO, Supra. Chapter Two,
Note 7
45 Firth, A. Interrogation, Police Review (28th November 1975)
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Despite the issuing of a Home Office circular in 1986 that encouraged the police
to adopt a more sympathetic approach when dealing with rape complainants,"
the Home Office research study into attitudes towards rape in the 1990s
indicates that police attitudes often tend to display similar presuppositions. This
study cites research conducted by Jennifer Temkin in both 1997 and 1999, the
results of which indicate that, "old police practices and attitudes, widely
assumed to have vanished, are still in evidence and continue to cause victims
pain and trauma.?" Furthermore, Temkin also noted that although police
guidelines provide a framework for a system of care for victims, in practice they
are not always followed. Indeed, as has been suggested, disbelieving
stereotypical attitudes persist about women who report rape." It is no accident
therefore that rape complainants do not benefit from the same presumption of
truthfulness that is afforded to the witnesses and victims of all other crimes".
As Deborah Rhode concluded in Justice and Gender, "the threat of criminal
charges based on female fabrications has dominated the history of rape law?"
despite an absolute lack of empirical data to support such assumptions.
It seems, furthermore, that this unfounded suspicion of female honesty runs not
only through the police department with whom the rape victim has initial
contact, but also through the entire criminal justice system. Only a small
percentage ofwomen who report having been raped to local Rape Crisis Centres
report their charges to the police, largely due to fear of a cynical and
overbearing justice system. Of the minority of cases that are reported to the
police, the Chambers and Millar study found that a large percentage of them are
not processed. Of the dwindling percentage that are processed, what's more, the
46 Home Office Circular 69 /1986
47 Temkin,J. "Plus ca change: Reporting Rape in the 1990s" (1997) 37(4) British Journal of
Criminology 507, p. 527
48 Temkin, J. "Reporting Rape in London - A Qualitative Study" (1999) Howard Journal ofCriminal
Justice, February 1999. Discussed in Harris, J. & Grace, S., "A Question of Evidence?", Supra.
Chapter Two, Note 22, p. 61
49 To illustrate this point, let us use a different model- the essence of the crime of rape is consent.
Similarly, the essence of the crime of theft is also consent. However, the man who reports the theft of
his car to the police is not automatically treated with suspicion and is not required to undergo gruelling
cross-examination to establish that he did not in some way, intentionally or inadvertently, imply that
another person could take his car, simply say by driving it along the road in the accused's presence!
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prosecution rate remams low - within the confines of the study, it was
established that the Procurator Fiscal decided not to initiate proceedings in 30%
of the cases reported to him by the police with a view to prosecution. This
stands at a far higher no-proceedings rate than research has revealed for other
crimes of violence in Scotland. 51 Often the attitudes displayed by legal officials
offer implicit support for the assumptions that perpetuate this unsatisfactory
position. Within the confines of the study conducted by Harris and Grace, for
example, this attitude was illustrated in the suggestion made by one barrister
that it is even more likely that those rape cases that do make it to trial are the
ones premised upon false allegations because the more genuine complainant
would most likely have already withdrawn her charge because of the traumatic
nature of any ensuing trial.f .
It may be hoped that since the publication of the Chambers and Millar study,
which identified these figures, that the Scottish record for prosecution of sexual
assault cases may have improved. Lamentably, this has not been the case. In
fact figures suggest that the situation has only worsened over the past decade.
Despite a marked increase in the number of reported cases of rape and serious
sexual assault, from 1,322 in 1987 to 1,979 in 1997, and despite reports from
police departments confirming named suspect being sent to the Procurator
Fiscal in approximately two-thirds of those cases, the number of people being
prosecuted for these crimes in Scotland has actually fallen over the same period.
What's more, the number of convictions secured in the percentage of cases that
make it to the courts has fallen still lower - from 173 in 1987 to only 135 in
1997. Where in the 1980s Chambers and Millar were highly critical of a
prosecution rate of only 13%, the current prosecution rate in Scotland for crimes
ofrape and sexual assault stands at the significantly reduced level of only 6.8%.
Meanwhile, the proportion of people successfully convicted in Scotland for
50 Rhode, D. Justice and Gender (1989) Cambridge University Press
51 Chambers, G. & Millar, A. "Investigating Sexual Assualt" Supra. Chapter Two, Note 7, p.lO
52 Harris, 1. & Grace, S. "A Question of Evidence?", Supra. Chapter Two, Note 22, p. 36
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other serious non-sexual assault stands three times as high, with 19.2% of all
recorded cases in 1997 being successfully prosecuted.53
Furthermore, this trend has also been borne out by developments in England and
Wales. Despite a three-fold increase in the number of cases of rape being
reported to police departments within this jurisdiction over the past decade, the
proportion of recorded rapes that result in a defendant being convicted for rape
has fallen dramatically. Where the conviction rate for rape in England and
Wales stood at 24 % in 1985, this figure has now dropped to an almost
unprecedented low of 9% in 1997.54
Much of the discriminatory treatment encountered by the victims of rape can be
explained (although not justified) by the prevalent stereotypes that infiltrate
every day practice within society. As Carol Smart has suggested:
"the rape trial distils and epitomises all of the problems that feminists have
identified in relation to law...The rape trial is a quintessential moment in which
law provides a specific meaning to women's bodies, reproducing cultural
beliefs about female sexuality, but also constructing its own legallexion of the
female body and rehearsing its own very powerful mode of disqualification.?"
Attitudes of the judiciary and the legislature have been framed by the fear that
women, who have in a moment of passion given in to their underlying sexual
desires, can all too easily express regret the morning after by screaming rape.
Through the pervasive deployment of sexuality within modem, disciplinary
society, women's sexuality has become constructed as something separate from
the woman herself. Women are viewed as having charge of something that is of
far greater value to men than to themselves. 56
53 Figures taken from a report in The Scotsman Newspaper: Wednesday 17th February 1999. This
trend has been borne out also by figures in England and Wales where a similar 6% conviction rate for
rape cases has been identified despite a marked increase in the number of reported cases
(Approximately 7,000 in 1998/9) - 'Dispatches' Documentary, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 9.
54 Harris, 1. & Grace, S., "A Question of Evidence?", Supra. Chapter Two, Note 22, p. 43
55 Smart,c. "Penetrating Women's Bodies - The Problem of Law and Medical Technology" in Abbott
& Wallace(ed.) Gender, Power and Sexuality, Supra. Chapter One, Note 45, p.162
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The premise which underlies the rape trial is a premise which underlies the
general social confusion over the existence and exercise of an operative female
sexuality, namely that it is mysterious and whimsical, that a woman does not
know what she wants, and that even when she says 'no', she probably means
'yes'. This is an assumption that has been heavily informed by 'knowledge'
constituted within the field of medical discourse. It has subsequently been
translated into legal doctrine as part of the general trend of inter-dependency
between legal and medical discourse that was noted in Chapter One. As
Edwards has suggested,
"Within medical jurisprudence, the construction of the crime of rape and the
perception of the rape complainant echo the assumptions of femininity found
within the paradigms ofmedicine, gynaecology and psychoanalysis.'?"
Medical, legal and psychoanalytical discourse have perpetuated the assumption
that we should treat with scepticism all that a woman says in relation to sexual
matters. Paradoxically, however, and despite this apparent scepticism over a
woman's ability to exercise meaningful self-determination over the confines of
her own body, it remains the case that the women's consent or non-consent is
the fundamental definitional factor of the crime of rape.
There is nothing unique in affording such centrality to the concept of consent in
the rape trial. Indeed consent, as a legal and moral concept, is often heralded as
of primary importance and non-consent is certainly a definitional requirement of
many crimes (e.g. theft, assault, etc.). In fact it has been suggested that,
''No idea testifies more powerfully to individuals as a source of value than the
principle of consent...The existence of a doctrine of consent testifies, therefore,
to the existence of personal rights....A culture that recognises personhood,
where individuals are distinct entities, must recognise...consent as it bears on
the institutions ofproperty and sexual access. Without the distinction between
mine and thine, the notion of a person has little meaning.'?"
What makes consent such a controversial notion in the field of rape law,
however, is the manner in which the judiciary have traditionally constructed and
56 Holloway, W. "Heterosexual Sex's Power and Desire for the Other" in Cartledge, S. & Ryan, J. (ed.)
Sex and Love (1984) Women's Press
57Edwards, S., Female Sexuality and the Law, Supra. Chapter One, Note 46, p.120
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interpreted the non-consent requirement. As Whitford has alluded to in her
discussion of the works of Luce Irigaray," the corporeal reality of the male
subject is a closed one, while by contrast women's sexual bodies are
precariously open (in sex and in childbirth). Thus the crucial question for
women becomes one of territory, and of whether a visitor is a welcome guest or
an intruder. This evolves centrally around the notion of consent and illustrates
the epistemological importance that women afford to having a right of
meaningful consent.
Consent as a Threshold in Heterosexual Relations
Edwards in Female Sexuality and the Law has noted that,
"The most productive way of examining sex laws is to observe the principal
criteria behind the system of classification. The criterion of consent appears as
the key factor, and results in a major division between activities that are illegal
although the parties consent (for example homosexual sado-masochistic
practices) and activities that are illegal where the parties do not consent (e.g.
rape)?"
Recent figures suggest that the number of reported rapes by acquaintances and
intimates has substantially increased, such that this circumstance now dominates
the majority of instances brought to police attention. Within the confines of the
1999 Home Office study, for example, of the nearly 500 cases examined, only
12% of cases related to stranger rapes and the remainder were almost equally
divided between rapes perpetrated by acquaintances ofthe victim or persons of a
more intimate relationship." The implications of this upon the process of the
rape prosecution are such that the issue of consent has now become the most
crucial factor in the determination of guilt or innocence.
In the context of rape cases, this determination of guilt or innocence is therefore
dependent on the outcome of another pair of binaries being established, i.e.
58Fletcher, G. Basic Concepts ofLegal Thought, Supra. Preface, Note 3, p.109-11O
5~itford, L. Luce Irigaray - Philosophy in the Feminine, Supra. Chapter One, Note 57, p.160
6°Edwards, S. Female Sexuality and the Law, Supra. Chapter One, Note 46. Quoted in Jackson, S.
Women's Studies - A Reader (1993) Harvester Wheatsheaf, p.266
61 Harris, J. & Grace, S., "A Question of Evidence?", Supra. Chapter Two, Note 22, p. ix
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consent or non-consent. Mossman's article on feminist legal method has
illustrated the operation of a legal methodology that supports a rigid system of
exclusion of certain information, while simultaneously allowing for the
inclusion of other information that may be entirely irrelevant to the victim's
experience of the rape. 62 Smart suggests that this legal method combines with
the broader notion of a binary system of logic." Cumulatively, these two
methodologies collude to prevent what she considers a more complex
understanding of the crime of rape. The binary system of logic to which Smart
refers is illustrative of the way in which we think in oppositional terms, for
example truth / lie, rationality / emotionality, man / woman. These binary
opposites are not, however, of equal power - according to Smart, one is always
subordinate to the other and the subordinate one is always associated with the
female. On this basis, Smart alleges that the consent side of the dichotomy,
which is of crucial significance in the rape trial, is associated with the male,
while the non-consent side is associated with the female. While the male is able
to consent effectively on behalf of the female (via the defence ofmistaken belief
in consent which we will discuss shortly), it seems that the female is not able
even to consent for herself.
Even if we were to establish the invalidity of this allegation of the inequality of
the distribution of credit to opposing sides of these dichotomies, the very
construction of any kind of consent / non-consent dynamic within the context of
the rape experience is problematic. In many situations such a dichotomy may
be completely irrelevant to the female experience of rape and sex because it
denies the complexity of the victim's position. A woman may agree to a certain
level of intimacy but not to intercourse. In the legal model, however, consent to
the former is construed as consent to the latter. There is, furthermore, no room
for the concept of submission in the dichotomy between consent and non-
consent which dominates the rape trial, although submission may be the
62 Mossman, M. "Feminist Legal Method - The Difference It Makes", Supra. Chapter One, Note 12
63 Smart, C Feminism and The Power ofLaw, Supra. Chapter One, Note 10.
Olsen, F. "Feminism and CLS - An American Perspective" (1990) 18 International Journal ofthe
Sociology ofLaw 199
84
experience which the majority of raped women have endured - for example, in
the fear of future violence, they have unwillingly submitted to sex. In legal
terms, this falls within the consent side of the dichotomy because the woman
has submitted and has failed to establish non-consent.
Some superficial attempt to accommodate the specific situation of submission
within the legal treatment of rape was made in the English case of R v
Olugboja£±. In this case, the Court of Appeal judges found that "there is a
difference between consent and submission; every consent involves a
submission, but it by no means follows that a mere submission involves
consent.?" The court repudiated the suggestion that consent should be given a
narrow definition, pointing to the distinction between consent and submission.
The dicta suggests that submission obtained by threats other than of violence
might suffice for rape, and it was held that it should be left to the discretion of
the jury (with adequate judicial direction) to determine whether or not, on the
facts of the case, the woman had truly consented. The superficial concession
that this makes is far from as promising as it may initially appear, however. The
dicta is authoritative only within the English jurisdiction, and even within those
confines, it has met with little success because of the continued reliance upon
discretionary judgement which permits conclusions drawn on the basis of
sexually stereotypical conceptions of appropriate conduct."
Within the adversarial and dichotomous confines of the legal system, each court
finding of innocence implies sexual complicity and subsequent deceit on the
part of the victim, which re-affirms the perception of women's sexuality as
64 R v Olugboja (1981) 3 All ER443
65 (1981) 1 QB (CA) 320, p.332
66 This is not, however, to suggest that there is no potential for improvement in this model. Similar
developments in Victoria, Australia have been considerably more promising. Although not without
difficulties, the 1992 Amendment to the Victorian Crimes Act statutory model at least holds the
advantage over the English judicial model in that it has codified the relevant conditions of submission
for application without strong discretion. A modified version of the Victorian model has been
recommended for incorporation throughout Australian in the 1999 Draft Model Code on 'Sexual
Offences Against the Person'. It remains to be seen, however, whether this proposal will be accepted
as law at the national level.
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capncious. Judicial recognition of this perception is far from uncommon."
Patullo in Judging Women listed one of the most memorable-
"women who say no do not always mean no. It is not just a question of saying
no, it is a question of how she says it, how she shows it and makes it clear. If
she doesn't want it, she only has to keep her legs shut and she couldn't get it
without force." (Judge Wild 1982)68
Although non-consent is a required element in the definition of many crimes, it
seems that rape is unique in that court decisions have traditionally made it clear
that in order to establish that she did not consent, a female rape victim must
demonstrate that she actively resisted the alleged crime. A system of law which
has traditionally treated women as passive and powerless in matters ranging
from property ownership to voting, nonetheless demands that in intimate
matters of sexual relations, women be strong, aggressive and powerful. In the
1906 US case of Brown v State of Wisconsin22 it was clearly stated that "not
only must there be entire absence of mental consent or assent, but there must be
the most vehement exercise of every physical means or faculty within the
women's power to resist the penetration of the person." It becomes apparent
from dicta of this kind that the legal system has defined resistance in aggressive
terms - fighting back with fists, elbows and knees - although this is quite far
removed from what it generally considers to be the normal behavioural
standards of the reasonable woman. As LeGrand pointed out, it seems that rape
is the only crime that requires the victim's active resistance up to the point of
severe injury as an indication of non-consent.70Courts have interpreted silence
and non-resistance as signs of consent and even in cases where there has been a
clearly overwhelming use of force the courts have pursued the issue of consent.
In the case of People v Burnham "for example, a woman was severely beaten
and then forced to have sex with her husband and a dog, but the court still held
67 Furthermore, such judicial approval is set to strengthen with the advent of cases such as that ofLynn
Walker where a man cleared of rape allegations was able to successfully sue the alleged victim for
damages of more than £500,000 - "Woman who cried Rape faces £500,000 Libel Bill", The Guardian
Newspaper, Tuesday 8th February 2000.
68 Pattullo, Judging Women, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 37, p 20-21
69 Brown v State of Wisconsin (1906) 127 Wis. 193; 106 N.W. 536
7°LeGrand, "Rape & Rape Laws - Sexism in Society and Law" (1973) 61 California Law Review 919
71people v Burnham (1986) 222 Cal. Reprt. 630
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out the possibility of consent, or at least that the defendant might reasonably
have thought that she was consenting.
Such has been the traditional definition of the cnme of rape, and it is a
definition that has persisted in many jurisdictions supported by a rationale
which suggests that the female victim who has conformed with the appropriate
social demands of sexual chastity can only be raped if they have encountered an
overwhelming degree ofphysical force. As a converse of that premise has been
the supporting rationale that those women who do not display such signs of
utmost resistance have secretly welcomed the sexual interaction and are,
therefore, implicitly unchaste and undeserving of legal protection. As relatively
recently as 1984, we can see strong evidence of the persistence of this attitude -
in an edition of the Scottish Criminal Police Duties and Procedures Handbook, a
guideline is issued that,
"except in cases of a woman who through infirmity is unable to resist, the
woman must resist the designs ofher assailant to the last. It is not rape if, after
offering resistance, she consents to sexual intercourse.?"
The current legal definition in England describes rape simply as sexual
intercourse that takes place without the woman's consent. Originally, the
English definition also relied on the strict interpretation discussed above.
However, the 1845 case of CamplinZl appeared to change the definitional slant
adopted by the English jurisdiction. This case established for the first time that
rape could take place despite the absence of use or threats of force in
circumstances where it was clear that the victim had not consented (in this case,
the victim lacked sufficient capacity to consent to any act). This cleared the
way for English decisions, such as Mayer (l872?4 that considered it to be rape
to have intercourse with a sleeping woman. Unfortunately, however, this at
least superficially more liberal trend has not been adopted by other jurisdictions.
72 Compiled by Grampian Police for the Scottish Police Service (1984) Aberdeen, Aberdeen University
Press p.I?
73 Camplin (1845) 1 Cox C.C. 220
74 Mayer (1872) 12 Cox C.C. 311
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Most particularly, Scotland and many US states continue to abide by their strict
definitional interpretation.
In Scotland the emphasis continues to be placed on the positive presence of a
will to be overcome, rather than on the negative absence of consent. 75 In what
continues to be the leading Scottish case on rape", it was held that there must be
some force involved in rape. This difference of approach explains why in
Scotland, unlike in England, sex with a sleeping woman cannot count as rape
because her will is in a dormant state. It may also explain, in part, the attitude
of the Scottish police illustrated by the Chambers and Millar study. Where non-
expression of affirmative consent is construed as positive consent and where
only active non-consent is of a sufficient standard, the need for the additional
evidentiary weight found in signs of resistance is all the more pressing. Hence,
perhaps, the reason why the Scottish prosecution service seem to require such
compelling evidence of force before the victim's allegations will be credited."
Such speculation aside, in Scotland, it continues to be necessary to prove that
the will of the victim was overcome by violence, or by the threat of violence.
This stands as a stubborn reminder within the Scottish legal jurisdiction of the
thoughts of the influential institutional writer Hume. In Volume I of his
Commentaries, Hume notes that "the knowledge of the women's person must be
against her will and by force ... the resistance must be continued to the last, so
that it is only by main force and terror that the violation is accomplished.'?"
A similar requirement persists in many US states. Judicial affirmation of this
staunch requirement has provoked considerable agitation across Anglo-
American culture. Nonetheless, the operative evidentiary requirements in these
jurisdictions continue to demand satisfaction both of the fact that the intercourse
was without the woman's consent, and that her will was overborne by a
considerable level of violence or intimidation.
75 Gordon, G. The Criminal Law ofScotland (2nd Edition) (1978) Greens
76ChasSweenie (1858) 3 Irv 109
77 Brown, B., Burman, M. & Jamieson, L., Sex Crimes on Trial, Supra. Preface, Note 12, p. 24
88
Before we are too complacent, however, of the position under English law, it is
worth noting that the apparent change in definitional emphasis post-Camplin
may be somewhat deceptive. The legacy of the Camplin decision suggests that
the English approach to rape has done away with this requirement of force.
However, it seems that many English judges remain unaware of this shift in
emphasis - for example LCJ Parker in D.P.P v MorganZ2. stated that
"The crime of rape consists in having unlawful sexual intercourse with a
woman without her consent and by force. 'By force'. Those words mean
exactly what they say. It does not mean that there has to be a fight or blows
have to be inflicted. It means that there has to be some violence used against
the woman to overbear her will or there has to be a threat of violence as a
result ofwhich her will is overborne."
The English legislative guidelines set down by the Sexual Offences
(Amendment) Act 1976 do little to clarify the position. This statute expressly
states that rape is an offence committed when sexual intercourse takes place
without the woman's consent. However, no definition of non-consent is
provided. As Temkin notes -
"The absence of a statutory definition coupled with the dearth of juridical
authority on the matter results in a situation in which the parameters of consent
are by no means clear. Thus, it is uncertain whether and to what extent
consent may be regarded as absent where the defendant uses neither violence
nor the threat of it. .. Some judges favour a narrow and some a broad approach
to the meaning ofthe term.,,80
It is the judge in the rape trial who exercises control over what the jury takes to
be the definitional requirements of the crime. If LCJ Parker's dicta is
representative of the popular opinion of the modem day judiciary, then we
should resist the temptation to celebrate the facade of leniency which the
Camplin decision suggests, and should aim our critique of the construction of
consent in the crime of rape equally as sharply towards the English criminal
justice system.
78 Hume, D., Commentaries on the Law ofScotland, Vol. II, p.302
7'1)pp V Morgan (1976) AC 186-7
80 Temkin, J., Rape and the Legal Process, Supra. Preface, Note 12, p.63
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Consent is recognised as the central pivot of rape trials. It is supposed to
embody women's form of control over intercourse, different from but equal to
male initiative. Even as an ideal model, however, this is not an equal and
mutual terrain. The textbook law of rape, even for cases of what Estrich would
call 'ideal rape' is inappropriate because it presents consent as a free exercise of
choice under conditions of equal power. This becomes patently inadequate
when we recognise that women are socialised into passive receptivity, into a life
model of 'submit to survive'. As MacKinnon puts it, "rape law takes women's
usual response to coercion - acquiescence, the despairing response to
hopelessness, to unequal odds - and calls that consent.':" Similar forceful
sentiment has been reiterated in the critical work of Ngaire Naffine who in 1994
noted that,
"We should observe that rape is a crime whose setting is a society where
women are expected to repress their desires, where they are expected to want
what a man wants, where woman's sexual wishes are actively (though never
completely) suppressed or rendered mysterious or incredible whenever they
cease to fit the possessive form.?"
Alluded to in the foregoing chapter has been the existence of social stereotypes
and cultural inscriptions that seek to constrain female sexuality into a
precariously open and passive position. Utilising the machinery of explicit and
implicit condemnation of women who fail to conform to these sexual norms,
modem disciplinary society has perpetuated a regime of normalisation that
operates upon docile bodies to produce constructed sexual identities. At the
most simplistic level of analysis, these identities are constituted by a
polarisation of male and female as between active and passive sexual agents.
Even the most egalitarian of rape legislation will therefore remain inadequate
because it has of necessity been formulated against a background of legal
liberalism which fails to take account of this social constructionism, and of the
disparate power relations which it is illustrative of. As MacKinnon has noted in
Towards a Feminist Theory ofState, "the law of rape presents consent as free
exercise of sexual choice under conditions of equality of power without
8\ MacKinnon, C. Towards a Feminist Theory ofState, Supra. Chapter One, Note 33, p.186
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exposing the underlying structure of constraint and disparity.?" In a similar
fashion, Frazer and Lacey" have devoted much attention to criticising this
aspect of the liberal legal construction of consent in the rape trial context. They
beg the question of whether it is appropriate to disregard background social
factors about the power ofwomen to withhold their consent and to communicate
effectively that refusal in a culture where men hold power over women in the
sexual sphere.
''Not only feminist theorists and activists, but also many practising lawyers are
convinced that rape law operates oppressively to rape victims, but without an
analysis of the culture which sexualises power and disempowers women,
partly through its construction of their sexuality as a paradoxical mixture of
the capricious and the passive, political theory cannot begin to transform this
area of social practice. ,,85
Historically, the now well-revered notion of consent presented an overtly
inegalitarian dynamic - in the nineteenth century, consent was not even
superficially conceived of as a matter of the woman's will, of whether she
resisted or not. Rather, it was a matter ofhow she conducted herself, ofhow she
attempted to make it clear that she was the sexual property of another man
(husband or father). This interpretation of consent has laid the foundations for
the presumption which remains integrally implicated in the more liberal
interpretation afforded to the concept today - namely that if a woman is
unchaste, her consent may be implied, even ifthere is evidence ofher resistance.
This begs the question of whether the construction of consent in rape is much
different today, or have these draconian assumptions simply been elevated from
the status ofpractise to the level of disciplinary doctrine?"
MacKinnon has drawn heavily upon this insight into the unequal power
distributions that operate to construct the nature of female sexuality at a pre-
82 Naffme, N "Possession- Erotic Love in the Law of Rape" (1994) Modern Law Review
83 MacKinnon, C., Towards a Feminist Theory ofState, Supra. Chapter One, Note 33, p. 175
84 Frazer, E. & Lacey, N., The Politics ofCommunity (1993) Harvester, p.92
85 Frazer, E. & Lacey, N. The Politics ofCommunity, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 84, p. 92
86 Clark, A. Men's Violence; Women's Silence (1987) Pandora
Smart, c., Feminsim and The Power ofLaw, Supra. Chapter One, Note. 10, p. 41
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legal level. In line with her overall radical position, Mackinnon puts this
concern in its most dramatic construction -
"Perhaps the wrong of rape has proven so difficult to articulate because the
unquestionable starting point has been that rape is definable as distinct from
intercourse, when for women it is difficult to distinguish them under
conditions ofmale dominance.'?"
This has become a central assertion of MacKinnon's thesis on rape. She argues
that the institution of male dominance within society is so pervasive and so
powerful that it has become impossible for women to distinguish the experience
of rape from the experience of 'normal' heterosexual intercourse. In the
circumstances of the 'normal' heterosexual scenario, she alleges that the man as
sexual predator can use whatever level of force and seduction the male-
influenced legal system considers acceptable. Until we define rape purely in
terms of the victim's violation, MacKinnon concludes that all heterosexual sex
will remain indistinguishable from rape.
This is a radical standpoint with which many feminists would not seek too much
affiliation. While there is considerable rhetorical and indeed at some level
ideological value in making this assertion, many feminists remain sceptical of
the propriety of equating all heterosexual sex with rape. While it is generally
conceded that the two acts lie at different points on the same continuum, and to
that extent may well bear many unfortunate resemblances, this assertion remains
far removed from legitimating the proposal that we conflate the two acts".
MacKinnon's assertion presents far too deterministic a view of male-female
relations. What's more, it is difficult to see how equating rape with
heterosexual sex can do anything other than belittle the experiences both of the
rape victim (by making her violation 'ordinary') and the voluntarily
heterosexual sexual agent (by making her sexual relations into a rape attack).
87MacKinnon, C. "Feminism, Marxism. Method and The State", Supra. Chapter One, Note. 63, p.647
88In my opinion, a better assertion of the relationship has been afforded by Kelly in Surviving Sexual
Violence (1988) Polity where she suggests that the construction of male sexuality as dominant and
active, alongside the objectification of women as the subject of male desire and the belief that men
have rights of sexual access to certain groups of women, all contribute to a social order within which
rape and sexual assault are endemic. This remains, however, a far cry from suggesting that rape and all
heterosexual intercourse are indistinguishable
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MacKinnon becomes as guilty as her patriarchal protagonists of prioritising the
experience of some over those of others. While MacKinnon's patriarchites
privilege the experience and testimony of men over women, MacKinnon's
analysis becomes equally distortive through the privilege she affords to female
experience and testimony of violation, at the deliberate expense of women's
testimonies of loving and fulfilling heterosexual relationships. The point
against MacKinnon's radical assertions is well assessed by Archard-
"Consent does have a meaning for women. They can and do consent to
heterosexual relationships with men. That does not mean that men and women
always understand consent to these relationships in the same ways, or that
women are immune from various pressures to constrain and regulate these
relationships, or that such constraints operate to the prejudice ofwomen and to
the benefit of men, or that the existence of such constraints cannot be
explained in tenus of a disparity of power between men and women, or that
heterosexuality is or should be the only possible sexual choice for women,
individually and as a gender. However, to understand these qualifications in a
way that denies that women ever do validly consent to sex with men is
mistaken. It also ironically represents a refusal to take seriously what women
themselves take seriously: their own giving and withholding of consent.'?"
Although much of the faith that Archard places in the inherent value and
legitimacy of the concept of consent may be misplaced (for reasons that will be
discussed in more detail in later chapters), there is considerable merit in his
critique of MacKinnon's essentialist stance on this issue. Perhaps most
significant and most debilitating of all is the tendency within MacKinnon's
thesis to presuppose that it is only the construction of female sexuality into
passivity which is problematic. As is often the case with traditionally radical
feminist theories (such as those advocated by MacKinnon) this critique fails to
appreciate the more complex and dialectical dynamics of construction that
operate to constrain not only female sexuality, but also male sexuality. The debt
which feminism owes to Foucault (as we have seen) lies in his revelation that
the power to construct the meanings and requirements of social norrnativity
does not divide simplistically along gender lines, and does not lie exclusively in
the hands of the omnipotent male aggressor. Rather, our sexuality as human
social agents is constructed regardless of gender, although the demands of that
89 Archard, D., Sexual Consent, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 24, p.97
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construction do vary along gendered lines. This is not to imply, however, that
the construction of male sexuality as aggressive and virile is any less alienating
for the male heterosexual agent than is the construction of female sexuality as
passive and subordinate for the female agent.
MacKinnon's rhetorical synthesis of rape with heterosexual intercourse is
problematic at several levels, politically, ideologically and epistemologically.
Contemporary feminist analysis has increasingly recognised, however, that we
do not need to make this controversial assertion to sympathise with the point
that MacKinnon makes in relation to the difficulties of constructing a
meaningful notion of consent against the background of prevalent sexual
stereotyping and normalisation in society."
The dynamics of consent even in instances of what Estrich has called 'ideal
rape' remain fundamentally misunderstood by the law." The assumption
underlying the current liberal legal stance is informed by a belief in an inherent
equality between gendered social agents. The legal system's continued
deference to consent as the appropriate medium of communication is fuelled by
a presumption that men and women are operating that communication from the
basis of an equal and mutually respectful terrain. Lamentably, however, this is
not the case. Social stereotypes and anachronistic cultural assumptions about
the appropriate conduct of gendered social agents (male and female) inform our
subjectivities and render us subservient to the demands made by such identity
politics. Hence, men are pressured into the role of sexual hunter, while women
are encouraged to perform the role of sexual prey. This hardly represents the
climate of mutual equality, dignity and respect that the liberal legal model
seems to presuppose.
90 West, R. "Legitimating the Illegitimate - A Comment on Beyond Rape" (1993) Columbia Law
Review 1442
West, R. "A Comment on Consent, Sex and Rape" (1996) 2 Legal Theory 233
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This situation is sufficiently problematic in itself. However, in the
circumstances of 'real rape', the issues become even more complex. When the
social agents involved (particularly the woman, it seems) digress from the
socially prescribed normative sexual categories and behaviours, or when the
experience ofreal rape departs from the conceptualised model of 'ideal rape' the
ability of the agents to give or refuse meaningful consent becomes yet more
illusive. It becomes clear that only certain women (those who have conformed
to normative gendered identities) have retained the right to exercise consent or
non-consent. Admission of previous sexual history evidence in relation to the
victim permits the legal arena's incorporation of stereotypical assumptions that
in tum operate to invalidate the rights of certain social agents to the
untramrnelled protection of the law. What's more, the increasing modem trend,
identified in the previous section, which involves the admission of more general
victim-centred character evidence into the rape prosecution presents a more
deeply ingrained version of the effects of previous sexual history evidence.
Encouraging a reminiscent concern to compare the conduct of the particular
woman with the dictates of the normative ideal of passive, chaste, submissive
femininity, the increasing reliance of defence counsel upon more general aspects
of the victim's conduct and lifestyle permit a more intimate regime of discipline
that leads jurors to question her entitlement to the protection of the law on the
basis ofvarious 'improper' lifestyle choices.
Cumulatively, incorporation of both forms of evidence in cases that fail to meet
the abstract standards of the 'ideal' rape permits continued marshalling of
stereotypical female social behaviour to discredit the complainant who has
drunk alone, walked alone, dressed provocatively, etc. The effects of such
incorporation, as we have seen, are primarily located in reducing the credibility
of the 'real' victim and reducing the likelihood of redress against a sexual
violation that the jury are encouraged to perceive as invited and therefore
consensual. In a recent survey of leading barristers, Jennifer Temkin discovered
that amongst the most commonly relied upon defence strategies was the
introduction of the charge that the victim somehow brought the attack upon
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herself through her non-conformist behaviour. Such arguments imply to the
jury that even if the victim did not actually give her consent to the sexual act,
she is nonetheless to blame for its having occurred and therefore should not be
afforded the protection of rape legislation."
Adding credibility to the process of disqualification encouraged by this
incorporation of previous sexual history and victim-centred character evidence
is the manner in which the judiciary have construed the requisite mens rea of the
crime of rape. This issue was dealt with head-on by the House of Lords in the
case of D.P.P. v Morgan22. where effectively it was established that the law on
rape punishes those with a mental attitude ofrecklessness, but not of negligence.
The circumstances of this case were as follows - Morgan had invited three
strangers to have sex with his wife, whom he told them was a little 'kinky' and
may appear to struggle in order to become aroused. Based on this information,
the three claimed a defence to the charge of rape on the grounds that they
believed that Mrs. Morgan was in fact consenting. The trial judge at first
instance directed the jury that (as is the case with the determination of mens rea
in all other crimes) unless the beliefwas based on reasonable objective grounds,
it could not constitute a defence to the charge. On appeal to the House of Lords,
however, this decision was overturned and it was held that there can be no
conviction for rape in cases where the accused honestly believed that the woman
was consenting, regardless ofwhether that belief is based on reasonable grounds
or not. This decision did receive heavy criticism, however the Helibron
Committee, which was subsequently set up to review the decision, concluded
that it was correct in principle and the sentiment behind the decision has now
been given statutory authority in England and Wales via the Sexual Offences
Bill introduced in 1976. Similar sentiment has also been echoed in the Scottish
courts where the 1982 case of HMA v Meek~ adopted a similar test of
subjective belief of consent.
92 Interview with Professor Temkin, 'Dispatches' Documentary, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 9
96
Feminist commentators have been vociferous in their condemnation of this
approach - MacKinnon among others have alleged that,
"In conceiving a cognizable injury from the viewpoint of the rapist the rape
law affirmatively rewards men with acquittals for not comprehending
women's point ofview on sexual encounters.'?"
Nonetheless, the defence of mistaken belief in consent remains a cornerstone of
the current law on rape. In effect this presents a spectacular anomaly within the
legal system - the male agent is given authority to consent to sexual intercourse
not only on behalfof himself, but also on behalf of the victim. If the assailant
believes that the victim is consenting, and if the assailant believes that the
experience is one of sex and not rape, then the court will believe that the woman
was consenting and that her experience was one of sex and not rape. This
unshakeable conviction will remain intact regardless of her insistence that this
fundamentally misconstrues her own subjective interpretation of the experience.
The woman's experience is denied a voice and is supplanted by the male
impression of her experience, as it is re-enforced by the 'truth' of legal
discourse. Even in circumstances where the agents involved have fulfilled the
draconian requirements of normative social stereotypes, and the disciplinary
power networks they represent, it seems that the male agent still holds the final
and authoritative judgement. If he considers that the victim was consenting,
then regardless of the rational founding, or otherwise, of that belief the law will
accept and credit the belief of the perpetrator over the protestations of the
victim.
The law's construction of consent in the context of the rape trial has met with
heavy criticism from several camps. One of the most recurrent themes is
embodied in the claim that if the law is truly concerned with protecting the
autonomous rights of women, it should drop this persistent requirement for
resistance in a far more successful way than the relatively meagre attempts made
by the English system. If we are to take women seriously as powerful agents of
93 DPP v Morgan (1976) AC 182
94 Meek & Others v HMA (1982) SCeR 6143; (1983) SLT 280
95MacKinnon,c., Towards a Feminist Theory ofState, Supra. Chapter One, Note 33
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themselves, capable of meaningful exercise of self-determination, we must free
the law from the shackles of sexual stereotyping and we must recognise a verbal
protestation on the part of the woman as a sufficient condition for non-consent.
MacGregor's article entitled "Why When She Says No She Doesn't Mean
Maybe And Doesn't Mean Yes,,96 lodges scathing criticism of the current
standards employed in the legal construction of consent. She suggests that the
standards of what constitutes consent in the current criminal sex codes are so
weak that they undermine the moral legitimacy of the consent requirement in
general.
In seeking an improved standard for the formulation and application of the
consent threshold in rape trials, or in at least seeking an improved justificatory
framework for their current construction, Malm illustrates that the concept of
consent can be defined in several ways. For the purposes of his discussion in
"The Ontological Status of Consent and Its Implications for the Law on Rape"2.Z,
he considers it as the signification of a particular mental state, rather than as the
mental state itself. This simple definitional readjustment serves to remedy many
of the problems that feminists have encountered in the rape context. Carol
Smart has been highly critical of the law's dependence on the construction of
binary opposites and of categorical determinants because of a concern that the
psychological state of women that lies behind the issue of consent is, of
necessity, submerged in emotion and ambiguity. The merit of Malm's approach
is that it allows us to appreciate that the mental state associated with consent
may well manifest itself in degrees, but consent itself does not. Unfortunately,
it remains questionable how adoption of this definition of consent can help in
the situation of submission. We have noted the difficulty of distinguishing rape
from heterosexual sex within the rigours of our currently inegalitarian social
system - if women have been socialised to 'submit to survive' then surely we
cannot in all conscience consider such submission as an exercise of valid
consent. Nonetheless, it seems that such submission would adequately fulfil
96 MacGregor, J. "Why When she says No she Doesn't mean Maybe and Doesn't mean Yes" (1996) 2
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Malm's criteria because it would constitute an exercise of signification of a
mental state that permits sex.
Let us assume, however, that Malm seeks only to address the more superficial
problems with the current construction of consent. As a more simplistic device,
this approach to consent does seem to hold some attraction, although it does
leave us to grapple independently with the issue of the moral acceptability of the
mental state for which the exercise of consent provides a vehicle of
communication. In all but a few jurisdictions, the consent necessary to avoid a
charge of rape is defined in the negative. In other words, the woman is
presumed to have consented unless she has provided clear expression of dissent.
This has long since been the'premise of legal precedent on rape, and one would
therefore assume that this formulation of a negative definition of consent in rape
law must be supported by a particularly persuasive defence of its usefulness or
necessity. Malm's article gives a detailed examination of potential candidates
for this defence, such as those relying on arguments about the 'everydayness' of
sex or the 'everydayness' of control over one's own body, thereby implying that
the context of rape must be set apart from this as an exception to the general
presumption of consent. None of these arguments seem to be satisfactory,
however. According to Malm, negative definitions make sense as a starting
point only if the thing in question and the proposed opposite are actually
mutually exclusive and if the proposed opposite is easier to observe than the
thing in question. In the context of consent, however, this is clearly not the case
because it is possible to neither actively consent nor to actively dissent and the
signs of active consent are as observable as the signs of active dissent. The
conclusion that Malm reaches entails a fundamental reversal of the current
construction of consent such that it is premised on the assumption that the
woman has not consented and then demands proof (whether verbal or otherwise)
that she has consented, or has in some way led the man to reasonably believe
that she was consenting.
97 Malm, H. "The Ontological Status of Consent and Its Implications for the Law on Rape" (1996) 2
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This proposal although obviously a considerable improvement on the current
situation still provides some scope for concern in the fact that it leaves it open
for our discursively disciplined culture to determine what conduct on the part of
the female can be reasonably inferred as constituting consent. This brings us
back to the concern that the judiciary will play on pervasive sexual stereotypes
to suggest that the woman who drinks on her own, who walks on her own, who
goes on dates without accompaniment, who in any way deviates from
appropriate feminine conduct, has impliedly consented to sex. Within the
current social climate, it is doubtful, therefore, whether this proposal brings us
much further forward. Although superficially a revision of the definitional
requirements of rape may appear to redress the balance, the more fundamental
inadequacy remains intact. This approach is equally guilty of failing to address
the background social factors that operate to construct gendered identities and to
incorporate social judgements upon individual conduct within the legal arena.
Critique of the operation of consent in rape law that fails, like Malm's, to give
credence to the deployment of social normativity, and to the influence this bears
out upon the legal protection afforded to the particular social agent, will remain
inconclusive primarily because of its centrality within the realms of superficial,
liberal legal analysis.
The current legal construction of the concept of consent is riddled with
inadequacy. The heavy reliance of legal discourse on pervasive disciplinary
ideology necessarily results in legal codification of ill-founded sexual
stereotypes. Once supported by such convincing institutional mechanisms,
these stereotypes become accepted as a natural assertion of sexual identity and
become part of the operative social mores on the basis of which we experience
our subjective lives. These gendered roles and identities become representative
of our subjective 'truths' in the social world. Our conception of self becomes
intrinsically connected to the normative fashionings that have been elevated to
the status of indisputable truth by the interplay of the legal, medical,
psychoanalytical and sexual discourses of modernity. This has profound
implications upon the way in which we view ourselves, upon the way in which
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we are viewed by others and upon the power which we as individuals have to
exercise meaningful control over our own identity and our own subjectivity.
The concept of consent has been heralded as the moral and legal notion that
affords us rights of autonomy and self-determination over our bodies, and by
implication, our lives. However, by analysis of the construction and operation
of consent as a vehicle for communication of rights within the context of the
rape trial, we can begin to see the inadequacies of this concept. Consent is not
the neutral facilitator of self-determination which legal and moral discourse
would purport to suggest. In the context of the rape trial, we have seen that the
construction of consent has been heavily influenced by sexual ideology to such
an extent that it has become more a mechanism for affording men sexual access
to certain 'types' of women than a mechanism for protecting all women against
unwanted intrusion. As MacGregor surmises -
"From the moral point of view, concern about personal autonomy and self-
determination is represented by guaranteeing agents control over their domain
through their power of consent.. ..If consent is inferred from the mere fact of
silence or submission through intimidation or implicit threats, then consent
does not provide the agent with a significant instrument with which to police
his / her boundaries ...Consent standards in rape laws have been a travesty
against any serious account of the moral conception of consent.'?"
The shortcomings of this are particularly lamentable in the context of rape law,
for as Archard among others have noted, at stake in any sexual encounter is the
identification of the individual as an embodied self." Sex is carnal and as
incarnated beings, we have a strong interest in regulating and controlling access
to our bodies. It is a concern rooted in considerations of self-esteem, integrity
and personal dignity, and it is this that makes the failure of consent standards in
the rape context all the more damaging. In an arena where it would be hoped
that consent would command its strongest level of respect, it seems that the
concept has been distorted out of recognition, and all too often out of utility.
98MacGregor,J. "Why When she says No she doesn't mean Maybe and Doesn't mean Yes", Supra.
Chapter Two, Note 96, p. 191-2
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Conclusion
"If sexuality is relational, specifically if it is a power relation of gender,
consent is a communication under conditions of inequality. It transpires
somewhere between what the woman actually wanted, what she was able to
express about what she wanted and what the man comprehended she
wanted"'"
There is more at stake here than the need to review the legal discourse and
methodology that surrounds the rape trial. While at a pragmatic level, this is to
be welcomed as a step towards a kind of utilitarian improvement upon the lived-
out lives of rape victims, there is a more fundamental problem which needs to
be addressed within the concept of consent itself. In the preceding paragraphs,
the effect of the incorporation of nonnative expectation into the legal arena of
the rape trial has been illustrated. It has been suggested that pervasive social
stereotypes operate at the level of individual consciousness within modern,
disciplinary society to instigate a regime of normalisation, This regime posits
highly artificial and arbitrary constructions of appropriate gendered identities
and appropriate sexual conduct upon social agents. In an era of increased
pressure for conformance, those who meet these exacting demands (for men,
sexual aggression; for women, sexual passivity) are celebrated and protected,
while those who fail to conform are condemned. Women who fail to comply
with the passive imperative are refused the protection of the law and are
effectively denied the right to communicate in a voice ofnon-consent.'?'
This loss of essential autonomy is in turn justified by continued deference to a
system of highly artificial and highly restrictive ideologies and stereotypes that
restrict, not only the sexual role of women, but also their social role. As Temkin
99 Archard, D. Sexual Consent, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 24
100 MacKinnon, C., Towards a Feminist Theory a/State, Supra. Chapter One, Note 33, p.182
101 Similarly, at the other end of the spectrum - men who fail to conform to the social requirement of
aggressive heterosexuality are also refused their voice. The decision in RvBrown offers forceful
illustration of this - the parties involved were denied the ability to express their consent to homosexual
sado-massochistic practices. The court considered these practices inhumane and degrading and refused
parties involved the option of consensual participation. It seems to be no coincidence that the law is
refusing freedom of autonomous sexual expression here to a category of people who fail to conform to
prevalent normative sexual demands made upon them.
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puts it, "to justify a treatment of women which denies their autonomy, resort has
been had to a ragbag of ideas about female and male sexuality, varying from the
bogus to the irrelevant, and culled formerly from medicine, and latterly from
psychoanalysis.v'f In Foucaultian terms, this has the added benefit of
conferring even greater power upon the claims to truth of medicine and
psychoanalysis; these are claims to truth that in effect render the individual of
modernity passive and docile.
In the following chapter, we will examine a similar system of artificial and
restrictive ideologies that operate in the legal and social realm to structure
women's maternal role. Continuing to apply our methodological critique to
ensure that the extent to which disciplinary discourses in modem society have
infiltrated the legal decision-making arena is drawn out from the shadow of the
juridical, we will examine the effects of that incorporation upon the ability of
pregnant women to refuse consent in circumstances of alleged maternal-foetal
'conflict'. In performing this analysis, it will become evident that once again in
this context women's alleged right to self-determination through the vehicle of
consent has been systematically denied, overruled or blatantly ignored in order
to give credence to the purported social 'truths' of female existence which
demand a pull towards motherhood and a selfless priority in favour of the
unborn child. In the following chapter, we will examine in more detail the
ideological influences and discursive strategies that have been imposed in this
particular context of social living and legal interaction to legitimate this
treatment of the female agent. In so doing, the similarity between this
constructive process and the methodology employed in rape prosecutions to
determine consent or non-consent will also be illustrated.
102 Temkin, J. Rape and The Legal Process, Supra. Preface, Note 12, p.82
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CHAPTER THREE
CONSTRUCTED IDENTITIES AND THE POSSIBILITY OF
FEMALE NON-CONSENT IN THE MATERNAL CONTEXT
"Women's mothering is central to the sexual division of labour. Women's
maternal role has profound effects on women's lives, on ideology about
women, on the reproduction ofmasculinity and sexual inequality...,,1
While the experience of the male agent in the procreative process dictates that
the activity of copulation and the resultant birth are clearly demarcated and
separated by a lengthy period of gestation within the female body, for the
female agent the process is one of continuous progression from initial sexual
contact through to the final stages of childbirth. This circumstance of biology
has a profound effect, as we shall see, on the subjective experiences of these-
agents. Furthermore, it has a marked effect on the manner in which society
distributes responsibilities to these agents along gendered lines.
We have seen in the discussion of the previous two chapters that women's
agentic capacities have historically been oppressed by the moralistic controls
which society has placed upon their sexual expression and sexual activity. This
chapter will be dedicated to an examination of the extent to which a similar
pattern can be discerned in the social treatment afforded women's procreative
expression and activity. In perpetuating the reduction of women to their
biological functions of sex and procreation, it will be alleged that prevailing
social mores have imposed upon women a subjective identity that demands
complicity and self-sacrifice. In the context of maternal-foetal conflict, these
pervasive social imperatives have been translated most ruthlessly by medical
and legal institutions to impose upon pregnant women a highly restrictive
regime of subservience to the interests of another. Through the employment of
a variety of disparate mechanisms of force and normalisation, the law has
actively encouraged the adoption of this restrictive regime and where
1 Chodorow,N., The Reproduction ofMothering (1978) University of Califomi a Press, p.ll
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circumstances have required it, legal decision-makers have forcefully required
compliance by denying women the right to refuse consent.
Just as we were led in the preceding chapter to question the imposition of a
negative standard of consent in the rape trial,' in this chapter we will question
the imposition of a medical imperative which operates to cancel out the
necessity of maternal consent, despite a rhetoric of modem medicine which
holds out the notions of autonomy and informed consent as its central ethical
pillars. We will examine the extent to which the social expectation of passive
and altruistic motherhood has infiltrated into the legal arena's treatment of
pregnant women. The judiciary, armed once again with pervasive normative
stereotypes, have relied upon a ragbag of expectations to effectively remove
from women the right to exercise their powers of non-consent to deny
conformity to maternal ideals. Legal power has been exercised with varying
degrees of force and manipulation to ensure that pregnant women comply with
requirements of self-sacrifice to the welfare of the foetus they are carrying. This
is the 'truth' of the female maternal experience and once again legal
interpretations of consent exhibit a tendency to punish women who seek to
choose an alternative definition. The so-called maternal-foetal conflict situation
- where a woman refuses consent to invasive surgery deemed beneficial for her
foetus - has illustrated this judicial tendency most forcefully.
Against a clinical context of selective indifference to the averred wishes of the
maternal patient must also be weighed the less dramatic, but equally as
tenacious, social imperatives which construct motherhood as an essential part of
the identity of woman. In Chapter One, we discussed the notion, posited by
Adrienne Rich, of a regime of compulsory heterosexuality that operates within
the microcosms of society, promoting the belief that socially approved
heterosexual conduct is an intrinsic and essential part of female identity.' In a
2 MaIm, H., "The Ontological Status of Consent and Its Implications for the Law on Rape", Supra.
Chapter Two, Note 97
3 Rich, A. "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence" (1980) Signs, in Evans, M. The
Woman Question, Supra. Preface, Note 13
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similar fashion, this chapter will illustrate the existence of a parallel system of
compulsory motherhood that ties women's conception of self inextricably to
their fulfilment of the maternal imperative. We have seen that in the Victorian
era distrust of operative female sexuality led to the incarceration of women who
failed to conform to the restrictive social ideals; similarly, in the Middle Ages,
women who failed to reproduce children were often reproached, ridiculed and
burned as witches." The existence of such ideology, both in its historical and
more contemporary manifestations, automatically calls into question the
availability of legitimate choice for women in any sphere of the reproductive
arena.
MacKinnon has criticised the concept of consent in the rape trial context
because it operates from what she considers to be an essentially misguided
premise that the sexual interaction of heterosexual couples takes place on a
forum of individual equality.' She is cynical of the possibility of legitimate
consent against such a cultural background. In a similar way, by analysis of the
operation of social ideologies of motherhood, including the common assertion
of some kind of inherent 'maternal instinct', many feminists have become
increasingly sceptical regarding the possibility of unconstructed choice in the
issue ofmotherhood."
Cultural Inscription ofExpectations ofMotherhood
A well-illustrated examination of the social ideologies of motherhood, and the
influence that they wield over constructions of female subjectivity has been
provided by Gena Corea. In her article "What the King Cannot See" 7 she seeks
to establish that while on first sight it may appear that women do have some
inherent and natural pull towards motherhood, on closer inspection, it becomes
4 Corea, G., The Mother Machine (1988) Women's Press, p. 15
5 MacKinnon, C., Towards a Feminist Theory ofState, Supra. Chapter One, Note 33
6 Corea, G., The Mother Machine, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 4
7 Corea, G., "What the King Cannot See", in Baruch, E., D'Adamo, A. and Seager, 1. (ed.) Embryos,
Ethics and Women's Rights - Exploring the New Reproductive Technologies, (1987) Hamworth, p.78
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apparent that this desire has been heavily constructed by social forces. In
adoption of a Foucaultian position, she suggests that there is no such thing as a
desire for a child which is unstructured by the society in which the agents exist.
While acknowledging that men and women do indeed share some common
motives for desiring children, she seeks to expose the additional forces which
operate to shape a woman's will to have a child, while leaving the male's desire
unaffected.
Corea posits the existence of six social forces in particular which operate
exclusively upon women to structure their desire to bear children. Firstly, she
notes that by fixing woman's functions to the roles of sex and reproduction,
society has promoted the intemalisation of these functions by the female agents
as manifestations of their female destiny and as necessary incarcerations of their
own fulfilled subjectivity." Secondly, Corea draws attention to the subtle
manipulation of female emotions and motivations that operate through
pervasive propaganda to secure the fear that if a woman is infertile, she loses her
most basic identity as a woman. Corea alleges that such propaganda has had a
hugely coercive effect."
Manipulation through propaganda is the central methodology also of Corea's
third force - she asserts that by withholding vital information about the reality of
motherhood, and by substituting this with a socially validated cliche of
motherhood as rosy, feminine fulfilment, women are presented with a highly
artificial image of the 'reality' of motherhood. 10 To be sure, many women do
find motherhood a fulfilling and indeed empowering experience, however, many
others find it frustrating, exhausting and draining. Nonetheless, women's
negative accounts of motherhood are not incorporated into the social vision of
'ideal motherhood'.
8 Corea, G., "What the King Cannot See" in Baruch, E., D'Adorno, A. and Seager, J. (ed.) Embryos,
Ethics and Women's Rights", Supra. Chapter Three, Note 7, p. 79
9 Corea, G., "What the King Cannot See", in Baruch, E., D'Adorno, A. and Seager, 1. (ed.) Embryos,
Ethics and Women's Rights, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 7, p. 79
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In the context of the rape trial we noted the process whereby a stereotype was
constructed of the highly artificial 'ideal rape' against which all lived out
experiences of real rape were measured, and where the real experience
denigrated from the constructed ideal, the real victim was denied fair treatment
or was led to doubt the truth of her own experience. In the context of
motherhood, we can see a similar process unfolding whereby an artificial ideal
of maternal bliss is heralded as the pervasive yardstick against which all
experiences of motherhood are to be measured, and when found to be wanting,
the blame is attributed not to the unrealistic demands of the ideal but to the
mother who falls short of those demands. Once again, this acts to undermine
the confidence of the female agent, leaving her deeply sceptical of the merits of
her own abilities and judgements,
The final three social forces drawn out by Corea are all closely related and
pertain to the overall devaluation of women's experiences and abilities in the
social world - social devaluation of her labour skills, as well as of her creativity
and intelligence, and continued social complacency regarding male violence and
abuse toward women. I I These final forces collude to encourage the female
agent to retreat into the protective environment of the private sphere where her
position as wife and mother will be socially valued and her status will be
improved to afford her a better level ofpersonal protection.
As an amalgamation, these six social forces operate most insidiously to
reinforce woman's lack of self-worth and to structure women's choices,
individually and collectively. As Rothman has noted,
"Lacking economic power, physical and emotional safety, women can be
coerced into motherhood, which seems to offer a power-base from which to
negotiate for some degree of status and protection.t'"
10 Corea, G., "What the King Cannot See," in Baruch, E., D'Adorno, A. and Seager, J. (ed.) Embryos,
Ethics and Women's Rights, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 7, p. 80
11 Corea, G. "What the King Cannot See", in Baruch, E., D'Adorno, A. and Seager, J. (ed.) Embryos,
Ethics and Women's Rights, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 7, p. 80-81
12 Rothman, B., "The Tentative Pregnancy", in Baruch, D'Adorno & Seager (ed.) Embryos, Ethics and
Women's Rights, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 7, p. 81
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The net result of these forces, according to Corea is a profound reduction in the
female sense of self-definition and autonomy.
"The autonomous ability of these women to control their procreative progress
is diminished. Another aspect of a woman's self-definition is undermined
which, when added to her loss of political, economic and social power,
transforms her consciousness of herself as an inferior being...Loss of
autonomous reproduction is one more fundamental layer leading to a loss of
Self.,,13
Ifwe are to accept this conclusion, then we must begin also to call into question
the legitimacy of the liberal and juridical notion of unfettered and unconstrained
consent for the female agent in any reproductive context."
A more radical critique of the forces bearing upon operation of a network of
compulsory motherhood has been offered by Shulamith Firestone. In her
controversial work, The Dialectics ofSex15, she alleges that it is specifically the
female role as reproducers that has handicapped women throughout history and
has made possible the tenacious stronghold of male power that she believes
exists. She sees the future liberation of women as being heavily reliant on the
promises heralded by the new reproductive technologies that will free women
from the curse of their reproductive role. This suggestion has been met with
mixed response from within the feminist community. FINNRAGE (Feminist
International Network of Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering)
writers, for example Corea, are staunchly opposed to such technological
advancement. They have sought to reclaim the experience ofmotherhood as the
foundation ofwomen's identity and they consider the severing of sexuality from
reproduction to be an attack on women, and an attempt by men to appropriate
the reproductive capacities that have historically been the unique source of
women's power."
13 Corea, G., "What the King Cannot See", in Baruch, D'Adorno & Seager (ed.) Embryos, Ethics and
Women's Rights, Supra. Chapter Thee, Note 7, p. 90
14 An examination of this issue will form the body of ensuing discussion within this chapter regarding
the implications of constructive forces upon the legitimacy of the operation ofprevailing consent
standards.
15 Firestone, S The Dialectic ofSex, (1979) Women's Press
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Firestone's analysis is indeed problematic at many levels, not least because of
her failure to disentangle the social and biological aspects of childbirth and
childrearing. Nonetheless, her central thesis that a feminist theory of women's
historical and current social position must start with the process of human
reproduction has proven very popular with many other writers in the field, for
example Mary O'Brien who in The Politics of Reproduction17 argued that
reproduction is not an unchanging biological constant, but rather a process of
dialectics related to human consciousness and the fluid bases ofhuman society.
By building on the insights implied at the outset of this chapter regarding the
differences in epistemological experience of the reproductive process between
gendered social agents, O'Brien suggests that this alienation of the male from
the reproductive process is the root inspiration for the social institution of
patriarchy. Adopting the insights of Hegel regarding the notion of dialectics
and applying this to analyse the processes that operate to structure the
frameworks ofreproduction, O'Brien asserts that
"Man, the procreator, by virtue of his need to mediate his alienation from
procreation, is essentially man the creator. What he has created are the
institutional forms of the social relations ofreproduction, forms which mediate
the contradictions in male reproductive consciousness.':"
Men have long since understood their separation from nature and their need to
mediate this separation. Hence, according to O'Brien, patriarchy has become
the medium through which they have assumed for themselves the power to
transcend natural realities with historical, and man-made realities. The
dialectical structure of reproductive consciousness is reaffirmed in the social
relations of reproduction, and thus in a female reproductive consciousness that
is aware of the child as hers, but also of the fact that she is the child born of
another woman. This reproductive labour serves, then, to confirm woman's
sense of genetic coherence and species continuity. By contrast, male
reproductive consciousness is splintered and discontinuous, and it cannot be
16 Corea, G. The Mother Machine, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 4
I7 O'Brien, M., The Politics ojReproduction (1981) Routledge
18 O'Brien, M., The Politics ofReproduction, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 17, p. 56
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mediated within the reproductive process. Men, thus alienated from their
children, seek to transcend that alienation by in their tum alienating women
from their reproductive labour power, through the medium ofpatriarchy.
This important distinction between the female expenence of her own
reproductive consciousness and the resultant contortions of that consciousness
once it has been appropriated by patriarchy is lamentably lacking in Firestone's
own theory. Her assertion of pregnancy as an essentially humiliating and
oppressive activity has been contra-indicated by the experiences of many
women who have found the journey through pregnancy, childbirth and
motherhood extremely positive and fulfilling. Feeding into this confusion,
many cultural feminists have sought to redefine the experience of pregnancy to
give credence to the positive aspects of the experience, not only in order to give
voice to the lived-out experience of many women, but also to challenge the
seemingly uncritical acceptance of the patriarchal value system that informs
Firestone's assertions.
A particularly effective attempt at this reconciliation of feminist theory with
female experience has been pioneered by Adrienne Rich. In Of Woman Born 19,
she takes pains to stress that it is not the biological fact of giving birth that
oppresses women, but the fact that they reproduce in the context of a patriarchal
society in which motherhood is (as Corea has proposed) seldom freely chosen
and is controlled by prevailing social forces. In order to clarify this point, she
draws a sharp distinction between the experience and the institution of
motherhood, aiming her critique only at the latter form. Hence, her work is "not
an attack on the family, or on mothering, except as defined and restricted under
patriarchy.?" While acknowledging the importance of Firestone's work, Rich
criticises her for reproducing a male-influenced ideology of childbirth by failing
to imagine what transformations might occur in the experience of childbirth
19 Rich, A., OfWoman Born (1977) Virago
20 Rich, A., Of Woman Born, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 19, p.14
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should the present realities surrounding it be changed. According to Rich,
therefore, Firestone makes a fatal error in her failure to appreciate that
"It was not, then, the fact of women's capacity to reproduce that was the basis
of women's enslavement...but the mode by which that fact had become
integrated into the systems of male political and economic power over
women.'?'
Rich argues that it is the male-centred control of motherhood, rather than the
experience of pregnancy itself, which has turned women's reproductive power
into a patriarchal institution, a form of 'penal servitude' that confines women to
their bodily functions and denies their manifold potentialities.
"The institution has been a keystone of the most diverse social and political
systems. It has withheld over one-half of the human species from decisions
affecting their lives...In the most fundamental and bewildering of
contradictions, it has alienated women from our own bodies by incarcerating
us in them. At certain points in history, and in certain cultures, the idea of
woman-as-mother has worked to endow all women with respect...But for the
most ofwhat we know as the 'mainstream' of recorded history, motherhood as
institution has ghettoized and degraded female potentialities.?"
She aims to recover that feminine experience of motherhood that has been
repressed by patriarchy by reconnecting women to their bodily powers,
encouraging them to think through their bodies to attain a new consciousness.
This reformative proposal is, however, saddled by the same idiosyncrasies that
have plagued the Foucaultian assertion that we use our bodies and our
subjective experiences of them to subvert oppressive power dynamics." The
problem in either context remains one of method, of how this fundamental
change is to be brought about in a social context where the most intimate
aspects of self are rigidly constructed."
A similar approach has been adopted by Nancy Chodorow in her analysis of the
institution of motherhood entitled The Reproduction of Mothering -
Psychoanalysis and the Sociology ofGender. Chodorow notes that although the
21 Eisenstein, Contemporary Feminist Thought (1984) Unwin, p71-2
22 Rich, A., OfWoman Born, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 19, p.13
23 Foucault, M. The History ofSexuality Vol. I, Supra. Chapter One, Note 3
24 Fraser, N., "Foucault - A Young Conservative?" in Fraser, N., Unruly Practice, Supra. Chapter Two,
Note 1, p. 55
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physical and biological requirements of childbearing and child care have
markedly decreased in recent societies, it appears that women's mothering role
has in fact gained psychological and ideological importance, and has come
increasingly to define women's lives. In this work, she seeks to contribute to
the overall feminist effort to demystify the institutions of patriarchy by
analysing the reproduction of mothering throughout the ages as a central and
contributing element to the social organisation and reproduction of gender. In
adoption of a more individualistic, and psychoanalytical, explanation of the
phenomenon ofmotherhood, she alleges that
"the contemporary reproduction of mothering occurs through society's
structurally induced psychological processes. It is neither a product of
biology, nor of intentional role-playing ....(rather) women's mothering
reproduces itself cyclically. Women, as mothers, produce daughters with
mothering capacities and the desire to mother...By contrast, women as mothers
(and men as not-mothers) produce sons whose nurturance capacities and needs
have been systematically curtailed and repressed.?"
Parenting is not simply comprised of a set of non-specific behaviours, rather it
involves participation in a diffuse and interpretative relationship - as Chodorow
says, "good-enough mothering requires certain relational capacities which are
embedded in personality and a sense of self-in-relationship.'?" Here again we
see the suggestion that social standards of mothering are measured against the
structured ideal ofwhatever is to constitute good-enough mothering. This ideal,
however, is not an ideal that stands in abstraction from the social context in
which it is elevated to the status of absolute. Rather, the very demands and
ideology that inform that society's supportive structures are heavily implicated
in the demands of the ideal.
"Women's mothering is tied to many other aspects of our society, is
fundamental to our ideology of gender, and benefits many people. It is a
major feature of the sex / gender system. It creates heterosexual asymmetries
which reproduce the family and marriage, but leave women with needs that
lead them to care for children...It creates a psychology of male domination and
fear ofwomen in men. It forms a basis for the division of the social world into
25 Chodorow, N., The Reproduction ofMothering, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 1, p. 7
26 Chodorow, N., The Reproduction ofMothering, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 1, p. 33. In the
following chapters of this work we will come to see that this sense of self-in-relationship is hugely
problematic when it is juxtaposed alongside the possibility of female consent
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unequally valued domestic and public spheres, each the province of people of
a different gender.'?"
The impossibility of compliance with demands made in the name of an artificial
ideal of motherhood has also been developed by the works of Ann Oakley.
Through a critical analysis of the themes most commonly highlighted in
contemporary pregnancy advice literature, Oakley seeks to illustrate the
traditional requirements that inform the contemporary ideal of 'normal
motherhood'." She highlights five themes which are particularly prominent in
such literature, being passed over as medical descriptions of normal motherhood
- normal mothers, or mothers-to-be, are people who are especially in need of
medical care and protection; they are essentially childish, but at the same time
are fundamentally altruistic; they are married; and they ought to be happy but
are instead beset with anxiety and depression. Of all these themes, Oakley
suggests that the notion of an inherent maternal altruism is the most prevalent.
She suggests that putting the baby first is perhaps the primary definition of
normal motherhood in modem industrialised societies, owing much to the
development of child psychology and the creation of a feminine psychology that
takes self-immolation to be a sign ofproper womanhood. As Oakley points out,
however, this requirement is also perhaps the most artificial of all.
"To be overcome by such spontaneous feelings of 'natural' maternal warmth
and acceptance is noL.the destiny of most mothers at this particular moment
in their motherhood careers. But it is, on the other hand, a very definite image
of how mothers expect childbirth to be - and how they imagine that they
themselves will feel and act.,,29
Oakley summarises the themes heralded in the advice literature as stipulating
normal motherhood as an exercise in 'the denial of the self .30 The general
approach suggests that a woman's capacity for choice is necessarily modified by
27 Chodorow, N., The Reproduction ofMothering, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 1, p. 218-9
28 Oakley, A., "Normal Motherhood - An Exercise in Self-Control?" in Hutter & William (ed.)
Controlling Women (1981) Croom Helm
29 Oakley, A., "Normal Motherhood- An Exercise in Self-Control?" in Hutter & Williams (ed.)
Controlling Women,Supra. Chapter Three, Note 28, p.85
30 Oakley, A. "Normal Motherhood - An Exercise in Self-Control?" in Hutter & Williams (ed.)
Controlling Women, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 28, p. 89
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her 'nature', thus rendering her a fit subject for the care, protection and control
of medical experts. Women's interactions with the medical profession are (as
Foucault would doubtless concur) an important means of conveying to pregnant
and nursing women what types of behaviour are acceptable. Such translation of
moral assumptions and expectations into laws of 'nature' operate to forcibly
maintain the female image. Hence, 'maternal instinct' is natural while
conversely it is 'unnatural' for a woman not to want children, and it goes
'against their nature' to seek an abortion. 'Good' mothers take the advice of
experts, they breast-feed their babies and they stay at home, 'bad' mothers are
'selfish' and 'foolhardy' in their quests for a career, etc.
In reality, there is an inherent clash between a mother's needs and those of her
child. The requirement of normal motherhood that the mother's needs be
relegated to the background in order to respond selflessly to those of the child
marks an extremely difficult transition for most women. The advice literature,
however, cultivates an expectation within mothers-to-be and within society at
large that this transition should be managed without difficulty or resentment,
and that what's more women should derive personal joy and enrichment from
such selfless subservience. Women who do not cope well with the strain that
this transition causes are labelled at best inadequate, and at worst psychiatrically
imbalanced.
Implication ofCultural Inscription Upon the Exercise ofChoice
Each of the foregoing writers provides highly diverse accounts of motherhood
as personal experience and as social phenomenon. The purpose of this chapter
is not to attempt any kind of reconciliation of these theories, nor to attempt any
determination of which theory is superior. The most interesting aspect of this
ongoing dialogue on motherhood, for our current purposes, relates to the
common thread that is asserted by all the theorists regarding the way in which
pregnancy and motherhood are implicated in what society considers the
essential role of the feminine.
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Each of these theorists, despite their internal disputes, has posited a scenario
where the experience and institution of motherhood are held out by society as
imperative components of appropriate female subjectivity. Women are
constructed by this pervasive ideology, and in their tum have begun to
internalise the demands that this asserts upon them. Helena Deutsch (an
extremely unlikely feminist figurehead)" has been one among many academics,
more or less sympathetic to the feminist crusade, who have noted that in any
society, women's experience of their body in childbirth is necessarily mediated
by the social attitudes that surround them. Women may well experience
childbirth, and motherhood, as extremely fulfilling, however, until we dispel the
social myths that surround the whole process of pregriancy, we will never be
able to truly determine whether this is the case. Rich was indeed correct in her
assertion that we need to separate the experience from the institution of
childbirth. Simone de Beauvoir, in The Second Sex, has drawn on the
psychoanalytical insight that
"no factor becomes involved in the psychic life without having taken on
human significance; it is not the body-object described by biologists that
actually exists, but the body as lived in by the subject.?"
Women's experience of childbirth derives much of its significance from the
rigours of the social structure through which it is mediated. It is only when we
have dispelled the myths of ideal motherhood, and of motherhood as the
essential manifestation of female identity that we can begin to give real
credence to the experience itself.
One of the most insidious elements of the social myth of motherhood is rooted
in social assertions that the identity of woman as mother is a necessary element
in the identity of woman as woman. The reduction of women to their
procreative powers has been a pervasive medium of social control throughout
history, and it continues (albeit in more subtle manifestations) today. All the
theories on motherhood discussed above have highlighted the extent to which
society exercises its forces of normalisation to pressure women into a maternal
31 Deutsch, R., The Psychology of Women, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 33.
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role. We do not need to resort to examples of rape or incest where the woman
has been impregnated against her will to illustrate the point that motherhood as
an institution is rarely entirely freely entered into. Even in the circumstances of
what must be considered the 'normal' pregnancy - i.e. where the woman has
taken a conscious decision to fall pregnant and become a mother - it is alleged
that this is not an exercise ofunconstrained choice.
Rothman's work The Meaning of Choice in Reproductive Technology33 makes
a crucial point about the role of choice in personal decision-making. Although
she raises the issue specifically in regard to the advent of assisted reproductive
technology, the suggestion behind the premise can be applied equally to all
decisions relating to the institution of motherhood. Rothman points out that
while individual choice must always be defended, as an intrinsically valuable
ethical imperative, exercise of that choice must always be understood within the
context of the society which structures the choices available to individuals. In a
society which posits the family network as ideally heterosexual, male-headed,
and childrearing, women continue to gain their status from their relationship to
men, whether as daughters, wives or mothers." As Corea has noted, women
seeking improved social status in such an environment will consider the
protection afforded by adopting a maternal role to be a material factor in their
decision to bear children."
Choice has been the watchword of feminists arguing in favour of women's
reproductive rights without state control. However, as we have seen, serious
questions must be asked regarding the adequacy of the notion of choice in a
social environment where women are continuously pressurised (consciously and
sub-consciously) to fulfil a role as mothers. In the liberal legal model of
32 De Beauvoir, S., The Second Sex, Supra. Chapter One, Note 53, p.38
33 Rothman, B., "The Meaning of Choice in Reproductive Technology", in Arditti, R., Klein, R. &
Minden, S. (ed.) Test-Tube Women: What Future/or Motherhood? (1984) Pandora
34 Aldbury, R., "Who Owns the Embryo?" in Arditti, R., Klein, R. & Minden, S (ed.) Test-Tube
Women, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 33, p.57
35 Corea, G. "What the King Cannot See" in Baruch, E., D'Adomo, A. & Seager, 1. (ed.) Embryos,
Ethics and Women's Rights, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 7, p. 78-81
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equality and egalitarianism, issues of power distribution are masked behind a
facade of neutrality that obscures form consideration the real dynamics that
affect the decision of a woman to bear children in our current social structure.
Any adequate critique of the notion of consent must recognise the artificiality of
such liberal frameworks as part of its overall challenge.
"Perhaps what we should realise is that human beings living in society have
precious little choice ever. There may really be no such thing as individual
choice in a social structure, not in any absolute way. The social structure
creates needs - the need for women to be mothers - and creates the technology
which enables people to make the needed choices. The question is not
whether choices are constructed but how they are constructed. Society, in its
ultimate meaning, may be nothing more and nothing less than the structuring
of choices.,,36
Rebecca Aldbury in "Who Owns The Embryo"?" has argued that to define such
issues within a framework of 'choice' for women is totally inadequate because
the concept derives from a liberal philosophy which assumes no serious
differentiation in power amongst social groups. In reality, however, we live in a
gendered society in which women's identities are heavily constructed.
Consequently, women are pressurised into a role as mother in order to afford
themselves a greater level of respect and protection. An individual's perception
of choice is shaped by what it is that society teaches each individual to want.
Hence, for those women who 'choose' pregnancy and motherhood, the choice is
very real, although in reality heavily constructed. In The Transexual Empire,
the point is made in relation to a woman's 'choice' to enter into IVF
programmes that "the appearance of voluntarism is deceptive, for the control
over women begins a long time before they can voice a choice." 38 Social
stereotypes invoking the role of woman as mother filter through society's
institutions with the propaganda that women are nothing unless they bear men's
children. Through philosophy, psychiatry, religion, literature,
36 Rothman, B., "The Meaning of Choice in Reproduction" in Arditti, R., Klein, R. & Minden, S. (ed.)
Test-Tube Women, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 33, p. 32
37 Aldbury, R., "Who Owns the Embryo?" in Arditti, R., Klein, R. & Minden, S. (ed.) Test-Tube
Women, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 33
38 Raymond, The Transsexual Empire, (1979) Women's Press
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"Century after century, the message seeped deeply into woman: If she cannot
produce children, she is not a real woman, for producing children is the
function that defines woman.'?"
We live in a society that reduces women to their biological and procreative
functioning by asserting that their primary fulfilment as women can only be
found through adoption of the role of mother. In such a cultural climate,
women's exercise of 'choice' to become mothers has been fundamentally
mediated by social demands. What's more, women's sense of subjective
identity and worth have become inextricably linked to their ability to reproduce.
We must, then, call into question the confidence with which we can talk of any
woman's choice to become a mother, and we must adopt a more cynical
approach to the prospects of any system that relies upon the liberal
presuppositions of unfettered and self-determining female choice within such a
social context.
To assert some cynicism over whether the exercise of female choice in the
reproductive arena is unconstructed is not, however, to dismiss the experience of
the woman who believes it to be a meaningful exercise in self-expression.
Indeed, the process of procreation has the potential to be one involving the
utmost in self-expression. In our discussion of the experience and institution of
motherhood, we must not forget therefore that motherhood as an experience
holds a profoundly liberating promise, and we must exercise caution not to
dismiss the positive accounts of the experience in our concern to criticise the
institution of compulsory motherhood within which that experience is
encapsulated.
The critique that radical feminists such as Firestone" and O'Brien41 have
advanced, postulating patriarchy as the pervasive enemy, and reproduction as its
39 Corea, G. "What the King Cannot See" in Baruch, E., D'Adorno, A. & Seager, J. (ed.) Embryos,
Ethics & Women's Rights, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 7, p.89
40 Firestone, S. The Dialectics ofSex, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 15
41 O'Brien, M. The Politics ofReproduction, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 17
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primary tool, heralds considerable rhetorical benefit. We have seen, however, in
the context of the more radical feminist theories on rape (such as those
presented by MacKinnon in the previous chapter") that we must resist the
temptation to become overwhelmed by such hyperbolic potentiality. Not only
should we express concern over the simplified model that this radical vision
posits of the power dynamics between men and women in society (as has been
discussed at length through our contrast between Foucault and MacKinnon in
Chapter One), but we should also be wary of the implications that flow from
often counter-intuitive radical claims.
Feminism must remain true to its methodology, and to its ideology which
demands continued effort to articulate the realities of female experience." In
order to do so effectively, and realistically, we must refrain from too heavy a
reliance on radical theories that posit a deterministic vision of women as
eternally oppressed. While it is necessary to recognise the means through which
this oppression is signified in the institutional support networks of society, it is
also necessary to delineate space for the expression of women's experiences of
pregnancy and childbirth, whether they be positive or negative. This remains
the benefit of the more cultural analysis advocated by Rich" - this enables us to
re-affirm the positive epistemological expressions of motherhood while
simultaneously deconstructing the social imperatives within which they are
constructed.
It seems, however, that even if this institution of compulsory motherhood could
be deconstructed such that each woman's choice to become a mother was truly a
choice of expression of self, rather than a coerced expression of social
normalisation, the problematic nature of choice in the motherhood experience
would reoccur at a stage later in the gestational process. On the assumption that
42 MacKinnon,. C. Towards a Feminist Theory ofState, Supra. Chapter One, Note 33. Discussed in
Chapter Two, Note 81 onwards.
43 Jaggar, A. "Feminist Ethics" in Becker, L. & Becker, C. (ed.) Encyclopaedia ofEthics, Supra.
Preface, Note 7
44 Rich, A. Of Woman Born, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 19
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all pregnant women have voluntarily chosen their motherhood role, the issue of
female choice and the ineffectiveness of the vehicle of female consent are again
brought to light within the field of maternal-foetal conflict where a pregnant
woman's refusal of consent to medical treatment for the benefit of her foetus
strikes against the normative assumption of unlimited maternal altruism. Where
the preceding discussion has critiqued the effect of the cultural assumption of
woman as inevitable mother on the construction and exercise of female choice,
the remainder of this chapter will centre upon this problematic interplay
between female consent and the cultural assumption of pregnant women, and
mothers, as inherently self-abnegating and altruistic.
Consent as a Threshold in Foetal Therapy
Facilitated by recent advances in reproductive technology and ideology, a new
trend has developed within the field of obstetrics that posits the foetus as a
patient, distinct and separate from the women in whose body it is formed. This
has allowed medical and social imperatives to interject into the maternal-foetal
relationship at a far earlier stage of gestation. When coupled with the general
social imperative that women sublimate themselves and their own medical care
to the demands of the foetus, the advent of this new technology poses a
considerable threat to the autonomy of the pregnant woman. Over recent
decades this has been used to justify various infringements on female autonomy,
including enforced medical treatment of the maternal patient for the benefit of
the foetus," attempts at punishment ofmothers for failing to take due care of the
foetus," and even the suggestion of taking custody of the foetus (and therefore,
by necessity, of the woman) to ensure that such due care is taken." Such a shift
in ideology poses the potential for considerable infringement upon the rights
and freedoms afforded to pregnant women. Predictably, therefore, it has created
45 Re. S (1992) 4 All ER 671
46 D v Berkshire County Council (1987) 1 All ER 20
47 Re F (In Utero) (1988) 2 All ER 193
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a stonn of agitation amongst feminist commentators and condemnation of this
trend has been vociferous."
Within the confines of this work, we will examine the implications of these
developments in relation to the medical care received by the maternal patient
and the broader social and legal effects that this generates. Despite a general
concern within medical discourse to act beneficently and only with the informed
consent of the patient, it seems that many of the cases of enforced treatment
have contradicted these ethical principles. This brings into question the issue of
whether such derivation from the general principles of modem medical care can
be justified on alternative grounds. Discussion through the duration of this
chapter will suggest the conclusion that there can be no justification for such
blatant breach ofwomen's rights to bodily integrity and individual autonomy.
Clinical Obstacles to the Establishment a/Non-Consent
To understand the problematic nature of the maternal-foetal conflict situation,
we must first understand the nature of the dilemma that it poses to the physician
involved. Technological advances in foetal treatment and therapy have allowed
physicians to identify the existence of two separate and distinct patients where
formerly only one was recognised. This elevation of the foetus to patient status
has not occurred because of any change in the nature of the foetus, nor in the
nature of the maternal-foetal relationship. It has been facilitated, rather, by the
increased availability of advanced medical technologies. When a pregnant
woman refuses medical treatment that has been recommended as beneficial for
the health of the newly individuated foetal patient, physicians are faced with a
conflict between honouring what are perceived to be competing values of foetal
benefit and maternal autonomy.
48 Gallagher, J., "Prenatal Invasions and Interventions - What's Wrong with Fetal Rights?" (1987) 10
Harvard Women's Law Journal 9 provides an illustrative example of such condemnation.
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Prior to the advent of the technological avalanche, in situations where maternal
and foetal burdens associated with foetal therapy were relatively small and the
prospective benefits to the foetus were substantial, the physician had a duty to
consider whether the combined maternal-foetal benefits to the organic whole of
mother and foetus outweighed the combined maternal-foetal burdens. If the
result of this balancing equation proved positive, the physician was under a duty
to recommend, but not to enforce, treatment. As the physician became armed
with more complex technical machinery, s/he was enabled to see the foetus and
the pregnant woman as separate patients. In this light, it was no longer
appropriate to consider the effects of treatment on the two combined. On the
basis of this two-patient model, when foetal problems did arise, they often posed
no tangible threat to maternal health. However, to care for the foetal patient
necessarily involves some degree of discomfort, harm or risk being imposed
upon the maternal patient without any off-setting therapeutic benefits. On the
basis of the traditional evaluation, then, maternal medical burdens outweigh
maternal medical benefits and ordinarily, this would require a recommendation
against treatment from the physician." This presents a difficult dilemma for the
physician to untangle. The only other area of medical practice where a
comparable dilemma may arise relates to donor transplantation. In this area,
moves towards a more utilitarian ethic whereby resultant medical rescue would
justify the imposition of relatively small harms and risks on others have been
strongly resisted (e.g. the US case ofMcFall v Shimp~).
On the one-patient model, conflicts between maternal and foetal medical needs
occur within, not between patients and their resolution involves an internal
balancing decision. On the two-patient model, however, competing maternal
and foetal needs must be settled by applying a standard of justice by which the
doctor is not permitted to benefit one patient by inflicting medical harms upon
another.
49 Mattingly, S. "The Maternal-Fetal Dyad" (1992) Hastings Report, 16
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Of course, in most cases, pregnant women will continue to identify foetal needs
and interests with their own, and will request treatment to promote foetal health.
However, a physician may not recommend foetal therapy as if it were medically
indicated for both patients and the clinical dilemma arises when the maternal
patient withholds consent to treatment. On the traditional one-patient obstetric
model, recommended foetal therapy offers net medical benefits to the pregnant
woman. Although efforts to encourage consent are appropriate, enforced
treatment of a competent dissenting patient is unacceptable. Where on this
model the dissenting patient is causing harm only to herself because the foetus
is seen as part ofher self, on the two-patient model this is no longer the case and
a remit for potential challenge to maternal autonomy is established.
Despite advances in obstetrical care, interventions on behalf of the foetus
continue to require the medical invasion of the mother and any such medical
invasion necessarily brings with it attendant risks to maternal health. In this
circumstance, refusal of treatment is refusal of treatment that is contrary to the
medical interests ofthe maternal patient. As Mattingly explains,
"Detached conceptually from the fetus, the maternal patient suffers medical
harms from fetal therapy that are no longer offset by fetal benefits. Her
physician may not recommend fetal therapy for her, and the injunction against
harming one patient voluntarily to help another is virtually absolute."?'
In an attempt to protect themselves from the implications of making a wrong
treatment decision, physicians have tended to tum to the courts to give legal
credence to their paternalistic demands. We will shortly go on to look in more
detail at how it is that the courts on both sides of the Atlantic have sought to
deal with such complex situations. Before doing so, however, it is important
that we develop a better understanding of how this shift in the clinical
perception of the maternal-foetal relationship has affected the manner in which
the relationship is perceived in the broader social arena.
50 McFall v Shimp (1978) 127 Pitts. Leg. J 14
51 Mattingly, S. "The Maternal-Fetal Dyad", Supra. Chapter Three, Note 49
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We have discussed at some length in Chapter One Foucault's assertion that the
ideology cultivated within the field of medical discourse has a profound effect
on the overall structuring of pervasive social mores. In the specific example of
the maternal-foetal relationship, this certainly appears to be the case. Medical
technology, having advanced to permit clinical recognition of a two-patient
model, has fuelled a shift in perception of the maternal-foetal relationship at a
more general level. The claim that medical discourse makes to truth and
rational objectivity has promoted a ready acceptance within society at large of
all the ideology that it espouses. The 'truth' of the maternal-foetal relationship
has become one of two separate entities with potentially mutually exclusive and
hostile interests. Women have increasingly become perceived less as the life-
lines and protectors of their children, and more as incubator environments for
separate individuals. This 'truth' has been adopted and perpetuated within the
social field and has heralded a significant alteration in the treatment received by
the pregnant woman, medically and socially.
It has been proposed by many UK commentators on this issue that the case of
CvSg marked the original infiltration of this social ideology into the field of
legal doctrine." In this case, we can trace the origins of the legal separation of
the foetus from the mother which has provided the basic ideology for the foetal
rights movement, and which is closely linked to the development of the new
reproductive technologies. As we have become increasingly able, in the clinical
context, to conceptualise the foetus as separate from the mother, this has led to a
rapid increase in attempts to afford the foetus rights as a legal subject. These
claims have been supported by the new technologies in that the moral claim to a
right to life can now be attached more concretely to an identifiable being. In
tum, this new model of conceptualisation has led to the mother being viewed as
a potential threat to the foetal entity inside her body. As we will come on to
discuss later in this chapter, the implications of this new perception of a
52 C v S (1987) 1 All ER 230
53 Smart,C., "Penetrating Women's Bodies - the Problem of Law and Medical Technology" in Abbott
& Wallace (ed.) Gender, Power. and Sexuality, Supra. Chapter One, Note 45, p. 171
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potentially hostile relationship between mother and foetus has had profound
effects on the liberty and status ofpregnant women.
One of the most staunch advocates of the foetal rights movement has been
Margaret Shaw. In her article "The Potential Plaintiff - Preconception and
Prenatal Torts"54 she suggests that,
"once a pregnant woman has abandoned her right to abort and has decided to
carry the foetus to term, she incurs a 'conditional prospective liability' for
negligent acts towards her foetus if it should be born alive."
Arguments such as this one are both common and dangerous. Not only do they
posit the notion that the foetus has rights (which in itself is an extremely
difficult moral and legal notion), but they also assert that these rights are
different from and potentially opposed to those of the mother whose body keeps
it alive.55 Perhaps more disconcerting, furthermore, is that these arguments
place the responsibility for implementing these 'rights' squarely on the
individual woman, without any consideration that reasonable steps should also
be taken at the social level to ensure that pregnant women have access to good
nutrition, housing and education in order to enable them to comply with the
demands made upon their body. Hubbards has summarised the duplicitous
nature of new medical technology most aptly when she suggests that,
"the very availability of the new technologies, however uncertain and
unexplored they may be, increases women's isolation by playing on our sense
of individual responsibility to produce healthy children.':"
Of all the arguments that have been asserted in favour of foetal rights, those that
have generated the most support have been those based upon 'scientific' and
technical developments. Janet Gallagher in "The Fetus as Patient" has been
highly sceptical of any such alleged 'scientific objectivity' in these
54 Shaw. M., "The Potential Plaintiff - Preconception and Prenatal Torts" in Milinsky, Aubrey &
Annas (ed.) Genetics and the Law II (1980) Plenum, p. 228
55 Diduck, A. "Legislating Ideologies ofMohterhood", Supra. Preface, Note 14 considers rights
discourse in the pregnancy context to be wholly inappropriate because its ascription of an atomistic
foetal individual is inconsistent with the experience of pregnancy
56 Hubbard, R., "Personal Courage Is Not Enough - Some Hazards of Childbearing in the 1980s" in
Arditti, R., Klein, R. & Minden, S. (ed.) Test-Tube Women, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 33, p. 350
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developments. She proposes that they simply "provide contemporary scientific
rhetoric for reassertions of powerful, largely unacknowledged social attitudes in
which pregnant women are viewed and treated as vessels.'?" Jennifer Terry has
built upon this critique and, in adoption of the Foucaultian paradigm of bio-
power, has proposed that the foetal rights discourse operates as a new,
legitimating ideology for the deeper aspirations of control of reproduction, and
pregnant women, which forms part of an overall increase in state intervention in
population regulation.58
For obstetricians and gynaecologists, specific types of reproductive technology
may display advantages quite separate from their impact on women and infants.
These technologies often enhance the status of the medical profession by
underpinning claims to specialised knowledge. New reproductive technologies
establish the idea that obstetricians and gynaecologists know more about
pregnancy and about women's bodies than women themselves do."
A more fully developed connection between the Foucaultian methodology
discussed in Chapter One and the increased deference to the advocation of foetal
rights has been advanced by Jana Sawacki. In her article "Disciplining Mothers
- Feminism and the New Reproductive Technologies", she suggests that
"new reproductive technologies clearly fit the model of disciplinary power.
They involve sophisticated techniques of surveillance and examination ... that
make both female bodies and fetuses visible to anonymous agents in ways that
facilitate the creation of new objects and subjects of medicine as well as legal
and state intervention.t'"
The implications of this shift in social ideology for the life and liberty of the
pregnant women are significant. Even before we consider the implications of
57 Gallagher, J. "Fetus as Patient" in Cohen & Taub (ed.) Reproduction Lawsfor the 1990s (1989)
Hurnana Press, p. 188
58 Terry, J. "The Body Invaded" (1989) 19 Socialist Review 13-43
59 Stanworth, M., Repoductive Technologies - Gender, Motherhood and Medicine (1987) Polity Press,
p.13
60 Sawacki, J., "Disciplining Mothers - Feminism and the New Reproductive Technologies" in Jackson
(ed.) Women's Studies, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 60, p.395
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the legally enforced decisions that give credence to this peculiarly modem and
disciplinary perception, we can appreciate the general effect that prevalence of
such ideology would have upon the pregnant women's subjective experience of
pregnancy, and upon the way society at large interacts with her. As Olsen has
pointed out, the indirect implication of this ideology relates less to the
disputable status of the foetus as a moral and legal agent, and more to the status
ofwoman in current society.
"If women were not devalued, a pregnant woman's control over reproduction
would seem natural and inevitable. Most people simply would not
conceptualize an early fetus as a baby or as a person with interests separate
from and potentially hostile to those of its mother .... If women were taken
seriously, early fetal life would not be valued by society at large unless and
until the woman carrying the fetus valued it.,,61
Although Olsen speaks here specifically in regard to the issue of abortion, the
sentiment implied can be equally as well applied to the field of apparent
'maternal-foetal conflict', such that the whole notion of conflict is diffused.
There is no conflict because the dilemma starts and finishes with the woman's
choice in exercise of her own moral sensibilities regarding the complete
situation of her life. Lamentably, however, this does not appear to have been
the position generally adopted by Anglo-American legal culture in its
consideration of this issue.
In adoption of a position similar to that of Olsen, Gallagher has argued that,
"The ... 'fetal rights' cases posses great symbolic and precedential
significance, but they have less to do with the status of the fetus than with the
moral and legal status of women. They reinforce deep societal stereotypes of
women, particularly pregnant women, as somehow incompetent to make moral
decisions. They also serve to legitimise a forceful, even physically violent,
assertion of doctor's control over pregnancy and childbirth.t'f
This cynicism regarding the capacity of the pregnant woman to exercise serious
and rational thought has indeed been borne out by much medical literature in
this area. In an article in the Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, for
61 Olsen, F., "Unravelling Compromise" (1989) 103 Harvard Law Review 105, p. 126-8
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example, guidance was given to physicians regarding situations in which the
maternal patient refuses her consent to medically advocated treatment.
Applying a tone of utmost condescension to the female patient, it was proposed
that,
"Such a case may occur for different reasons: fear of surgery, prejudice,
ignorance, difficulties with language, or inadequate rapport between doctor
and patient. However, if all these factors are overcome and the patient
continues to refuse the medical proposal, a suspicion of an occult reason
arises. It is probable that the patient hopes to be freed in this way of an
undesired pregnancy and in no case will the patient share her secret thought
with the physician.'?"
Nowhere is mentioned the patient's right to bodily integrity and self-
determination, nowhere is credence given to the pregnant woman's ability to
reach a rational choice. Such medical literature seems to dictate that the
pregnant patient is either a foolish and ignorant child or a covert and selfish
manipulator. The woman who continues to refuse treatment in the face of
clinical pressure is, it seems, harbouring occult secrets and cold indifference to
her foetus. This presents a highly abstracted and over-simplified analysis of the
situation of the maternal patient. Nonetheless, it is an imagery which, when
supported by cultural assumptions of motherhood as an inherently altruistic and
selfless pursuit, has fuelled much of the legal decision-making in this arena.
Some more contemporary guidelines have sought to distinguish themselves
from advocation of such forthright enforcement of authority. A changing trend
in modem medical practice has been remarked upon by some commentators."
This contemporary trend increasingly relies upon the opposing model of clinical
management, whereby women are required to exercise choices regarding their
pregnancy with little or no guidance from medical authority." However, this
does not represent the kind of liberation that it may seem to suggest. We have
noted in our discussion of Foucault in Chapter One that the nature of modem
62 Gallagher, J "Prenatal Invasions and Interventions - What's Wrong with Fetal Rights", Supra.
Chapter Three, Note 48, p. 58
63 Leiberrnann, Razor, Chairn & Cohen, "The Fetal Right To Life" (1979) 53 Obstetrics and
Gynaecology 515
64 Harpwood, V. Legal Issues in Obstetrics (1996) Dartmouth, p. 29-30
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power IS primarily disciplinary, operating through increasingly subtle
manifestations of power epitomised by normalisation rather than by the brute
exercise of authority. As social conceptions of pregnancy and childbirth have
increasingly become centred upon the two-patient model (facilitated by the
visual advances in ultra-sound, etc.), medical authority has been able to
implement a more disciplinary framework. It is not the case that the power
wielded by medical discourse is no longer exercised to construct women's
choices, it is simply the case that the modus operandi of that power has shifted
towards a more peculiarly modem manifestation." Agents of medical power
will continue to forcibly wield the strong arm of objective scientificity and truth
when necessary (as is established by the examples of enforced medical
intervention), however an overall more disciplinary approach may now be
adopted.
By shifting the onus of choice onto the pregnant woman, modem medical
practice does little to liberate the actuality of those choices, it simply allows
itself to rely upon the normalising mechanisms which are in operation both
within and outwith the field of medical discourse. In reality, pregnant women
are trapped at a more intimate level than ever before and the binds that ensure
that entrapment are becoming increasingly invisible. As Raymonds notes,
"Social controllers have been well-known for convincing the individual that
she! he is in control'"?
This mirrors the trend which was discussed in Chapter One in regard to the
changing operation of law in modernity - both legal and medical discourse have
traditionally exercised their authority through the imposition of command and
force, however in modernity, this becomes increasingly unnecessary. Although
there is always the opportunity, and institutions, to enable a resort to such
methodology, the primary mechanisms of power have become heavily reliant
65 Sawada, 1. Disciplining Foucault, Supra. Chapter One, Note 39, p. 85
66 Sawada, 1. Disciplining Foucault, Supra. Chapter One, Note 39, p. 86
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upon the responsibility of the individual as a social agent to meet the cultural
imperatives imposed upon her by a society increasingly pre-occupied with
normalising its agents. The choice of the individual is structured at the micro
level of personal life, thereby decreasing the need for more dramatic exercises
of oppressive power. The power of medical discourse is becoming productive
in the same way that the power of legal discourse has done. It is this that
necessitates the need for a detailed examination of the social context in which
'choice' is exercised.
We have seen in the preceding sections the difficulty faced by a woman of
child-bearing age to exercise an unconstructed choice, not only in regard to
whether to have children, but also in regard to the clinical management of that
pregnancy. It would be an exhaustive task to list the infinite ways in which the
exercise of choice in this arena is constructed by pervasive social ideologies
from outwith. For the purposes of this work, however, it is sufficient that we
have now established that such construction does occur and that this is
becoming an increasingly important instrument in the methodology of modem
power regimes. With the benefit of at least some analysis of the medical and
social ideology that forms the cultural background of this judicial exercise, we
can now tum our attention toward the more specific operation of the law in this
arena.
Legal Obstacles to the Establishment ofNon-Consent
In "Protecting the Liberty of the Pregnant Patient" Annas suggests that "we are
seeing the beginning of an alliance between physicians and the state to force
pregnant women to follow medical advice for the sake of the fetus.'?" Citing the
findings of Kolder et al that almost half of the heads of US fellowship programs
67 Raymonds, "Fetishism, Feminism and Genetic Technology" (1979) Paper to the American
Association for the Advancement of Science, Houston (Texas). Thus position has been approved by
Gena Cora in The Mother Machine, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 4, p. 177
68 Annas, G "Protecting the Liberty of Pregnant Patients" (1987) 316 New England Journal of
Medicine 1231-4
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III maternal-foetal medicine support the involuntary detention of pregnant
woman whose behaviour endangers the foetus, and more than one quarter
support 'state surveillance' during the third trimester to protect the foetus",
Annas proposes that these attitudes betray a profound suspicion of pregnant
women and a failure to identify with them.
What's more forcing pregnant women to follow medical advice places an
unwarranted faith in that advice - this is a very real problem given that
physicians often disagree about the appropriateness of obstetrical interventions,
and they can be mistaken (although the medical claim to 'truth' tends to abstract
that reality). Driven to do what they can to preserve life and pushed by the fear
of malpractice suits, doctors often translate their ability to treat a problem into
an imperative to do so. This is not, however, always appropriate. Indeed in
three of the first five US cases in which court-ordered caesarean sections were
sought, the women ultimately delivered vaginally and without complication."
Perhaps more disconcertingly, this trend continues to be identifiable. Earlier
this year, an enquiry was ordered by Scottish medical authorities who were
concerned by findings that approximately one quarter of all pregnant women in
Scotland were being advised by clinical staff that caesarean delivery would be
necessary. Despite claims by hospital doctors that this dramatic increase in the
occurrence of caesarean births has been at the patient's request, medical
overseeing authorities have expressed concern that it actually has more to do
with doctor's fear ofbeing sued for not having taken sufficiently proactive steps
to ensure delivery."
Although traditionally reluctant to involve judicial interference in the clinical
relationship, obstetricians have increasingly called upon the courts to give
blessing to their actions in this complex context. Annas acknowledges that
physicians often feel absolved of responsibility by deference to legal judgement,
69 Kolder, V., Gallagher, J. & Pasrons, M., "Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions" (1987) 316 New
Englands Journal ofMedicine 1192-6
70 Annas, G. "Protecting the Liberty of Pregnant Patients", Supra. Chapter Three, Note 68
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but suggests that they should not be so complacent.72 The appearance of such
legitimacy is often deceptive because the judge has been forced to act quickly,
in an environment where he knows little and will almost always defer to the
opinion of the physician. Rhoden's article "The Judge in the Delivery Room" 73
has launched a scathing criticism of the manner in which legal decisions are
made in this arena. More often than not, the case will pertain to an emergency
clinical situation where the pregnant woman is near the point of labour. Judges
are required to make hurried judgements (often in a matter of hours or minutes)
within the confines of a clinical environment where the physician is lord and
master, where the pregnant woman is afforded no opportunity for proper legal
representation or appeal, and where there is definite social and moral pressure to
decide in favour of medical action which will save lives, regardless of
subsequent alienation stemming from invasion ofbodily integrity.
In this environment, it is far from surprising that most judges have concurred
with the physician's requests. Likewise, it is far from surprising that some of
these decisions have been overturned on appeal (as we shall see in the US case
of AC?i and St. George's Healthcare NBS Trust v SZ?). After the event, the
appeal judge is given the time and opportunity to consider the legal and ethical
implications of these decisions in a more appropriate and procedurally fair
setting. When the ideals of autonomy and self-determination (which are held to
be the pillars of modern liberal legal principles) are given voice in this belated
setting, it is predictable that judges will condemn the decision at first instance.
In some appeal cases, this condemnation has been quite explicit. The appeal
court in the Re AC case, for example, stated that,
"The procedural shortcomings rampant in these cases are not mere technical
deficiencies. They undermine the authority of the decisions themselves, posing
serious questions as to whether judges can, in the absence of genuine notice,
adequate representations, explicit standards of proof, and right of appeal,
71 Reported in Scotland Today, Scottish Television, 23rd March 2000.
72 Annas, G. "Protecting the Liberty of Pregnant Patients", Supra. Chapter Three, Note 68
73 Rhoden, N. "The Judge in the Delivery Room" (1986) 74 California Law Review 1572
74 Re AC (1990) US 573 A2d 1235
75 St. George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S (1998) 3 WLR 936
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realistically frame principled and useful legal responses to the dilemmas with
which they are being confronted.'?"
This reversal comes too late for the woman in question, however, her body
having already been violated, and it leaves the overall legal position riddled
with internal contradiction and confusion. It has become difficult to predict
exactly how anyone court will resolve any particular case of 'maternal-foetal
conflict'. Rulings of higher courts have tended to favour the principles dictated
by a preference for maternal health and autonomy over foetal life. On the other
hand, however, trial judges who have rushed to hospitals to answer urgent
questions have felt relatively free to enforce caesarean section delivery, hospital
detention, and other measures in order to protect the near-term foetus." Few of
these decisions are ever appealed and this makes it very difficult to determine
any clear pattern of a legal position.
We have seen in the preceding sections, the development of a medical ideology,
gaining ground with the advent of modem techniques of assisted reproduction,
which defines the foetus as an independent patient with a right to medical
treatment. This change in perception of the foetus has facilitated the definition
of the pregnant woman as an ancillary part of the organic vessel with no right to
refuse treatment. Originally, this perception was manifested in the prohibition
of certain conduct from pregnant woman (smoking, drinking, etc.). This more
simplistic mechanism of control was stretched to its limits by the US case of
Pamela Rae Stewart that arose in California in 1987.78 In this case, a woman
was brought up on charges of foetal neglect for among other things not getting
to hospital with due haste and for having intercourse with her husband during
pregnancy. Her husband, a batterer whose brutal outbursts had summonsed the
police to their home more than twelve times in one year alone was not charged,
76 Re AC (1990) US 573 A2d 1235, quoted in Gallagher, 1. "Prenatal Invasions and Interventions-
What's Wrong with Fetal Rights?", Supra. Chapter Three, Note 48, p. 49
77 Kolder, V., Gallagher, J. & Parsons, M, "Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions", Supra. Chapter
Three, Note 69, p. 1192 discussed in detail in Evans, M., Fletcher, J., Dixler, A. & Shulman, 1. Fetal
Diagnosis and Therapy - Science, Ethics and the Law (1989) JB Lippincot Co., p. 237
134
nor even questioned! Although this case was later dismissed, it is apparent that
this case is only one of the more blatant manifestations of a broader trend in
which the state and other third parties have increasingly asserted what are
perceived to be foetal interests in an attempt to use the law to dictate how
women should behave during pregnancy.
Following on from the 'successful' promotion of such prohibitions (which
rendered women incapable of eating, drinking and acting as they pleased in the
same way that rape laws continue to render women incapable of walking, acting
and dressing as they please), the medical profession took more active steps,
encouraging the operation on pregnant women with, or without, their consent.
Cases in which women are forced to undergo caesarean sections against their
will provide a particularly vivid illustration of the increasing power being
claimed by the state to override the wishes ofpregnant women in the interests of
the foetus. In one of the first US cases involving this issue, Jefferson v Griffin
Spalding County HospitalZ2. the court noted that the examining physician had
found that a caesarean section was dictated in the interests ofpreserving the life
of the pregnant woman as well as the foetus and considered this point to be
exhaustive of the issue of the overall interests of the pregnant woman who was
nonetheless refusing consent to the operation.
Judges who support these medical crusades often do so with such fervour that
they appear to have trouble envisaging the woman in question as in any way a
full and living person. In the case ofRe. Madyun, a Washington Supreme Court
judge ordered a caesarean section to be performed against the wishes of a 19
year old pregnant woman with the assertion that "all that stood between the
78 For Discussion of this case, see Mair, J. "Maternal-Foetal Conflict: Defmed or Defused?" in
McLean, S., Contemporary Issues in Law. Medicine and Ethics (1996) Dartmouth. Also Johnsen, D.
"A New Threat to Pregnant Women's Autonomy" (1989) 12 Hastings Report, p. 33
79 Jefferson v Griffm Spalding County Hospital (!981) Ga 274 Se 4d 457
135
Madyun fetus and its independent existence, separate from its mother, was, put
simply, a doctor's scalpel.':"
A review ofmedical institutions in 18 states between 1981-86 is cited by Faludi.
In the 36 cases where doctors had gone to court to force an unwilling woman to
submit to obstetrical intervention, judges granted all but three requests. 88%
were decided within six hours; 20% within one hour. In each instance, no
evidence was adduced to suggest that the women were in any way mentally
incompetent, yet nonetheless in each case, the woman's express wishes were
overruled."
In a legal climate where the right of the patient to refuse medical treatment was
gaining credibility, pregnant women were increasingly losing battles to exercise
that refusal in the obstetrical ward. In the UK, a flimsy justification for this
paradox can be found in the statement given by Lord Donaldson in the case of
Re T§l. In this case, which involved the right of a Jehovah Witness to refuse
life-saving treatment on religious grounds, Lord Donaldson alluded to the
general principle that "the law requires that an adult patient who is mentally and
physically capable of exercising choice must consent if medical treatment of
him is to be lawful". However, through the duration of his deliberation, he also
drew attention to certain areas of the law where he felt that this general principle
may not be applicable - one such area concerned decisions that could affect the
death of a viable foetus. This one line obiter dictum was never argued in court,
yet it has been relied upon in subsequent cases dealing with maternal-foetal
conflict to add support to the claim that these circumstances should present an
exception to the general deontological rule (manifest in the requirement of
informed consent) because they exhibit problems of considerable ethical and
legal complexity.
80 Re Madyun (1990) 573 A 2d 1235. Discussed in Faludi,S., Backlash - The Undeclared War Against
Women (1992) Vintage, p. 466
81 Faludi S. Backlash - The Undeclared War Against Women, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 80, p. 466
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In ordering these operations, judges are going far beyond the existing law on the
parental duties owed even to live children. It has been a long-since established
premise of Anglo-American legal culture that parents cannot be compelled to
benefit their child's health when this would be to their own detriment. In the
case of McFall v Shimpg, for example, it was expressly stated that "to compel
the defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body (for the benefit of another)
would change every concept and principle upon which our society is founded".
Apparently, it is less of a legal and ethical leap to intrude forcibly on the body
of a pregnant woman.
The argument has often been advanced that forced obstetrical surgery does not
interfere with the rights of pregnant women in any serious way. However, the
case ofAC~ shows in most dramatic fashion that this is not always the case. In
this US case, a woman who was 26 weeks into her pregnancy and who had been
in remission from cancer for several years, developed a cancerous tumour in her
lung. She expressly informed the clinical staff that she wished her own health
to have priority over that of the foetus and asked to be given the necessary
radiation and chemotherapy. The doctors involved refused to do so because it
would be dangerous for the foetus and they felt that the treatment would be
futile in any event, the cancer being in their opinion terminal (remarkably
enough, however, AC's cancer had twice before been diagnosed as terminal and
she had nonetheless survived).
At 26 weeks' gestation, the foetus was unlikely to survive ex utero. The doctors
felt, however, that if they could prolong AC's life by another two or three
weeks, the foetus would have a better chance of survival. Hence, instead of
treating the tumour, the clinical staff sedated AC in the hope of delaying her
death. When AC tried to refuse this 'treatment' she was ignored and a tube was
placed in her throat, making it impossible for her to speak. On being informed
82 Re T (1992) 4 All ER 649, Supra. Preface, Note 16
83 McFall v Shimp (1978) 127 Pitts. Leg. J 14
84 Re AC (1990) US 573 A2d 1235
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of the details of the case, the hospital administration in question became
concerned that medical staff were not taking sufficiently heroic steps to rescue
the life of the foetus at this stage, and they proposed that an immediate
caesarean section be performed. In her current state, an operation of this
significance was likely to kill AC. Given that she was unconscious from the
sedatives, and therefore unavailable for consultation, and given that even the
hospital doctors who were in favour of saving the foetus were opposed to the
operation, the hospital administration called upon the judiciary to mediate the
situation.
The judge in question focused his attention almost exclusively on the foetus,
and the effects of the operation on its health. Without making the brief walk
down the hospital corridor to see AC himself, he concluded that the doctors
should operate immediately, calling her struggle to live an almost selfish
concern for her own comfort. As the sedatives were beginning to wear off, AC
was told of the developments. While still foggy from the sedatives, she agreed
to the operation, but half an hour later, in a clearer state of mind, she
vociferously and unambiguously stated that she did not want the operation to go
ahead. Nonetheless, the judge felt that her intent was unclear and that in any
event, her intent had been superseded by his decision and was therefore
irrelevant. Shortly after, the doctors delivered a girl whom they claim survived
for two hours. Two days later, AC died. An autopsy report determined that the
operation was a contributing factor in her death. Three years later, on further
appeal by AC's parents, the District Court of Appeals overruled the decision.
This decision came tragically three years too late for Angela Carder."
Despite the subsequent overruling of this decision in AC, the first UK decision
to deal with similar issues, Re S86, relied heavily on the reasoning ofthe original
AC decision to justify its imposition of an enforced caesarean section delivery
8S More details of the case can be found in Faludi's discussion in Backlash - The Undeclared War
Against Women, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 80, p.468-473
86 Re. S (1992) 4 All ER 671
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on a competent dissenting maternal patient. The UK legal experience traces out
with much similarity the experience within the US, although the number of
reported cases marking this out have been far fewer (perhaps because patients
within the UK medical climate are less inclined to question and challenge
clinical authority - statistics on medical malpractice suits would indeed seem to
bear this out)."
In the 1987 case of D v Berkshire County Council~, the potential for conflict
between the autonomy of the pregnant woman and the well-being of her foetus
was brought into the legal forum. In this case, it was established that account
may be taken of a woman's prenatal behaviour in determining the future care of
the born child. Although the court refused to take the step of recognising the
foetus as the bearer of enforceable legal rights, it did establish the premise that
prenatal conduct on the part of the mother was a relevant consideration in care
cases.
This recognition gave rise to questions regarding what protection would be
afforded to the foetus against prenatal conduct on the part of the mother which
may be injurious to the subsequent health of a born child. In Re F (In Utero)~,
the court, when asked to consider making a foetus a ward of court to protect the
foetus from its mother's lifestyle, appeared to retract a little from its position,
stating that the foetus had no separate legal personality, and that even if it did,
the freedom of the mother must take priority. The court appeared reluctant to
press the issue of foetal interests to this extent, particularly given the biological
imperative that taking custody of the foetus necessarily requires taking enforced
custody of the mother, which presents a gross infringement ofpersonal liberty.
It seems that in this regard at least, the UK courts have been reluctant to follow
the US precedent with such fervour. In relation to the practice of enforced
87 Kennedy, I & Grubb, A. Medical Law - Texts with Materials (1994) Butterworths, 506-7 (Annex B)
88 D v Berkshire County Council (1987) 1 All ER 20
89 Re F (in utero) (1988) 2 All ER 193
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caesarean section, however, this may well not be the case. In a court decision
which occupies less than a page in the law reports, and which was reached in a
matter of minutes, the court in Re S2Q ruled in favour of an enforced caesarean
section on the ground that it was in the vital interests of both mother and child,
despite vehement refusal from the mother on account ofher religious beliefs.
This decision was premised on the at best flimsy legal basis of a one line obiter
dictum in Re T2! and on the wrong AC'll:. decision. Nonetheless, judicial
approval of this decision was afforded in the subsequent cases of Tameside and
Glossop Acute Services Trust v CH2l and Norfolk and Norwich Healtchcare
NHS Trust v W.94 Again, these cases referred to pregnant women and their
refusal to give consent to caesarean section operations. In the Tameside case,
the woman in question had been suffering from paranoid schizophrenia which
medical evidence suggested made her incapable of exercising a competent
decision regarding her treatment. Having been sectioned under Mental Health
legislation, the court authorised enforcement of a caesarean section operation
despite the patient's clear refusals of consent. The Norfolk and Norwich case
stands on significantly less sure ground - despite professional psychiatric
evidence attesting to the fact that the woman in question was not suffering from
a mental disorder under Mental Health legislation, the court felt free to apply the
Re S dicta to enforce a caesarean section against the women's averred wishes.
This decision was reached without the judge ever coming into contact with the
woman herself. Perhaps most remarkably in this case, one of the express
reasons given for the judicial decision to authorise treatment was to avoid the
patient's "feeling any guilt in the future were she, by the refusal of her consent,
to cause the death of her foetus.'?" This provides an illustrative example of the
incorporation of altruistic maternal ideology within the legal arena. Surely, it is
not the role of the courts to override the wishes of mentally competent patients
90 Re S (1992) 4 All ER 671
91 Re T (1992) 4 All ER 649
92 Re AC (1990) US 537 A2d 1235
93 Tameside and G1ossop Acute Services Trust v CH (1996) 1 FLR 762
94 Norfolk and Norwich Healthcare NHS Trust v W (1996) 2 FLR 613
95 Norfolk and Norwich Healtchcare NHS Trust v W (1996) 2 FLR 613
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on the grounds that, were they not to do so, the patient may later come to regret
the outcome of their decision. Such legal and medical paternalism is
unjustifiable in a supposedly liberal legal and clinical context.
Furthermore, there was some implication in both these cases that a woman so
close to delivery would necessarily be in severe pain and distress and that this in
itself would be sufficient to justify finding her incapable of exercising a rational
choice." This presents somewhat of an anomaly to our legal and medical
imperatives - the judge never came into contact with the women in question so it
is difficult to discern from whence he takes this knowledge about their pain and
distress. What's more, arguments that patients are suffering from pain and
distress are surely applicable to a great majority of patients whose health
condition dictates that surgery is medically indicated. In all other contexts,
however, it seems that the pain and distress of the patient is not sufficient to
supplant their ability to make a rational judgement.
In the aftermath of these two decisions, it had seemed rather that the legal
position within the UK had become fairly well cemented. However, a recent
appeal case" has suggested that this may not yet be so. Although this decision
holds only persuasive authority within the English law system, it is worth giving
some consideration to because it has been received by many commentators as
presenting a dramatic revision of the legal position in this arena. However, such
optimism must be tempered. In line with the pattern that has been discerned by
Annas and Rhoden" in the US legal system in relation to this area, it may be
that cases heard on appeal will overrule those decisions that have been reached
at first instance. However, this does not necessarily imply that a dramatic
96 In the case ofRochdale Healthcare (NBS) Trust v C (1997) 1 FCR 274 this was explicitly given as
the reason behind the determination of the maternal patient's incompetence and attendant inability to
exercise a rational choice
97 St. George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S (1998) 3 WLR 936. Reported in The Guardian, Friday 8th
April 1998
98 Annas, G. "Protecting the Liberty of Pregnant Patients", Supra. Chapter Three, Note 68
Rhoden, N. "The Judge in the Delivery Room", Supra. Chapter Three, Note 73
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alteration will follow III the way III which these first instance cases are
themselves decided.
Given the nature of these cases, it is rare that an appeal will ever be pursued.
However, in the case of St. George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S22, where appeal
was pursued, the court deemed it appropriate (having taken a more lengthy look
at the issue at stake) to overrule the original decision. The appeal court declared
that the health authority in question acted unlawfully in forcing a woman to
undergo a caesarean section operation against her will. In far more familiar
legal language, the appeal court noted that,
"When human life is at stake, the pressure to provide an affirmative answer
authorising unwanted medical intervention is very powerful. Nevertheless, the
autonomy of each individual requires continuing protection even, perhaps
particularly, when the motive for interfering with it is readily understandable,
and indeed to many would appear commendablc.?"?
Although the decision in this case does hold some promise, we must exercise
caution in heralding its liberatory zeal. We have seen that a similar pattern can
be discerned within the US legal system, and nonetheless judges at first instance
continue, as a general rule, to authorise enforced treatment regardless. 101
Furthermore, the reasoning in this recent decision was heavily pre-occupied by
the fact that the local authority had the woman sectioned under Mental Health
legislation in circumstances in which the court did not consider that action to
have been appropriate. Commentary in the aftermath of the Tameside case was
heavily critical of what was considered to be an illegitimate use of Mental
Health legislation to enforce treatment upon pregnant women. The provisions
of the Mental Health Act!" clearly state that the need for patient consent can
only be overruled in regard to treatment related to the mental disorder displayed
99 St. George's Hea1thcare NHS Trust v S (1998) 3 WLR 936
100 St. George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S (1998) 3 WLR 936, 953
101 Ko1der, V., Gallagher, J. & Parsons, M. "Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions", Supra. Chapter
Three, Note 69
Evans, M., Fletcher, J., Dixler, A & Shulman, J., Fetal Diagnosis and Therapy, Supra. Chapter Three,
Note 77
102 Mental Health Act 1983 (especially relevant, s. 63)
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by the incompetent patient. Hence in the case of Re C~ a patient suffering
from schizophrenia and detained in hospital under the Mental Health Act was
held to be entitled to refuse consent to treatment upon his gangrenous leg on the
basis that his gangrene was 'entirely unconnected with the mental disorder' and
therefore beyond the remit of Mental Health provisions overruling the need for
patient consent. The decision in the Tameside case to overrule a refusal of
consent to the caesarean operation under the provisions of the legislation has
met fierce criticism from those who have suggested that this subverts the intent
of the Mental Health Act, permitting enforced treatment on incompetent patients
for a range of symptoms unconnected to their mental condition. In St. George's
Healthcare, the condemnation aimed at the Health Authority's attempts to
section the pregnant patient under this legislation demands redress for previous
misinterpretation of the Act. 104 Although this represents a promising
recognition ofpatient's rights in this context, it is arguable that the decision says
less about the autonomy rights of pregnant women and more about policy
concerns regarding the integrity of the Mental Health Act.
The appeal court in the St. George case was also particularly critical of the lack
of appropriate procedure in the first instance hearing and of the prejudicial effect
that this had upon the ability of the woman involved to have her position
afforded credibility.105 In the original hearing, the order authorising the
caesarean section had not only been made without the woman being
represented, but it had also been made without her knowledge and without any
attempt to inform her or her solicitor of the application. What's more, it was
subsequently found that the trial judge had been told certain untruths in regard
to the case and had not been informed of certain materially relevant factors prior
to his deliberation. So, although the statement by the appeal court in this case
does offer some promise, we must not become too complacent of the legal
position in the UK at this early stage. It may prove to be the case that the
judgement was motivated more by a concern to be seen to be protecting the
103 Re C (1993) 15 BMLR 77
104 81. George's Healthcare NH8 Trust v 8 (1998) 3 WLR 936,957-962
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procedural legal rights of participants in trial hearings and by a concern to
ensure that health authorities do not construct the condition of pregnancy as
rendering somebody mentally incapable.106 In circumstances where appropriate
procedures are followed and an enforcement order still arises before the courts,
it is difficult to predict at this stage how the court would decide. This is of
course compounded by statistical evidence from across the Atlantic that despite
clear appeal court decisions condemning enforced treatment, first instance
courts continue to give judicial approval for intervention.
There was also some suggestion in the 81. George Healthcare case that despite
the appeal courts explicit condemnation of any 'balancing test' between
maternal and foetal benefits and burdens in cases of maternal-foetal conflict,
should surgical techniques improve to the point where caesarean sections
becomes less dangerous for the pregnant women, enforced intervention may
become more acceptable.':" In effect, therefore, the court has continued to
implicitly accept a balancing test in its deliberation. This veiled recognition of
the two-patient model is most apparent in the concluding deliberation that "the
interests of the foetus cannot be disregarded on the basis that in refusing
treatment which would benefit the foetus a mother is simply refusing treatment
for herself."!" What this suggests is that while courts may condemn enforced
caesarean section operations under the current clinical environment, should less
invasive procedures become viable, the courts may be willing to reassess their
position in regard to the alleged supremacy of maternal autonomy and bodily
integrity. As methods of foetal diagnosis and therapy advance, the likelihood of
this becoming a future consideration does not seem especially remote.
While the legal position remains problematic and ambiguous across the Anglo-
American legal culture, we must continue to be vigilant regarding the
105 St. George's Healthcare NBS Trost v S (1998) 3 WLR 936,947-8 & 969-70
106 Dolan, B & Parker, C. "Caesarean Section - A Treatment for Mental Disorder" (1997) 314 British
Medical Journal 1183
107 St. George's NBS Healthcare Trost v S (1998) 3 WLR 936,951-954, esp. 953
108 St. George's NBS Healthcare Trost v S (1998) 3 WLR 936,953
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implications of this trend and of the effects that this bears out upon the life of
pregnant women, and on their status in society at large. One of the most
pessimistic analyses of the inhibitory effect of the new reproductive
technologies, and their legal enforcement upon reluctant pregnant women, has
been presented by Gena Corea in her book, The Mother Machinel'" She
suggests that the ultimate aim of these new technologies is to replace biological
mothers with 'mother machines'. Modem medical discourse has often proposed
that the maternal womb environment is less 'safe' for the foetus than the clinical
environment of an artificial womb, and Corea suggests that it is only a matter of
time before the technology has developed sufficiently to replace the natural
gestational environment with an artificial one.
Although allegedly in the best interests of the foetus, Corea suggests that the
hidden agenda behind this lies in a concern to supplant women's source of
power that is derived from their position as reproducers of the species.
Furthermore, Corea laments the fragmentation of the once unified biological
process of motherhood that is facilitated by these new technologies. She
considers the separation of this process into separate functions as a kind of
biological division oflabour that has the same alienating effects upon the agents
involved as Marxist analysis has suggested in regard to the capitalist division of
labour. As these separate functions are increasingly taken under the surveillance
and regulation of male dominated medical and legal agencies, and as the
interests of the foetus begin to override the rights of the mother, Corea fears that
women's claim to reproduction as their source ofpower in a world wrought with
power imbalance will be eroded.
The Foucaultian methodology that has been discussed in Chapter One would
have considerable difficulty in accepting the original premise asserted by Corea
that the advent of new reproductive technologies is the result of an entirely
male-constructed desire to take control of female reproduction. For the
Foucaultian feminist, as we have seen, the dynamics of power relations are too
109 Corea, G The Mother Machine, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 4
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fluid to permit of such a deterministic analysis. Nonetheless, we are able to
recognise the interplay between what Neitzsche has called 'the will to power'
and what Foucault has called 'the claim to truth' in the increasing level ofmale-
influenced control being exercised over the biological processes of pregnancy
and childbirth. This trend was initiated with the proliferation of medical
discourse which displaced the role of midwife and replaced it with the male-
defined role of obstetrician, which made the processes of the female body a
subject within the expert knowledge of male-influenced medical discourse, and
which in its more modem manifestations has produced a wealth of assisted
reproductive technologies which have been imposed upon women, with or
without their consent, often with the result of a profound alienation between the
women and her own bodily processes.
Not only has the forced imposition of this technology provoked a sense of
alienation in the female agent in regard to control over her own biology, it has
promoted a sense of alienation from all aspects of the female right to self-
determination by encouraging a social perception of women which ties them to
their biology and renders them incapable of action as free and liberated
individuals.
"By creating an adversarial relationship between the woman and her fetus, the
state provides itself with a powerful means for controlling women's behaviour
during pregnancy, thereby threatening women's fundamental rights."!"
Courts, both in UK and US, have traditionally recognised the rights of the foetus
on the condition that there be a live birth of the child. This was based on the
rationale that the foetus was a valued part of the pregnant woman, and was
asserted only in situation where recognition of such interests would be to the
benefit to the mother as organic whole. Increasingly, however, courts have
become more willing (particularly in the US) to recognise foetal interests that
are not contingent upon a subsequent live birth. Originally this shift in legal
ideology may have been well-intentioned, constructed to protect the rights of the
pregnant woman to the full. However, as these rights have developed, they have
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come to embody a dangerous conceptual move, gradually being extended in
ways which conflict with the rights of women. We have seen this most
forcefully in the cases of enforced medical treatment discussed above.
Given the foetus's complete dependence upon the body of the mother, the
implication of cases asserting foetal rights (e.g. D v Berkshire eel!.! or Grodin v
Grodinill) is that virtually every act of the pregnant women will have a potential
effect on the foetus, thereby leaving the woman open to all kinds of criminal or
civil liability. We have seen that the law has often permitted the enforcement of
caesarean section operations on women against their will. This legal and
medical phenomenon is troubling enough in itself, given the profound
implications which this holds for a pregnant women's right of self-
determination, the credibility given to their consent or non-consent, and their
own subjective experience of self as a serious and rational agent. Kary Moss, a
staff attorney on a New York Women's Rights Project has summarised this
position,
"these cases for the first time force a pregnant woman to act in the service of
another, the foetus. If you see a child in a burning building you are not
required to risk your life to save the child. These cases ask a woman to
sacrifice her right to privacy and open herself to policing during pregnancy.
All of a sudden, the behaviour of the pregnant woman is open to state controls
to which no-one else is subject."!"
There have been few attempts at state intrusion of the rooted and personal nature
involved in state regulation over the actions and medical care of pregnant
women. US courts have held unconstitutional even isolated instances of the
kinds of intrusion to which foetal rights advocates would have women
continually subjected.!" This is susceptible to even more dangerous expansion
110 Johnsen, D "The Creation ofFeta1 Rights - Conflict with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty,
Privacy and Equal Protection", Supra. Chapter Three, Note 78, p.600
III D v Berkshire County Council (1987) 1 All ER 20
112 Grodin v Grodin 102 Mich. App. 396 (1980)
113 Taylor, K. (staff attorney on the ACCU Women's Ri~hts Project) quoted in Taylor, J., "Punishing
Pregnant Addicts" New York Times Review Section, io September 1989
114 In Rochin v California (1952) 342 US 165, it was held that forcible pumping of a criminal's
stomach violated the individual's rights to due process, calling it conduct which 'shocks the
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as the new methods of foetal therapy and foetal surgery gain medical ground.
Many of these procedures are still at a highly experimental stage, however as
one physician has noted, "excessive enthusiasm, combined with inexperience,
can be dangerous. Eager to learn and refine these procedures physicians and
surgeons may rush ahead."!"
Today physicians impose caesarean sections upon women, despite little clinical
evidence to suggest that delivery in this manner presents any significantly better
chance of a safe delivery in most case. Annas has already established that a
majority of caesarean sections that are performed by physicians are not
necessary operations. 116 Currently, therefore, physicians are willing to impose
considerably serious surgery upon pregnant women in circumstances where this
may well be unnecessary. JJ7 Medical imperatives and the technological fixation
that they perpetuate have encouraged physicians to apply heroic measures when
this is not medically required. Many commentators have already noted in other
fields ofmedical decision-making (particularly end of life decision making) that
modem medicine has a tendency to over-treat by virtue of the technology that it
has at its disposal. 118 When this clinical environment of excessive use of
surgery and technology is coupled with the development of foetal surgery, the
potential implications are alarming. It is a small step from a surgical technique
being medically approved to its becoming medically indicated and legally
enforced - we have seen this in the context of caesarean section - and there is a
real danger that we will see this again in the field of the far more intrusive
techniques of foetal therapy and foetal surgery.
conscience'; In Winston v Lee (1985) 105 S. Crt. 1611, the court considered it unconstitutional to
violate a criminal suspect's rights by surgically removing a bullet from his body for use in evidence.
115 Shriner, "Maternal versus Fetal Rights - A Clinical Dilemma" (1979) 53 Obstetrics and
Gynaecology 519
116 Annas, G. "Protecting the Liberty of Pregnant Patients", Supra. Chapter Three, Note 68
117 Haverkamp & Orleans, "An Assessment of Electronic Fetal Monitoring" (1982) 7 Women and
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The implications of this for women's autonomy are even more alarming.
Knopoff, in her article "Can A Woman Morally Refuse Fetal Surgery?"!"
argues that enforced imposition of foetal therapy is grounded even more solidly
in a crusade for foetal rights. While in the context of enforced caesarean
sections, it is often argued that the surgery is enforced to serve the best interests
of both mother and child, in the context of foetal therapy, no medical benefit
will accrue to the pregnant woman. On the contrary, the process will involve
harm, distress and substantial risk, even of death, to the woman. Nonetheless, if
the law continues to advocate this medical shift away from its deontological
approach towards a more utilitarian ethic whereby benefits can be balanced
against burdens, it becomes feasible that in this context more moral weight may
be placed upon the rights ofthe foetus to receive treatment than upon the rights
of the mother to make autonomous decisions and to have a protected bodily
integrity.
The viability of this possibility is augmented when we consider the tendency of
medical discourse, discussed by Foucault!", to make claims to objective truth
that overrate the reliability and accuracy of medical determinations and surgical
techniques. We have noted at length in Chapter One, the modem proliferation
of disciplinary discourse and we have drawn attention to the strong relationship
that Foucault has isolated between the rise of disciplinary technology and the
claims to truth made by medical discourse. Although the circumstances of
enforced medical treatment which have formed the main body of this chapter
have illustrated the most dramatic examples of perceived maternal-foetal
conflict (because the woman has attempted to expressly utilise her alleged
'right' to refuse medical treatment), we must not underestimate the proportion
of clinical situations which never escalate to this scale.
There is a notable deference in society at large to the claims of medical
discourse that pertain to establish 'truth' through means of scientific objectivity.
119 Knopoff, "Can A Woman Morally Refuse Fetal Surgery?" (1991) Califomai Law Review499
120 Foucault. M. The History ofSexuality Vol. I, Supra. Chapter One, Note 3
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In light of this, it is not unrealistic to assume that in many cases, pregnant
women in an already imposing clinical environment would be inclined to accept
the advice of medical staff as authoritative. Many women, although
uncomfortable with the idea of bodily intrusion will defer to the decrees of the
demi-god of medical discourse, not so much out of a genuine faith in their
assertions as from a socially indoctrinated response which teaches them not to
scrutinise such claims. We must, therefore, treat with suspicion even those
cases where it appears that women have given their consent to the operation.
In a cultural climate where women are structured to be .altruistic and selfless as
mothers, and where such ideological deference is afforded to the claims of
medical discourse, we have' good cause to be critical of the legitimacy of the
consent that physicians in this situation do obtain. The doctor-patient
relationship is not one of equal terrain and the social requirements of the
institution ofmotherhood do not afford women the right to consider themselves.
Even without the additional complication of the cases where doctors seek legal
enforcement of medical intervention upon the maternal patient, this area of
socio-medical interaction is highly problematic.
Much of the problem in situations of expressly enforced medical treatment
results from the over-simplistic reasoning that courts have employed III
consideration of the maternal-foetal relationship. Influenced by a trend III
obstetrics that has come to identify mother and foetus as separate and distinct
entities, and in operation of the traditional legal dichotomous rationality
discussed by Mossman in relation to rape law'", courts have too readily
accepted a model of conflict between mother and foetus. For the pregnant
women involved in the clinical situation, a model of conflict between herself
and her foetus is highly distortive of the actual moral dilemma that she is facing.
Viewing the foetus as a separate entity from the mother has allowed judges and
physicians to deprive women of their decision-making autonomy. This fails to
121 Mossman, M. "Feminist Legal Method - The Difference it Makes", Supra. Chapter One, Note 12
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appreciate the true complexity of the situation of the maternal patient, for whom
her pregnancy is one factor among many in a string of complicated life
circumstances, personal values and individual preferences. The situation of a
pregnant woman who refuses consent to surgical intervention in the interests of
her foetus (and even of herself) on the ground of religious conviction provides a
useful illustration of this. In this context, the woman acts in accordance with
what she genuinely believes to be in the best interests of her child, and the
suggestion that there is a conflict between herself and her foetus is to apply
oversimplified and inappropriate categorical and polarised modes ofreasoning.
Surely, the woman herself is the person most qualified to make the most
comprehensive decision regarding the fate of herself and her child. As Olsen
has suggested, therefore, society's relationship to the foetus must be mediated
by the woman within whose body it is located. When the situation is taken in
abstraction from this context, as is the case when it is considered in the legal
forum, the presence and value of these other considerations is lost and in turn
the woman loses her right to control the overall trajectory of her life. Pregnancy
and childbirth mean different things to different women,
"but one thing most women would agree upon is that the pregnant woman is
the central participant in the process and that child-bearing is an experience
that makes sense in the context ofher biography as a whole person."?"
Mair, in asserting the inappropriate nature of this conflict model, has asserted
that the conflict lies more often not between mother and foetus, but between
mother and doctor.!" While both doctor and mother believe themselves to be
acting in the best interests of the foetus, the conflict stems from confusion as to
what those best interests are. For the physician, best interests implies medical
health and physical well-being, while for the mother best interests may involve
evaluation of various moral and ethical considerations regarding what she feels
is constitutive of a 'good life'.
122 Stanworth, M., Reproductive Technologies, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 59, p.16
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Through the judicial tendency to give automatic credence to medical
determinations, judges have perpetuated a model of conflict which unfairly
presents the woman as at best foolish, and at worst selfish, but in any event as
acting in opposition to the interests ofher foetus.!" As Mair says, "this displays
an arrogance and lack of understanding of the woman's life".125 This lack of
understanding is far from surprising, however, when we consider that all too
often these decisions are taken without the judge even coming into contact with
the pregnant woman.
To depict the context and relationship as one of conflict is to take the
circumstances ofthe pregnancy in abstraction from the other constituent parts of
the woman's life. This is highly artificial, since pregnancy and childbirth are
experiences that are intrinsically tied to the other elements of an individual's
subjectivity and external existence. The net result of this is the production of an
acute sense of self-alienation in the female agent who is deprived not only ofher
ability to make credible choices regarding the direction of her life and the
treatment afforded to her body, but also of the freedom to determine the
definitions which surround her life experiences. This has implications not only
for the individual woman, but also for the position of women in the broader
social field.
"By substituting its judgement for that of the woman, the state deprives
women of their right to control their lives during pregnancy...Furthermore, by
regulating women as if their lives were defined solely by their reproductive
capacity, the state perpetuates a system of sex discrimination that is based on
the biological difference between the sexes, thus depriving women of their
constitutional right to the equal protection of the laws."!"
Only women can suffer the great intrusions of this legal development because
only women have the ability to bear children. Hence, the proliferation of foetal
123 Mair, J. "Maternal-Foetal Conflict: Defined or Defused?" in McLean, S. Contemporary Issues in
Law, Medicine and Ethics, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 78
124 Diduck, A. "Legislating Ideologies of Motherhood", Supra. Preface, Note 14, p.462
125 Mair, J. "Maternal-Foetal Conflict: Defined or Defused?" in McLean, S. Contemporary Issues in
Law, Medicine and Ethics, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 78
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rights, and their enforcement against the wishes of the pregnant woman, not
only infringe upon the legal and moral rights of individual women to exercise a
meaningful right of consent and self-determination, they also serve on the social
level to disadvantage all women by further stigmatising them on the basis of the
very gender-specific characteristic which has been used throughout history to
perpetuate a system of sex inequality. As Johnsen notes, the ability to bear
children is to sex discrimination what dark skin is to race discrimination. It is
the characteristic that has been used to systematically disadvantage women by
defining their proper role in terms of that ability.'?"
Conclusion
"The implication of these judgements are considerable. It is possible that
women in labour (and perhaps earlier) may only have the capacity to withhold
consent so long as they do not."'"
The shift in ideology promoted by the clinical two-patient model, and the legal
conflict model, has generated profound implications upon the ability of the
woman to exercise meaningful consent in the pregnancy experience. We have
seen earlier in this chapter that operating in the microcosms of society is an
institution of compulsory motherhood which structures and perpetuates the
female desire to mother. It has been suggested that the existence of such a
cultural climate must lead us to question the extent to which an individual
woman's 'choice' to become a mother is exercised 'freely'. All choice is
mediated by the society in which that choice is exercised. In a society which
encourages the equation of femininity with motherhood, the extent to which the
choice to become a mother is the result of social constructionism must be re-
evaluated.
126 Johnsen,D "The Creation of Fetal Rights - Conflict with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty,
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Furthermore, even if it were possible to deconstruct the institution of
motherhood to liberate the exercise of these choices, the possibility of female
consent becomes problematic again later in the pregnancy experience. Cultural
prescriptions which propose women's role of mother to be one of utmost
selflessness and altruism interact with the alterations in clinical and legal
ideology discussed above to make it increasingly difficult for women to refuse
their consent to treatments and lifestyles which will benefit the health of the
foetus. By strengthening the position of foetal rights, and by depicting the
relationship between mother and foetus as one of conflict, the current legal
position adopts the individualistic and polarised ideology that many feminist
commentators have suggested is wholly distortive of the feminine
epistemological position.!"
Through the legal advocation of enforced medical treatment, Anglo-American
legal discourse has given credence to the impossibility of female non-consent.
By asserting the requirements of a cultural assumption ofwomen as mother, and
of mother as self-deprecating, the law has permitted the medical establishment
to invade the bodies of pregnant women in wholly unprecedented ways.
Pregnant women have become exempt from the general liberal legal protections
of autonomy and bodily integrity that liberal rhetoric purports to afford to all
other agents in the social field, even in their dealings with medical institutions.
In the context of the rape trial, we have seen in Chapter Two how legal
discourse has applied cultural stereotypes about the role of women to make it
extremely difficult for the rape victim to establish that she did not consent to
sex. In the rape context, women's consent to sex is automatically implied
because this is assumed to be woman's natural role. In a similar fashion in this
context, a woman's consent to foetal treatment is automatically implied because
this is assumed to be a mother's natural role, and all women naturally want to be
mothers. Rich has summarised the spirit of this conclusion as follows -
129 Diduck, A. "Legisltaing Ideologies of Motherhood", Supra. Preface, Note 14
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"If rape has been terrorism, motherhood has been penal servitude. It need not
be.,,130
In a truly cruel gesture, it seems that the modem medical establishment have
with one hand given women the power, for the first time in history, to control
their reproductive lives, while simultaneously depriving them of that control
with the other hand by affording the state the ideology and technology to control
the lives and choices of pregnant women. Legal decisions condemning this
treatment of the pregnant woman as obstetrical vessel have in real terms come
only on appeal. They have, therefore, come too late and if, as is likely, the UK
position is to follow the same trend as that which has been discerned in the
US,131 the insight of the appeal decisions will be afforded as little consideration
as are the wishes of the pregnant woman when judges rush to the hospital to
make their first instance ruling.
Discussion over the previous two chapters has clearly established the
problematic nature of the current treatment of female consent within the specific
legal arenas examined. The extent to which normative expectations regarding
'appropriate' identities and forms of conduct have infiltrated the legal arena
through a variety of discursive strategies has been forcefully illustrated, as have
the curtailing effects of that incorporation upon the alleged ability of the legal
agent to choose freely and from an unrestricted remit. Most specifically, we
have noted the damaging effect that the passive and altruistic requirements of
such expectations have had upon the liberties afforded to female agents and the
credibility afforded to their forms of agency.
Developing that thesis further, it has been implied that the operation of consent
in these legal contexts remains problematic primarily because of the position of
consent within liberal frameworks which fail to illustrate the extent to which
choices in the social world are constructed and constrained by normative
130 Rich, A. Of Woman Born, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 19, p. 14
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stereotype and which fail to offer an honest account of law's operation in that
constructive process. We have seen in our discussion in Chapter One that a
necessary prerequisite to the achievement of a more meaningful standard for the
operation and interpretation of consent can only be achieved by shedding the
prevailing notion of unlimited and unconstrained human agency. Through the
specific examination of the contexts of rape and maternal-foetal conflict, we
have illustrated the disjunction between that liberal ideal and the experiential
reality ofheavily constructed agentic capacity.
131 Kolder,V., Gallagher,J. & Parsons,M. "Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions", Supra. Chapter
1bree, Note 69
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONSENT, INDIVIDUALISM AND FEMINIST
THEORIES OF THE SELF
'The idea (of the voluntary) is useful, and it helps to serve the purposes of justice,
but it is essentially superficial; if we seek to give it greater depth, or to redefine it
by pressing too hard on questions of the agent's precise intention, state of mind or
power of self-control at a particular moment, we sink into the sands of an everyday
entirely justified skepticism, that is, we enter a realm of psychological reality that
is - and is recognized by us to be - too indeterminate to provide a rationally
motivated answer to every possible question about the correct application of our
concept of the voluntary.' 1
In the preceding chapters of this thesis, we have examined the extent to which
stereotypical assumptions about gender identity and socio-sexual behaviour have
been incorporated into legal discourse and marshalled to discredit the possibility of
female non-consent. Established from the outset has been the viability of the
premise that modem legal power operates not only through juridical mechanisms,
but also through the manipulative power of myriad normative disciplinary
techniques." This disciplinary aspect of legal power infiltrates the life of the human
agent at intimate levels. Most poignantly, as we have seen, the mechanisms of a
specific species of discipline, namely bio-power, operate to construct even the
corporeal manifestation of the human body through the proliferation of skewed
discourses about the dictates of sexuality.3
The peculiar effectiveness of the mechanism of bio-power has provoked concern to
examine the extent to which disciplinary dictates can be said to have curtailed the
bodily expression of autonomy in the human agent. Given the historical and
philosophical trend, which has advocated a particularly inextricable link between the
female body and the female identity, our focus has primarily involved examination
1 Williams, B Shame and Necessity (1993) Berkeley, p.67
2 See Discussion in Chapter One, "Legal Power as Disciplinary Power".
3 See Discussion in Chapter One, "Feminism and Law's Disciplinary Power" & "Discourses of Female
Embodiment".
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of the effects of the incorporation into law of disciplinary power (most especially
bio-power) upon the female agent.
The constructionism implicated in the networks of normative disciplinary power has
significant effects at all levels of living. At the most general, however, the prime
effect of the incorporation of disciplinary techniques into our analysis of legal power
is the increasing recognition of the artificiality of the notion of choice and self-
determination that has fuelled legal analysis within the juridical mould. Having
established the existence of networks of discipline as operative upon the human
experience, and having established the force of the normative imperatives that they
communicate, it becomes increasingly difficult to stand by the prevailing liberal
assumption ofunfettered freedom and unconstrained individual choice.
The discourses of discipline, whether legal or otherwise, operate upon the decision-
making process of the human agent, obscuring from view the possibility of
'undisciplined' options, while simultaneously accrediting priority to the specific
modes of being deemed more appropriate. The existence of such discourse
establishes, as we have seen through our discussion of the discourse of sexuality, a
regime with which the subject must comply or face the condemnation of failing to
meet the ideal. A society implicated in disciplinary power becomes a society
peopled by subjects who struggle to meet the ideals presented to them for fear of
reprisal. In their eternal struggle to comply with the ideals presented by disciplinary
discourse, of course, the power of the agent to freely and meaningfully choose from
a full range of possibilities is lost. On the contrary, the agent has the ability to
choose only within the restricted remit made available through their submersion
within the categories of desire directed by disciplinary regimes.
Nonetheless, the rhetoric of law continues to stand by the conception of
unconstrained choice, or 'consent', which took precedence in the days of the social
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contract tradition," where the power wielded by law was unanimously attributed to
the realm of the juridical. In contemporary society, where the mechanisms through
which legal power operates are significantly more diffuse and complex, the model of
human agency that acts as a pillar to legal power remains within this artificial and
historical guise. Through the more general critique of Chapter One, and the more
specific treatment of particular contexts in Chapters Two and Three, it has been
suggested that the time for abandoning the myth of the juridical conception is long
overdue. In analysing legal power outwith the shadow of the juridical, it becomes
apparent that legal power significantly affects the remit and credibility of human
agency in ways that can never be understood through a continued deference to the
unidirectional conception of power privileged by legal analysis to date. The
disciplinary discourses incorporated on the underside of the juridical in the
operations of law establish normative ideals of behaviour, identity and even
embodiment that saturate the life of the individual. This process of saturation
significantly weakens the autonomy of the agent by skewing perceptions of their
legitimate choices and constructing their ability to express freedom of choice to
within strictly pre-ordained parameters.
Highlighted through the specific examination of the contexts of rape and matemal-
foetal conflict in the preceding chapters has been the existence and operation of
various stereotypes which have been incorporated into the legal arena through a
multitude of discursive strands. The normative demands made upon social agents by
these stereotypes are restrictive and inhibitive to the development of truly chosen
gender identities. In the context of the legal treatment of rape, we have drawn
attention to the existence of a pervasive ideology, which asserts that the appropriate
role of the female is one that assumes a passive position in sexual relations. What's
more, it is a role within which the behaviour exhibited in all areas of social living
should embody a clear element of submission, be it through dressing reservedly,
preserving one's chastity or never leaving home without the security of some male
4 See Discussion in Preface. Particularly, Hobbes, T. Leviathan (ed. MacPherson) &
Locke, J. Two Treatises ofGovernment(ed. Laslett, P.), Supra. Preface, Note 4
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protection. Notions of the 'ideal rape' and the 'ideal victim' in this mould render it
increasingly difficult for the female agent to 'choose' to live a life of personal and
sexual freedom without also casting herself from the protective umbrella offered by
the legal authorities to those women who succeed in conformity. If the female agent
conforms to the demands of the protective confines of legal discipline, her 'choice'
to do so must be treated with some degree of cynicism regarding the extent to which
that choice has been imposed upon her by social expectations and fear of reprisal.
Simultaneously, however, if the female agent refuses to comply with these demands
and 'chooses' a life of independence and sexual initiative, she is divested of her
powers of self-determination, should she be raped. This remains the case because in
flirting with a man, or having a drink alone with him, the meaning of her conduct is
construed to effectively deny her the claim that she did not thereby implicitly
consent to sex with him.
In the context of maternal-foetal conflict different stereotypes infiltrate the legal
arena, but the end result for the female agent remains similar. Where in the rape
context, the disciplinary discourses were concerned with the proper role of woman
as sexual agent, in this context, the concern is to fix the proper role of woman as
mother. Once again, however, the dictates demand compliance with ideals of
passivity, and self-abnegation. The most prevalent theme of disciplinary discourse
being associated with the inherently altruistic nature of the 'good mother', the
dictates of legal power operate to enforce this ideal when necessary, even in
circumstances where there may be a dangerous effect upon the mother herself. In a
fundamental contradiction to the body of legal authority on medical treatment, the
maternal-foetal conflict situation (fuelled by the disciplinary discourses of altruism
and selflessness) represents the only arena within which an agent is not entitled to
refuse medical treatment. In a legal climate where all other competent adults are
entitled to refuse treatment upon whatever basis (deemed rational or otherwise), the
dictates of the 'proper' role of woman as mother are so strongly implicated as to
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deny the same rights to pregnant women.5 Legal power in this context operates
likewise to eliminate the possibility of legitimate choice - if the female agent
complies with the demands of selfless motherhood, she will consent to treatment and
be cherished by society, but the pressure towards compliance operating upon her
makes the legitimacy ofher 'choice' questionable. If, on the contrary, she refuses to
comply with such erroneous demands, her desire to construct her own meanings
around the motherhood experience are frustrated by a legal power which once again
makes it impossible for her to continue to refuse her consent to the demands of the
ideal at the clinical stage.
Of course, the specific contexts examined here involve particularly strong gender-
specific assumptions. While this has made them particularly attractive contexts in
terms of our current concern to illustrate the close relationship between conceptions
of law and power and the deployment of sexuality, as we shall see, this factor also
makes them a relatively open target for counter-criticism from those who wish to
defend the current notion of consent.
The argument developed over the preceding chapters has implied that the prevailing
operation of consent is problematic in large part because it has continued to allow
for the incorporation of prejudicial and anachronistic social stereotypes in its
interpretation and application in the legal arena. It has been argued that such
incorporation is misguided and dangerous, perpetuating a skewed dynamic of
agency that affords greater credibility to the self-determination of some and not
others. This problematic interdependence between social expectation and legal
standards of consent has often been isolated within critique, particularly in the
specific contexts previously addressed.6 However, the fact that many commentators?
have criticised the incorporation of social expectation into legal deliberation
5 See discussion of case law on this issue in Chapter Three
6 See Discussion throughout Chapter Two and Chapter Three on this issue
7 Most notably perhaps Estrich, S. Real Rape, Supra. Preface, Note 11 in relation to Rape, and Corea, G.
"What The King Cannot See", Supra. Chapter Three, Note 7 & Oakley, A., "Normal Motherhood - An
Exercise in Self-Control?" Supra. Chapter Three, Note 28 in relation to materal-foetal conflict.
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surrounding the consent / non-consent dichotomy does not imply that the claim
embodied in this thesis, which entails a fundamental reformulation of the very
notion of consent, has been unanimously advocated.
Indeed, the argument has sometimes been made that a more appropriate remedy to
the problems of consent discussed over the preceding chapters lies simply in
ensuring the eradication of such gender-specific stereotypes.f By eliminating the
incorporation of blatant stereotypical assumptions into legal decision-making, it is
claimed that the prevailing liberal conception of consent will be able to operate as its
rhetoric suggests, providing a medium for the free articulation of human choice. On
this account, the unsatisfactory results of the application of the current standard of
consent exist as enigmas within a generally valuable and egalitarian system of self-
determination. The specific contexts of rape and matemal-foetal conflict are
problematic because of the particularity of the issues being dealt with, rather than
because of any problem inherent in the conception of consent involved in translating
those issues into the legal realm. By establishing a more vigilant and critical
approach to what issues of social expectation and stereotype are considered relevant
to the issue of consent or non-consent, this counter-claim argues that the
uncomfortable consequences discussed previously can be avoided. Once the
eradication of erroneous stereotypical assumptions has been ensured by this
proposed solution, the implication remains that the prevailing conception of consent
is the most appropriate vehicle for the articulation of free and unfettered choice.
Although this argument offers the benefit of simplicity and superficial redress, it is
fundamentally incapable of achieving its averred aims and therefore fundamentally
incapable of offering a solution to the critique of the preceding discussion. By
eliminating discourse from law in the way that this proposal requires, we harness
legal power once more within the confines of the juridical conception. However, we
8 Fletcher, G. Basic Concepts ofLegal Thought, Supra. Preface, Note 3. Arguments of this kind have been
implicit even in some of the most well-respected feminist critique (e.g. Estrich, S. Real Rape, Supra. Preface,
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have seen elsewhere that this juridical conception is not only outdated but also
artificial.9 In hiding behind the veil of the juridical, the solution which has thus been
offered to the foregoing critique may succeed in presenting the illusion of
improvement, but in real terms it simply relegates the significance of discourse and
discipline once more to the underside oflaw's power.
In underestimating the centrality of the incorporation of stereotype and discourse
into the operation of modem power, this proposed solution suggests that the
incorporation of discursive strategies and disciplinary techniques into legal decision-
making is the result of accident or ambivalence. In Chapter One, however, it was
clearly established that this is not the case. The problematic situations highlighted in
Chapters Two and Three cannot be remedied merely by the adoption of a more
watchful approach to the incorporation of discourse into law. On the contrary, the
incorporation of such discourse into law is a central aspect of the assumption of
disciplinary power within law. The dangerous effects of this incorporation must be
accredited with more significance than that afforded to it within the confines of this
counter-claim - the incorporation involved is not the result of a simple lack of
judicial impartiality, but an index of changing networks of power with tangible
effects and consequences.
Eradication of the gulf between the model of unconstrained choice assumed by the
liberal notion of consent and the reality of a constructed remit of agency implicated
in the contemporary rise of disciplinary power requires the development of a
complex methodology far beyond the framework of superficial judicial vigilance
proposed by this counter-claim. The solution to the problems inherent in the
prevailing operation of consent isolated over previous chapters does not lie in such
proposals. Through their enduring reliance upon the epistemological foundations of
the concept of consent itself, the proposals embodied in the counter-claim discussed
Note 11) which has primarily concerned itself with the deficiencies in the immediate operation of prevailing
consent standards, brought into play by the invocation of stereotype.
9 See Discussion in Chapter One, "Legal Power as Disciplinary Power"
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here do not only fail to examine the place of that concept within the overall
framework of changing patterns of power dynamics, but they also assume that,
subject to some necessary vigilance to ensure a fairer interpretation, consent as a
vehicle for the articulation of personal autonomy is unproblematic. This approach
fails, however, to devote necessary attention to the nature of its foundations, and to
question the legitimacy that is uncritically accredited to the prevailing conception of
consent as representing the most appropriatevehicle.
In the remaining sections of this thesis, we will examine the difficulties inherent in
the uncritical faith in the prevailing notion of consent that is illustrated by many of
the counter-claims offered in response to the critique of the preceding chapters. In
challenging the authority afforded to the prevailing notion of consent as a medium
for communication of will, subsequent chapters will continue to further the
methodological aim, established at the outset, namely the examination of legal
power and legal concepts outwith the shadow of the juridical.
It has been alleged that the conception of consent as unconstrained choice has been
heavily implicated in the assumptions of the juridical conception of law.10 Over the
preceding chapters, we have begun to question the legitimacy of that assumption
through an analysis of the extent to which legal agents have been 'disciplined' in
their choices by the incorporation of social stereotype into the interpretation of the
medium of consent. This critique strikes at the heart of the claim (inherent to the
liberal notion of consent) that consent is equally available to all competent adults as
a medium for the articulation of their equally free and self-determined human
choice.
Within the confines of what follows, we will begin to challenge another assumption
that informs the framing of the notion of consent within juridical analysis - the
assumption that the self for whom consent is the vehicle of self-determination is an
10 See Discussion in Preface and Chapter One, "Legal Power as Disciplinary Power"
164
individual and abstracted self, unaffected by relationship or social influence.
Although related to the critique of the preceding chapters in the sense that the
inherent assumption of individualism thus isolated may be seen as another form of
social expectation, the particularly problematic nature of this assumption renders it
deserving of specific critique.
The operation of consent standards in the particular contexts of rape and maternal-
foetal conflict has proven problematic for various reasons, not simply because of the
incorporation of erroneous and gender-specific stereotypical models into legal
discourse. Although this has certainly presented a significant obstacle to the
realisation of a more meaningful medium of self-determination, it will be submitted
in what follows that a potentially even more fundamental obstacle to that realisation
lies in the incompatibility of these contexts with the assumption of consent as the
articulation of individual and rationally motivated will. Whether the context is one
of a dating companion raping his victim, or a pregnant woman refusing consent to
medical treatment for the benefit of her foetus, the pre-existing relationships
involved establish a network of conflicting desire and dialectical interaction which is
far more complex than that assumed within prevailing interpretations of consent. It
is in contexts such as these that the individualism and abstraction implicit in the
standard assumption of the consensual agent becomes most observably at odds with
the more complex realities of the decision-making process.
Our concern to date with critique pertaining to the manner In which judicial
interpretations of consent operate has been relevant and valuable. However, to leave
our critique at this stage would run the risk, in Foucaultian terms of maintaining a
discursive smoke-screen over the more fundamental prejudices which inform the
concept of consent - the prejudices which operate to favour an abstracted and
artificial concept of human subjectivity as disembodied and disembedded. Consent
has been heralded, as we have seen, as the paradigm instance of self-determination,
as the medium through which the integrity and autonomy of our self can be
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articulated. In the preceding chapters we have examined the legitimacy of that claim
in terms of the experiential operation of that standard, and we have found it to fall
short frequently of its averred aims. We have seen in Chapters Two and Three that
prevailing social imperatives have often infiltrated the legal arena and rendered
consent in its current model an inappropriate vehicle for the translation and
transmission of personal will. The inadequacies of counter-claims that offer
remedies through the revision of the existing conception of consent to be more
vigilant against the incorporation of such manipulative forces have been well-
illustrated. Central amongst these inadequacies must be placed the fact that such
approaches leave unquestioned the other side of the coin of self-determination,
namely the extent to which the self embodied within the current conception of
consent represents a valid personification of its subject. Who is the self to whom the
medium of consent seeks to give voice?
The subject of the current conception of consent is, as we shall see, an abstracted
and disembedded individual. However, the world in which we live is not populated
by such abstract entities. The failure of the prevailing conception of consent to
realise this tension and its failure to seek a manifestation more inkeeping with the
epistemological realities of the human self it avers to represent render it a focus of
substantial and enduring critique. Concern to evaluate not only the operation of
consent, but also the conception of consent itself, must be the project of any
meaningful examination of the scope of human self-determination. On that basis,
the remainder of this thesis will examine the inadequacy of the conception of
consent itself, highlighting the various ways in which the conception falls short of
providing a true vehicle for the determination of the will of the human beings who
populate our world.
In what follows discussion will commonly involve a focus upon alternative
formulations of subjectivity. Implicit throughout such discussion, however, is also
an evaluation of alternative formulations of the notion of consent. Consent is our
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most highly prized medium for self-determination. The ensuing discussion seeks to
establish, however, that the self allegedly being determined through the medium of
consent is an artificial one. Before we can develop a more appropriate medium for
self-determination, we must first develop a more experientially viable formulation of
human subjectivity. The project of uncovering such a methodology will form the
basis of the following chapters. The excursion into this search for meaningful
agentic subjectivity is a necessary prerequisite to establishing the foundation from
which our improved medium of self-determinationwill develop.
This critique, as we shall see, should be of considerable interest to a feminist
academy concerned with the development of feminist ethics towards the realisation
of less structured gender identities and more powerful mediums of self-
determination. The essential claim made here is that contra the aforementioned
counter-claim to the criticism contained in Chapters Two and Three, any theory
based on the foundation of individual consent is necessarily unsatisfactory because
of the inherently artificial nature of this foundation. Consent as a legal and moral
notion can only herald the normative significance generally attributed to it on the
basis of what shall be argued to be a suspect theory of the interaction between the
individual and society. Any such theory presents its subject as highly atomistic,
representing society as a voluntary and equal association of self-sufficient
individuals, each capable of making free decisions as to how best to live their lives.
Such individualist notions of human subjectivity reiterate the essential premises of
an entrenched Western philosophical tradition which, being heavily influenced by
Enlightenment quests for universality and rationality, favours conceptions of the
human subject as self-motivating, and capable of reasoned self-determination that
transcends the contingencies ofpersonal circumstance.
As we will come on to see through the duration of this chapter, however, this is a
highly artificial and deficient vision of the dynamics of social interaction. Feminist
commentators have joined a vociferous trend in contemporary philosophy that has
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challenged the legacy of this individualistic vision of human subjectivity. Carol
Pateman's critique of social contract theory has precipitated a fury of feminist
discussion on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the claims that have been made
regarding individuals and their interaction with one another within the confines of an
operative society."
Many of the most prominent advocates of Enlightenment rationalism and
universalism have developed their theories from the origins of the social contract
ideology. Immanuel Kant, for example, has been quite explicit in accrediting the
indebtedness of his theory to the work of Rousseau.V Kant has borrowed heavily
from the frameworks of contract theory and has added flesh to the bones of
Rousseau's conception of subjectivity. Indeed, Kant's notion of moral rationality,
made manifest in his requirements of the 'categorical imperative' (which will be
examined in the following section) plays a similar role to the notion of the General
Will in Rousseau's theory.l'' Adopting highly reminiscent views of the nature of
human freedom, both Kant and Rousseau demand that the morality of our actions
consists in their being directed in accordance with universal law. The implication of
this for both theorists, although perhaps more famously for Kant, is that those
actions that are guided merely by our passions or appetites do not constitute moral
acts.i" The strong nature of this linkage between Rousseau (as representative of a
social contract perception of human interaction) and Kant (as representative of
Enlightenment pretensions regarding the nature of human subjectivity) has been
noted by much subsequent commentary. Riley, for example, notes that,
11 Pateman, C. The Sexual Contract, Supra. Preface Note 5
12 Rousseau, J. J. The Social Contract and Discourses (ed. Cole, G.), Supra. Preface, Note 4
13 Kant has often expressed his indebtedness to Roussaeu, especially for his belief in the common man, and
for having "first discovered universal human nature beneath the multiplicity of adapted human forms and
hidden laws." - Friedrich, W. The Philosophy ofKant-Immanuel Kant's Moral and Political Writings,
Supra. Preface, Note 17, Intro. xxiii.
14 Friedrich, W. The Philosophy ofKant - Immanuel Kant's Moral and Political Writings, Supra Preface,
Note 17, p. xxiii
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"Kant wanted to preserve and defend Rousseau's notion of will as an uncaused
causality, but also to show how a truly free will would be determined by practical
reason itself, not by feeling.,,15
Hence, Rousseau's perception of consent as a one-dimensional interchange of
authority between rationally motivated and mutually distinct individuals has been
incorporated and advocated within the confines of Kantian Enlightenment theory.
With his emphasis on the conditions of freedom and autonomy, Kant has built upon
the premises laid bare by the social contract tradition to assert a universalising
imperative in the domain ofmorality, freedom and autonomy.
"Following Rousseau, Kant constructs a contractarian model in which the
legitimacy of a law resides in' its expression of the public will, although, for Kant,
this does not require the active participatory consent of its citizens; rather, it
merely requires that the law in question be rationally worthy of consent.t''"
Since the dawn of Enlightenment rationality, all major fields of academic discipline
have concerned themselves with the pursuit of all-encompassing, universal and
rational truths. Although writers within the Enlightenment tradition have not always
written as a cohesive collective, certain themes have commonly united disparate
theories. One of the most commonly implied theses has involved the conception of
human nature as fundamentally individualist, autonomous and one-dimensional. In
many respects, this perception of subjectivity has been most strongly associated with
the metaphysics of Immanuel Kant (who, as we have seen, owes his own allegiance
to social contract theory). Despite the profound influence of Kantian ethics upon
contemporary models and codes, this chapter shall seek to establish the inadequacy
of his conception of the autonomous human self, not only for the legal
conceptualisation of consent, but also for the purposes of moral, legal and social
ethics more generally.
15 Riley, P. "On Kant As The Most Adequate of the Social Contract Theorists" (1973) Political Theory 400,
p.457
16 Owens, D. Maturity and Modernity - Neitzsche, Weber, Foucault and the Ambivalence ofReason (1997)
Routledge, p. 9-10
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Who is the Subject ofthe Enlightenment?
"Enlightenment is man's leaving his self-caused immaturity. Immaturity is the
incapacity to use one's intelligence without the guidance of another...all that is
required for this enlightenment is freedom; and in particular the least harmful of all
that may be called freedom, namely the freedom for man to make public use of his
. 11 ,,17reason III a matters.
In popular analysis, the Enlightenment is considered as marking an episode in the
history of thought where full confidence was placed in the universality of law based
upon a strong commitment to man's intrinsic rationality. Employing a perception of
subjectivity as constituted by an historically bound self-emancipating individual,
writers within the Kantian species of Enlightenment theory have developed a model
of autonomy as inextricably bound up with the exercise of rationality.
Kant explains the background to the development ofEnlightenment spirit-
"The guardians who have so benevolently taken over the supervision of men have
carefully seen to it that far the greatest part of them (including the entire fair sex)
regard taking the step to maturity as very dangerous, not to mention difficult.
Having first made their domestic livestock dumb, and carefully made sure that
these docile creatures will not take a single step without the go-cart to which they
are harnessed, these guardians then show them the danger that threatens them,
should they attempt to walk alone.,,18
This critique bears similarity to the Foucaultian thesis, discussed in Chapter One,
that presents disparate power relations as crucial to the construction of the 'docile
bodies' deemed characteristic of modernity.i" However, where Kant seeks to
resolve the problem of enforced 'immaturity' through the encouragement of the
exercise of individual rationality, Foucault finds resolution only through the
recognition that power forces carmot be transcended, but can only be subverted from
within. Kant's belief in the possibility of transcending power and conditioning
through the employment of pure rationality is contra-indicated by the Foucaultian
17 Kant, I. "What is Enlightenment?" (1784) in Friedrich, W. The Philosophy ofKant - Immanuel Kant's
Moral and Political Writings, Supra. Preface, Note 17, p133-4
18 Kant, I. Perpetual Peace and Other Essays (trans. Humphreys, T.) (1983) Hackett Press, p. 41
19 Owens, D. Maturity and Modernity, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 16
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thesis discussed previously that power is omnipotent, and a site both of oppression
and resistance. Furthermore, this Kantian notion, which provided the original
impetus for the Enlightenment crusade, is premised upon the assumption that power
is operated by a privileged elite (the State) who possess the power to restrict the
development of individual rationality and therefore autonomy. The inadequacies of
that assumption have been discussed at some length in Chapter One where it was
argued that state power has become increasingly dispersed within the network of
relationships that deny any such rigid differentiation of 'state' from 'society'.
Despite our previous condemnation within Chapter One of the 'one-dimensional'
approach to legal power exhibited by this Kantian thesis, we have also been
compelled to note the continued deference which liberal legal analysis has afforded
to its juridical conception of state power as manifest by dynamics of sovereign
command. The tenacity of that juridical conception within dominant liberal
frameworks can in large part be attributed to those aspects of Kantian theory that
have proven hugely influential in subsequent legal thought. Developing that link
further, Carty20 has argued that the survival of a conception of law as embodying a
form of rationality which, because universal, positively enables social integration
proclaims liberal theory's solidarity with the Western metaphysical tradition as a
whole, and with the project ofKantian Enlightenment in particular.
This Enlightenment project seeks universal and rational truths, capable of reasoned,
empirical representation. It seeks a place of convergence in the midst of
multiplicity, and in order to do so it employs a strategy involving a subject who sees
and an object that is seen. The tradition of liberal theory that dominates legal
analysis exists as an attempt to design and maintain the conditions under which a
universal legislator (as envisaged by the Enlightenment) may be enabled to exist."
To that extent, therefore, there exists a strong inter-relationship between the
20 Carty, A. (ed.) Postmodern Law: Enlightenment, Revolution and the Death ofMan (1990) Edinburgh
University Press
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pretensions of Enlightenment theory and the liberal analysis that provides the
framework for prevailing legal ideology.
An important vehicle for this legitimation is manifest in notions of and discourse
surrounding the human subject - the essence of subjectivity heralded most
commonly by liberal legal theory is freedom, defined as the capacity to make
rational choices. Building upon the social contract perception that freedom comes
from giving consent to authority being exercised, much Enlightenment theory has
likewise been grounded on the basis of similar assumptions regarding the centrality
of freedom to subjectivity. This in itself is not necessarily controversial, at least not
amongst the contentions of this thesis, which claims that the capacity of the
competent person to meaningfully give or refuse consent (as a manifestation of
personal freedom) is crucial to the realisation of their humanity. However, the
dominant Enlightenment requirement that that choice can only be exercised morally
and meaningfully through the employment of rational decision-making processes is
significantly more jarring.
The precise nature of the problems inherent in this position will be developed in
more detail shortly. For current purposes, it is sufficient to note that the demands
made upon our decision-making processes and motivations by certain Enlightenment
theorists are by no means uncontroversial. Nonetheless, they have been heavily
incorporated within the dictates of a liberal legal philosophy that is attracted by the
possibility inherent in such theorising of presenting 'illusions' of rationality and
impartiality despite overwhelming experiential evidence challenging the legitimacy
of such claims.
Despite the persuasive force wielded by these individualist and rationalist subject
strategies in contemporary formulations of notions of selfhood, self-determination
21 Carty, A. (ed.) Postmodern Law: Enlightenment, Revolution and the Death ofMan, Supra. Chapter Four,
Note 20, p. 108
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and consent, these Enlightenment-based presuppositions have also often been the
focus of radical critique. Seyla Benhabib expresses the common nature of that
critique,
'the ideal of autonomy in universalistic moral theories from the social contract
traditions down to Rawl's and Kohlberg's work is based upon an implicit politics
which defines the 'personal' in the sense of the intimate or domestic sphere as
ahistorical, immutable and unchanging, thereby removing it from discussion and
reflection. Needs, interests, as well as emotions and affects, are the considered
properties of individuals which moral philosophy recoils from examining on the
grounds that it may interfere with the autonomy of the sovereign self. ,22
In subsuming the disparate philosophical premises of writers from Rawls to
Kohlberg under the category of universalistic theory, and then attributing to each
theorist the same level of experiential abstraction, Benhabib makes an extremely
strong claim. We have mentioned previously that even those writers consciously
congregated under the heading of Enlightenment theorists have encountered internal
disagreements.v' Although, as we shall see, there is considerable merit in the
criticism that Benhabib makes of the tendency towards rational abstraction often
exhibited by the writers she critiques, we must be wary of her tendency to assume
too much unity between disparate theorists. Lodging a general critique at each and
every Enlightenment theorist denies the reality that these theorists are positioned
along a spectrum of ranging philosophical pretensions, some of which favour
experiential abstraction more strongly than others. Once again, we must resist the
temptation involved in sacrificing grounded and comprehensive critique to the
achievement of forceful rhetoric. Subsuming all Enlightenment theory under one
category provides a remit for a radical critique that is thereby entitled to set itself
apart from a long and established philosophical history. Although the hyperbolic
potential of such claims is significant, a more particularist critique that attends to the
specificity of individual theorists offers the more promising conceptual option.
22 Benhabib, S. Situating the Self(1992) Polity Press, p170
23 See Discussion in Preface, Note 4
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In order to offer such particularist critique within the confines of this work, we will
restrict our focus primarily to that genre of Enlightenment theory associated with the
works of Immanuel Kant.24 Kant's ideas continue to attract considerable allegiance
today and what's more, his work develops a specific focus on the problematisation
of notions of autonomy and rationality that remain particularly relevant for our
excursion into Enlightenment perceptions of subjectivity and their influence upon
current formulations of consent. Restricting our analysis to the theory of Kant
therefore seems justified within the parameters of our immediate focus. However, as
will become apparent, restricting our focus to the work of one theorist does not
dismiss entirely of the need for subtleties in our analysis.
An important distinction must be drawn from the outset between Kant's own
philosophical intentions and motivations and the so-called 'Kantian' analysis that
has built upon these premises. Often, the subtleties of Kant's own analysis have
been lost in contemporary translation. Kant's premises, which will be described in
some detail in this section, are by no means uncontroversial in themselves.
However, much of the controversy which surrounds Kant's theory in contemporary
analysis is attributable, not so much to Kant himself, as to his Kantian successors
who seem to have selectively built upon his foundations to develop a conceptually
distinct, albeit in some respects reminiscent, critique. Within the confine of this
chapter, our interest will, therefore, not exclusively be with an examination of the
deficiencies inherent in Kant's theoretical form, but also with directing attention
towards the extent to which certain Kantian deficiencies mayor may not be fairly
attributed to the philosophical impetus ofKant's own position.
The ideal of autonomy is certainly central to Kant's original treatment of the
problems of freedom and obligation. In asserting that the autonomous will is a will
not subject to any set of extemallaws, he proposes that all ends which depend upon
24 Most Particularly - Kant, I. Groundwork ofthe Metaphysics ofMorals (1964) Harper Row
Kant, I. Critique ofPure Reason (Trans. Smith, N.) (1965) St. Martin's
Kant, I. The Critique ofJudgement (trans. Pluhar, W.) (1987) Hackett Press
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the workings of the phenomenological realm for their realisation (for example the
ends of happiness) must not be involved as more than a slight motivational force in
the exercise of true agency."
Within the confines of this chapter, we will examme the often dangerous
implications of that thesis. Before doing so, however, it ought to be stressed that
many of the more sweeping criticisms that have been lodged against it (such as that
initiated by Benhabib above) develop from an original misunderstanding of the spirit
and intent of Kantian Enlightenment. In seeking a foundation from which to
establish the intrinsic meaning of normativity, Kant does not in fact wish to imply
that the search for happiness (and like ends) is in anyway unjustifiable or unreal. On
the contrary, Kant insists that this search is inherent in the make-up of human
beings.
What does make Kant's analysis controversial, however, is the extent to which he
then exclusively relegates law to the realm of rationality and abstraction from
phenomenological ends. Although Kant recognises the operation of elements of
human subjectivity other than reason, and this is often forgotten in more sweeping
criticisms of his work, he insists upon a conception of reason as acting as a filter
through which all other ends must pass before they can act as a motivational force
upon the truly autonomous will. As Lloyd explains,
"The limited picture of an austere moral agent in some respects does less than
justice to Kant's intentions. His point was not that genuinely moral agents must
shed their natural inclinations, desires and affections, but rather that what is
distinctively moral about their actions can be expressed entirely in terms of rational
principles.T"
Hence, although Kant accepts that people do seek ends other than those of a purely
rational guise, it is only those ends that can be translated into the rational form that
can be accredited with the normative significance characteristic of law. Kant seeks
25 Kant, 1.The Critique ofJudgement, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 24, p. 362. Quoted in Owens, D. Maturity
and Modernity, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 16, p. 13
26 Lloyd, G. The Man ofReason - Male and Female in Western Philosophy (1993) Routledge, p.68-9
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to justify that position through his assertion that "to be subject to emotions and
passions is probably always an illness of mind because both emotions and passions
exclude the sovereignty ofrcason.v"
Although it is therefore unjustifiable to criticise Kant for failing to recognise the
existence of phenomenological imperatives within the context of human and social
life, it remains legitimate to challenge Kant's reluctance to accommodate such
concessions in his moral depiction of the transcendental self. Kant's account
remains plagued with considerable inadequacy in its failure to accommodate
,/ meaningfully the concessions made to non-rational motivation. As Sedgewick
explains -
"So long as our affective natures are allowed no constitutive role in the forming of
the strictly moral component of personality, that part of ourselves from the moral
point of view will have to drop out on the Kantian model as simply irrelevant. No
matter how great an influence Kant admits feelings to have in preparing us for the
proper moral response, he nonetheless takes them to be in themselves ill-suited to
determine the morally permissible maxim or the right course of action.,,28
Such critique has become increasingly justified, furthermore, as much subsequent
Kantian analysis has not only displaced the existence of these concessions, but has
actually encouraged a public perception of Kant's theory as having rejected out of
hand the very notion of an extra-rational world.29 This recapitulation of Kant's
original critique has been hugely influential in the development of liberal legal
philosophy and explains the roots of the misinterpretation of Kant's own theory that
has been isolated in the critique lodged at it by Benhabib, among others.
We have proposed in Chapter One that perceptions of legal power are shifting as
analysis seeks to lift the veil of the juridical. Perhaps Kant's preoccupation with
27 Kant, 1. The Anthropologyfrom a Pragmatic Point of View (trans. Dowdell, V.) (1978) Southern Illinois
University Press, p. 155
28 Sedgewick, S. "Can Kant's Ethics Survive the Feminist Critique?" in Schott, R. (ed.) Feminist
Interpretations ofImmanuel Kant (1997) University ofPennsylvania Press, p. 88
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nonnativity and his unthinking assimilation of law with the species of rationalism
provoked by his concern with nonnativity can be accounted for by his place within
the genre of the juridical approach to law. While this may serve as an explanation
for the specific format of Kantian Enlightenment, this fails to remedy the very real
effects which the influence of the Kantian thesis have marked upon prevailing legal
notions of freedom, autonomy and consent even in contemporary times.
Kant's professed focus in his analysis of metaphysics has lain in a preoccupation
with the role of reason. Where experience-based knowledge is deemed immanent
(and therefore inferior and irrelevant to the issue of law in its juridical guise), reason
is transcendent. Hence Kant's concern for
"the occupation of reason with itself alone and the supposed acquaintance with
objects arising from reason as it broods over its own concepts without having need
of, or being able to achieve, such knowledge through the meditation of
experience.,,30
The pure form of reason to be striven for by the autonomous will in this respect
constitutes Enlightened reason, no longer reliant upon the direction of motivation
from other fields (such as the phenomenological). For Kant, the will constituted
only by such purely rational motivation is a truly autonomous will. Hence, the
model implicitly proposed for the development of autonomy is one that also
demands the development of a sense of individual subjectivity divested of concern
for experiential ends or relational priority.
In the preceding chapters, we have examined the damage that can be done by
imposing stereotypical assumption over the experiential account given by the sexual
or maternal agent. In many ways, the imposition of stereotype constitutes the
second stage of this disciplinary approach. In what follows, we will examine the
dangers of the preliminary stage involved, which abstracts the self and its
29 This has permitted critics of Kantianism to unfairly criticise the work of Kant in this regard. See Baier, A.
"Hume, The Woman's Moral Theorist" in Kattay, E. & Meyers, D. (ed.) Women and Moral Theory (1987)
Rowman & Littlefield
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mechanisms for self-determination from the experiential knowledge and impulses,
which, it is argued, should be of central concern in any communication of self-
desire.
By excluding from legal consideration issues of personal affection and
phenomenological experiences, theories born in the dawn of Kantian Enlightenment
have enabled the perpetuation of a highly abstracted conception of human
subjectivity. Throughout the duration of this thesis, it has been argued that any
conception of subjectivity, which fails to take personal attachment into account,
presents only the most hollow and inadequate of descriptions of what it is to be a
self-aware and socially immersed human agent. Nonetheless, it is this hollow
perception of subjectivity that continues to be represented by the primary
mechanism for self-determination available within our legal CUlture, namely the
prevailing conception of consent.
We have noted above that one of the central aims of Enlightenment methodology
lies in the realisation of universal absolutes of rationality. Philosophical aspirations
towards such grand meta-narratives of truth have been labelled 'logocentric' (a term
devised originally by Jacques Derrida") because they exhibit a longing for a
constitutive reason (logos) and for an order of concepts that can be claimed to exist
in itself as a complete, self-referring and proper entity. Such logocentric impulses
have been strongly influential in the writings of many Enlightenment thinkers. This
has been most commonly made manifest through a shared ascription to the belief
that knowledge and truth are achievable through reliance upon a sovereign, self-
conscious and reflecting human subject possessing the ability to reason through to
the truths ofreality itself.
30 Friedrich, W. The Philosophy ofKant - Immanuel Kant's Moral and Political Writings, Supra. Preface,
Note 17, p.93
31 Derrida, J. OfGrammatology (1976) Johns Hopkins University Press & Speech and Phenomena, and
Other Essays on Husserl's Theory ofSigns (1973) Northwestern University Press. Good Introductory
Discussion to 'logocentrisrn' in Sarup, M. An Introductory Guide to Poststructuralism and Postmodernism
(200 Ed.) (1993) Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 34-8.
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It has been suggested above that Kant has been amongst the most celebrated
exponents of this species of 'subjectivist rationalism'. Strongly influenced by the
universalist impulse of many of his philosophical predecessors, represented in his
own work through the establishment ofthe 'categorical imperative', Kant posited the
belief that objectivity and reality can only be approached through the reasoning of a
human subject capable of transcending the contingencies of history, context and
perspective.
The formulation of the Categorical Imperative requires that one 'act only according
to that maxim by which one can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law' .32 Kant has specified that the test for this becomes one of discerning
what kind of world the moral agent, acting under the guidance of practical reason,
would create, it being a world in which he would present himself as a member. 33
Implicit in that imperative is the assumption that moral agents are transcendent of
circumstance and attachments - since the moral will in question is one involving the
exercise of practical reason, and since everyone must arrive at the same conclusions
as a matter of moral duty, the maxim simply cannot accommodate the possibility
that what the moral agent would will is a matter ofpersonal taste or desire.i"
This belief in the possibility of transcendental human consciousness has become an
integral part of the contemporary understanding of morality and legal agency.
Modem day moral and political theories continue to be framed within the confines
of the assumption that we, as rational human agents, can withdraw from our bodily
impulses, from the conditioning of our social milieu and the limits of our natural
environment in order to reflect on the basis of unencumbered reason towards the
32 Kant, 1. Groundwork ofthe Metaphysics ofMorals, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 24, p.96
33 Kant, I Religion Within the Limits ofReason Alone (trans. Greene, T. & Hudson, H.) (1960) Harper
Torchbooks, p. 5
34 Korsgaard, C. "Kant's Formula ofUniversal Law" (1985) 66 Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 24, in
Klemme, H. & Kuehn, M. (ed.) The International Library ofCritical Essays in the History ofPhilosophy:
Immanuel Kant, Vol. II (1999) Dartmouth
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recognition of objective truth.35 This assumption has been affirmed and privileged
in the very notion of consent that informs prevailing legal and moral sensibilities.
Building upon the social contract notion that consent to authority arises, not because
of any inherent human desire for social interaction, but because of rationalist
requirements of self-preservation through the forced maintenance of social harmony,
the conception of consent prioritised today continues to assume that consent is
issued or refused on the basis of similar rationalistic argument. Implicit in this logic
is the secondary place of non-rational (and therefore illegitimate) motivations,
desires and preference that human experience suggests are often felt to be important
factors in the decision-making process.
The liberal framework of consent assumes that legal agents can transcend these
contingent circumstances and emotive motivations to express their autonomy in a
rational manner, which, due to its rational foundation, is capable of universal
expression as a general maxim. Assumptions of individualism and universalism are
therefore central to the prevailing operation of the consent standard, finding their
roots in the Enlightenment-based notion of subjectivity discussed above. Our
critique of the operation of consent in the contexts of rape and maternal-foetal
conflict has begun to offer some insight into the inadequacies of such assumptions in
situations where concerns regarding relationships, emotions and pragmatic
contingencies are paramount.
In recognising the legacy of individualism within prevailing liberal legal standards,
however, we must cautiously distinguish the individualism of Kant's own theory
from that of his Kantian successors. Within the confines of The Metaphysics of
Morals, Kant expresses a position that offers at least some superficial concession to
the significance ofmoral communities and personal association. Kant suggests that,
35 Rawls, J. A Theory ofJustice (1971) Harvard University Press
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"It is a duty to oneself, as well as to others, not to isolate oneself, but to use one's
moral perfections in social intercourse. While making oneself the fixed center of
one's principles one ought to regard this circle drawn around one as also forming
an all-inclusive circle of those who are citizens of the world.,,36
Although this statement suggests potential dangers in terms of over-emphasising the
need for universality at the expense of concrete inter-personal relationships, it does
have the benefit of presenting an aspect of Kant's original theory that is less
sympathetic to the merits of radical individualism. In large part, however, that
promise is frustrated by accompanying aspects of his thesis that understand the
dictates of moral law (as manifest through submission to the categorical imperative)
to require each rational person to respect others as rational people, where that
'respect' remains entirely compatible with non-association, and in fact actually
appears to contra-indicate too close an association.
Kant and Neo-Kantianism
Once again, therefore, the merits of Kant's concessions are questionable. However,
the very fact of their existence is significant as a means of illustrating the subtle
distinctions mentioned previously between Kant's own analysis and that of more
contemporary neo-Kantians. Kant's original theory, despite his aforementioned
concessions, remains far from unproblematic. However, the tensions between
Kantian rationalism and experiential reality have been enflamed by subsequent
analysis that has, in the name of Kantianism, developed a highly selective
recapitulation of Kant's original critique.V This recapitulation has commonly
tended to ignore the subtleties of Kant's concessions within his theory and has thus
presented a far more radically individualistic thesis than Kant himself appears to
have advocated.
36 Kant, 1.The Metaphysics ofMorals (trans. Gregor, M.) (1991) Cambridge University Press, p. 474
37 The inadequacies of that Kantian recapitulation have been highlighted by Herman, B., "Integrity and
Impartiality" (1983) 66(2) Monist, 233 & O'Neill, O. "Kant After Virtue" (1983) 26 Inquiry 399
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Although this neo-Kantian position has been privileged with affording the dominant
mode of philosophical and legal discourse on the subject, it has increasingly faced
challenge and critique from various fields. Traditions of thought through the
twentieth century have witnessed a shift in intellectual focus away from the
universalism and individualism implicit in modernist epistemology toward
recognition ofparticularity and concreteness. As Andrea Nye comments,
"Recent critiques suggest that the pure rational ego of the Kantian tradition is an
ethical nightmare in which ethics is divorced from the emotional and sexual
realities ofhuman existence.t''"
The main motivation behind this sea change has been an increasing level of attack
upon the centrepiece of modernist, Kantian Enlightenment epistemology - the
notion ofman as the rational, abstract and autonomous constitutor of knowledge. In
contradiction to this conception of the subject, many contemporary thinkers have
posited a subject who is embedded and situated, constituted and bound by language,
culture, discourse, and history. Nussbaum has paid heed to the significance of this
shift in perception -
'Anglo-American moral philosophy is turning from an ethics based on
enlightenment ideals of universality to an ethics based on tradition and
particularity; from an ethics based on principles to an ethics based on virtue; from
an ethics dedicated to the elaboration of systematic theoretical justifications to an
ethics suspicious of theory and respectful of local wisdom; from an ethics based on
the isolated individual to an ethics based on affiliation and care; from an ahistorical
detached ethics to an ethics rooted in concreteness and history. ,39
This challenge to the primacy of the essentially non-specific and abstract human
subject of Kantian Enlightenment has prompted development of a school of moral
theory that demands increased recognition of the specificity of the particularity of
the individual. It is alleged that many of the epistemic incoherencies inherent in
universalistic moral theories can be attributed to their tendency to ignore the
standpoint of the 'concrete' human identity in the drive to develop an abstracted
38 Nye, A. Feminist Theory and the Philosophies ofMan (1988) Croom Helm
39 Nussbaum, M. "Virtue Revisited" , Times Literature Supplement, 3rd July 1992, p9
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'general' human core.40 The problem with the Kantian subject is that these
transcendental selves cannot be individuated. When all that belongs to these
subjects as embodied and affective creatures is subsumed under the suppressed
realm of the phenomenal, we are left with a concept of human subjectivity which
presents little more than an empty mask that is simultaneously both everyone and
no-one.41
In all attempts to devise a rationalistic and abstract subject, the supreme concern has
been to maintain a strong theory ofthe autonomous subject (of which the capacity to
give consent has been the paradigm characteristic). This is central to the Kantian
thesis and yet it also demands that we define human subjectivity by reference only to
the capacity for agency, without any conception of the ends that that capacity would
select. To be capable of transcending the contingencies of social living in the
manner that the Kantian account of subjectivity ascribes, the subject must be capable
of representing his or her inherent nature without the support of such
phenomenological frameworks. The capacity to exercise autonomy has been
accepted as a crucial defining element in what it is to be human. However, the
Kantian thesis has developed the notion of autonomy as being inextricably tied up
with dictates of rationality and universality. The human subject who is sketched out
by these requirements is a subject who expresses his or her humanity through the
capacity to exercise autonomy. However, by requiring that that exercise of
autonomy must be framed only by rational reasoning, as opposed to contingent or
affective motivations, the resultant subject manifests an empty conception of
selfhood, exhibiting no experiential context within which to legitimate the exercise
of his or her rationalistic competence. This has proven hugely problematic and, as
we will see in the chapters which follow, many influential arguments have been
brought to bear which propose that this conception of human selves who can be
individuated prior to their moral ends is incoherent despite its centrality within the
40 Benhabib, S. "The Generalised and The Concrete Other" in Benhabib, S. & Cornell, D. (ed.) Feminism as
Critique (1987) Polity Press
41 Williams, B. Moral Luck- Philosophical Papers 1973-80 (1981) Cambridge University Press, p.14 - 9
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Kantian Enlightenment crusade and its continued prommence m contemporary
formulations ofhuman agency.f
Various species of criticism have been lodged against the notion of the
transcendental and atomistic subject espoused by Kantian Enlightenment. Each of
these strands of criticism has pertained to different overall philosophical theses and
has been informed by divergent philosophical persuasions. Nonetheless, there are
some themes and concerns which unite them all and which operate to justify their
treatment as constituent parts of an overall challenge to that species of thought
constituted within the parameters of the particular Enlightenment genre outlined
above. Jean Grimshaw in her article "Autonomy and Identity in Feminist Thinking"
has explained this synthesis of concern most lucidly. She suggests that any adequate
account of the self must be able to encompass and make intelligible the ways in
which human beings experience themselves. For Grimshaw (among others) the
central reason for rejecting the rationalist paradigm of the self is that there are many
important aspects of the self that are not easily accessible in this way to processes of
individual consciousness. Indeed,
"structures of desire, emotion and fantasy have deep roots of some sort in the self
which are not necessarily amenable in any simple way to processes of conscious
rational argument. An adequate theory of subjectivity has to recognise and try to
understand these rootS.,,43
Hence one theme that unites criticism from VarIOUS disparate fields (feminist,
poststructuralist, communitarian) can be located in a common concern to establish
that human beings are necessarily and primarily social beings. In direct
contradiction to the Enlightenment-based liberal perception of subjectivity as
essentially individualistic and self-referential, therefore, these schools of
contemporary critique suggest that our very identities as human agents are
inextricably tied to our communal experiences and associations. Insights of this sort
have led communitarians like Michael Sandel (among others) to challenge
42 Benhabib, S. Situating the Self, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 22, p. 161-2
43 Grimshaw, J. "Autonomy and Identity in Feminist Thinking" in Jackson,S (ed.) Women's Studies, Supra.
Chapter Two, Note 60, p.44
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liberalism's continued deference to the popular Enlightenment ideal of a
'disembodied' perception of the human subject which, in existing as a complete
entity prior to its ends, is capable of rational abstraction from all its social
circumstances and contexts." Sandel argues this has led to an impoverished
conception of the realities and potentialities ofhuman subjectivity.
This concern has been echoed by developments in the fields of deconstruction and
hermeneutics. Finding their roots in the critique lodged by the 'romantic' thinkers of
the eighteenth century, the hermeneutic theses of Gadamer'f and Heidegger'" have
exposed empiricist models of language as inappropriate instruments for the
communication of ideas. In their place, they have proposed that the content of our
experience (beyond the level of the utmost simplicity) depends upon the linguistic
and cultural forms available for its expression. This thesis is in many ways
reminiscent of our claim, proposed at the outset, that the individualist model of
subjectivity which frames prevailing conceptions of consent renders consent an
inappropriate medium for the communication of self-determination. This in tum
justifies the project of this thesis that is to devise alternative formulations of
subjectivity that permit of more meaningful self-determination in the reformulation
of the concept of consent.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the species of Enlightenment discourse we
have examined, and the most united field of critique against it, is centred around its
assumption that each individual man or woman possesses a unique essence ofhuman
nature. Although the precise constituents of this essence may vary, as Weedon has
noted, in the still dominant version of classical liberalism, it is the existence of
individual rational consciousness that prevails.f This concern with individual
rationalism has obvious connections with the model of autonomy established as
44 Sandel, M. Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice (1982) Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1. Also
discussed in Lacey, N. Unspeakable Subjects - Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory, Supra. Preface,
Note 2, p. 54
45 Gadamer, H. Philosophical Hermeneutics (trans. Linge, D.) (1976) University of Califomi a Press
46 Heidegger, M. Being and Time (trans. MacQaurrie, J. & Robinson, E.) (1962) SCM Press
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fundamental to the Kantian project. Foucault has noted, however, that this enduring
pre-occupation with processes of self-conscious, rational and individualistic agency
renders legal analysis incapable of comprehending the more subtle dynamics of
normalisation which he has posited as being definitive of modem society. Most
specifically, Foucault expresses concern that "what liberal theory cannot
understand .. .is how things work at the level of ongoing subjugation, at the level of
those conscious and uninterpreted processes which subject our bodies, govern our
gestures, dictate our bchaviour.Y" When we recall the conclusions drawn from our
analysis in Chapters One to Three, the dangerous implications of that blinkered
approach become most palpable.
The general themes that unite the critique of the Kantian self are essentially three-
fold. Firstly, there IS a marked scepticism regarding the paradigmatically
Enlightenment claim of the existence of a 'legislating' reason enabling the
articulation of the necessary conditions of some abstract moral point of view (in the
case of Kant the moral rationalism exemplified by the categorical imperative).
Secondly, each genre of critique exhibits a scepticism regarding the abstract and
disembedded ideal of the autonomous human ego that has been privileged by the
Kantian tradition. And finally, there is an overall concern to unmask the inability of
Kant's universalist rationality to deal with the indeterminacy and multiplicity of life
situations and contexts that eternally confront practical reasoning.t" These concerns
have been summarised eloquently by one commentator:
"What we lose ifwe are Kantians in moral theory is the sense of the uniqueness of
persons and their contexts and histories, or a sufficiently informed and
compassionate standpoint from which to judge them."so
Built against the backdrop of such epistemological concerns, various alternative
philosophical premises have been established. Within the confines of this work, it
47 Weedon, C. Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory (1987) Oxford, p. 77
48 Foucault, M. Power / Knowledge - Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77 (Ed Gordon, C.),
Supra. Preface, Note 8, p.97
49 Benhabib, S. Situating the Self, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 22, Intra. iii
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would be impossible to examme each of the various alternative theses such
motivations have produced. Hence, in ensuing chapters, analysis will be restricted
to what are considered to be the two most significant fields of anti-Enlightenment
and anti-Kantian critique - namely poststructuralism (specifically that associated
with the work of Michel Foucault") and communitarianism (specifically that
associated with the work of Alasdair Maclntyre"). The purpose of this expedition
will be to further the search for an appropriate methodology through which to arrive
at a better articulation of human subjectivity and thereby a better vehicle for the
communication of its self-determination than that currently afforded by our
conception ofconsent.
It has been suggested above that the contexts of Chapters Two and Three hold
particular relevance for this project at various levels - their close involvement with
issues of embodiment allows for a more comprehensive analysis of the role of bio-
power; their incorporation of erroneous stereotypes illustrates particularly well the
disciplinary element of legal power; and their grounding in arenas of relationship,
emotion and complexity allows for a striking exemplification of the inflexibility of
the prevailing individualistic conception of selfhood and agency.
It is also because of the exhibition of these factors that the application of feminist
theory on subjectivity to these contexts remains particularly pertinent. It has been
implied above that, as a general rule, the feminist position on the Kantian model of
subjectivity and autonomy has been highly sceptical. In the following section, we
will examine the exact nature of the feminist concern about the abstraction and
individualism of the legal subject prioritised in popular concepts and forms. By
highlighting the aspects of traditional (Kantian-influenced) legal subjectivity which
50 Sedgewick, S. "Can Kant's Ethics Survive the Feminist Critique?" in Schott, R. (ed.) Feminist
Interpretations ofImmanuel Kant, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 28, p. 78
51 Foucault, M. The Archaeology ofKnowledge (Trans. A. Sheridan) & The History ofSexuality, Volume I,
Supra. Chapter One, Note 3. Also, Foucault, M. Power I Knowledge - Selected Interviews and Other
Writings 1972-77 (Ed C. Gordon), Supra. Preface, Note 8
52 MacIntyre, A. After Virtue (1999) Duckworth; Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988) Duckworth ;
Three Rival Versions ofMoral Enquiry (1990) Duckworth
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feminist theory finds most problematic, we will be able to cultivate a more clear-
sighted approach to those elements which an appropriate theory of the self should
contain, including particularly an improved capacity for meaningful self-
determination and consent.
Feminist Concern about the Legal Subject
"Like the Foucaultian analysis of 'Man', the feminist critique of masculinist uses
of the 'natural' extends to the deconstruction of Western humanism. But for
feminists, the problem with humanism is not merely that it derives from illusory
assumptions about an autonomous and universal self, but that this particular self is
the domain of the privileged white man.,,53
In the preceding section, we have been introduced to the existence of an influential
field of critique that alleges that the very concept of consent as a legal and moral
vehicle for self-determination is inherently flawed because of its continued reliance
upon a highly artificial and abstracted conception of subjectivity. Our brief
summary of the principal tenets of the Enlightenment philosophy of Kant in
particular, has suggested that this scepticism in regard to the viability of the notion
of consent can be justified in light of the centrality of that notion within the
rationalistic frameworks of Enlightenment thought. It has been submitted that the
paradigmatic illustration of such rationalistic Enlightenment frameworks in
operation can be found in the treatment afforded by Kant to the human subject.
Building upon an epistemological premise that asserts that the essence of human
subjectivity is atomistic and abstracted, we have seen that such species of
Enlightenment rationality have developed a conception of consent as a one-
dimensional interchange between disembedded and mutually disinterested human
agents.
Finding the conclusions of such rhetoric both experientially counter-intuitive and
philosophically dangerous, a large body of feminist analysis has joined in the
attempts being made by contemporary theory to challenge the primacy of this model
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of subjectivity.i" The aim of such critique is to liberate the potential for the
development of alternative conceptions, not only of our notions of subjectivity and
inter-subjective engagement, but also of the conceptions of agency and autonomy
upon which our legal principles of consent are premised. By examination of some
of the most celebrated feminist theories of the self within the confines of this
chapter, we will seek to pin down more accurately the locus of conflict between
feminist and more traditional (Enlightenment-influenced) perceptions of human
agency.
One of the greatest philosophical achievements of the feminist movement in general
over the last few decades has been the successful demonstration of the absence of
generic women's interests from the agendas of moral and political philosophy" In
a wide range of feminist work, it has been argued that the tradition of western
thought has proceeded on the basis, not only of a Cartesian dualism between mind
and body, but also of a privileging of the mind over the body/" This recognition
heralds important insights for feminist theory. Most significantly, it suggests the
relative absence or invisibility of the body in a western philosophical and social
tradition that has implied the supremacy of rational mental capacities through a
cultural association of masculinity with the mind and femininity with the body.
Feminism has consistently sought to expose the inaccuracy of fundamental liberal
political and ethical assertions of gender neutrality." Many feminists have been at
pains to point out the gender-specific exclusionary effect of the liberal conception of
choice as causally unconstrained, as the supposed expression of our inherently
rational and individualistic nature. As Jane Flax has pointed out,
53 Diamond 1. & Quinby L., Feminism and Foucault, Supra. Chapter One, Note 30, Intro. xv
54 Schott, R. (ed.) Feminist Interpretations ofImmanuel Kant, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 28 provides some
illustrative examples.
55 Frazer, E., Hornsby & Lovibond, L. Feminist Ethics - A Reader (1992) Basil Blackwell, p. 5
56 Lacey, N. Unspeakable Subjects, Supra. Preface, Note 2, p. 107
57 Minow, M. "Justice Engendered" (1987) 101 Harvard Law Review 100
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"What Kant's self calls its 'own' reason, and the methods by which reason's
contents become present or self-evident, are no freer from empirical contingency
than is the so-called phenomenal self.,,58
Some feminists, such as Luce lrigaray, have interpreted this as necessitating an
absolute abandonment of all such epistemological frameworks. This assertion is
based upon her belief that the very existence of these frameworks is premised upon
the continued denial of female subjectivity, and the continued delineation of woman
as 'other'." lrigaray suggests that, even in the allegedly 'liberated' era of the
twentieth century, the 'normal' body remains the male body and the female body
continues to be constructed III significant ways as abnormal, disruptive and
problematic.
Such radical assertions have been mirrored in the works of Catharine MacKinnon
and Robin West who have argued that, in making man the implicit measure of all
things, the whole social and legal system (including its envisaged legal agents) is
inescapably patriarchal and irretrievably masculinist.Y What's more, by virtue of a
continued uncritical embrace of what West terms the 'separation thesis' (i.e the
thesis that the paradigmatic human experience is the phenomenological experience
of the male agent - inevitable separation of the self from others), all modem legal
and moral theory is essentially male and exclusionary to female participation.
Whereas men are essentially physically separate from all other human beings,
women are essentially connected to others because of our material experience of
connection through pregnancy, heterosexual intercourse and so on. Hence, for West,
"while it may be true for men that the individual is 'epistemologically and morally
prior to the collectivity', it is not true for women. The potential for material
connection with others defines women's subjective phenomenological and
existential state, just as surely as the inevitability of material separation from the
other defines men's existential state. Our potential for material connection
engenders pleasures and pains, values and dangers, and attractions and fears, which
58 Flax, J. "Postmodernism and Gender Relations" in Nicholson, L. (ed.) Feminism / Postmodernism (1990)
Routledge, p. 43
59 lrigaray, L. Ce sexe qui n 'est pas un, Supra. Chapter One, Note 38
60 See Discussion of MacKinnon's Radical Thesis on power in Chapter One
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are entirely different from those which follow, for men, from the necessity of
separation.,,61
According to this radical view, then, it is the peculiarly male sense of separateness
and consequent valuation of autonomy that is represented throughout the legal
system to the exclusion of the values and dangers characteristic ofwomen's lives.
Where West's critique has centred around the adoption of the male value of
autonomy throughout the legal system, other radical feminists have applied similar
insights to the critique of other legal arenas. Lucinda Finley, for example, has
criticised the law's exclusive adoption of the methodology of 'male' reasoning into
the methodology of the law. Most specifically, she draws critical attention to the
law's exemplification of rationality and abstraction over experiential and anecdotal
evidence, and to the ongoing incorporation in legal analysis of a conflict model of
social life'f. We have seen in Chapters Two and Three of this thesis the tangible
implications that such methodology can have upon the operation of legal decision-
making in arenas where the conflict model is often inappropriate.
Similar methodological critique has been developed by Ann Scales III her
delineation of the essential characteristics of feminist jurisprudence'", In her
discussion of the 'tyranny of objectivity' reified by the legal system, Scales suggests
that the pretensions of abstract universalism (as characterised by the Enlightenment)
represent a specifically masculinist worldview which has made maleness the norm
ofhumanity under the superficial guise of a pretence towards neutrality. In contrast,
she proposes that feminist analysis must begin with the principle that objective
reality is a myth, recognising that the claims about the law's neutrality and
objectivity, which operate as the foundations of adjudication, are presented under a
kind of false consciousness made manifest as nothing more than patriarchal
61 West, R. "Jurisprudence and Gender" in Bartlett, K. & Kennedy, R. (ed.) Feminist Legal Theory-
Readings in Law and Gender (1991) Quoted in Reaume, J. "What's Distinctive about Feminist Analysis of
Law?" (1996) 2 Legal Theory 289
62 Finley, L. "The Nature of Domination and The Nature of Women : Reflections on Feminism
Unmodified", Supra. Preface, Note 10
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projections of the male psyche. The essence of the radical contention has been
expressed most lucidly by Catharine MacKinnon in Towards a Feminist Theory of
State-
"The state is male jurisprudentially, meaning that it adopts the standpoint of male
power in the relation between law and society...the foundation for its neutrality is
the pervasive assumption that the conditions pertaining among men on the basis of
gender apply to women as well.,,64
This statement illustrates well the central tenet of the radical thesis. It also well
illustrates the problematic tendency towards essentialism and determinism that has
too often been the end result of radical feminism. The whole radical thesis on the
legal subject is predicated on the assumption that all men are possessed of a
specifically male identity which values separation and seeks autonomy, power and
domination, and that all women are possessed of a specifically female identity which
values connection and context. Elsewhere in her thesis, MacKinnon is highly
critical of similar essentialist tendencies (which she attributes, as we shall see, to the
care ethics of Carol Gilligan'"). However, in continuing to adopt such a simplistic
correlation between the rationality of the state and the rationality of the male,
MacKinnon herself is open to similar criticism for having implicitly essentialised
women into the realm of the irrational. What's more, she fails to give sufficient
consideration to the emerging feminist proposal that the rationality of the state has
less to do with the essential attributes ofmen and more to do with the Enlightenment
roots of liberalism and the socially constructed character imperatives imposed upon
the creators and perpetuators of the legal order, historically always male, but
potentially also female.
In our discussion of shifting patterns of power in feminist analysis, embarked upon
in Chapter One, it was suggested that in terms of this aspect of theory a relatively
63 Scales, A: The Emergence ofFeminist Jurisprudence (1986) 95 Yale Law Journal p1373-1403
64 MacKinnon, C. Towards a Feminist Theory ofState, Supra. Chapter One, Note 33, p. 163
65 Gilligan, C. In A Different Voice - Psychological Theory and Women's Development, Supra. Preface, Note
23. The 'care ethics' tradition of theory, established by Gilligan will be discussed in detail in Chapter Seven
of this work.
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clear division can be made between advocates ofwhat is often referred to as 'radical
feminism' and more contemporary manifestations of feminist critique. It was
asserted in Chapter One that the essentialist tendencies employed to support the
determinist thesis often associated with radical feminist commentators (most notably
Catharine MacKinnon) have yielded in more contemporary feminist analysis to a
more complex examination of power dynamics, which find their medium through
elements of social constructionism bearing upon the life plans of both male and
female agents.
A similar shift in perception can be discerned in the feminist treatment of the
problematisation of the Enlightenment-based perception of the self. According to
both radical and contemporary critique,
"the basic argument is that the paradigm legal subject has been constructed as an
individual, and moreover, as an individual abstracted from its social context,
including the context of its own body, and of the dependence of its own identity on
its relationships towards and affective ties with others.t''"
However, the details of the analysis of the problematic interplay between the legal
subject and its embodied and communal constitution have often been disparate. In
many respects, this chasm is a direct result of the differing perceptions of power
relations discussed in Chapter One. While radical feminism restricts its analysis
within the confines of the juridical conception of oppressor-oppressed, analysis of
the issue of subjectivity also remains comfortably supported by the pretension
discussed above that the legal subject is quite simply the male subject elevated to the
status of neutral absolute. On the contrary, more contemporary feminism has begun
to question the legitimacy of this deterministic thesis on power relations. In
developing an analysis of the more subtle operations of power, contemporary
feminist analysis has developed an alternative explanation for the origin of the
problematic legal subject."
66 Lacey, N. "Feminist Legal Theory Beyond Neutrality" (1995) 48(2) Current Legal Problems 1, p.8
67 An illustrative example can be found in Wittig, M. "The Mark of Gender" (1985) 5 (2) Feminist Issues 6
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More contemporary feminism has taken on board the assertions made by members
of the Critical Legal Studies movement that suggest that law has no fundamental
essence, but is, rather, a belief system created and perpetuated by specific human
activity.t" Accepting this assertion as their point of departure, many contemporary
feminists have criticised the implication inherent in the radical thesis that the law
itself is inherently male. While conceding the critique of the masculine defined
standards and methodology of legal liberalism, contemporary feminism attributes
this deficiency, less to any essentially male essence of law, and more to the fact that
historically, it has predominantly been men who have created and perpetuated the
belief clusters which inform our legal system. The main contention of contemporary
feminism is that the liberal ideology and Enlightenment rationalism that inform
those belief clusters have made it impossible to shift prevailing assumptions.t" By
presenting an intractable dichotomy between the male and female experience,
radical feminism has come under critical fire for deterministically perpetuating
existing ideology." Contemporary feminism, on the other hand, seeks to question
the origins of these assumptions and seeks to present alternative models to legal
liberalism that will enable the meaningful eradication of our most erroneous
prejudices.
In this respect, Littleton's development of the notion of 'phallocentrism' has proven
most useful. In "Reconstructing Sexual Equality",71 Littleton has helpfully argued
that it is more appropriate to suggest that those traits culturally identified as 'male'
are, and have been, more highly valued than those identified as 'female'. Unlike the
radical thesis, however, Littleton seeks to divert attention away from any pretension
towards an inherent male or female nature characterised by the traits in question.
Instead, Littleton talks of the legal system as having been constructed by authors
who have drawn their perspectives from what it is to be 'culturally male'. To
68 Kennedy, D. A Critique ofAdjudication (1997) Harvard University Press
69 Lovibond, S. "Feminism and The Crisis of Rationality" (1994) New Left Review 72 & "Meaning What
We Say - Feminist Ethics and the Critique of Humanism" (1996) New Left Review 98
70 Cornell, D. "Sexual Difference, Feminism and Equivalency" (1991) Yale Law Review 100
7\ Littleton, C. "Reconstructing Sexual Equality" (1987) 75 California Law Review 1274
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capture this perspective, which is not necessarily the perspective ofbiological males,
but the perspective that culture urges male social agents towards, Littleton invokes
the notion of 'phallocentrism'.
Many theorists within this tradition have accepted that although there is no reason of
abstract principle as to why the frameworks of individualism could not be applied to
both sexes indifferently, there remains an indisputable social legacy which makes
the value of autonomy more typical to male life histories than to female.72 This is
not to say that such values cannot or do not figure in female life histories. What this
does suggest, however, is that these values are not the most typical values of the
female experience, that is to say that they are not the values which the dictates of
traditional femininity require women to draw upon in construction of their own self
identity.
"For present purposes, the important point about this distinctively 'feminine'
character structure is its incompatibility with the image of the untramelled, self-
determining subject so familiar from moral and political philosophy. What the
feminist critique of ethics has helped us to see is that if the salient features of your
social experience are seeking to please, fitting in with others, being the one whom
others count on, ...then it is no cause for surprise if you re~ard that familiar image
either as irrelevant or as a cue for feelings of inadequacy.t"
This assertion does not seek to make the suggestion that moral autonomy is in any
way inherently more difficult for women to achieve than it is for men. On the
contrary, the contemporary feminist claim is that both sexes are intrinsically capable
of exercising the same degree of autonomy, whatever the criteria for that necessarily
revised autonomy may tum out to be. However, there remains in current social
practice a massive contrast between male and female subjectivity in respect of the
empirical conditions under which that subjectivity is constructed and signified.i"
Both forms of subjectivity are constructed and constrained by social determinants.
The claim of contemporary feminism is not that men have unconstrained freedom
where women are subject to inescapable constriction. Rather, the claim is simply
72 Frazer, E., Hornsby & Lovibond, S. Feminist Ethics, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 55, p. 5
73 Frazer, E., Hornsby & Lovibond, S. Feminist Ethics,Supra. Chapter Four, Note 55, p.6
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that the social determinants which construct traditional male subjectivity result in the
production of human characteristics (of autonomy, abstraction, etc.) which are
privileged within the legal sphere, while the determinants which construct traditional
female subjectivity result in the production of characteristics (of selflessness and
dependence) which are denigrated in the legal realm and reserved for the private
sphere. As Lacey explains,
"Moral and political theory misunderstands their subject-matter by exaggerating
and naturalizing not only women's difference from men, but also - and no less
damagingly - men's difference from women. The thought that men too are
embodied and vulnerable; ...that they too can think and choose only on the basis of
what they have learned from a finite initiation into the 'ways of the world'; and
that they are caught up, as women are, in social structures which they do not know
how to alter - all these truisms are capable of serving as powerful feminist
insights. ,,75
This realisation has prompted recognition within the feminist academy that any
account of human nature, such as that typified by the species of Enlightenment
theory examined above, that takes the value of individual autonomy to be
paradigmatic of all human experience is radically incomplete."
In feminist analysis, this refusal to account for the culturally and historically specific
formulation of human subjectivity is the central deficiency of the traditional
conception of the legal subject. It is a deficiency that strikes at the heart of a
considerable body of feminist theory that has stressed the centrality of contingency
and relationship in the presentation of available options for the expression both of
identity and autonomy. Hence, contemporary feminism must devise the means to
rectify this deficiency if it is ever to be possible for women to exercise a more
meaningful right to self-determination. As Biddy Martin explains in "Feminism,
Criticism and Foucault",
"The tendency to place women outside culture, to define femininity in terms of an
absolute exclusion and consequent innocence with respect to language and
ideology reflects an overly simplistic understanding of the relationship between
identity and discourse. It reproduces the classical split between the individual and
74 Frazer, E. Hornsby & Lovibond, S. Feminist Ethics, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 55, p.6
75 Lacey, N. "Feminist Legal Theory Beyond Neutrality", Supra. Chapter Four, Note 66, p.7
76 Frazer, E., Hornsby & Lovibond, S, Feminist Ethics, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 55, p.5
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the social formation, assuming that we can shed what is supposedly a false
consciousness imposed and maintained from the outside and begin to speak an
authentic truth. The search for a more perfect self,... a more authentic 'I' too often
represents a refusal to account for the position from which we speak, to ground
ourselves materially and historically.v"
Discussion over preceding sections has suggested that the majority of feminist
commentators concerned with challenging the notion of consent manifest within
Enlightenment frameworks of subjectivity have sought to do so through the radical
effacement of such Enlightenment frameworks. However, this has not unanimously
been the case. Certain feminist commentators have continued to express concern
that in denouncing altogether the frameworks of the Enlightenment, and the notion
of a transcendent, 'authentic' self to which those frameworks appeal, such feminist
critique runs the dangerous risk of denying itself a notion of identity that is crucial to
the pursuit of political and pragmatic ends. In expressing a fundamental reluctance
to detach themselves conceptually from the prevailing assumption that agency
without a distinct and self-determining subject is not valid agency at all, these
feminists have suggested that a continued allegiance to prevailing Enlightenment
frameworks is necessary to ensure the maintenance of a conception of agency that is
integral to the achievement of feminist aims. Within the confines of the following
section, we will examine some of the most celebrated attempts made by these
theorists to rearticulate the notion of consent without abandoning the Enlightenment
frameworks within which the prevailing notion has been enmeshed. In so doing, we
will highlight the fundamental inadequacies that render such approaches
ideologically difficult for feminist theorising on the issues of subjectivity and
agency.
77 Martin, B. "Feminism, Criticism and Foucault", in Diamond, I. & Quinby, L. (ed.) Feminism and
Foucault, Supra. Chapter One, Note 30, p.15
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Feminism and the Revival ofthe Enlightenment
In foregoing discussion, it has primarily been asserted that the criticism lodged at the
subject of Kantian Enlightenment by feminist commentators has provoked
unanimous feminist concern to dislodge the primacy of that subject within current
theory and practice. Certainly, it is true that the majority of feminist commentary on
this issue has conceded that the criticisms lodged at the abstract and rational subject
have been sufficient to necessitate the revision, not only of the formulation of the
legal subject, but also of the general trend of contemporary reliance upon
Enlightenment pretensions.
We have noted, however, the existence of a small (but important) field of feminist
theory that develops from the premise of dissatisfaction with current fashionings of
human subjectivity towards a markedly different conclusion. Contrary to the
dominant feminist approach that involves determining alternative anti-
Enlightenment ethical models of subjectivity that avoid the polarities and artificial
abstraction of the Kantian subject, these feminist commentators have sought to
redefine key elements of subjectivity, not by seeking doctrinal alternatives -to
Enlightenment, but by internal modification to the main pre-existing authorities of
rationalistic thought.
One of the most significant attempts at such feminist modification of Enlightenment
thought has come from Diana Meyers. In her work Self, Society and Personal
Choice, Meyers has sought to redefine the concept of autonomy within the
parameters of Enlightenment frameworks. On that basis, she has developed at
length a conception of autonomy as a procedural life requirement, involving people
in the pursuit of life according 'to their own lights'. By cultivating a life plan which
conforms to the requirements of personal autonomy in this way, Meyers proposes
that an individual will be able to separate her 'authentic self from that which social
experience has moulded her identity towards. To be truly an autonomous self,
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according to Meyers, an individual does not need to be possessed of a personality
composed solely of original characteristics. Rather, the question of somebody's
autonomy is settled by assessment of whether that person is in possession of, and is
capable of employing successfully, those skills that Meyers stipulates in her criteria
for autonomy competence. Meyers justifies this revised conception of autonomy-
"Viewing autonomy as competency allows us to evade the traps set by the primary
ontological account of the self without unhinging conduct from all standards of
faithfulness to self ,,78
According to Meyers, the authentic self remains a viable philosophical notion
despite a necessary recognition of the existence of social influence upon the
development of that self. This is the case because the authentic self is constituted by
the evolving coalition of those traits that emerge when an individual makes the
appropriate use of their skills of autonomy competence. This is not, however, to say
that the authentic self thus envisaged should be conceived as necessarily
socialisation-transcending. The authentic self revised by Meyers is a self shaped
both by social experience and by individual choice.
Nonetheless, the theory of the self that Meyer proposes stands in stark contrast to the
majority of feminist theory that recognises both social influence and personal self-
determination. We have noted that the general trend of such theory has been to
recognise the centrality of social construction in identity formation, and on that basis
to seek alternatives to the idea of a pre-existing 'true' self inherent in Kantian
thought.i" Meanwhile, Meyers has sought to admit of the significance of
socialisation while continuing to posit the possibility of realisation of some core
'authentic' self, discoverable through a personal application of the requirements of
self-definition and self-examination that constitute the skills of autonomy
competence. As Meyers explains,
"the account of the authentic self that emerges from my treatment of autonomy
competence is a self that is shaped by social experience as well as by individual
78 Meyers, D. Self, Society and Personal Choice (1989) Columbia University Press, p.55
79 Amongst the most drastic feminist examples of this trend is displayed in Butler, 1. Gender Trouble, Supra.
Preface, Note 20
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choice. Presupposing as it does, self-discovery, self-definition, and self-direction,
this conception does not ignore nor deplore people's socialisation, but neither does
it abandon people to it. This balance can be maintained because autonomy
competence takes advantage of the reciprocity that can hold between one's self-
portrait and one's personal ideals and, more broadly, between one's desires and
conduct and one's life plans."so
Problems abound in relation to Meyer's thesis, however, in regard to whether we
can be convinced by the logical premise upon which her thesis is developed. If an
'authentic' self can be realised through the scrutiny of autonomy competence, it
must be the case that an individual may be possessed of the skills of self-definition
independently of their development within societal influence. Surely, this is of
dubious grounding when we note the concessions that Meyers makes throughout her
argument to the existence and influence of social mores. In the quote above, we see
that Meyers has presupposed self-discovery, self-definition and self-direction. The
existence of these personal skills are fundamental to her overall thesis, however,
their very viability is called into question by the incorporation of recognition of
socialisation pressures into the framework of the authentic self. The only
justification Meyers offers relies upon the ability of autonomy competence to
mediate between socialisation and self-direction.s1 However, the existence of
autonomy competence is itselfparasitic upon the existence ofself-direction.
Hence, Meyers argument becomes fatally circular. Meyers seeks to redefine the
Enlightenment conception of subjectivity in order to continue to give credence to the
possibility of a core self while simultaneously recognising the role of social
constructionism in the development of individual identity. In making this latter
concession, however, Meyers concedes too much because she necessarily recalls
into question the possibility of a process of self-definition that stands uninfluenced
by social pressure toward conformance. This renders Meyers attempt at revision of
subjectivity within the paradigms ofEnlightenment self-defeating.
80 Meyers, D. Self, Society and Personal Choice, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 78, p.96
81 Meyers, D. "Personal Autonomy and the Paradox of Feminine Socialisation" (1987) 84 Journal of
Philosophy 619, p. 624-5
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What's more, it renders its compatibility with feminist ethics somewhat
questionable. Meyers explicitly notes that compliance with the principle of
responsibility to self is necessary for the continuation of on-going autonomy.
However, in recognising the existence and force of trends of socialisation, Meyers is
also forced to recognise that the modes and demands of that socialisation are gender-
specific. Most particularly, Meyers acknowledges that women have historically
been socialised to accord priority to responsibilities to others over responsibilities to
themselves.82
Although Meyers seeks to accommodate socialisation pressures within her
framework, she fails to give sufficient consideration to the gender-specific nature of
social norms in terms of the resultant discrepancy in the development of autonomy
competence skills in male and female agents. Indeed, where she does consider the
issue, Meyers concedes that socialisation tends to render women more altruistic and
servile in a way that necessarily must curtail autonomy competence.V Meyers fails
to recognise, however, that this has seriously damaging implications for her overall
theory that then becomes more readily available to men than to women, and
therefore remains fundamentally at odds with feminist ethical aims.
Meyers has not been the only influential feminist theorist to attempt such a
revisionary project, however. Most notably, Meechan has attempted to build
feminist theory on the foundations laid by Habermasian theory that stands squarely
in the tradition of the Enlightenment.i" For Habermas, identities are formed in webs
of social relationships through the undertaking of myriad social roles, most
especially the role of 'generalised other'. This generalised position can be achieved
82 Meyers, D. Self, Society and Personal Choice, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 78, p. 136 & 143
83 Meyers, D. "Personal Autonomy and the Paradox of Feminine Socialisation", Supra. Chapter Four, Note
81,p.627
84 Habermas, J. The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity (1987) Polity Press & Between Facts and Norms
_ Contributions to a Discourse Theory ofLaw and Democracy (1996) MIT Press
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by subjects distancing themselves from particular roles in the recognition that all
roles are structured by shared social norms.85
While seeking to reject the Kantian view of moral subjects as capable of discerning
moral law for themselves through reflection, Habermas continues to adopt many
other Enlightenment characteristics of human subjectivity, especially its pretensions
towards universality. Although he recognises that even the very possibility of social
action rests upon the intersubjectively constituted forms which originate in
communication, he does not seek to present a neo-Aristotelian or communitarian
ethics in the way that many others who have accepted these principles have tried to
do.86 On the contrary, he suggests that the rationalisation of the modem lifeworld
entails that all claims be justified by an appeal for valid criteria when challenged,
and that the validity of those criteria does not derive in any simple way from the
shared values of the community. It is the existence of such universalistic and
rationalistic conceptions within his framework that continue to render Habermas
amongst the main Enlightenment thinkers.
Interestingly, however, the elements of Habermasian thought which Meechan seeks
to build upon in her feminist recapitulation do not relate to his highly rationalistic
notions of the 'ideal speech situation' or to his other peculiarly Enlightenment
notions. The main element that Meechan develops pertains, on the contrary, to his
recognition of the fundamentally intersubjective nature of human subjectivity, and to
his proposals as to contexts of non-coercive discourse." His appreciation of the
intersubjective constitution of identity is expressed in his belief that we become
human selves through social interaction. The constitution of the self is concomitant
with the establishment of relationships in the context of a shared lifeworld. What's
more, development of meaningful self-identity is only possible through the
85 Meechan, J. "Autonomy, Recognition and Respect - Habermans, Benjamin and Honneth" in Meechan, J.
(ed.) Feminists Read Habermas - Gendering the Subject (1995) Routledge, p. 240
86 Meechan, J. (ed.) Feminists Read Habermas, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 85, p. 4
87 Meechan, J. (ed.) Feminists Read Habermas, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 85, p. 3
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development of a capacity for mutual understanding within inter-subjective
relationships.
This may well sound resonant of the claims of communitarian theory that, as will be
suggested in Chapter Six, represent an important field of distinctly anti-
Enlightenment and anti-liberal critique. In many ways, these elements ofHabermas'
thought do indeed bear a striking resemblance to the communitarian contention that
the individual self can only be developed and given meaning by her place within a
network of communal and associative ties.88 The most significant difference here
between Habermas and communitarianism, and the difference which justifies
Habermas' continued position within the Enlightenment school, relates to his
assertion that human subjects must be able to conceptually abstract from the
relationships which they form to the intersubjective meanings which mediate those
relationships. Where for communitarianism, the link between relationship and.
meaning is intrinsic, for Habermas the two must remain conceptually distinct in
order to make sense of the processes of their interaction.
This does indeed constitute an important influence within the overall Habermasian
project. However, on reading Meechan's commentary on the development of
feminism upon Habermas, it does not seem that this element ofhis thought is given a
particularly important place within her overall framework. In fact, the main
premises that are borrowed from Habermas continue to be in regard to the
development of self within relationships ofmutual understanding and the cultivation
of discursive sites of agency. These premises, however, are not of a genre that is
typical to Enlightenment rationality. Indeed, they are more typical to the theses of
communitarianism and social constructionism to be developed in detail elsewhere in
this thesis. This renders Meehan's claim to be reformulating feminist theories of
subjectivity in the mould ofEnlightenment thought somewhat dubious.
88 See ensuing discussion of the communitarian critique of selfhood discussed in Chapter Six of this work
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It may well be the case that Meechan succeeds in presenting a viable model for the
reformulation of the self. And it cannot be disputed that her thesis is in many
respects built upon the foundations of Habermasian ethics. However, her reliance
upon Habermas is selective. Most noticeably, her reliance is premised upon a
selective incorporation of Habermasian theories that stand least centrally within the
general frameworks of Enlightenment pretensions. Although there is nothing
inherently wrong with Meechan's method of selective appropriation from Habermas
(in fact, in many respects, this presents a very favourable method), the nature of the
bases that she chooses makes her claim to preservation of the Enlightenment highly
questionable. Habermas has indeed been heralded as an 'influential Enlightenment
thinker. However, more is required to support a claim to feminist Enlightenment
theory than the selective incorporation of some Habermasian insight, especially
when the genre of the insight selected is precisely that which has distinguished
Habermas from many other Enlightenment theorists. In fact, when we come on to
discuss the idea of a 'contextual self in later chapters, it will become apparent that
there is more to unite the strands of Habermasian thought selected by Meechan to
that 'alternative' field of ethics than there is to justify their continued claims within
Enlightenment rationalism.
In many respects, Habermas presents himself as an attractive partner in dialogue
with feminism. His critique of the legacy of the Kantian transcendent subject, his
requirement of the plurality of participants in dialogue and his insights into the
interdependence of conceptions of knowledge and conceptions of community
resonate particularly clearly with certain aspects of feminist epistemology.t"
However, these insights inform the work of many thinkers, both within and outwith
the Enlightenment tradition. It is insupportable, therefore, to argue that by continued
allegiance to these aspects of Habermasian theory (without full incorporation of the
more rationalistic aspects of his theory), feminists like Meechan are forging a
pathway for feminism within the Enlightenment.
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When we examine Habermas' notions of the ideal speech situation, etc. the tensions
between himself and feminism become patently clear - his implicit claim that the
ideal speech situation represents the ideally emancipated, coercion-free form of
human interaction rests upon the specific concepts of autonomy, coercion,
community and social integration which have informed the work of a great number
of thinkers who have been challenged by feminist critique (most clearly, perhaps,
Lawrence Kohlberg who had his own allegiance to Kant).90 Hence while
Habermasian consensus theory departs from Kant in theorising reason as inherently
dialogical, it retains the Kantian association of community with autonomy, of
autonomy with rationality, and of rationality with the ability to discover laws, both
natural and ethical. These are the elements in Habermas' thought that are most
central to his critique, and also the ones most problematic to feminist theory.
Nonetheless, they are the very aspects which Meechan's theory fails to deal with.
This being so, Meechan's theory presents only the most superficial attempt at the
development of a truly Habermasian feminist ethics.
Another influential attempt has been made to revive Habermasian ethics by Seyla
Benhabib in Situating the Self.91 Far more willing than Meechan to incorporate the
tenets of the notion of the ideal speech situation, Benhabib has developed a position
known as 'interactionalist universalism' based upon the communicative ethics
developed by Habermas. This interactionist universalism continues to seek
recognition of the Enlightenment vision of a rational justification for morality.
However it attempts to do so through the employment of strategies that have been
developed within post-Enlightenment thinking.
Although Benhabib professes to be developing a Habermasian reformulation, the
extent to which the spirit of the Habermasian (Enlightenment) ideal remains intact is
89 Green, K. The Woman ofReason - Feminism, Humanism and Political Thought (1995) Continuum
90 Koh1berg, L. The Philosophy ofMoral Development (1981) Harper & Row. For further discussion of the
relationship between Habermas, Kohlberg and Kant, see Bracken, J. "From Communicative Rationality to
Communicative Thinking" in Meechan, J. (ed.) Feminists Read Habermas, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 85, p.
143
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again debatable. Remaining strongly in favour of the need for universalisability in
theory, Benhabib suggests that universalisability is a necessary procedure that brings
multiple moral subjects into an ideal conversation. The ideal conversation she
envisages is one between equally informed interlocutors, free of communicative
barriers, with the aim of achieving universal agreement. Despite her concern to
retain this essential element of universalism, however, Benhabib worries that
stressing universal rational argument (the central pillar of Enlightenment thought)
may lead to the assumption of a single model of human rationality and selfhood like
that which has informed the Kantian legacy. To avoid this essentialist tendency,
Benhabib revises the conception of discourse such that it will emphasise the
historical and culturally embedded nature of the moral conversationalists who join in
the dialogue. Benhabib's account seeks to build upon Habermas while demanding
that agents achieve inter-subjective understanding, not by erasing either the
differences between moral conversationalists or the social particularities of the
vision, but by requiring that participants in the dialogue are able to acquire multiple
points ofview.
Although this presents an attractive arrangement, in many ways aligned with the
celebrated feminist conception of an ethics of care (which we will discuss in Chapter
Seven), once again the appeal is largely superficial. Benhabib claims to be
developing her theory on the foundations ofHabermas' thought. In many arenas she
does indeed borrow heavily from him. However, she seeks to revise one of the
central elements ofhis ideal speech situation. In doing so, however, her argument is
far from convincing. She offers little account of what is to be involved in
competently recreating the point of view of the 'other', of what level of knowledge
of the other one must have, and of how one is to acquire it.92 What's more, she
seems to assume that conceptual frameworks are commensurable and, as a result,
she takes for granted a significant degree of cultural homogeneity which may result
91 Benhabib, S. Situating the Self, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 22
92 Shrage, L. Moral Dilemmas ofFeminism (1994) Routledge, p. 13
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in the obscuring of important differences between ourselves and cultural others.93
Perhaps most damagingly of all, Benhabib remains overly optimistic about the
ability ofparticipants in dialogue to recognise and maintain their own distinctiveness
in moral conversation." Her failure to consider the tendency of participants to
conclude by validating their own culturally and historically engrained common sense
renders her particular treatment of the idea of 'generalised' and 'concrete' others
liable to damaging critique. One commentator, for example, has concluded that in
real terms,
"Benhabib's communicative ethics belie the Enlightenment conceptions of human
selves and human reason contained in the Kantian and liberal theories from which
interactionist universalism is derived. She does have one extremely important
insight though, and that is that the aim of moral analysis should be tentative
political agreements between different and interested agents rather than intellectual
homogeneity. This insight can and should be disconnected from the formalist
apparatus she has developed.t''"
In seeking to maintain some allegiance to the claims of Habermas, Benhabib
continues to make too many assumptions based upon the existence of inherent
human rationalism. However, this fails to conform to the main thrust of the feminist
critique. Most significantly, Benhabib's theory allows for the submersion of the
identity of the 'concrete other' within the demands of the 'generalised other' because
of her continued allegiance with universalist philosophical pretensions. Although
many of the modifications that Benhabib makes to the notion of the 'ideal speech
situation' are to be commended for their success in alleviating its most alienating
and artificial aspects, in the final analysis, her allegiance with universalism frustrates
the potential insights ofher original alterations.
Benhabib's establishment of a model of dialectical discourse within which moral
particularity can be taken into account represents a most promising vision for
feminist ethics in particular, and legal ethics more generally. Furthermore, it holds
considerable promise for the ensuing reformulation of the medium for the
93 Diprose, R. The Bodies ofWomen - Ethics, Embodiment and Sexual Difference (1994) Routledge, p. 14
94 Diprose, R. The Bodies ofWomen, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 93, p.1S
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communication of self-determination towards the realisation of a more fluid and less
rigidly rationalistic and abstract standard. However, her unshakable conviction in
favour of the necessity of universalisability in theory frustrate these more promising
aspects by effectively subsuming the concrete (situated) agent within the more
abstract category of the generalised other.
Just as Foucault has criticised Habermas' ideal speech situation for its failure to
recognise the normative role of discipline in the imposition of privileged identities,"
so we can criticise Benhabib's reformulation of that situation for its failure to
recognise the imbalances of power implicated in the envisaged co-existence of
'general' and 'concrete' identities within the discursive interaction. In both
situations, the resultant model of subjectivity remains one that is too artificial to be
accredited with existence outwith the shadow of the juridical. However, from what
has been established elsewhere, it remains the case that lifting the veil of the
juridical is a necessary pre-condition of the realisation of any truly valuable theory
of the self or of self-determination.
In seeking to defend the conception of autonomy in terms that theoretically demand
only a limited revision of the original Enlightenment notion, theories such as those
proposed by Meyers, Meechan and Benhabib have done little more than to state that
autonomy is not inconsistent with the existence of social influence. A careful
reading of even the most staunchly anti-Enlightenment theories of subjectivity and
agency do not, however, seek to dispute this. Where Meyers presents a theory
which leaves us question-begging as to its epistemological possibility, Meechan
develops a theory based on those strands ofHabermas, thought which exist where he
95 Shrage, L : Moral Dilemmas ofFeminism, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 92, p. 14
96 Foucault, M. "The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom" (1987) Philosophy and Social
Criticism XII, p. 117. Foucault comments "The thought that there could be a state of communications which
would be such that the game of truth could circulate freely, without obstacles, without constraint and without
coercive effects, seem to me to be Utopia....The problem is not of trying to dissolve them in the utopia of a
perfectly transparent communication, but to give one's self the rules oflaw, the techniques of management,
and also the ethics, the ethos, the practice of self, which would allow these games ofpower to be played with
a minimum of domination." Quoted in Hoy, D. "Foucault and Critical Theory" in Moss, J. (ed.) The Later
Foucault (1998) SAGE, p. 20-1
208
stands least in the centre of Enlightenment theory (in fact where, upon the kind of
limited interpretation afforded by Meechan, he stands more in line with anti-
Enlightenment critique). Although Benhabib's account relies more strictly upon a
fuller exposition of Habermas, original critique, her attempt to re-conceive the ideal
speech situation to avoid the essentialist tendencies which have plagued
Enlightenment rationalism remains unconvincing and results in continued deference
to the generalised other.
Species of feminist thought, such as those discussed within this section, which
purport to make feminist claims about subjectivity and agency from within the
Enlightenment tradition are all too often based upon illusory premises. Their claims
are illusory because, in reality, the feminist theories in question develop what are
more appropriately called anti-Enlightenment insights through the selective
appropriation of strands of Enlightenment thought, or through the misrepresentation
of the claims of anti-Enlightenment proposals. In either case, this hardly presents
the most convincing defence of this minority feminist claim in favour of the
maintenance of Enlightenment frameworks and polarities. What this should also
establish is that the strongest and most promising feminist position on subjectivity
and agency continues to be the Enlightenment-sceptic approach developed in the
preceding section. This more radical critique demands not only the revision of
contemporary models of selfhood, but also the eradication of uncritical reliance upon
the rationalistic and individualistic paradigms privileged in the Enlightenment
frameworks of the Kantian tradition.
Conclusion - Alternative Visions ofSelfand the Concept ofConsent
"That it could never pass from the I to the We, that in spite of Kant's genius, it
always remained within the framework of bourgeois individualist thought, these
are the ultimate limits ofKant's thought.t''"
97 Goldman, L. Immanuel Kant (trans. Black, R.) (1971) New Left Books, p. 170
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The subject who populates legal analysis is constructed in line with highly artificial
expectations and assumptions. Since the time of Kelsen, theorists have been
concerned to illustrate furthermore that the law has engaged in this act of creation
quite self-consciously, aware that it is constructing an entity to be contrived as 'the
legal subject' .98 Amongst the most oppressive of such expectations and assumptions
is the notion, clearly explicated in much Kantian analysis, that the legal subject is
inherently individualistic and capable of rational abstraction from emotion and
context.
Commentators within a range of disparate theoretical traditions have produced a
critique of the alleged inadequacies of such Kantian assumptions. Amongst such
commentators has been a large contingent of feminist theorists who express concern
regarding the counter-intuitive and restrictive nature of abstract frameworks of
subjectivity. Critique illustrating the incompatibility of such individualistic
frameworks with the realities of exercising agency and choice within connected and
contingent life circumstances has challenged the liberal pretensions behind the
prevailing notion of consent. Portraying their own philosophical and political
motives more explicitly, feminist theorists have also commonly expressed concern
with the problematic interaction of the legal subject with the paradigmatic character
traits prioritised in the disciplinary character formation ofthe female.
Diverse genres of feminist critique have been united in their belief in the artificiality
of the subject that populates the legal realm. In the body of feminist critique
discussed above, the prime source of this artificiality has been located in the
perpetuation ofpretensions towards rationality and abstract individualism inherent in
the assumed character of the legal subject. It has been alleged that these pretensions
have found their roots in the frameworks of subjectivity and agency established in
the era ofEnlightenment rationality, most specifically within the model of subjective
rationalism espoused by Immanuel Kant.
98 Kelsen, H. The Pure Theory ofLaw (trans. Knight, M.) (1967) University of California Press, p. 170-4
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Although the focus of discussion in this chapter has often involved specific
examination of competing conceptions of subjectivity, implicit throughout that
discussion has been the necessity of a fundamental reconstruction and challenge to
the dominant notion of consent. Within the confines of this chapter, the centrality of
the Enlightenment perception of an essentially autonomous and atomistic self to the
prevailing interpretations of consent that inform liberal legal analysis has been
continually illustrated. It has therefore been proposed that any meaningful
examination of the role and construction of consent cannot be undertaken without
also a lengthy examination into the nature of the self that lies behind the medium of
consent.
The thrust of the critique of the preceding sections has established that one of the
primary difficulties with the model of consent isolated in Chapters One to Three lies
in the artificial perception of human interaction which it privileges. Assuming the
basis of human interaction to be one founded upon an equal engagement of
disinterested and highly individualist agents, the medium of consent has been
developed as reflective of this dispassionate interchange. However, our experience
dictates that this model of interaction is counter-intuitive, and the contexts isolated
in Chapters Two and Three serve as stark illustrations of life situations within which
this model is particularly jarring.
This conclusion that the prevailing model of consent fails to account for the realities
of human interaction, and therefore fails to act as a vehicle for human self-
determination in any meaningful way, has provided the justification for re-vitalised
theorising about the notion of consent. A necessary prerequisite to that theorising,
however, demands devoting attention to the realities of human interaction. Within
the confines of this chapter, our critical examination of the model of selfhood that
informs existing perceptions of the medium of consent has provided this theoretical
foundation. Having now established the inadequacies of that model, we may
commence our search for an emerging conception of the self that IS more
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experientially appropriate. Within the following chapters, therefore, we will
illustrate alternative models of subjectivity that have been fashioned within the anti-
Enlightenment schools of poststructuralist and communitarian thought. In doing so,
our aim will be the realisation of a conception of subjectivity and inter-subjective
interaction that permits a more experientially appropriate analysis. Once such an
analysis has been established, we will be able to re-evaluate the prevailing
conception of consent and seek its re-emergence as a more meaningful medium for
the determination of this more comprehensive self.
Such re-conceptualisation will not necessitate, however, the rejection of the
traditional concern to facilitate .human agency. A desire to avoid the dissolution of
human agency has often lain behind those attempts within the feminist community to
reconceive subjectivity in alternative terms while maintaining affiliation with
Enlightenment frameworks. The supposition that we cannot have a conception of
agency without the epistemological foundations of the Enlightenment has been
framed precisely by the 'Enlightenment blackmail' Foucault has warned us against.
Our recognition that agency and abstraction are not mutually dependent permits the
development of theory outwith the demands of this rationalist imperative and frees
feminist theorists, such as Meyers, Meechan and Benhabib, from the tenacious
legacy of superficial concession to Enlightenment dictates.
In its search to develop the criteria that would render the frameworks of legal
subjectivity (and thereby legal consent) more complete, feminist theory has often
employed insights developed within alternative fields of anti-Enlightenment critique.
Over the next two chapters, our examination of the affinities which unite and the
tensions which divide feminism from these other schools of theory, will enable our
progression towards a fuller awareness of the demands which any adequate
conception of human selfhood must satisfy. By looking specifically at the feminist
critique's interaction with poststructuralist and communitarian problematisation of
the legal subject of contemporary liberalism (framed as it is by the dictates of
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Kantian Enlightenment), we are also able to pursue our original quest for an
improved methodology with which to envisage the realities of subjectivity and
agency outwith the shadow of the juridical framework.
Once we recognise the realities of the human condition - namely that it is not
inherently transcendent and disinterested - we can begin to question anew the
legitimacy of the current concept of consent as providing the most appropriate
vehicle for the communication of desire and intent within an inter-subjective
arrangement. By developing a more associative conception of the self, critique over
the following chapters will precipitate a more truly contextual version of the
possibilities of human agency than that currently offered by the concept of consent
that dominates our legal tradition. This contextual version of human agency departs
from traditional liberal legal frameworks in various ways. Most importantly,
however, in terms of its implications for the conception and operation of standards
of consent, it asserts the necessity of an augmentation of peripheral vision in the
resolution ofmoral and legal dilemmas.
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CHAPTER FIVE
POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND FEMINISM
"To the extent that atomism, individualism and the impoverishment of
relationship are objects of feminist critique, that critique is not feminist critique
alone. The future of feminism lies in the development and exploitation of the
links between feminist analysis and radical social critique more generally. To the
extent that the 'return to sex' dulls our appreciation of our links with these other
radical projects it should be undertaken with caution and with a constant eye on
the possible necessity of future diversions or even strategic reversals."!
We have discussed at some length in the preceding chapter the nature of feminist
concerns regarding the individualism and rational abstraction considered inherent in
the Kantian notions of selfhood and agency that have informed prevailing liberal
frameworks of consent. Implicit throughout our evaluation of such feminist
critique has been the assertion that the most appropriate remedy to the inadequacies
highlighted in the operation of consent lies, not in the internal modification of the
application of the consent standard, but in radical challenge to the one-dimensional
and isolated legal subject who populates liberal analyses.
In seeking the means to reconceptualise the legal subject in a manner more
inkeeping with our experiential accounts of subjectivity, feminist theory has begun
to seek strategic allegiances with other fields of anti-individualist critique. Within
the confines of this chapter, we will examine the nature of the allegiance between
feminism and that school of anti-individualist and anti-liberal critique commonly
referred to as poststructuralism.
In the preceding chapter, we noted the existence of a long tradition of normative
social criticism that has centred around individualist notions of autonomy and
consent. Traditionally, as we have seen, these have depended in their tum on a
particular Enlightenment conception of the metaphysics of subjectivity manifest
1 Lacey, N. "On the Subject of 'Sexing' the Subject" in Naffme, N. & Owens, R. (ed.) Sexing the Subject of
Law (1997) Sweet & Maxwell, p. 76
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most clearly in the work of Immanuel Kant. A vociferous challenge to such
ideology has recently been lodged in the name of poststructuralist theory. This
poststructuralist account has sought to explicitly reject the metaphysics of
subjectivity embodied in prevailing liberal assumptions. Not only does such
poststructuralist theory deny the possibility of objective knowledge of an
independently existing real world, it also stresses (as we have seen III our
discussion of Foucault in Chapter One) the potentially manipulative powers of
'discourse' that has attained the status of knowledge and the implications of that
discursive power upon prevailing conceptions of consent.
The overall project ofpoststructuralist theory (such as can be discerned from within
such a diverse school of thought) can generally be categorised under a concern to
challenge manifestations of liberal rhetoric, most specifically its universalising
theories about the human subject and the values to which it appeals. United in their
common assertion that the subject is merely a derivative product of particular
contingent and historically specific sets of linguistically infused social practices.i
various theorists congregated under the poststructuralist header have challenged the
legitimacy of any critique oriented around the notions of autonomy, mutual
recognition and dignity framed by the Kantian legacy.
Despite certain unifying moments, such as those mentioned above, it must be
conceded that the 'school' of poststructuralist theory suffers from significant
internal disagreement and critique.' In reality, there is no one form of
poststructuralist theory and to assume too much unity between disparate theorists
within this tradition would be inappropriate. Furthermore, in terms of our
immediate project, it would also be dangerous because not all forms of
poststructuralism are necessarily productive for feminist analysis." Of the most
fruitful forms ofpoststructuralist theory for feminist critique are those that attend to
2 Derrida, J. OfGrammatology, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 31
3 Weedon, C. Feminist Practise and Poststructuralist Theory, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 47, p. 19
4 Weedon, C. Feminist Practise and Poststructuralist Theory, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 47, p. 19
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the manner in which social power is exercised and to the potential for
transformation in social relations of gender, class, etc. In this regard, it seems that
the work ofFoucault (discussed in Chapter One) lends itself particularly favourably
to feminist theorising.
On the basis of that claim, this chapter will therefore be primarily concerned with
an examination of the poststructuralist theory of Michel Foucault. Our discussion
in Chapter One has already provided an introduction into the Foucaultian critique.
In what follows, we will build upon that first stage of critique (which was
concerned primarily with the disciplinary role of modem power) to illustrate (as
Foucault himself has done in latter volumes of his work') the forms of agency
embodied within the frameworks of disciplinary power. Having drawn attention to
this aspect of Foucaultian theory, we will move on in a later section ofthis chapter
to examine the similarities that unite and the tensions that divide Foucault from
feminist theorising on agency and the self.
The Poststructuralist Critique ofSubjectivity
"I do indeed believe that there is no sovereign, founding subject, a universal form
of subject .. .1 believe, on the contrary, that the subject is constituted through
practices of subjection, or in a more autonomous way, through practices of
liberation, of liberty, as in Antiquity, on the basis, of course, of a number of rules,
styles, inventions to be found in the cultural environment.,,6
For Foucault, as for many other poststructuralist theorists, language and discourse
playa crucial role in the construction and perpetuation of power relationships and
conceptions of subjectivity. Unlike the Kantian theory discussed previously, which
implies a conscious, knowing, unified and rational subject, poststructuralists
generally conceive of subjectivity as a site of discursivity and conflict. Most
importantly in terms of our analysis of poststructuralist accounts of agency, this
5 Particularly Foucault, M. The History ofSexuality Vol. II - The Use ofPleasure (1985) Viking Press &
The History ofSesxuality Vol. III - The Care ofSelf, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 2
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conception of the formation of subjectivity is rendered central both to processes of
political change and to preserving the status qUO.7
The centrality of language to poststructuralist theory is largely attributable to the
influence which structuralist theory has had upon its development. While building
upon the structuralist assertion that language, rather than reflecting some pre-given
reality, actually constitutes social reality through its operation and articulation.'
much poststructuralist theory moves beyond this critique to challenge the
assumption inherent in structuralist theorising that meaning can be in any way
'fixed,.9 Emphasising the plurality of meaning' in diverse discourse,
poststructuralist theory implies that there can never be a fixed meaning in language
because meaning is eternally deferred from one locus to another. The significance
of that claim for poststructuralist theory is that it permits a greater concern with the
role of language as a site of political struggle than that afforded to it within the
frameworks of its structuralist predecessor.10
The influence of language has gained further ground in poststructuralist theorising
because of the strong reliance that such theorising places upon techniques of
hermeneutics. Hermeneutics has been amongst the most influential methodologies
to develop within the confines of anti-Enlightenment theory. As a broad school of
method, hermeneutics disputes the thesis that understanding and truth are based on
timeless intuitions of the eternal, transcendental subject (envisaged by Kant). On
the contrary, it is suggested that all understanding takes place in particular
historically-bound and linguistic contexts. In direct contradiction to the
Enlightenment thesis developed in the preceding chapter, this alternative approach
suggests that the subject, rather than being the foundation of knowledge, history
and the world, is itself thrown into history as a contingent entity. We, as human
6 Foucault, M. "An Aesthetics ofExistence" in Kritzman, L. (ed.) Michel Foucault - Politics, Philosophy,
Culture: Interviews and Other Writings ofMichel Foucault 1977-84 (1990) Routledge, p.50
7 Weedon, C. Feminist Practise and Poststructuralist Theory, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 47, p. 22-30
8 de Saussure, F. Course in General Linguistics (1974) Fontana/Collins
9 Derrida, J. OfGrammatology, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 31
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subjects, are nothing more than a creation and conglomeration of those customs,
practices and prejudices in which we find ourselves enmeshed. I I
Much of the general poststructuralist concern to challenge the classical liberal
subject (framed by the assumptions of Kantian theory developed in the preceding
chapter) has found its roots in the deconstructive insights of Neitzsche.i ' In a
commentary on Neitzsche, Micheal Haar gives voice to the poststructuralist
revelation that a number of philosophical ontologies have been trapped within
certain illusions of 'being' and 'substance'i' These illusions have been fostered on
the premise that the grammatical formulation of subject 'and predicate reflects the
prior ontological reality of substance and attribute. Integral to the poststructuralist
thesis is the claim that these constructs constitute the philosophical means by which
simplicity, order and ascribed identity are instituted despite their lack of legitimate
fit to experiential realities. Haar presents the essence ofthe Neitzcshean thesis-
"All psychological categories (the ego, the individual, the person) derive from the
illusion of substantial identity. But this illusion goes back basically to a
superstition that deceives not only common sense, but also philosophers -
namely, the belief in language, and more precisely, in the truth of grammatical
categories. It was grammar (the structure of subject and predicate) that inspired
Descartes' certainty that 'I' is the subject of 'think' ... The subject, the self, the
individual, are just so many false concepts, since they transform into substances
fictitious unities having at the start only a linguistic reality.t''"
Hence, while structuralists see truth as being 'behind' or 'within' a text,
poststructuralists stress the interdependent and constructive relationship between
the reader and the text. 15 The poststructuralist thesis strongly implies that there is
no position or perspective available outwith language. Hence there can be no
distinction between subject and object and no self-evident structure for the binary
10 Weedon, C. Feminist Practise and Poststructuralist Theory, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 47, p. 30
II Gadamer, G. Truth and Method (1985) Sheed & Ward. See also discussion in Douzinas, C. &
Warrington, R. Postmodem Jurisprudence - The Law ofthe Text in the Text ofthe Law (1991) Routledge.
12 Neitzsche, F. On the Genealogy ofMorals (1969) Vintage Books
13 Haar, M. ''Neitzsche and Metaphysical Language" in Allison, D. (ed.) The New Neitzsche>
Contemporary Styles ofInterpretation (1977) Delta.
14 Haar, M. "Neitzsche and Metaphysical Language" in Allison, D. (ed.) The New Neitzsche»-
Contemporary Styles ofInterpretation, Supra. Chapter Five, Note 13, p.17-8
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opposites that have produced the polarised logic that certain radical feminist
theorists have asserted to be characteristic ofmodemity.l"
In Thinking Fragments, Jane Flax characterises the poststructuralist position as
essentially involving submission to the content of three main propositions17. The
first, she stipulates as a conviction in favour of 'the death of man'.
Poststructuralists tend to challenge any and all essentialist conceptions of human
nature or subjectivity. Refusing to accept the Kantian thesis of Man as
transcendental, rational being, poststructuralism as a genre of thought has insisted
upon the contingent existence of Man as a social, historical and linguistic artefact.
The second poststructuralist thesis proclaims the 'death of history', suggesting that
the notion of history accompanies the conception of Man as transcendental,
privileging and presupposing Enlightenment values of unity, homogeneity and
identity. The third and final thesis deals with the 'death of metaphysics'.
According to most poststructuralist thought, the Enlightenment quest for the 'real'
conceals the desire of most Western philosophy to master the world by enclosing it
within an illusory, but absolute, system which it is believed corresponds to a unitary
Being, beyond history, particularity and change.
The belief that poststructralism has caused, or at least announced, the 'death of the
subject' is a pervasive one in today's intellectual climate. It is, however, somewhat
misleading because far from being in a position of having abandoned the subject,
many poststructuralist theories are better characterised as being obsessed with
subjectivity. While some poststructuralist theories overemphasise the instability of
subjectivity (producing difficult conceptions of inherently fragmented, conflicting
and over-determined selves'"), others (such as Foucault's) attempt to reformulate
subjectivity into a more discursive formation that is considered to be more
15 Sarup, M. An Introductory Guide to Poststructuralism and Postmodernism, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 31
p.3
16 For dicussion of such critique, please see Chapter Four - "Feminist Concern About the Legal Subject"
17 Flax, J. Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West
(1990) University of California Press, p. 32-4
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appropriate to the epistemological concerns of the subject in the contemporary
world.
Of the most celebrated advocates of the former variant of poststructuralist theory is
Jacques Derrida.19 With a significant methodological reliance upon the insights of
hermeneutics, semiotics and psychoanalysis, Derrida has emphasised the linguistic
constitution of the subject, fostering an approach in favour of a strict deconstruction
of the transcendental subject. This Derridean deconstructive project
"arises out of a fundamental critique of humanist discourses and their conception
of subjectivity and language. It rejects unitary intentional subjectivity, locating
,~ meaning in texts and their relations with other texts, insisting that this meaning is
not only plural but constantly deferred in the never-ending webs of textuality.t''"
While deconstructive method is useful for feminism to the extent that it offers a
method capable of decentring certain hierarchical oppositions and binaries that are
seen to underpin gender oppression, its failure to attend sufficiently to social
context and particular power relations renders it a duplicitous ally. As Weedon
notes,
"While its stress on the plurality and non-fixity of meaning is a helpful move
beyond criticism which attempts to identify one true meaning, the implicit
assumption that there is a free play of meaning not already located in a
hierarchical network of discursive relations is to deny social power by rendering it
invisible and therefore to reaffirm the status quO.,,21
Many commentators have built upon Weedon's critique to make the claim that
pursuing such semiotic strands of poststructuralism to their logical ends presents an
unproductive distraction for social criticism generally. Essentially, two main
problems have been isolated with the method of deconstruction employed by these
'strong' poststructuralist ideological trends. Firstly, theorists like Derrida do not
make any pretence towards offering an alternative theory of the subject on the
18 See ensuing discussion of the poststructuralist thesis of Jacques Derrida in this chapter.
19 Derrida, J. OfGrammatology, & Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of
Signs, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 31
20 Weedon, C. Feminist Practise and Poststructuralist Theory, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 47, p. 163
21 Weedon, C. Feminist Practise and Poststructuralist Theory, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 47, p. 165
220
grounds that to do so would be to succumb to the epistemological dictates of
modernism. This refusal to discuss an alternative conception of knowledge tends,
however, to result in pursuit of a philosophical dead-end that prevents the theorists
who advocate this position from developing arguments in support of their own
thesis. Furthermore, Derridian and semiotic strands of poststructuralism encourage
us to conceive of subjectivity as play by equating the subject with a fiction of
modernity.r' Although it is an important and valuable insight of these theories that
the subject is constituted by the play and interaction of meaning in language, what
these theories tend also to ignore is that this 'play' is a serious moral enterprise
pursuant of end products that are by no means fictitious. 'On the contrary, the play
of meanings in language produces real subjects with complex subjectivities that
constitute their identities and experiences. As noted above, this latter criticism has
significant implications in terms of the viability of collaboration between feminist
theory and strict deconstructive methodology.
Such ideological shortcomings of the 'strong' poststructuralist thesis have led many
commentators to concern themselves more progressively with the claims of an
alternative poststructuralist thesis often associated with Michel Foucault. Foucault
has been critical of the tendency within Derridean theory to deliberately restrict its
focus to textual analysis without evaluating that textual analysis as a social and
political practice. Furthermore, Foucault alleges that Derrida's self-professed
desire to avoid questions about the extent to which a particular text arises out of and
reflects underlying social practices actually precludes the very possibility of such
questioning and therefore implicitly perpetuates the underlying status quO.23
Without abandoning the insights provided by Derrida regarding the plurality and
non-fixity of language and discourse, and without denying the imperative
deconstruction of the subject, as it has been framed by liberal and neo-Kantian
thought, Foucault has fused such concerns with his peculiar brand of theorising
about modem power to provide a far more appealing partner to feminist dialogue.
22 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p. 79
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Foucaultian Perspectives on Subjectivity and Agency
Foucault's contribution has been unique within the school of poststructuralism
particularly because of his concern to distinguish Enlightenment categories of
thought (such as those espoused by contemporary liberalism) from the original
Enlightenment spirit that provoked such categories. We noted previously in
Chapter Four that the 'spirit' of the Enlightenment isolated by Immanuel Kant
bears certain notable resemblances to the notion, established by Foucault, that
modem power operates to produce 'docile bodies' and that the project of critique
should encourage the production of means of resistance to power forces. Where
Foucault diverges from Kant is in the Kantian assumption that power forces can be
transcended and overcome through the employment of rational abstraction. Where
Foucault agrees with Kant, however, is in the claim that freedom and autonomy are
being curtailed by the operation of power forces in society and that procedures
ought to be devised to minimise the impact of such forces. Foucault's thesis is anti-
Kantian, then, to the extent that it rejects many of the metaphysical assumptions
regarding the self-reflective power of the individual that are inherent in Kantian
theory. However his thesis can only be conceived of as anti-Enlightenment to the
extent that we can establish that the Enlightenment spirit presented by Kant (and
accepted by Foucault) has been subsequently distorted by the dangerous
metaphysical assumptions mentioned within our discussion in Chapter Four?4
Furthermore, unlike many other poststructuralist theories, the Foucaultian project
does not entail the entire rejection of identity-based politics in the sense of political
strategies that focus upon the human being as the centrepiece ofreformism. Rather,
what is required is a rejection of the search for some 'true' and inherent human
identity that will form the basis of universal emancipation (in the case of Kant's
23 Sarup, M. An Introductory Guide to Poststructuralism and Postmodernism, Supra. Chapter Four, Note
31,p.54
24 Foucault, M. "What is Enlightenment?" in Rabinow, P. (ed.) Michel Foucault Ethics - Essential Works
ofFoucault 1954-84, Vol. I (1997) Penguin, p. 303
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theory through the rational transcendence of enforced curtailments upon individual
autonomyj.P
"The individual is not a pregiven entity which is seized on by the exercise of
power. The individual, with his identity and characteristics, is the product of a
relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desire
forces.,,26
Foucault refuses to see the individual (subject) as the point of origin in the way that
the metaphysical assumptions of popular (inherited) Enlightenment would require.
The world is not peopled by autonomous, self-legislating Kantian moral subjects.
On the contrary, the subject that populates the modem world is the resultant
outcome of the social life in which it is immersed. Relations of power script the
subjects envisaged by Foucault - they are subjects who are subjected rather than
transcendent.
Foucault deconstructs the basis of the Kantian subject by establishing the historical
and discursive origins of its defining characteristics in order to establish that the
characteristics which modernity associates with subjectivity (namely agency,
autonomy, and separation) are not paradigmatic. Contrary to traditional
interpretations, Foucault suggests that these characteristics of the human subject
have evolved as the constituted products of the discourse of the modem (Kantian)
subject. In other words, these characteristics are historical, discursive products,
rather than given attributes of subjectivity itself.
In respect to this aspect of his thesis, Foucault adopts an approach not dissimilar to
that developed by Heidegger in relation to the constitution of the subject. In The
End of Philosophy'], Heidegger argued that the subject and the object taken by
modem philosophy to be necessary, universal and ahistorical fundamentals are
actually contingent, historically situated products of the modem interpretation of
25 Sawada, J. Disciplining Foucault- Power, Feminism and the Body, Supra. Chapter One, Note 39, p.5
26 Foucault, M. PoweriKnowledge- Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77, Supra. Preface, Note
8, p.73-4
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Being. Foucault couples this thesis with his overall insight into the operation of
power regimes to suggest the existence of historically specific systems of norm-
governed social practices that define and produce distinctive subjects and objects of
knowledge and power in differing eras. Thus, the subject is always produced as the
result of social processes that give rise to the 'subjectivity' within which
individuals experience themselves.
"One has to disperse with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself,
that is to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the
subject within a historical framework.,,28
Foucault's project can thus be seen as developing a new historiography that can
demonstrate that the Kantian concepts of subjectivity and objectivity that have
operated in the post-Enlightenment epoch to legitimate liberal values are in
actuality mere 'fictions'. They are fictions that operate to legitimate certain social,
moral and legal practices that, once divested of their aura of legitimacy, take on an
unsatisfactory appearance and call into question again the legitimacy of the
practices they support.
This suggestion that the notion of agency so closely associated with the modernist
subject is not the only possible definition holds important consequences for the
development of moral and legal theory. Perceiving this dominant definition as a
specific attribute of the Kantian subject suggests that other definitions of agency
can and have been defined which are specific to other definitions of subjectivity.
Through the development of his thesis on technologies of the self, Foucault intends
to examine some of these alternative conceptions of subjectivity and agency.
In line with developments in hermeneutical critique, Foucault's genealogy of the
subject as a critical category has suggested that the subject, rather than being
identified strictly with the individual, ought to be designated as a linguistic category
27 Heidegger, M. The End ofPhilosophy (trans. Stambaugh) (1973) Harper & Row
28 Heidegger, M. The End on Philosophy, Supra. Chapter Five, Note 27, p.117
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eternally in formation. Individuals come to occupy the position of subject and this
position provides the linguistic occasion for the individual to achieve and reproduce
the constrained subjectivity that is the condition of its existence and agency. The
essence of Foucault's thesis suggests that no individual becomes a subject without
first becoming subjected in this process of 'subjectivization'. In recognition of this
epistemological fact, Foucault alleges that the point of modem politics is no longer
to liberate the subject from social constraints, but to interrogate the regulatory
mechanisms through which 'subjects' are produced and maintained.
"I will call subjectivization the procedure by which one obtains the constitution of
a subject, or more precisely, of a subjectivity which is of course only one of the
given possibilities of organisation of self-consciousness.v'"
One of the main criticisms that Foucault lodges against liberalism and the liberal
perception of the human subject lies in the ability of these concepts to disguise the
processes of subjectivization which occur at the level of everyday life. The
imposition of this liberal discursive smoke-screen operates, in terms of our analysis,
to encourage a one-dimensional conception of agency which demands recognition
of a simplistic operation of consent. On the contrary, the Foucaultian suggestion of
a necessary recognition of subjectivization demands examination of the social
processes structuring the remit and format of that consent before it is even available
to the agent in question. Application of such methodology heralds significant
implications in terms of the contexts isolated within Chapters Two and Three of
this thesis, where we drew attention to the experiential reality that the agency of the
legal subject is heavily constructed and constrained by the prevalence of nonnative
imperatives. Foucault's criticism of the inability of liberalism to recognise this
reality has been re-cast by the legal postmodernist, Carty, in the following terms -
"Liberalism, in theorising power as sovereign power, and sovereign power as the
relationship between abstract subjects - each characterised by an autonomous,
responsible will - and the law, ignores those practices of government by which
living individuals become the objects of detailed manipulation and management.
In ignoring them, it has also concealed them and, by the same movement
disguised the extent to which state power itself has been progressively
29 Foucault, M. "The Return to Morality" in Kritzman, L. (ed.) Michel Foucault - Politics, Philosophy,
Culture, Supra. Chapter Five, Note 6, p.253
225
governmentalised, that is, the extent to which these mechanisms of 'disciplinary'
power have been taken over and utilised by the state.,,30
In the latter volumes of The History ofSexuality, Foucault initiates a deliberate shift
in emphasis away from the body, and towards consideration of the human self.
Although many commentators have suggested that this change in emphasis is
indicative of recognition on Foucault's part of the failure ofhis thesis on power and
its operation on the body3\Foucault seems to staunchly reject this interpretation.
In fact, he explicitly states that this change in emphasis should be seen as part of the
ongoing process ofhis work, at most a modification ofhis previous thesis:
"Having studied the field of power relations taking domination techniques as a
point of departure, I should like...to study power relations, especially in the field
of sexuality, starting from the techniques of the self.,,32
By Foucault's own admission, then, an analysis of the techniques of domination
must be counterbalanced with an analysis of techniques of the self. Foucault's
earlier work in relation to how it is that the subject is constituted as an object of
knowledge is now to be supplemented and complimented by an analysis ofhow the
individual comes to understand himself or herself as subject.
In The Use ofPleasure, Foucault no longer talks of the individual as a docile entity.
Rather, he seeks a more dynamic conception of the manner in which individuals
interpret their own experiencea" He identifies the era of Christianity as founded
upon a morality orientated more towards codes than ethics. Hence the emphasis
today placed upon the individual's conformity to externally imposed codes of
behaviour. He contrasts this to the position he considers characteristic of the era in
classical Greek thought which had a strong orientation towards ethics. In this
30 Carty, A. (ed.) Postmodern Law: Enlightenment, Revolution and the Death ofMan, Supra. Chapter Four,
Note 20, p.l09
31 For example, O'Farrell, C. in Foucault- Historian or Philosopher (1989) MacMillan. Makes the
suggestion that this shift in emphasis represents a turn-around in his work, forced to come about by his
recogniton that his previous focus on disciplinary power and docile bodies neglected the role of the subject,
leading to a theoretical dead-end
32 Foucault, M. "Sexuality and Solitude" in Blonsky, M. (ed.) On Signs - A Semiotic Reader (1985) Basil
Blackwell, p.367
33 Foucault, M. The History ofSexuality Vol. II - The Use ofPleasure, Supra. Chapter Five, Note 5
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classical Greek era, there was a "strong dynamic interchange with relative
autonomy" between systems of law and the individual's own ethical conduct."
The emphasis within classical Greece lay less with conformity to systems of law,
and more with the formation of the individual's relationship to themselves, and on
the methods by which this relationship was to be cultivated. No Greek thinker ever
found a definition of the subject, and nor did they ever look for one. This "does not
mean that the Greeks did not strive to define the conditions in which an experience
would take place - an experience not of the subject, but of the individual, to the
extent that the individual wants to constitute itself as its own master".35 In line with
a large amount of the critique which we will discuss within this thesis'", Foucault
has harked back nostalgically to this era of thought based on promotion of 'ethics
of self where the concern was,
"a matter of forming and recognising oneself as the subject of one's own actions,
not through a system of signs denoting power over others, but through a relation
that depends as little as possible on status and its external forms, for this relation
is fulfilled in the sovereignty that one exercises over oneself.,,3?
For Foucault, the individual may exercise a degree of choice in the way his or her
existence is fashioned, however the practices through which this self-formation is
achieved are always over-determined by the socio-cultural context. At the same
time, however, although these practices of the self are necessarily defined by social
context, the way in which the individual is related to them is by no means reducible
to such a context. Foucault explains this,
"I am interested.. .in the way in which the subject constitutes himself in an active
fashion, by the practices of the self; these practices are nevertheless not something
that the individual invents by himself. They are patterns that he finds in his
culture, and which are proposed, suggested and imposed upon him by his culture,
his society and his social groUp.,,38
34 McCarthy, T. "The Critique of Impure Reason - Foucault and the Frankfurt School" in Kelly, T. (ed.)
Critique and Power, Supra. Chapter One, Note 28, p. 267
35 Foucault, M. "The Return to Morality" in Kritzman, L. (ed.) Michel Foucault - Politics, Philosophy,
Culture, Supra. Chapter Five, Note 6, p.253
36 Similar nostalgia for the ethics ofpre-Homeric Greece have been heavily influential in the work of
Bernard Williams, Alasdair MacIntyre and Martha Nussbaum - These will be discussed in detail in the
following chapter.
37 Foucault, The History ofSexuality, Vol. III - The Care o/Self, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 2, p.85
38 Foucault, M. in Bernauer, J. & Rasmussed, D. (ed.) The Final Foucault (1988) MIT Press, p.ll
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Within the social realm of Antiquity, the main emphasis was on self-formative
processes that enabled individuals to escape enslavement, and to achieve a desired
model ofbeing,
"the elaboration of one's own life as a personal work of art, even if it obeyed
certain collective canons, was at the centre of moral experience and of the will to
morality in Antiquity; whereas in Christianity, with the religion of the text, the
idea of the will of God, and the principal of obedience, morality took on
increasingly the form of a code of rules.,,39
This model of technologies of the self enables us to make sense of the possibilities
of resistance and revolt to power dynamics that Foucault had always insisted were
inherently implicated in systems of power. The subject thus produced through
subjectivization is not produced immediately in its totality; rather, it is in the
continual process of being repeatedly produced. It is the very possibility of such
repetition which denies any rigid consolidation of the subject and which proliferates
the technologies of the self with which to undermine the forces of normalisation.
Making creative use of whatever space for formation of the self these power
dynamics allow, these technologies of the self provide the means for infinite and
minute disjunctions between the dictates of power forces and the resultant
production of subjectivity in flux.
This more complex notion of difference, proposed by Foucault's practices of the
self, bears many resemblances to the concern amongst a large section of
contemporary feminists to demolish the assumed primacy of sexual difference.i"
Foucault's ethics of the self ("based on the problematisation of any straightforward
causal connection between social determinants and individual practices?") brings
his work in line with feminist pursuit of a non-reductive analysis ofwomen's social
status which recognises that gender is not the only determining influence in a
woman's life. This correlation of concern has been seized upon by many feminists,
39 Foucault, M. "An Aesthetics of Existence" in Krtizman, L. (ed.) Michel Foucault - Politics, Philosophy,
Culture, Supra. Chapter Five, Note 6, p.49
40 See discussion of 'contemporary' feminist approach to the legal subject discussed in the previous
chapter, particularly Littleton, C. "Reconstructing Sexual Equality" (1987), Supra. Chapter Four, Note 71
228
particularly, as we shall see, by those members of the French Feminist school who
have been particularly receptive to the Foucaultian notion of a limited remit of
agency within the confines of repetitious acts of character formation. This has
become an important focus of much contemporary feminism, and later in this
chapter, we will examine the merits of Judith Butler's most celebrated attempt to
build upon Foucaultian ethics of the self to derive a more appropriate premise for
feminism.f
For the moment, it is important that we notice the deference that Foucault's ethics
of the self admits to the overall social context of individual identity fashioning.
Foucault, in the final analysis is never unaware that practices of the self are
eternally introduced and imposed by their wider social context. However, he also
recognises that this imposition is never straightforward, and that in order to capture
the dynamics of power we must examine the manner in which individuals interact
with and interpret the imperatives demanded by these practices.
One of the main problems with Foucault's notion of an ethics of the self, based
upon pursuit of personal aestheticism, lies in the inability of this thesis to
differentiate between those practices which are imposed upon us more heavily than
others.
"By reducing the varying techniques of the self to the same effective level of self
'stylization', Foucault fails to distinguish between practices that are merely
'suggested' to the individual and practices that are more or less 'imposed' in so
far as they are heavily laden with cultural sanctions and taboos.'.43
Not all practices of the self are simply an exercise in aesthetics (as Foucault seems
to suggest)." If this ethics is to hold any potential for expansion by feminism, it
must be able to recognise that some practices of the self are linked in a more
intimate way with the maintenance of prevailing social hierarchies. Embedded in
41 McNay, L. Foucault and Feminism, Supra. Chapter One, Note 85, p.66
42 Butler, 1. Gender Trouble, Supra. Preface, Note 20
43 McNay, L. Foucault and Feminism, Supra. Chapter One, Note 85, p. 74
44 McNay, L. Foucault and Feminism, Supra. Chapter One, Note 85, p. 77
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this idea of a stylisation of the self is a notion of choice, but this remains inadequate
to fulfil the purposes demanded by feminist ethics, most specifically because of its
failure to tackle the involuntary and biological dimensions of sexuality. In order to
challenge certain aspects of sexuality effectively, we have seen in Chapters Two
and Three that we must engage in a detailed study of the network of entrenched
cultural norms in which our bodies are implicated. However, the imperatives of
stylisation and aesthetics presented by Foucault are insufficient for this purpose
because they fail to explain why certain modes of stylisation are not equally
available to men and women.f
While Foucault's theory heralds an advantage (in terms of feminist analysis) over
Derridean theory in that Foucault takes into account more seriously the relationship
between discursive analysis and power relations, his failure to further conceptualise
the relationship between power relations and aestheticism proves particularly
damaging. Despite the subtle and penetrating critique of power that Foucault
initiates in Volume One of The History ofSexuality, Foucault's prescriptive thesis
fails to pay sufficient attention to the interaction between stylisations of the self and
the differential degrees of embeddedness of social expectation. Although Foucault
constantly refers to his perception of power relations as all-pervasive, his theory
fails to accommodate the experiential fact (central to feminist analysis) that some
cultural expectations are far more implicated within the frameworks of the social
status quo than others. Cultural inscriptions bearing upon the lives of women are
often supported by immensely oppressive power machinery. This renders the
potential for contravening stylisation of the self far harder to achieve in these
situations than it is in those contexts where the power machinery wielded in support
of the expectation is less firmly embedded in the constitution of dominant social
trends.
"Although Foucault is right to reject the idea that gender is definitively imposed
on individuals by external forces, at the same time, his notion of style
45 McNay, L. Foucault and Feminism, Supra. Chapter One, Note 85, p. 80
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significantly underestimates the force of the cultural norms that come into play in
the formation of individual's gender identity.?"
Realisation of the inadequacy of this aspect of the Foucaultian thesis has been
particularly damaging to many contemporary attempts to develop his insights.
Nancy Fraser, for example, has been highly critical of what she considers to be an
'agnostic' theory of power developed by Foucault, which assumes that because
power is productive and ineliminable, it is therefore normatively neutral.Y The
danger of this, from a feminist perspective, lies in its inability to distinguish
between good and bad social practices in any meaningful way." While this
presents a locus of legitimate concern amongst many feminist commentators, many
others have sought to revise Foucaultian aesthetics in a manner that avoids arising
such concerns. In later sections of this chapter, we will examine such attempts in
more detail.
In a series of more general engagements with Foucaultian critique, Richard Rorty
has noted with disapproval what he perceives to be a tendency to make the drama
of the legal subject into a melodrama." Rorty is keen to demonstrate that liberal
constitutional philosophy (such as that developed by Rawls'") is not committed to
any definitive notion of the subject, and certainly not to the definitive thesis
suggested for it by Foucault and his fellow deconstructionists. According to Rorty,
the prime value to be defended by such liberal theories is the principle of justice.
Justice, however, is not a matter of our ensuring that something conforms to a pre-
given order, but rather (and more simply) that it accords with the idea we make of
ourselves, given the history and traditions of our public life. In this light, liberal
46 MacNay, L. Foucault & Feminism, Supra. Chapter One, Note 85, p.82
47 Fraser, N."Foucault - A Young Conservative?" in Fraser, N. Unruly Practices, Supra. Chapter Two,
Note 1
48 Deveaux, M. "Feminism and Empowerment - A Critical Reading of Foucault" (1994) 20 (2) Feminist
Studies 223. Reprinted in Helanan, S. (ed.) Feminist Interpretations ofMichel Foucault, Supra. Chapter
One, Note 43, p. 221
49 Rorty, R.. Objectivity, Relativism and Truth (1991) Cambridge University Press &The Linguistic Tum :
Essays in Philosophical Method (1992) University of Chicago Press & Truth and Progress (1998)
Cambridge University Press. Discussed by Carty, A. (ed.) Postmodem Law: Enlightenment, Revolution and
the Death ofMan, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 20, p.29
50 Rawls, J. A Theory ofJustice, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 35
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philosophy no longer seeks to delineate the existence of a subject distinct from the
network of desires and beliefs in which the subject is supposed to be immersed.
Rorty accuses poststructuralist theorists, including both Foucault and Derrida, of
being 'crazed' and 'confused' because of their continued (yet unnecessary)
distinction between the essence of the subject and its accidents. Instead of pursuing
such a categorical distinction between the subject and its situation, and instead of
concerning ourselves with the conditions that define the identity of the subject,
Rorty proposes that we should be concerned more with those conditions that define
citizenship in a liberal society. This leaves us free to engage in the systematisation
of the principals and institutions that characterise those who wish to live within the
frameworks of such institutions.
Foucault believes, however, that contemporary society has reached such a degree of
scepticism about large-scale systems of belief that it must seek a more individuated
and localised basis for modem morality." What he values most highly in ancient
Greek thought is the degree of autonomy exercised by the individual in relation to
more general moral and social codes.
"what was missing in classical antiquity was the problematization of the
constitution of the self as subject. Beginning with Christianity we have the
opposite because of an appropriation ofmorality by the theory of the subject. But
a moral experience essentially centred on the subject no longer seems satisfactory
to me today.,,52
His main objection to contemporary society lies in its tendency to embed social
norms and rights in what are deliberately misperceived to be the rational and
objective structures of the law. As discussed in Chapter One, this process leaves
the individual trapped within a normalising web of law and medicine that produces
a pressure to conform that is so great that it operates to obliterate the liberal
conception ofthe autonomy of the individual.
51 McNay, L. Foucault and Feminism, Supra. Chapter One, Note 85, p. 85
52 Foucault, M. "The Return to Morality" in Kritzman, L. (ed.) Michel Foucault - Politics, Philosophy,
Culture, Supra. Chapter Five, Note 6, p253
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"Unlike postmodern theorists, Foucault refuses to reject completely certain
concepts derived from Enlightenment thought, for example autonomy,
domination, self-determination in the name of an undifferentiated celebration of
plurality. Rather, he recognises the importance of these concepts for formulating
effective strategies of social transformation and political resistance and he
therefore seeks to redefine them in relations to his ethics of individual praxis."s3
Foucault is as critical as any poststructuralist commentator of the Kantian (liberal)
definition of autonomy that emphasises the need for the individual subject to act on
abstract, impartial moral principles, regardless of the network of relations and
dependencies in which they operate. Unlike many critical commentators, however,
Foucault stops short ofproposing abandonment of the whole ideal of autonomy as a
moral and legal notion. Instead, Foucault seeks to reformulate the concept in line
with what he considers to be the original emancipatory aim of the Enlightenment
(which became corrupted by claims to scientificity, etc.).
We have mentioned previously in this section the correlation of concern between
Foucault and the original spirit of the Enlightenment. Inkeeping with the original
Enlightenment quest for advancement through permanent critique, Foucault's
conception of an ethics of self presents a notion of autonomy that is likewise
embodied in an attitude of unending challenge to pervasive authority.
"Foucault's notion of the radical interrogation of identity converges with the
internal feminist critique of essentialism while, at the same time, it retains a
notion of agency upon which a politics ofresistance could be articulated.t'"
Within the framework of this permanent critique lies the potential for the autonomy
that is central to Foucault's latter work. Contrary to the notion of autonomy
presupposed by liberal theorists (which assumes that autonomy is manifest through
the exercise of unconstrained rational abstraction and unconstructed choice),
Foucaultian autonomy exerts itself through a continuous process of negotiation and
subversion.
53 McNay, L. Foucault and Feminism, Supra. Chapter One, Note 85, p. 117
54 McNay, L. Foucault and Feminism, Supra. Chapter One, Note 85, p. 193
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Having conceded the omnipotence of power relations, Foucault has also sought to
challenge the Kantian aspiration towards the realisation of autonomy through the
transcendence of power. If all choice is inevitably curtailed and all identities
inevitably constructed, autonomy cannot be located in any simplistic exercise of
unilateral choice. Autonomy is not located outside prevailing power structures, but
rather its exercise is located centrally within them. Autonomy, on the Foucaultian
analysis, manifests itself when subjects consciously subvert expectation and deny
the consolidation of their identity within expected parameters. Continual
subversion of expectation presents a gradual means of producing change and
thereby exercising agency.
Although Foucault remains committed to the principle of freedom, therefore, he
refuses to theorise that freedom in terms of an abstract and transcendent subject.
Instead, he opts for a theory of freedom which is minimal in the sense that it offers
as little as it needs to make an ethical commitment to freedom without stipulating
innate structures ofthe autonomous subject. For Foucault, it is essential that we de-
centre subjectivity by challenging the pervasive belief in the subject of
Enlightenment rationalism, a subject assumed to have a consciousness governed by
reason and thus to have access to a universal and atemporal form of truth. Because
the agency of the subject is not a property of the subject (according to the
Foucaultian thesis), not an inherent will or freedom, but an effect of power
dynamics, it is constrained but not determined in advance.55 The freedom that
Foucault has in mind is a relative freedom. If, as has been suggested, the subject is
produced in speech through a set of foreclosures and expectations, this very process
of repetitive formation actually sets the scene for the agency of the subject because
the agency of this subject is dependent on the conditions of such foreclosure.
Simultaneously, however, this agency is never fully determined because the action
of foreclosure can never be completed, but relies instead upon the repeated
consolidation of its power through acts ofrepetition.
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This 'rediscovery' of the subject in poststructuralism has been precipitated by
reaction to the pessimistic determinism of approaches that have conceived of the
subject as a mere reflection of those social structures that have been accorded
theoretical priority. In this sense it has been interpreted as an attempt to rescue
poststructuralist theses of the fragmented and diverse self from charges of nihilism
and destruction of agency.56
Many commentators have found this claim less than convincing, however. Most
prominently perhaps, Jurgen Habermas has accused Foucault of elaborating a 'total
critique of modernity' that is necessarily both theoretically paradoxical and
politically suspect.57 It is theoretically paradoxical, according to Habermas,
because it cannot exist without a fundamental reliance on those very categories of
modernist thought that it claims to have surpassed, such as the self-motivated and
self-aware human agent, or a belief in the validity of notions such as truth,
rationality and freedom. Furthermore, it is politically suspect because it aims less
at a dialectical resolution of the problems of modem society, and more at a radical
rejection of modernity as such. Hence, according to Habermas, Foucault's thesis,
which purports to be postmodern, is at best modem, and at worst anti-modem.
In contrast to this, Habermas seeks to preserve and extend the 'emancipatory
impulse' behind the Enlightenment's success in overcoming pre-modem forms of
domination, while remaining in a position sufficiently critical to enable him to
attack the less desirable features of modem society. He distinguishes this from the
Foucaultian enterprise in recognition of Foucault's place within the tradition of
rejectionist criticism, originating in the work of Neitzsche, which upon his
interpretation aspires toward a total break from the Enlightenment.
55 Sawacki, J. "Feminism, Foucault and the 'Subjects' of Power and Freedom" in Hekman, S. (ed.)
Feminist Interpretations ofMichel Foucault, Supra. Chapter One, Note 43, p. 160-176. See especially her
discussion of Kolodny's thesis entitled "The Late Foucault", p. 173-175
56 Ramazanogu1u, C. Up Against Foucault (1993) Routledge, p. 134
57 Habermas, J. Philosophical Discourse ofModernity, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 84. Discussed in Carty,
A. (ed.) Postmodern Law: Enlightenment, Revolution and the Death ofMan , Supra. Chapter Four, Note
20, p. 29. See also Ashenden, S. & Owen, D. (ed.) Foucault Contra Habermas (1999) SAGE.
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We have seen from our discussion throughout this section, however, that this
particular criticism makes too many assumptions about Foucault's radical
intentions. Nancy Fraser, commenting on the Foucault-Habermas debate, despite
her own scepticism about the merits of the Foucaultian project, has recognised that
Habermas' critique ''jumps the gun with the alarmist supposition that if Foucault
rejects a 'universalistic' or foundationalistic meta-interpretation of humanist
concepts and values, then he must be rejecting those concepts and values
entirely.T" We have seen already, through our discussion ofFoucault's acceptance
of the spirit of Enlightenment and his insistence upon the maintenance of a
conception of revised agency, that this is not necessarily' the best interpretation of
the aims of the Foucaultian en~erprise.
This Foucaultian reassertion of a notion of agency presents a different range of
difficulties for feminists seeking to develop a more poststructural foundation to
their ethical approach.
"feminist critics of Foucault find in his cntique a wholesale rejection of
subjectivity and agency. But to focus on the ways in which the subject is in fact
constituted, and on the broader social and political forces that determine the
parameters and possibilities of rational agency is not to deny agency. It does,
however, point to its limits."s9
Many subsequent feminist commentators have drawn attention to Foucault's
examination of the technologies of the self in an attempt to defend him against the
charge that his development of a constitutive concept of discourse, necessarily
linked to power dynamics, has dissolved the agency of the human subject.
Nonetheless, many others have continued to find the relation between Foucault's
overall thesis and his attempt to stand by the principal of human agency difficult to
accept. Nancy Fraser has been highly critical of the possibility within Foucault's
work to ascertain a 'doer behind the deed,6o while MacNay finds his notion of an
58 Fraser, N. "Michel Foucault - A Young Conservative?", Supra. Preface, Note 1
59 Sawacki,J Disciplining Foucault- Power, Feminism and the Body, Supra. Chapter One, Note 39, p.103
60 Fraser, N. Unruly Practices, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 1
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aesthetics of existence problematic precisely because it continues to privilege what
she considers to be an undialectical and disengaged theory of the self'".
In an attempt to rescue Foucault's theory from the throws ofthis debate, Hekman
has argued that any critique which sees such discursive analysis as necessarily
disempowering the subject is itself caught up in the kind of polarity which is
characteristic of Enlightenment thought. 62 This parallels claims made by Foucault
in his latter works, especially "What is Enlightenmentv'f'' where he defers in many
respects to the insights of Kant's own philosophy. He explicitly refuses to be
drawn into 'the blackmail of the Enlightenment' which seeks to determine polarised
categories of thought, establishing an intractable dichotomy between those for and
those against the Enlightenment. In real terms, what Foucault seeks to undercut is
not the agency of the human subject, but the essentialist conception of the subject
that provides the framework of liberal thought and which has traditionally
encapsulated our notions of subjectivity and agency. He refers appreciatively to
Kant's ideas of maturity and autonomy. However, by presenting autonomy as
aesthetic self-invention he provides a very different twist to its definition, a twist
that seeks to eliminate the universality at the heart of traditional appropriations of
the doctrine.
Even when Foucault's thesis is recast in this light (i.e. outwith the blackmail of the
Enlightenment), his position in regard to human agency continues to encounter
resistance within the ethical position of certain feminist commentators. Nancy
Harstock (a prominent critic of poststructuralism generally) has argued that
Foucault's alleged rejection of modernity and its emancipatory theories, together
with his emphasis on resistance and destabilisation over transformation, have
robbed feminists of certain elements of theory and practice that are indispensable to
61 MacNay, Foucault & Feminism, Supra. Chapter One, Note 85
62 Hekman, S. Gender and Knowledge (1990) Polity Press
63 Foucault, M. "What is Enlightenment?" in Rabinow, P. The Foucault Reader, Supra. Chapter One, Note
73. Also in Rabinow, P. (ed.) Michel Foucault Ethics, Supra. Chapter Five, Note 24
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their goals." She warns that his ascending analysis of power encourages a
mentality of victim-blaming insofar as it highlights the agent's participation in their
own oppression. This concern leads Harstock to conclude that Foucault's theory
"fails to provide an epistemology which is usable for the task of revolutionising,
creating and constructing".65
These criticisms are actively taken on board and challenged by Judith Butler in her
reformulation of the Foucaultian thesis. In her influential work Gender Trouble -
Feminism and the Subversion of Identity,66Butler has argued that, contrary to the
.' concerns voiced by Harstock, a feminist politics without a feminine subject is both
possible and desirable. Objecting to identity-based politics on the grounds that they
tend to appeal to a pre-discursive identity as their ground and support, Butler argues
that feminism need not assume that there is a 'doer behind the deed'. Rather, the
thesis she advocates proposes that "the doer is invariably constructed in and
through the deed.,,67 Reiterating the Foucaultian assertion introduced in previous
discussion, Butler argues that suggesting that the subject is discursively constituted
does not necessarily preclude the possibility of agency - this only appears to be the
case because of feminist tendencies to confuse social constructionism with
determinism. This confusion is explained by Butler to be a result of their
enshrinement within a system of binary logic whereby the idea of a free will
necessitates a form of agency that transcends the world in which it must negotiate
its identity. On the contrary, according to Butler's Foucaultian thesis, "the subject
is not a thing, a substantive entity, but rather a process of signification within an
open system of discursive possibilities.V'''
64 Harstock, N. "Foucault on Power - A Theory for Women" in Nicholson, L. (ed.) Feminism /
Postmodernism, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 58
65 Harstock, N. "Foucault on Power-A Theory for Women" in Nicholson, L. (ed.) Feminism /
Postmodemism, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 58, p.l64
66 Butler, J. Gender Trouble, Supra. Preface, Note 20
67 Butler, J. Gender Trouble, Supra. Preface, Note 20, p.142
68 Gutting, G. A Cambridge Companion to Foucault (1994) Cambridge Uni. Press, p.299
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Hence, Butler's thesis, seeing identity as neither wholly determined nor wholly
arbitrary, seeks to move beyond this dichotomy towards recognition of the
possibility of critical agency which does not require the establishment of an
absolute ground of knowledge and experience beyond power relations. According
to Butler, feminist identity politics that appeal to a founding subject (such as
Harstock's) presume, fix and constrain the very 'subject' that they hope to represent
and liberate. In contrast,
"if identities were no longer fixed as the premises of a political syllogism, and
politics no longer understood as a set of practices derived from the alleged
interests that belong to a set of ready-made subjects, a new configuration of
politics would surely emerge from the ruins of the 0Id.,,69
This is the trajectory upon which Foucault has placed contemporary philosophy and
his challenge has been taken up by many influential feminist commentators. In the
following section, we will examine the merits of such an approach to feminist
ethics in more detail and will evaluate the successes and failures attributable to it.
Feminism and Poststructuralist Accounts ofthe Fragmented Self
"As a shifting and contextual phenomenon, gender does not denote a substantive
being, but a relative point of convergence among culturally and historically
specific sets ofrelations.Y'''
We have seen in our discussion in the previous chapter that the liberal conception
of the legal subject tends to assume a substantive person who is the bearer of
various essential and non-specific attributes. We can assume, on that basis, that a
liberal feminist position would understand gender as an attribute of a human agent
who is characterised generally as a pre-gendered entity with a universal capacity for
reason and moral deliberation. Many feminists have been keen to point out,
however, that any such understanding is disjointed by historical and
anthropological evidence which posits gender as a relation among socially
69 Butler, 1. Gender Trouble, Supra. Preface, Note 20, p.149
70 Butler, J. Gender Trouble, Supra. Preface, Note 20, p.lO
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constituted subjects in specific social and personal contexts." The implication
flowing from such evidence suggests that one's subjective identity is intrinsically
related to the social constructions and determinants under which it is constituted.
This species of constructivism has become a prevalent theme within contemporary
feminism and the correlation between this premise and the concerns of
poststructuralist theory is palpable.
Many of the contemporary theorists who have analysed the 'crisis of modernity'
have challenged this liberal notion of the unitary and abstracted self. Luce
Irigarary, for example, has argued that the legal subject is a construction of
patriarchy that specifically, excludes woman by positioning her traditional
subjectivity in an antithetical position to the ontological condition that has become
paradigmatic of the unitary subjecr". Such disregard for the constitution
characteristic of humanist subjectivity in Irigaray's work does not, however, imply
a disregard for the notion of subjectivity per se. In fact, in her commentary on
Irigaray, Whitford has noted the continued centrality of the question of female
subjectivity within Irigaray's philosophical frameworks73. The task Irigaray sets
women is not the abandonment of pursuit of subjectivity, but rather the
displacement of their current object status through the eradication of their linguistic
limitations as eternal predicate.
In recognition of the relative invisibility of corporeality within the liberal
philosophical tradition, and in direct opposition to the Kantian privileging of
disembodied rationality over embodied emotionality, poststructurally influenced
feminists (like Irigaray and Butler) have demanded the reconstruction of our world
view in recognition of the inevitability of human corporeality. This insight has
constituted the motivation behind Butler's celebrated claim in Bodies that Matter
that bodies are actively materialised through practices of citation within established
71 Butler, J. Gender Trouble, Supra. Preface, Note 20, p. 10
72 Irigaray, L. The Sex Which is Not One, Supra. Chapter One, Note 38
73 Whitford, M. Luce Irigaray - Philosophy in the Feminine, Supra. Chapter One, Note 57
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cultural discourses such as law.74 These practices inscribe meanmgs upon
corporeal surfaces that produce a cultural signification of bodies that have specific
power and capacities (i.e. bodies that matter), and those that do not.
Pursuant upon the development of such feminist insight, many feminist theorists
have drawn heavily upon the poststructuralist assertion that subjectivity, rather than
being the expression of a fixed core or essence, is in reality a composition that is
structured through language and other processes of signification such that it is an
open-ended and culturally specific entity. Recognition of the existence of
important arenas ofparallel concern between poststructuralism and feminism in this
regard has led many commentators to call for a far stronger strategic link between
the two schools of thought. While some feminists have been more optimistic than
others in relation to the possibility of forming any such coalition, it cannot be
disputed that there are certain important overlaps of concern that render this an at
least superficially attractive proposition.
One of the most significant arenas within which the insights of poststructuralism
may prove most fruitful to the feminist academy lies in the assertions of Foucault in
regard to the construction of meaning within pervasive power networks. The
overlap of concern in this context has been well illustrated by MacNay in her
commentary on Foucault-
"Foucault's ethics of active intervention opens a space for feminists to understand
and intervene in the processes through which meaning is produced, disseminated
and transformed in relation to the changing configurations of modem power and
domination.T''
Poststructuralism offers to feminism the methodological tools required for the
deconstruction of the gendered liberal subject, and of the gendered notions of truth
and reason upon which it is parasitic. Feminism, in allegiance with
poststructuralism, becomes equipped to illustrate the extent to which these features
74 Butler, J. Bodies That Matter, Supra. Preface, Note 21
75 MacNay, L. Foucault & Feminism, Supra. Chapter One, Note 85, p. 115
241
of subjectivity are in fact the constructed artefacts of the demands of the dominant
(male-influenced) discourse, as expressed in the text of the law and in other
authoritative statements. The synthesis of such authoritative discourse constitutes a
system that constructs and engenders both male and female subjectivity. Collusion
of a host of linguistic strategies along side a variety of processes of cultural
signification operates to naturalise resultant gendered identities which link men and
women to differentiated and prioritised images.
"By deploying these images, legal discourse rationalizes, explains and renders
authoritative the ... body rule network. The impact of the rule network on ...
reality in turn reacts back on the discourse, reinforcing the 'truth' of these
images.Y'"
This idea of the cultural manufacture of gendered identity through the construction
of a body rule network has made a significant contribution to the feminist school of
theory. In recognition of the psychoanalytical insight that the individual subject as
a gendered entity is at once produced by a complex interplay of unstable social and
discursive forces, it has become apparent that the relation of the subject to his or
her body can likewise no longer be complacently considered unproblematic. The
merit of this insight for the feminist academy has been recognised by Diamond and
Quinby-
"if the individual's experience of and relation to the body, and other bodies, is
seen as culturally produced at every level, feminists can work more effectively to
generate new concepts that permit a recognition of that experience as one that is
in struggle and whose destructive aspects can be altered.',77
In terms of the development of alternative stylisations of existence, this insight has
significant implications. Indeed, Judith Butler goes so far as to suggest that if
feminism were to ignore such insights of poststructuralist theory, it would open
itself up to legitimate charges of gross misrepresentation'" - in continuing to
conform to a requirement of representational politics which dictates that we must
articulate a stable and essential subject, non-poststructural feminists are offering
continued deference to the central pillar of the illusion oflegalliberalism.
76 Frog, M. Postmodem Legal Feminism (1992) Routledge, p.129
77 Diamond, 1.& Quinby, L. Feminism and Foucault, Supra. Chapter One, Note 30, p.174
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For many feminists, the first introduction to the possible synthesis of feminism and
poststructuralism has come from within that school of theory referred to as 'French
Feminism'. The figureheads of this movement (namely Irigaray, Cixous and
Kristeva") have developed a number of themes that have transformed discussion of
the human subject in feminist theory. They have been among the most prominent
advocates of the suggestion introduced above that there is an important link
between discourse and subjectivity. In addition, they have also made an important
contribution towards a possible re-definition of the nature of resistance to the
processes of subjectivization they stipulate.
We have seen in our discussion of Michel Foucault, that his treatment of the
possibility of resistance to imposed identity categories has often provoked a degree
of unease. Many commentators have expressed concern particularly about
Foucault's suggestion that power and power networks are all pervasive. This has
frequently been interpreted to imply the impossibility of resistance and the
eradication of the possibility of human agency. Within the feminist camp, Seyla
Benhabib has expressed these concerns most clearly,
"the subject that is but another position in language can no longer master and
create that distance between itself and the chain of significations in which it is
immersed such that it can reflect upon them and creatively alter them."so
If we exclusively focus upon Foucault's work in regard to power and domination,
this may well appear to be a reasonable assessment. However, we have noted
throughout this chapter that a more careful reading of Foucault's latter works on the
stylisation of the self posits an arena ofresistance and agency, albeit a limited one.
Such a sympathetic reading of the agentic potential identifiable within Foucault's
work has been cultivated within the school of French feminist thought. According
78 Butler, J. Gender Trouble Supra. Preface, Note 20, p. 5
79 Cixous, H. & Clement, C. The Newly Born Woman (1986) Manchester University Press
Irigaray, L. The Sex Which Is Not One, Supra. Chapter One, Note 38
Kristeva, J. "Motherhood According to Giovanni Bellini" in Desire in Language - A Semiotic Approach to
Literature and Art (1981) Basil Blackwell.
80 Benhabib, S. Situating the Self, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 22, p. 214
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to the works of Cixous, Irigaray and Kristeva, the human subject (male or female)
does not spontaneously arise from some essential core of subjectivity, as Kantian
theories would suggest. On the contrary, the subject is discursively and culturally
constituted. Upon this basis, they have developed a theory of resistance that is
similarly independent of the illusion of the autonomous, self-legislating liberal
subject. This alternative version establishes that resistance is simultaneously and
inextricably both discursive and political. In real terms, this demands that
resistance involves a commitment to 'disruptive excess', i.e. to strategies of
subversive signification which will challenge the pretensions of our constitutive
machinery by rejecting its sustenance through mundane acts ofrepetition.
This latter thesis of 'French Feminism' has gone a long way towards elimination of
a large amount of the critique often lodged at poststructuralism in general, and
feminist poststructuralism in particular. We have noted in our previous discussion
of Foucault that poststructuralist approaches of all genres have been criticised for
the emphasis that they place upon the ways in which meanings and identities (in the
case of feminist poststructuralism, gendered meanings and identities) are
constructed by discourse. If our identity is inevitably constructed by discourse,
meaning and language, then we must call into question the very possibility of a
meaningful notion of human agency. This has been an uncomfortable conclusion
for many contemporary feminists who remain keen to retain at least a modified
conception of the capacity for self-determination. The notion of agency through
subscription to subversive strategies of signification (initiated by Irigaray, Cixous
and Kristeva) furnishes feminism (and poststructuralism in general) with a
methodological tool to permit this.
Gender and meaning are constantly recasting themselves within the modem power
networks - they evolve new interpretations through the continuous act of mundane
repetition of prescribed meanings. Butler puts the point in relation to agency and
resistance most plainly,
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"The injunction to be a given gender produces necessary failures, a variety of
incoherent configurations that in their multiplicity exceed and defy the injunction
by which they are generated.t''"
Where traditional theories of the agentic self have required the existence of a self
that exists outside of and prior to discourse, this alternative conception argues that
the existence of any such 'antecedenly individuated self' is in itself illusory. Any
such self does not and cannot exist. Instead, agency can only consist in "a taking
up of the tools where they lie, where the very 'taking up' is enabled by the tools
lying there."s2
Providing the groundwork for the development of Foucaultian feminist theory,
Wendy Brown has challenged the legitimacy of the tenacious hold that many more
sceptical feminists seek to maintain upon the agentic subject of liberalism. In
Feminist Hesitations, she argues that such enduring feminist attachment to the
notion of an agentic human subject is rooted in a reluctance amongst certain
feminists to reject their long-standing project of grounding the moral and
epistemological authority of women's experiences as sources of political truths3.
This enterprise has riddled feminism with a paradoxical inconsistency - on one
hand, it is recognised that female identities are constructed under patriarchal
conditions, while on the other hand, this species of feminism continues to seek out
a secure ground of experiential truth which is beyond this construction.
Sawacki has likewise noted the misguided nature of enduring feminist scepticism
regarding the Foucaultian position on agency,
"feminist critics of Foucault find in his critique a wholesale rejection of
subjectivity and agency. But to focus on the ways in which the subject is in fact
constituted, and on the broader social and political forces that determine the
parameters and possibilities ofrational agency is not to deny agency."S4
81 Butler, J. Gender Trouble, Supra. Preface, Note 20, p.145
82 Butler, J. Gender Trouble, Supra. Preface, Note 20, p.145
83 Brown, W. Feminist Hesitations. Discussed in Sawada, J. "Foucault, Feminism and Questions of
Identity" in Gutting, G. (ed.) A Cambridge Companion to Foucault, Supra. Chapter Five, Note 68, p. 302-5
84 Sawada, J. Disciplining Foucault, Supra. Chapter One, Note 39 p.l03
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The Foucaultian subject is neither entirely autonomous nor entirely enslaved. This
has a palpable link with the feminist praxis of consciousness-raising, which seeks to
highlight both the elements of domination to which we act as collaborators, as well
as the possibilities for re-interpretation of the inherently fluid meanings enshrined
in such collaboration.P These critics of Foucault appear therefore to be misguided
in their interpretation of his thesis - the discursive constructionism that Foucault
posits as inescapable within disciplinary society does not entail historical
determinism, nor elimination of agency.
A correlation of concern between feminism and poststructuralism in relation to the
revision of the concept of human agency towards a recognition of subversive
strategies of signification has led many feminist commentators to seek a similar
allegiance in regard to the idea of an 'aesthetics of existence'. As discussed above,
this 'aesthetics of existence' constitutes the Foucaultian prescriptive thesis of self-
identity formation. Essentially, it advocates a return to classical Greek ethics where
the emphasis ofhuman agency lay, not in conformity to social imperatives (as is the
case in modernity), but in the cultivation of a life that exhibits itself as a 'work of
art' . Stylisation of the self in this sense requires the active subversion of social
imperatives and the development of creativity and aestheticism within one's life
plan.
Although many ofthe most ardent feminist followers ofFoucault have continued to
adopt this proposal, a large proportion of those poststructuralist feminists who owe
a debt of philosophical gratitude to Foucault have suggested that this 'aesthetics of
self represents the point of necessary departure between feminism and Foucault.
We noted in our previous discussion on aestheticism'" that an inherent problem, at
least with its Foucaultian development, lies in its inability to distinguish between
those patterns of behaviour and identity imposed upon us with varying degrees of
force.
85 Bartlett, K. "Feminist Legal Method" (1990) 103 Harvard Law Review 829
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Critique pertaining to this aspect of Foucaultian aestheticism has escalated pre-
existing and widespread feminist concerns that in a context where male
embodiment is perceived as 'normal', and female as 'abnormal',
"To suggest that those women, and others, already excluded from social
exchange, should practice an aesthetics of self outside existing social, economic
and political structures would perpetuate their exclusion'f"
In a social and political context where the prioritised 'mainstream' expectations of
female identity are currently rendered peripheral to the concerns of public life, the
notion that agency ought to be exercised through the adoption of identity
formations entirely outwith existing frameworks presents the dangerous spectre of
further exclusion and isolation for the female subject.
Just as no ethos or identity is developed outwith the influence of social discourse,
no conception of a work of art is created in a cultural vacuum. Failure to recognise
this fact constitutes a glaring omission in Foucault's own philosophy. Despite his
respected critique of the omnipotence of power forces, Foucault fails to accord
sufficient attention to the fact that the value that will be attributed to any body as a
'work of art' will be generated through it process of comparison with, and thereby
implicit denigration of, the other. In a social context where the male body is
assumed already to be a work of art, it seems implicit that female forms of
embodiment will be less recognised and less valued.
"The generation of identity and value by the denigration and exclusion of others is
apparent in Ancient Greek ethics, and without any indication to the contrary,
would also be true of the production of Foucault's contemporary corporeal
artefact - the self as a work of art, its meaning and value is not given outside its
relation to others, even if it is built without explicit reference to a universalizing
moral code.,,88
When the remit for one's agentic capacity is determined by one's ability to express
one's life as an aesthetic work of art in the manner envisaged by the Foucaultian
thesis, the gender-specific attribution of credibility to agency that has been
criticised over preceding discussion is reinserted within the ethical framework. In
86 See Chapter Five, "Foucaultian Perspectives on Subjectivity and Agency", esp. p. 227-8 above
87 Diprose, R. The Bodies ofWomen, Supra Chapter Four, Note 93, p31
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failing to pay due attention to the systemic difficulties presented to female agents in
their attempts to render an appropriate stylisation of the self, Foucault's thesis
implicitly accredits greater legitimacy to the aesthetic inventions of male agents
under the kind of superficial guise ofneutrality that he has been highly critical of in
his critique of the juridical framework.
Despite the existence of significant similarities that unite the poststructuralism of
Foucault with the concerns of feminist ethics, therefore, this oversight within his
thesis points to a necessary divergence between the two camps. Although we have
identified considerable affinity between feminism and poststructuralism in terms of
the critique of the Kantian .subject, and in terms of the association between
discourse and subjectivity, the prescriptive stylisations of existence which Foucault
proposes represent a more problematic interplay with feminist concerns.
We have discussed at length the main criticism lodged at Foucault's ethics of the
self in regard to the invisibility and impossibility of agency within such ethical
parameters. This is not, however, the concern that presents the most significant
obstacle to feminist poststructuralist accounts. Indeed, feminist commentators
within this tradition have generally accepted that Foucault's theory does not
preclude the possibility of agency or resistance per se. 89 However merited concern
remains in regard to the manner in which Foucault's ethics of the self are to be
realised. Foucault's reliance upon aestheticism in abstraction from social discourse
is recognised by many feminist theorists to be arbitrary and artificial.
88 Diprose, R. The Bodies ofWomen, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 93, p. 34
89 Butler, J. Bodies That Matter, Supra. Preface, Note 21, p. 30 - "To prob1ematise the matter ofbodies
may entail an initial loss of epistemological certainity, but a loss of certainty is not the same as political
nihilism. On the contrary, such a loss may well indicate a significant and promising shift in political
thinking. "
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Butler's Reformulation ofFoucault
In an attempt to rescue this species of poststructuralism from the limitations of this
oversight, and in order to preserve a claim for feminism built upon its foundations,
Judith Butler has employed a revised conception of Foucault's aesthetics of
existence that continues to pay credence to the existence and influence of societal
pressures. While Butler continues to promote the development of alternative styles
of existence, she refuses to adopt the Foucaultian paradigm that demands
development of the self as a work of art in isolation from an awareness of the
socially-influenced disjunction between what is and what is not 'valued'
aestheticism. In contrast, Butler proposes development of the self through a
detailed critique of the social discourses that construct identities in particular ways,
eliminating the possibility of unconstructed choice. In developing that critique,
Butler seeks to overcome the difficulties uncovered in the Foucaultian methodology
of stylisations of existence. She seeks to do so through an incorporation into
Foucaultian frameworks of the feminist insight that certain forms of existence and
forms of embodiment are more strongly imposed upon us by power forces than
others. It is this insight that, as we have seen, has been lamentably lacking in
Foucault's own critique.
In her discussion of the concept and possibility of agency, Butler notes that within
the parameters of modernist epistemology, the poststructuralist claim that a subject
is necessarily constructed entails the assumption that it is incapable of any exercise
of free will or agency. Seeking to deconstruct this modernist dichotomy between
the constituting, agentic subject and the constituted, non-agentic subject, Butler
reiterates the poststructuralist premise that to claim that a subject is constituted is
not to claim that it is wholly determined. Rather, it is to claim that the constituted
character of the human subject is in fact a very condition of the possibility of its
agency. Challenging the modernist assertion that agency must be grounded in the
action of some prediscursive 'I', Butler has claimed that,
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"there is no self that is prior to the convergence or who maintains 'integrity' prior
to its entrance into this conflictual cultural field.,,9o
Like the Foucaultian subject characterised in preceding discussion, the subject
posited by Butler is constituted but not determined. Unlike the Foucaultian subject,
however, she exercises the remit of her agency, not by making herself into a work
of art in isolation from her social milieu, but by challenging and subverting the role
scripted for her by social imperatives. The essence of the distinction between the
two accounts therefore is this - while for Foucault, this process of original character
formation takes place in abstraction from social influence over the valuation of
aesthetics, for Butler, this same process relies upon and draws its subversive
significance from the existence and influence of such social imperatives. In
Butler's own words,
"there is no possibility of agency or reality outside of the discursive practices that
give those terms the intelligibility that they have. The task is not whether to
repeat, but how to repeat, or, indeed, to repeat, and through a radical proliferation
of gender, to displace the very gender norms that enable the repetition itself."?'
In developing a specific focus upon the role and influence of gender as a part of
personal identity within modem disciplinary frameworks, Butler's thesis applies a
considerable amount of more general poststructuralist theory. Mirroring its
recognition of the eternally constituted and socially implicated nature of all
artefacts ofhuman selfhood, Butler comments that,
"Gender ought not be construed as a stable identity or locus of agency from which
various acts follow; rather, gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time,
instituted in an exterior space through the stylised repetition of acts. The effect of
gender is produced through the stylisation of the body, and hence, must be
understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements and styles
of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self....the abiding
gendered self will then be shown to be structured by repeated acts that seek to
approximate the ideal of a substantial ground of identity, but which, in their
occasional discontinuity, reveal the temporal and contingent groundlessness of the
'ground'. ,,92
90 Butler, J. Gender Trouble, Supra. Preface, Note 20, p.145
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In her reformulation of the Foucaultian notion of subjectivization, Butler
undertakes a perception of the subject position as simultaneously a position of
potential resistance. According to Butler, subjectivization is not a causal process
resulting in a fixed identity, rather it is a practice which requires repeated
performance by the subject. Hence, gendered identity consists in the repeated
stylisation of the body and the continued repetition of normative requirements. As
explained previously, resistance remains eternally possible on this basis because in
each act of repetition is inherent the possibility of subversion and continued
subversion will result in a challenge to the demands of prescribed meanings and
behaviours.
"the agency denoted by the performativity of 'sex' will be directly counter to any
notion of a voluntarist subject who exists quite apart from the regulatory norms
which he or she opposes. The paradox of subjectivization is precisely that the
subject who would resist such norms is itself enabled, if not produced, by such
norms. Although this constitutive constraint does not foreclose the possibility of
agency, it does locate agency as a reiterative or rearticulatory practice, immanent
to power, and not a relation of external opposition to power.,,93
This conception of agency stands in opposition to the assumptions embodied in the
liberal model developed from the Kantian conception of the self discussed in the
previous chapter. The kind of agency delineated within the poststructuralist
account, being conditioned by social regimes of power and discourse, simply
cannot be accommodated within the paradigms of the voluntarist, choosing
individual of the Enlightenment. However, employing Foucaultian arguments
regarding the possibility of continued agency and resistance within the confines of
such a social constructionist account, Butler maintains an at least limited remit for a
conception of human agency and self-determination outwith the paradigms of the
autonomous, abstracted and self-legislating Kantian subject"
Like Foucault, Butler devotes detailed examination to the mechanisms of agency
and resistance inherent in the power networks of society and in the very existence
91 Butler, J. Gender Trouble, Supra. Preface, Note 20, p.148
92 Butler, J. Gender Trouble, Supra. Preface, Note 20, p.140
93 Butler, J. Bodies that Matter, Supra. Preface, Note 21, p.15
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of the constituting demands of social imperatives. However, she also recognises
the contention that arises between the poststructuralist demands of Foucault and the
feminist ethical enterprise in terms of the more specific details of the operation of
these mechanisms of agency. In so doing, Butler makes a more specifically
feminist contribution to the poststructuralist tradition, embarked upon in the hope
of remedying the deficiencies noted above within Foucault's original ethical
framework of aestheticism.
Although Butler continues to support the Foucaultian idea that human agency is
manifest in the subjective exhibition of traits which challenge existing social
requirements and categories, Butler takes Foucault to task for his failure to
recognise that any such pursuit of aestheticism continues to obtain its relevance
only through its relation to those same social categories. In contrast, Butler
develops the notion of a subversive strategy of signification which will cultivate an
ethics of self to challenge existing categories while simultaneously acknowledging
the relevance ofthose categories in giving subversive meaning to the acts of agency
thus embodied. What's more, her theory seeks to accommodate the experiential
reality, denied in Foucault's account, that certain forms of subjectivity are imposed
upon human agents more strongly than others, rendering subversive strategies
increasingly unattainable. In a context where social expectation is manufactured
through the promotion and denigration of gendered identity traits, a competent
theory of agency must recognise the phenomenon of entrenched phallocentric
power.
In seeking to accommodate these more progressive insights, however, Butler has
developed a theoretical position involving an immanent critique that opens the
gateways to different complications. Butler's development of Foucaultian
poststructuralism has the advantage of presenting more clearly the correlation of
concern between feminism and poststructuralism in regard to the role of social
94 Butler, 1. Bodies that Matter, Supra. Preface, Note 21, p. 109
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constructionism and expectation. However, Butler's concern to explicate Foucault
from the deficiencies ofhis prescriptive thesis leads to an overzealous incorporation
ofcertain less desirable aspects ofpoststructuralist critique.
Motivated by a desire to provide a more attractive version of Foucaultian
aestheticism, Butler seems to accord insufficient attention to certain of the more
subtle aspects of Foucault's critique which, as we have seen, set him apart from
other poststructuralist critics and render him a more attractive partner in feminist
dialogue. Most specifically, Butler often affords too much credence to the notion
of an inherently fragmented self privileged in the Derridean theory discussed in the
previous section. Her concern to emphasise the artificiality of notions of inherent
gendered identity provokes an anti-essentialist position that rules out of hand the
possibility of communal affiliation in any guise.
While many feminist commentators have recognised the merit of Butler's
development of Foucaultian social constructionism within the specific confines of
gender identity, many have likewise found this exposition of the inherently
fragmented human subject deeply problematic. In developing her poststructuralist
critique into a project of permanent deconstructive challenge, Butler has been
critical of those species of feminism that remain committed to some assertion of a
'situated self or of a 'doer behind the deed' because such assertions betray an
acceptance of some level of pre-discursive essentialism. However it remains the
case (at least at the level of pragmatic politics, if not at the level of metaphysical
philosophy) that there is much to commend such approaches. If we disarm
feminism of its ability to talk of a female subject, we render the pursuit of tangible
improvements to the existence of women all the more difficult. Indeed, as Assiter
comments, a morality (such as that presented by Butler) that is not underpinned by
any attachment to particular ends or virtue runs the risk of not being a morality at
all.95
95 Assiter, A. Enlightened Women - Modernist Feminism in a Postmodern Age (1996) Routledge
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A self that continually creates itself in the way that Butler's ethics of the self
demand, may find itself in a position where it is incapable of forming any
commonalities at all with others. Assiter warns that this will render the fragmented
self incapable of occupying a position from which to describe common sources of
and ways of overcoming oppression'". This has made Butler's strongly
poststructuralist theory the target for a considerable amount of feminist concern -
"Feminists must continue to address the personal costs of patriarchal domination,
through attention to developing empowering practices of self-creation, while at
the same time avoiding the tendency to reduce politics to personal
transformation.,,97
The model of agency as subversive resistance offered by Butler is useful to the
extent that it encourages feminist theory to beg questions regarding the nature of its
foundational assumptions. However, while it may present an interesting theoretical
position, it does damage to feminist political agendas. In the preface to this thesis,
we noted with approval the assertion of feminist aims established by Alison Jaggar.
Those aims which were,
"first, to articulate moral critiques of action and practices that perpetuate women's
subordination; second, to prescribe morally justifiable ways of revisiting such
actions and practices; and third, to envision morally desirable alternatives that will
promote women's emancipation't'"
embody both theoretical and political concerns equally. For the future
advancement of feminism generally, it is imperative that that balance be
maintained. In presenting a model of agency as subversive resistance, Butler's
account fails to offer sufficient consideration to the political agenda of feminism.
Most specifically, she fails to offer a convincing account of agency as anything
more than reactive and defensive.99 This limited remit for proactive agency is
96 Assiter, A. Enlightened Women, Supra. Chapter Five, Note 95, p.108
97 Gutting, G. A Cambridge Companion to Foucault, Supra. Chapter Five, Note 68, p.308
98 Jaggar, A. "Feminist Ethics" in Becker, L. & Becker, C. (ed.) Encyclopedia ofEthics, Supra. Preface,
Note 7, p.361
99 Sand1and, R. "Between 'Truth' and 'Difference' - Poststructuralism, Law and the Power of Feminism"
(1995) 3 Feminist Legal Studies 4 has made a similar critique in regard to the thesis of Carol Smart - "This,
it seems to me, is to offer a strategy of 'no resistance', one posited on the 'end of identity' but which is
unable to deal with the Here and Now, which offers no mechanism to actualise its vision. To forsake
politics for philosophy in this way is...methodologically suspect." Quoted in Bridgeman, J. & Milnes, S.
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dangerous in itself. However, when compounded with the assumption, inherent in
Butler's thesis, that the self is fragmented and incapable of meaningful
collaboration with others, the danger is augmented. Cumulatively, this leaves
feminist political agendas without any capacity for strategic group affiliations. This
is particularly lamentable given that most of the major feminist political successes
in previous decades have been the result of the development of strategic
communities of communal concern and experience.l'"
Building upon the Foucaultian assertion that resistance is a necessarily localised
phenomenon, Butler has done nothing to counter the implication flowing from this
that as soon as resistance receives official recognition, it becomes caught up in a
network of controlling power relations.l'" Even if it were possible, then, for the
fragmented self of Butler's thesis to develop a means for group affiliation and
community, such affiliation is contra-indicated by the very assumptions of her
model of agency. To be effective, it seems that agency as resistance can only
operate at the particular and individual level. However, in real terms the individual
locus of this radical fragmentalism and subversive dislocation requires an implicit
replication of the artificial idea of the abstract individualism that has been
vociferously criticised by feminist critique of the Kantian subject. By developing a
theory of resistance that demands a fundamentally individualist approach, Butler's
prescriptive thesis inadvertently provides a remit for the reinsertion of the
dislocated and atomistic agentic subject within ethical theory. The deficiencies
inherent in that form of subjectivity have been well-established throughout
preceding critique. Feminist political methodology has long-since stressed the need
for 'asking the woman question,102 to illustrate the shared nature of certain power
forces and to convene a community of challenge. Whether that challenge takes the
(ed.) Feminist Perspectives on Law - Law's Engagement with the Female Body (1998) Sweet & Maxwell,
p.99
100 Willis, E. "Comment" in Grossberg, L. & Nelson, C. (ed.) Marxism and the Interpretation ofCulture
(1988) MacMillan Press, p. 118
101 Harstock, N. "Focault on Power" in Nicholson, L. (ed.) Feminism / Postmodernism, Supra. Chapter
Four, Note 58
102 Bartlett, K. "Feminist Legal Methods", Supra. Chapter Five, Note 85
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form of transcendence or subversion, it remains crucial to feminist theorising that
that challenge be available on the very kind of communal forum implicitly denied
by Butler's Foucaultian recapitulation.
In this respect a potentially more prormsmg feminist account of Foucaultian
theorising has been initiated in the work of Donna Harraway. Like Butler,
Harraway challenges the unitary self of liberal theory and advocates its replacement
with a 'split and contradictory' self.103 Also similarly to Butler, Harraway
concludes that "subjectivity is multidimensional...The knowing self is partial in all
its guises, never finished, whole, simply there and original." However unlike
Butler, Harraway's thesis goes on to comment that this subjectivity is "always
constructed, situated together imperfectly and therefore able to join with another, to
see together without claiming to be another.,,104 Harraway is keen to critique the
Kantian subject without making the assertion (often identified in certain
poststructuralist accounts) that the very notion of subjectivity itself is fictitious.
Linked to this, and ofparticular relevance in terms of feminist political concerns, is
the fact that the subject postulated by Harraway avoids the deficiencies of
essentialism while also retaining the capacity to join together with other 'situated'
selves to form a strategic collective. lOS Where the denunciation of essentialism and
universalism in Butler's theory implies a necessary denunciation of any kind of
unity between disparate selves, Harraway's thesis has the advantage of illustrating
that unity is still possible without employing essentialist assumptions. We do not
need to be united by any inherent 'nature', 'essence' or 'identity' to be successfully
united politically. On the contrary, a strategic collaboration formed on the basis of
a common desire to achieve a particular end is sufficient. The self developed in
Harraway's theory permits this realisation and permits the kind of strategic
103 Harraway, D. "Situated Knowledges" (1988) 14 Feminist Studies 575. See also Harraway, D. "A
Cyborg Manifesto" in Simians, Cyborgs and Women (1991) Routledge
104Harraway, D. "Situated Knowledges", Supra. Chapter Five, Note 103, p. 586
105 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p. 100
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association that Butler's theory would have considered counter-productive to the
pursuit of agency as subversive resistance.
While this aspect of Harraway's thesis presents a promising alternative to the thesis
of Butler developed within the confines of this chapter, it must also be noted that
problems abound regarding other aspects of Harraway's 'cyborgian' thesis.
Although discussion of these difficulties lies outwith the scope of our current
critique, their existence continues to provoke concern. While the argument has
been made here that Butler would do well to reconsider an approach to group
affiliation and politics more in keeping with that of Harraway, this is not, however,
to suggest that Harraway's thesis necessarily presents a better overall account of
selfhood and agency.i'"
"Rather than emphasizing autonomy as continual self-creation and re-creation, I
would emphasise autonomy as continual commitment to re-evaluating one's
desires and values, in the light of critical interaction with others. Political action
is based not on a shared identity, but on a critical adherence to shared values and
beliefs - on the notion of a community of individuals sharing ends in
common.,,107
It is a recognised facet of feminist theory that the individualist, abstracted subject
presents an inappropriate model of subjectivity. However, the recognition of an
inherent degree of 'situatedness' and context in human identity fashioning does not
lead all feminists to the extreme anti-essentialist position advocated by Butler.
Although there is a great deal in Butler's (and indeed Foucault's) work which
commends it to the overall feminist enterprise, we must remain eternally aware that
feminism is not merely an abstract philosophical tradition, but also a political
movement with pragmatic concerns and tangible interests to protect. Feminists
should retain an element of caution in their clamour towards the wholesale adoption
of Butler's philosophical pretensions. We can accept the importance attributed to
the poststructuralist examination of the interplay and influence of social forces
106 Hekmans, S. Moral Voices, MoralSelves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p. 100-1
107 Assiter, A. Enlightened Women, Supra. Chapter Five, Note 95, p. 109
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upon character formation without stretching this to its logical limits. As McNay
comments, "although there is a need for feminist theory to develop analytical tools
to deal more adequately with the category of difference, in the final analysis the
basic idea of a postmodern feminism is unviable,,108 because at some basic level,
feminist critique necessarily rests on certain normative judgements about what
constitutes legitimate and illegitimate forms of action in the overcoming of female
subordination.
We can accept Butler's assertion that human subjectivity is neither wholly
constituting nor wholly constituted without necessarily divesting ourselves of the
notion of the 'situated self which many other species of feminist theory have found
of considerable pragmatic and epistemological merit. Butler has argued that the
notion of the 'situated self is inadequate because it continues to betray too strong a
reliance upon the idea that the existence of some pre-discursive core of subjectivity
can be ordained. While strongly sceptical of the autonomous self of the
Enlightenment, postmodern feminist commentator Patricia Waugh expresses
similar scepticism in regard to the fragmented self supported by such permutations
of the Foucaultian thesis. Waugh suggests that both conceptions of the self are
representative of the same cultural tradition.i'" Hence, despite her claims to the
contrary, Butler is privy to the blackmail of Enlightenment by seeking too
strenuous a distinction between the pre-discursive humanist self and the critically
constituted and fragmented self. As Waugh explains, where the Enlightenment self
is a transcendent rationality that makes an artificial split from the emotional, the
poststructuralist schizophrenic self is the fin de siecle parody of that dualism.i'"
Neither representation of subjectivity, then, presents an altogether liberated or
alternative conception appropriate to the ends of feminist theory and practice.
While it is certainly true that "powerlessness comes from the very attempt to define
108 McNay, L. Foucault and Feminism, Supra. Chapter One, Note 85, p. 117
109 Waugh, P. Postmodernism - A Reader (1992) Hodder & Stoughton
110 Waugh, P. Postmodernism -A Reader, Supra. Chapter Five, Note 109, p.199
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a collective identity instead of defining the common interests of a diverse group of
people,"111it is equally true that powerlessness also comes from the failure,
manifest in Butler's thesis, to provide for the articulation of such common interests
amongst diverse groups. When agency requires subversive and strategic self-
formation above all else, the capacity for meaningful group affiliation is lost
because each self becomes radically fragmented and contingent. Feminist
insistence upon the relational nature of identity has, and should, emphasise the need
to move away from the preservation of enforced and artificial universal identities.
However, that insistence must also be capable ofmoving towards the exploration of
different forms of coalition between diverse groups with the ultimate aim of
achieving greater social justice.
It seems then that despite the improvements rendered to Foucaultian theory in terms
of its compatibility with feminism by Butler's reformulation, in the final analysis
certain fundamental inadequacies remain unaltered. Perhaps most significantly,
Butler's emphatic insistence upon radically fragmented and localised forms of
resistance has perpetuated the Foucaultian tendency to analyse power relations only
from the perspective of how they are installed in social institutions, and not in any
experiential way from the point of view of those who are subject to power.112 This
proves particularly damaging to the feminist political project because to address
meaningfully women's freedom, one must look at both external and internal
impediments to the exercise of choice.113
What Foucault and Butler fail to do, but what feminism must do, is look closely and
critically at the issue of freedom where it concerns responses to perceived structural
inequality and violence. At points where Foucault's theory is premised upon his
assumption that violence and power are different phenomenon (as it implicitly is in
some respects of his thesis on stylisations of the self), feminism must draw
III Sawacki, J. "Identity Politics and Sexual Freedom" in Diamond, 1. & Quinby, L. (ed.) Feminism and
Foucault, Supra. Chapter One, Note 30, p. 187
ll2 McNay, L. "The Foucauldian Body and the Exclusion of Experience" (1991) 6 Hypatia 125,134
113 Deveaux, M. "Feminism and Empowerment", Supra. Chapter Five, Note 48, p. 224
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attention not only to the experiential inadequacies of that position, but also to the
common transformation ofpower into violence and vice versa.114
Conclusion
"It would be a mistake to jettison appeals to identity and confessional truth telling
in slavish devotion to Foucault's skepticism. His discourses also bear the traces of
his own social and historical locations as a white male theorist. ..But it would also
be a mistake to assume uncritically feminist political theories and practices
developed in the context ofpatriarchal capitalism.,,115
Although in the final analysis, an exclusive focus upon poststructuralist foundations
has proven insufficient for feminist purposes, this is not to say that feminism has
nothing to gain from the strategic incorporation of poststructuralist insight. Both
the 'strong' poststructuralist thesis of Derrida, and the poststructuralist thesis of
Foucault developed in detail in this chapter have problematised our uncritical
acceptance of the validity of Enlightenment visions of human subjectivity in a way
which we have seen in Chapter Four is to be welcomed by the feminist academy.
Where Derrida has sought to challenge the foundations of knowledge and agency,
Foucault's thesis has been potentially more welcoming to the maintenance of these
categories of humanist ontology, subject to the condition of their reformulation
outwith the demands of Enlightenment rationality. Both manifestations of the
poststructuralist genre have employed insights of semiotics, hermeneutics and
psychoanalysis to question the legitimacy of the liberal notion of the atomistic,
abstracted, and transcendental human subject that has proven problematic and
counter-intuitive. Both manifestations have in their turn abandoned this conception
in favour of a vision of the self essentially constructed by the interplay of linguistic
meaning and symbolic interpretations that characterise the social contexts and
networks in which social agents find themselves enmeshed.
114Plaza, M. "Our Damages and Their Compensation" (1981) 1 Feminist Issues 25
115 Sawacki, J. Disciplining Foucault, Supra. Chapter One, Note 39, p. 108
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Admittedly, translation of this notion of the 'radically situated self within the
epistemological parameters of the 'strong' poststructuralist thesis has proven
somewhat problematic. The reluctance of Derridean followers to posit alternative
visions ofknowledge and existence have led this species of theory into theoretically
difficult ground - deprived of any conception ofhuman agency, or even of a human
capacity for extended self-awareness, this perception of the self has become
essentially fragmented. When coupled with the Derridean tendency to equate
constructionism with an elaborate 'play' of meaning, this presents a form of
critique incapable of accommodating feminist concerns in any experientially or
politically viable way.
Incorporation of the notion of the radically situated self within the Foucaultian
poststructuralist thesis, on the other hand, has proven far less jarring. Recognising
the inherently socially-determined, complex and contingent nature of the human
self, Foucault has advocated a revival of classic Greek ethics with their emphasis
upon techniques of the self. This will replace the Christian ethics of the post-
Enlightenment epoch whose primary concern has been with deference of the
subject to normative categories.
Development of these techniques of the self would encourage a deeper
understanding of the self than that afforded by the abstracted construct of the
Kantian subject. Operating eternally within the confines of ever-changing regimes
of power and demands for normalisation, the Foucaultian self is afforded a limited
arena within which to challenge categories of meaning and identity. This can be
contrasted against the highly artificial conception of agency privileged within the
Kantian thesis. Where this artificial conception (prioritised today in liberal
frameworks of consent) assumes an unlimited remit of self-determined and
unfettered autonomy, the Foucaultian conception accepts and draws attention to the
eternal limitations imposed upon the operation of consent by pre-existing networks
of omnipotent power forces.
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Foucault's techniques of the self have been heralded by many feminist
commentators as containing the methodological seeds that will enable moral theory
not only to give credence to the socially-situated and socially-constructed nature of
human subjectivity, but also to admit of the possibility of exercising a level of
subversive control over the social contexts which determine that subjectivity.
Hence, the Foucaultian self becomes perceived as occupying the epistemological
middle ground between a conception of the transcendental, isolated human subject
(of Kant) and a conception of the inescapably socially constructed and fragmented
self (of Derrida).
However, it seems that more is required from a feminist theory of the self than a
simple matter of occupation in the terrain of compromise. Although Foucault's
thesis lends feminism important methodological tools of critique that nonetheless
enable the preservation of some limited conception of agency, his own prescriptive
thesis remains inadequate. A thinker obsessed with power regimes, having failed to
problematise the gender-specific power dynamics that operate in the valuation of
aestheticism, he renders his own thesis unconvincing, certainly for feminist
purposes.
Although in many respects Butler presents a convincing re-formulation of the
Foucaultian approach to aesthetics, her more fundamentally subversive approach
casts up significant obstacles to the achievement of certain important political aims.
As an essentially political movement, feminism must remain wary of any ethical
theory of the self that demands fragmentation and dislocation as its primary
mechanism of reform. Most specifically, it must exercise caution in its advocation
of any theoretical position that implicitly denounces group affiliation as being
counter-productive to the pursuit of agency. A reformulation of agency that
demands such high levels of individual abstraction and inter-personal isolation
ought to be approached with cynicism by feminist commentators concerned to
eradicate the transcendent individualism isolated within the Kantian position.
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"While Foucault does not have all the answers for contemporary feminism, his
ethical work signals some of the political routes feminists might consider in an
attempt to reconfigure the links between the subject and politics.,,116
While it may be wise to borrow from poststructuralist critique, the truly wise
feminist will do so only selectively. While the challenge to the Kantian
transcendental subject lodged within the confines of this chapter offers many
important insights and methodologies to those feminist theorists concerned with a
similar challenge, the subversive fragmentation of its final form presents a less
attractive political vision. In the following chapter, we will examine alternative
feminist attempts to redirect the notion of the 'situated self in ways which do not
fall prey to the pragmatic deficiencies of the poststructuralist gendered self. In the
final analysis, it could be argued that this is exactly what a truly Foucaultian
feminism would require - that we conform to doctrinal categories which fit our
pragmatic ends and move beyond the limitations of those categories when they no
longer meet those ends.117 We take from the poststructuralist account the relevant
insights in regard to the inherently artificial nature of the Kantian constituting self,
but we move beyond the paradigms of the fragmented self in pursuit of a practical
feminist politics that will satisfy pragmatic ends.
116 Lloyd, M. "A Feminist Mapping of Foucauldian Politics" in Hekman, S. Feminist Interpretations of
Michel Foucault, Supra. Chapter One, Note 43, p.260
117 Sawacki, 1. Disciplining Foucault, Supra. Chapter One, Note 39, p. 109
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CHAPTER SIX
COMMUNITARIANISM AND FEMINISM
"Politically, the idea of communitarianism evokes a transcendence of the liberal
legal emphasis on individual rights as the basic units of both constitutional
entitlement and legal reasoning, and promises to reconceive legal justice and
equality in terms which reach beyond the formalism of liberal individualism to a
recognition, and even realisation, of alternative goals and values - the assertion of
collective over individual interests, of reintegration over exclusion, and the
pursuit of empathy, solidarity, reciprocity and care - within legal practice."!
As part of the progressive development of twentieth century thought towards
critique of the tenacious hold of Kantian Enlightenment rationality, an alternative
philosophical thesis has been produced which can broadly be categorised as
'communitarian'. In many respects, the communitarian philosophical position is
not dissimilar to that of poststructuralism discussed in the preceding chapter.
Communitarianism, like poststructuralism, has been concerned to highlight the
inadequacies of the construction of the neo-Kantian, liberal subject as essentially
individualist, atomistic and abstracted from all social, cultural and environmental
contingencies. What's more, both approaches have developed their critique of the
transcendental Kantian subject in terms that present it as a fictitious entity' and that
propose its replacement with a more experientially appropriate account of the
human self as firmly embedded within, and constructed and constrained by, its
membership of specific human associations, relationships and communities. There
are some fundamental differences, however, between the communitarian and the
poststructuralist position. While most of these differences will become more
apparent as we proceed with our discussion of the communitarian critique, it is
perhaps worth noting at the outset that one important point of divergence between
communitarian and poststructuralist theory lies in the ability of the former theory to
I Lacey, N. Unspeakable Subjects, Supra. Preface, Note 2, p.144
2 For Example, MacIntyre, A. "Community, Law and The Idiom and Rhetoric ofRights" (1991) 26
Listening 104 - "The individual qua individual, to be conceived apart from and independently of, whatever
social roles she or he may occupy, or whatever social relationships he or she may find him or heself in, is of
course a distinctive member of the dramatis personae of emerging modernity"
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accommodate the political role of the communal in a way that, as we have seen, is
not easily available to many poststructuralist commentators.
The Communitarian Critique ofSubjectivity
The most fundamental assertion of communitarian ethics is that, contra the
implications of the individualistic notions of human subjectivity suggested by the
Kantian thesis, human beings are essentially, and primarily, social beings. Not only
are our aims, desires and preferences inextricably linked to the networks of
relationships which constitute the communities to which we belong, but so too are
our very identities as human agents.' Recognition of this epistemological premise
has led communitarians (such as Alasdair Macintyre" and Michael Sandel") to
challenge liberalism's continued deference to an Enlightenment assumption of a
'disembodied' and 'disembedded' conception of the self. Most specifically, Sandel
challenges the liberal tendency, which this perception encourages, to privilege the
concerns of abstract justice between disconnected individuals at the expense of an
interest in the achievement of collective values. 6
Amongst the most common liberal retorts to such criticism has been to suggest that
the embodied and socially-situated perception of the self posited by communitarian
theory encounters significant problems in terms of its fragmented and determined
nature. In practice, it is alleged that this results in a conception of selfhood that
offers little room for the concepts of agency, will and subjectivity which are
essential not only to the liberal political vision, but also to the political vision of
many groups with whom communitarianism seeks allegiance (such as feminism),"
We have seen in our preceding discussion of the 'strong' poststructuralist thesis of
Derrida that too vehement a conviction in favour of the socially determined and
3 Lacey, N. Unspeakable Subjects, Supra. Preface, Note 2, p. 54
4 Maclntrye, A. After Virtue & Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 52
5 Sandel, M. Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 44
6 Sandel, M. Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice, Supra.Chapter Four, Note 44. Discussed in Lacey, N.
Unspeakable Subjects, Supra. Preface, Note 2, p. 55
7 Lacey, N. Unspeakable Subjects, Supra. Preface, Note 2, p. 55
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inherently contradictory development of the self can indeed lead to such theoretical
difficulties. 8 Even those commentators in favour of a communitarian ethic have, at
times, recognised the potentiality for communitarianism to encounter similar
difficulties. Nicola Lacey, for example, has noted that
"in escaping the implausibility and exclusions of the liberal concept of the
atomistic subject identified in terms of pre-social characteristics, some
communitarians seem to move towards a radically situated conception of
subjectivity in which the person is simply engulfed or determined by her social
and bodily context. To do so is to abandon altogether the idea of critical
reflexivity which must be necessary to any radical political consciousness.t'"
However, to suggest that this liberal counter highlights an arena of potential
concern for communitarian theory is not to imply that it therefore strikes a final
blow to its claims. On the contrary, our discussion of Foucault's prescriptive thesis
in the preceding chapter has established that alternative forms of subjectivity can be
devised that continue to permit a remit for the exercise of agency, albeit a remit
hitherto unrecognised within the frameworks of pervasive Enlightenment
perceptions. Whether or not we stand convinced by the prescriptive claims that
Foucault makes in this regard, it remains the case that his arguments present a
powerful critique of the 'blackmail' exhibited in the liberal presupposition that
agency exercised by a non-self-determining human subject is not valid agency at
all. The requirement of a self-determining and transcendental 'doer behind the
deed' is a fiction of liberal theory that, as we have seen, says more about the
entrenched nature of such theory than it does about the legitimacy of its forms of
agency. The communitarian position to be developed over this chapter does not
deny the possibility of agency in the way that the liberal counter suggests. On the
contrary, it seeks a redefinition of our conceptions of agency to incorporate the
experiential realities of social living that have been denied by the rigidly abstract
Kantian form. The concerns voiced by Lacey in the quote above do not imply the
impossibility of achieving a model of agency within communitarian frameworks.
Rather, they simply express the need for caution to avoid taking the communitarian
8 See Discussion in Chapter Five relating to Derrida and strict deconstructionism
9 Lacey, N. Unspeakable Subjects, Supra. Preface, Note 2, p.139
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model of subjectivity to an antithetical extreme that would effectively encourage
the polarities that have dominated many previous attempts to determine an anti-
liberal position.
Developing this defensive position further, Sandel has voiced the communitarian
thesis that recognition of the fact that humans are socially constituted does not
entail the non-reversibility of human ends and attachments in the way that the
liberal counter suggests." Where liberalism takes the individual and his / her
interests as their point of theoretical departure and develops from this premise a
framework for the satisfaction of communal needs and wants, communitarianism
requires a logical deduction in the opposite direction. On the premise that human
beings are necessarily social beings, it becomes apparent that even the most basic
provisions valued by liberalism can only be achieved within a social context.
Hence, it becomes apparent that the social structures and collective provisions of
human society represent, if not the most appropriate starting point for theoretical
deliberation, at least a starting point equally as legitimate as the liberal emphasis on
individual personhood. I I Nicola Lacey explains this position most lucidly in her
book, Unspeakable Subjects. Throughout this work, Lacey has
"argued for a proper recognition of the social location of the individual of the
ways in which our communal ties and affective attachments, along with our
cultural history, our geographic location, and so on, fundamentally affect what we
are like, our sense of our selves, who we are. Such recognition dictates that
political theory give a greater emphasis than has been the case with modem
liberal theory to social context, social institutions, communities and cultures. This
is not to say that our sense of ourselves as distinct and autonomous should not
have an important place: clearly, it should. But the recognition that what is good
for persons can only be fostered in social contexts must render those contexts at
least as important a focus for political theory as the rights, interests and claims of
the individual. The liberal ideal is that of persons living autonomous, choosing
lives, pursuing their conceptions of the good. This carries with it, implicitly, a
conception of political society and public culture, and this must have more
priority in political theory than most liberals have been willing to give to it.,,12
10 Sandel, M. Liberalism and the Limits ajJustice, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 44. Discussed in Lacey, N.
Unspeakable Subjects, Supra. Preface, Note 2, p. 55
11 Lacey, N. Unspeakable Subjects, Supra. Preface, Note 2, pp. 55-6
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Incorporation of such an increased recognition of the primacy of the social would
permit inclusion into political theory of the considerations of social context that
influence individual and collective judgement. This in turn would have a profound
effect in illustrating the inappropriate nature of assumptions about the possibility of
obtaining the detached, observer status implicit in transcendent, atomistic
conceptions of the self and its forms of agency because,
"in such a conversation of moral justification as envisaged by communitarian
ethics, individuals do not have to view themselves as 'unencumbered' selves. It is
not necessary for them to define themselves independently either of the ends they
cherish or of the constitutive attachments which make them what they are.,,13
In terms ofthe project of this thesis, the significance of that communitarian insight
upon the frameworks and assumptions that inform the model of legal consent are
considerable. Most importantly, recognition of the communitarian contention that
decisions are made and consent given or refused on the basis of a complex calculus
involving relational and contextual factors framed by one's communal associations
offers a mechanism for theoretical challenge to the assumptions of abstraction and
individualism that dominate current interpretations of consent.
While all genres of communitarian critique are united by a common concern' to
dislodge the legacy ofliberal individualism in favour ofwhat is considered to be an
enriched conception of the role of the communal, disparate theorists within the
tradition have employed differing approaches to this challenge. The impetus for
such divergence can be located in the differing ways in which communitarian
theory has sought to deal with the notion of community itself. Employing the
framework and terminology utilised by Hekman in her discussion of
communitarianism, this work will argue that there are two basic conceptions of
community that inform the work of those disparate theorists united under the
common header of communitarianism. These have been referred to as firstly the
'dialectical' account of community, and secondly the 'premodern' account.i" As
12 Lacey, N. Unspeakable Subjects, Supra. Preface, Note 2, p.67
13 Benhabib, S. Situating the Self, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 22, p.73
14 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p. 58
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we proceed over the duration of this chapter to examine the merits and demerits of
each conception, the differences between the two will become more apparent.
Dialectical Communitarianism
One of the most observable characteristics of the dialectical genre of
communitarian theory lies in the tendency for its advocates to seek a terrain of
compromise in their prescriptive theses. United with premodern communitarianism
in their critique of the abstract and atomistic liberal individual, the dialectical genre
diverges from the premodern in terms of the proposals for improvement that are
suggested. While, as we shall see, premodern theorists tend to require a radical
effacement of liberal perceptions, dialectical theorists call for the inclusion of
communal concerns within pre-existing frameworks. In seeking a terrain of
compromise between abstract individualism and communal constructionism,
dialectical theorists have largely sought to retain at least some allegiance to the
notion of a 'core self that is inherent in the Kantian notion of transcendence
discussed in Chapter Four. While this moderate vision presents itself as
superficially attractive, certain difficulties inherent in the delineation of
compromise have rendered dialectical communitarianism the subject of substantial
critique.
One of the key texts within this dialectical communitarian tradition is Michael
Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice. IS This text provides critique of the
attempt made by Rawls l 6 to reformulate a concept of the liberal subject in a form
that avoids the inadequacies and incoherencies that have increasingly become
associated with the inherited Kantian proposition. The Rawlsian thesis seeks the
middle ground between the Kantian conception of the radically disembodied
subject on the one hand,17 and the poststructuralist notion of the radically situated
15 Sandel, M. Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 44
16 Rawls, J. A Theory ofJustice, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 35
17 See Discussion in Chapter Four, "Who is the Subject of Enlightenment?" and "Feminist Concerns about
the Legal Subject"
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subject on the other." From the outset, however, Sandel asserts that this project is
doomed to failure because central to Rawls' theory continues to be the
presupposition that human beings are distinct individuals first, and only
subsequently do we form relationships with, and attachments to, others (or in
Rawlsian terminology, subjects are 'antecedently individuated'j.'" Despite Rawls'
disclaimers in regard to the Kantian subject, then, it seems that they bear many
similarities - both the Rawlsian and Kantian self are deemed to be beyond
experience, with community never being recognised as fulfilling a role as a
constituent element in that selfs character formation.
According to Sandel this presents a particular difficulty for Rawlsian theory from
which other social contract theorists (like Hobbes and Locke2o) have remained
immune.i' The model of justice essential to the Rawlsian thesis (namely
distributive justice) requires the very constituent concept of community that his
notion of subjectivity effectively precludes and undermines. Against the Rawlsian
subject, Sandel proposes what he terms a 'wider subject', which is marked by a
constitutive community, a common vocabulary of discourse and a background of
implicit practices and understandings. In opposition to the Rawlsian idea of the
'antecedently individuated' human agent, Sandel puts forward the paradigmatic
communitarian proposition that the relationships we form with others (through
family, community, nation, etc.) are both definitive and constitutive of human
subjectivity.
We have noted above that Sandel, taking on board the cautionary concerns voiced
by Lacey, is keen to avoid the tendency for this notion of the socially constituted
subject to dissolve the legitimacy and possibility of the concept of human agency.
From the outset then, Sandel rejects the notion of the wholly socially conditioned
18 See Discussion in Chapter Five, specifically in relation to Derrida and Butler
19 Sandel, M., Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 44, p. 53
20 Hobbes, T. The Leviathan, Supra. Preface, Note 4
Locke, J. Two Treatises on Government, Supra. Preface, Note 4
21 Sandel, M. Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 44, p. 153-60
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and fragmented subject as epistemologically incoherent. Furthermore, he informs
his reader that collapsing the distinction between self and situation obviates the
possibility of a coherent concept of the subject.r' In so doing, however, Sandel
positions himself within a long tradition of philosophical thought (traditional and
alternative) that has implicitly accepted the entrenched dichotomy between the
disembodied and the radically socially constituted subject" We have seen in our
previous discussion of the 'blackmail of the Enlightenment" that such dichotomies
have systematically stifled the possibility of more meaningful critique and have
encouraged a polarisation of those 'for' the Enlightenment and all its liberal values
and those radicals who stand 'against' the Enlightenment. While Sandel's
intentions in making the assertion that his 'wider self does not preclude the
possibility of agency are well-meant, his methodology is flawed. His desire to
maintain some allegiance with the model of agency framed by prevailing liberal
presuppositions renders his thesis a less than satisfactory compromise between the
two competing conceptions of the self. As we shall see, any such compromise is
faced with substantial adversity because its very existence is premised upon the
polarities that it professes to transcend.
In delineating this terrain of compromise, Sandel displays the classic formulation of
the dialectical account of community and its insistence upon the need to augment
liberal individualism with the inclusion of communal concerns without
destabilising the idea of a definite and determinate self. By positing the existence
of a subject that is only partially constituted by its immersion within communal
relationships, Sandel proposes that the subject would retain a 'core self that,
although partially socially constituted, is not radically situated. This continued
assertion of some element of 'core self enables Sandel to stand by his thesis on the
need for any theory of subjectivity to accommodate the possibility of self-reflection
in a way that the Rawlsian thesis fails to do. While this criticism of the Rawlsian
22 Sandel, M. Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 44, p. 16 & 20
23 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p. 52
24 See Discussion of the 'blackmail of the Enlightenment' in Foucault's treatment of Kant in Chapters Four
and Five.
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thesis may be well-founded, Sandel's reluctance to abandon altogether the notion of
some pre-existing 'core self' provides a superficial allegiance to the Enlightenment
claims about a transcendent and self-determining subject that the communitarian
critique has generally sought to undermine. Restricted by his desire to delineate a
remit for the exercise of agency along the lines dictated by the liberal model of self-
determination, Sandel is forced to make a concession to the notion of pre-existing
selfhood that undermines his communitarian intentions.
Seeking to justify that concession, Sandel argues that if agency is to consist in
something more than the exercise of efficient administration (which he ultimately
attributes to the Rawlsian self), we must be capable of a deeper level of
introspection than that implied by the 'direct self-knowledge' of immediate wants
and desires which have been privileged in accounts of the radically constituted self
discussed in the preceding chapter. However, we likewise cannot simply be wholly
unencumbered subjects of possession, individuated in advance and prior to our
given ends as the Kantian thesis implies. Accordingly, we must be subjects
constituted in part by a pre-existing 'core' and in part by our aspirations and
attachments. Where aspects of subjectivity are determined by constitutive
aspirations and attachments, we comprehend a wider subject than the individual
alone (be it the family, tribe, class or nation). To this extent these aspirations and
attachments define a community in the constitutive sense. The existence of such a
community is marked not merely by a spirit of benevolence, nor by the prevalence
of communitarian values, nor even by the existence of shared 'final ends' alone, but
by a common vocabulary of discourse and a background of implicit practices and
understandings.
Where the deontological rationalism attributable to Kant and Rawls insists upon our
conceiving of ourselves as thoroughly independent, Sandel proposes that we cannot
regard ourselves in this light without undermining the loyalties and convictions
whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them represents an
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intrinsic element of personal identity. In recognition of this paradox, Sandel
concludes that the imagining of a person incapable of constitutive attachments
results not in the conception of an ideally free and rational agent, as Kant and
Rawls would argue, but in the construction of an artificial and hollow subjectivity
wholly devoid of character and moral depth.
Contrary then to the dominant tradition of interpretation of the liberal humanist self,
Sandel argues that this transcendental vision actually fails to accommodate the
demands which liberalism makes of the value of autonomy. While the
incorporation of constitutive attachments may at first appear to present an obstacle
to the realisation of human agency, Sandel argues that incorporation of such
attachments along the limited remit dictated by the 'wider self actually enables the
reliance upon a relative fixity of character which is essential to the prevention of
the lapse into arbitrariness of which the transcendental self is frequently guilty."
Hence, Sandel seeks to justify his part-essentialist, part-constitutive conception of
subjectivity by claiming that in reality it presents a more appropriate embodiment
for the liberal model of autonomy and agency. Challenging the Kantian and
Rawlsian notion that the truly autonomous self is one divested of aspirations and
attachments, Sandel presents a convincing argument in favour of the incorporation
ofcertain elements of context and connection.
However, his failure to challenge the liberal notion of agency itself has rendered
Sandel a target for subsequent critique by many other communitarian
commentators. In seeking a mode of subjectivity that he feels better accommodates
the requirements of liberal perceptions of autonomy, it seems that, despite his
assertions, Sandel has conceded too much to the accompanying liberal conception
of the self. While Sandel has succeeded in presenting a convincing case for the
incorporation of some element of context into the notion of selfhood, his strong
allegiance to the existence of a 'core self has relegated those contextual factors as
25 Sandel, M. Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 44, p. 180
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subsidiary to the constitution of a primarily pre-determined subject. For many
commentators, this result is highly unsatisfactory."
A number of other related problems have been identified in Sandel's thesis."
Perhaps the most fundamental of these has pertained to his seemingly uncritical
acceptance of the entirely socially conditioned subject as an incoherent entity
primarily because of its lack of what he considers to be a 'true self.28 Without
providing any examination of the dichotomy that defines the gap between
constituting and constituted selves, and without any indication as to the components
of the 'true self (specifically its relationship to the transcendent self), Sandel's
theory becomes in many respects somewhat hollow. In his attempts to defend the
possibility and legitimacy of humanist notions of agency, etc. outwith the
paradigms of Enlightenment rationality, it may well be the case that Sandel has
conceded too much ofhis original communitarian ethic.
These criticisms are not, however, exclusively applicable to Sandel. In the
foregoing, we have used the work of Sandel to present an illustrative example of
the dialectical model of community. The criticisms lodged at Sandel's thesis can
likewise be lodged at many of the other dialectical theorists who have, like Sandel,
sought to satisfy the communitarian critique of the liberal individual through a
search for compromise between individualism and communality. One such theorist
is Charles Taylor.29 In seeking to avoid the polarities that have structured the
debate between the individualism of modernity and the communal concerns of
communitarianism, Taylor has explicitly demonstrated his allegiances by
developing a notion of a 'dialectical' conception of community within which
individuality and communality are intertwined. By implication, this suggests the
existence of a self that is also dialectical, reconciling the tensions between the
individual and the social self through inhabiting these communities.
26 See, for example, subsequent discussion of MacIntyre in this Chapter
27 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p. 53
28 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p. 53
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Recognising the shortcomings of Sandel's attempt at a compromise between the
disembodied transcendent self of Kant and the radically situated self of
constructionism, Taylor claims to be offering a more sophisticated version of the
dialectical account. Despite the more subtle form of his dialectical analysis,
however, Taylor's thesis likewise falls prey to the inadequacies that have been
isolated above in relation to Sandel. In Taylor's case, the difficulty centres around
the fact that his means of resolution is actually predicated on the existence of a
dichotomy between individual autonomy and communality that it never seeks to
challenge. Taylor's recognition that, as in any dichotomy, the one pole cannot exist
without the other because they are defined in opposition to one another.i'' is of
notable value and supports the criticisms lodged previously at Sandel's thesis.
However, Taylor fails to recognise that attempting a dialectical interaction between
these two forms of polarised discourse does nothing in real terms to alleviate the
polarity upon which the existence of these poles are premised, and nor does it make
any contribution towards the forging of a discourse which will displace that
polarity. The significance of this oversight has been noted previously in our
discussion of the difficulties faced by any theory of selfhood that fails, in this way,
to transcend meaningfully the dichotomous frameworks ofrationalistic thought.
The dialectical account of community that inhabits the theory of both Sandel and
Taylor insists upon a resolution of conflict between the opposing sides of the
metaphysical debate. Whether that resolution is framed in terms of a compromise
or a polarised dialectical interface, the fact remains that such approaches fail to
challenge the foundations of their theory sufficiently. Both the theory of Sandel
and the theory of Taylor are predicated upon the existence of a dichotomy between
the constituted and the constituting self. While their attempts at resolution may
seem attractive, they are only superficially so because at a deeper level, they fail to
offer any substantial challenge to the existence of this dichotomy itself. This
oversight proves fatal to any communitarian account because it demonstrates a
29 Taylor, C. Sources ofthe Self-The Making ofthe Modern Identity (1989) Harvard University Press
30 Taylor, C. Sources ofthe Self, Supra. Chapter Six, Note 29, p. 36
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fundamental inability to challenge the modernist presuppositions and dichotomous
frameworks that have proven so integral to the maintenance of the primacy of the
liberal individual in ethical and legal theory. The dialectical account offered up by
Sandel and Taylor leaves us in the final analysis only with a concept of the 'wider
self that retains the definitive aspects of the modernist self (i.e. its exclusionary
claims to agency and self-knowledge). This has, however, proven insufficient to
the purposes of many communitarian critiques. Increasingly, therefore, attention
has turned towards the second genre of theory mentioned above, namely the
premodern.
Premodern Communitarianism
One of the most prominent advocates of the premodern communitarian position has
been Alasdair MacIntyre. In his most influential works, After Virtue and Whose
Justice? Which Rationalityi'." MacIntyre has criticised the ethical discourse which
has been characteristic of modem thought. Most crucially, he is critical of the
conception of the self on which it rests. Placing strenuous reliance upon the
tradition of virtue ethics originating in the work of Aristotle, MacIntyre seeks to
replace this individualist, modernist self with a premodern conception of the
'narrative self. Unlike the dialectical approach, MacIntyre's premodern thesis
seeks a more fundamental challenge to prevailing liberal dogmas through a radical
effacement not only of the notion of the transcendent self but also of the notion of
atomistic autonomy upon which that notion of selfhood is premised.
In adoption of a position resonant with Foucault's.Y MacIntyre proposes a return to
the ethical dogmas characteristic of historical societies. In particular, he makes a
call for a return to the concept of virtue that was of central significance to ancient
Greek societies. Virtue of the kind envisaged by Maclntyre'r' operates in a society
31 MacIntyre, A. After Virtue & Whose Justice, Which Rationality?, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 52
32 Foucault's prescriptive thesis regarding classical greek stylisations of the self has been discussed in detail
in Chapter Five.
33 in a contemporary revival of the concepts of virtue adopted by Aristotelian ethics
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in which each individual has a specifically designed role and status. This socially
assigned role and status represents a crucial element in the delineation of one's
selfhood and one's own conception of identity, and acts as a filter through which
socially condoned paths of action are presented to the agent as legitimate choices.
Central to MacIntyre's understanding of the role of virtue is its dependence upon
the narrative character of human life. Within a society that is dominated by
consideration of the ethical principles of virtue, subjects find their identity and
subjective coherence in the construction of a narrative which links birth to death.
The unity of human life, within this model, lies in the unity of its 'narrative quest'
and personal identity is the identity presupposed by that narrative unity.
Hence, MacIntyre's thesis uncovers the experiential reality that the choices
presented to human agents are heavily scripted by social requirements and
expectations. While this presents a significantly less attractive proposition than the
model of transcendence and unfettered self-determination presented by Kant,
MacIntyre's thesis boasts conformity with experiential reality. As discussed in
Chapter One, this conformity with reality represents a crucial starting point from
which to commence the project of determining a more operative model for the
facilitation ofhuman agency and consent.
The purpose of MacIntyre's development of the concept of 'narrative selfhood' is
to offer up an alternative to the dominant conception of selfhood proposed by
liberal individualism. Where liberal individualism conceptualises a self that is
separate from the role it assumes in social life.l" the very definition of MacIntyre's
narrative self is dependent upon the roles ascribed to it in a given community. The
narrative selfhood thus achieved is a selfhood whose general form is pre-
determined by the communities in which the individual finds him or her self.
Nonetheless, the narrative self retains the capacity for individual interpretation of
their ascribed role. Based upon the premise of an operative network of social
34 See Discussion in Chapter Four, "Feminist Concerns about the Legal Subject"
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virtue, then, MacIntyre develops a conception of the self that presupposes a
community of fixed and ascribed roles.
Within the confines of such a virtuous community, selfhood is achieved by
knowing 'one's proper role' and by embracing the narrative required by it. Subject
to the satisfaction of these requirements of virtue, the subject is then free to define
that role in terms of their own characteristics. Hence MacIntyre delineates a remit
for the exercise of agency within the confines of his virtuous community. Not
dissimilarly to the model of agency offered by Foucault in the preceding chapter,
the agency envisaged by MacIntyre is a relative form of agency. Its operation is
not unconstrained and self-determining in the way that the Kantian thesis proposes.
Rather, it is heavily constructed by prevailing traditions and requirements for
virtuous conformity. Despite such construction, however, a narrow remit for self-
stylisation and agency remain. Once again, the difficulty lies in accessing that
remit and providing a workable platform for group action. In grounding the remit
for agency within communal parameters, however, MacIntyre's thesis has the
benefit of providing scope for communal action in a way that the radically
dislocated subversion tactics ofpoststructuralism fail to do.35
Narrative selfhood represents the moral theory accompanying the epistemological
theory developed by MacIntyre within his Three Rival Versions of Moral
Enquiry." Within the confines of that work, MacIntyre contrasts the formalist
position of what he calls the 'encyclopaedist' tradition (epitomised by Kant) which
has been concerned with the realisation of universality and objectivity, and the
poststructuralist or 'genealogist' tradition, which has been concerned to discredit
the possibility of any valid claim to truth through continual affirmation of the
particular and the subversive. These two epistemological forms relate in broad
terms to the accompanying theories of subjectivity which in their tum posit the
35 See Discussion in Chapter Five of the failure of Butler's account to acconunodate group affiliation
36 MacIntyre, A. Three Rival Versions ofMoral Enquiry, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 52
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human subject as inherently self-willed, transcendent and constituting, or
alternatively as essentially constituted, fragmented and internally contradictory.
MacIntyre recognises that acceptance of the dichotomies inherent in the relation of
these competing claims obscures from consideration the possibility of a third thesis.
This rival version of moral enquiry suggests that reason only moves towards being
genuinely universal and impersonal insofar as it is neither neutral nor disinterested.
Accordingly, membership of a particular type of moral community (one in which
virtue ethics are paramount) is a necessary condition of genuinely rational and
moral enquiry. Recognising the development of such moral enquiry to be a type of
craft (in terms not dissimilar to the Foucaultian idea of a stylisation of existence
through the process of making one's life into a work of art3?), MacIntyre suggests
that "only insofar as we have already arrived at certain conclusions are we able to
become the sort of person able to engage in such enquiry so as to reach sound
conclusions.Y" Flowing as a direct consequence of this proposition has been
MacIntyre's development of the narrative theory of the self and its attendant forms
of relative agency.
This notion of narrative selfhood presents a more radical vision than the 'wider
selfhood' discussed by Sandel in the preceding section. Where Sandel's dialectical
leanings lead him to graft some communitarian insight onto the continued assertion
of the modernist subject, MacIntyre's premodern thesis demands the absolute
rejection of that subject. In providing a theoretical mandate to transcend the
lingering polarities of Enlightenment rationality, this premodern thesis certainly
presents a more promising vision than the dialectical position. However,
MacIntyre's premodern thesis becomes problematic in different ways. For one
thing, the virtuous societies that present the inspirational model for his thesis are
essentially hierarchical societies in which everyone has a designated place in the
37 Foucault, M. The History ofSexuality Vol. III - The Care ofthe Self, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 2
38 MacIntyre, A. Three Rival Versions ofMoral Enquiry, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 52, p.63
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order of things." Such societies have, however, been thoroughly patriarchal and
the achievement of virtue within them has traditionally been predominantly
restricted to the male sphere. This presents the alarming possibility for feminism
that the narrative selfhood applauded by MacIntyre can only be achieved at the high
price of ascription to traditional roles associated with societies that have been
saturated with confirmations ofsex discrimination.l''
To say that this appears to be the consequence of MacIntyre's ethical project is not
necessarily to assume, however, that such obstacles are unsurpassable. A more
sympathetic interpretation of some of MacIntyre's concluding remarks in After
Virtue appear to present the seeds of some progressive potentiaL He specifically
asserts that the fact that the self has to find moral identity in and through their
membership within specific communities (e.g. the family) does not entail that the
self has to accept the conventional moral limitations of the particularity of those
forms of community." Without these moral particularities to begin from, the self
would be without a requisite plateau from which to commence their search for the
good. However, it is specifically in the moving forward from these beginnings that
the search for the good consists. That said, however, MacIntyre reminds us that the
structures of such particularity may never be simply left behind or obliterated and
perhaps this is sufficient to justify the feminist concern. In an attempt to undermine
any such residual feminist concerns in this regard, Martha Nussbaum42 has sought
to reassert the proposal for a return to neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics embodied in
MacIntyre's thesis in a more women-friendly manner. In later sections of this
chapter, we will examine in detail Nussbaum's attempt to restructure the theses of
Aristotle and MacIntyre into a format more compatible with the requirements of
feminist ethics, and we will evaluate the success that this attempt has enjoyed.
39 MacIntyre, A. After Virtue, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 52, p. 122
40 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p. 55
41 MacIntyre, A. After Virtue, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 52, p. 205
42 Nussbaum, M. "Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defence of Aristotleian Essentialism" (1992)
20 (2) Political Theory 202 & "Equity and Mercy" (1993) 22 (2) Philosophy and Public Affairs 83
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An alternative field of criticism has been developed by Bernard Williams in his
discussion ofMacIntyre within his work Shame and Necessity. 43 While not seeking
to challenge the premodern conception of community developed by MacIntyre,
Williams expresses concern regarding the origins of the narrative self that populates
this analysis. Williams attributes to MacIntyre the belief that one of the major
reasons for a necessary abandonment of the legacy of the Enlightenment lies in its
unanimous assertion of the featureless moral self as a characteristic expression of
human identity." Contrary to this, however, Williams suggests that the
Enlightenment (represented by a set of social and political ideals in favour of
truthfulness and objectivity) has no need for such images of the self. In fact,
Williams argues that we can continue to adhere to these ideals, and indeed make
better sense of them, by returning to the ethics ofHomeric Greece.
Although Williams thus makes a claim similar to MacIntyre in that both prescribe a
return to ancient Greek ethics, the motivations behind these theses are markedly
different. Both MacIntyre and Williams propose similar prescriptive theses
regarding the development of improved ethical positions and conceptions of the
self, but while MacIntyre considers his thesis representative of a radical
restructuring of the whole ethical enterprise, Williams suggests that the process of a
return to Homeric Greek ethics "need not condemn the ideals of the Enlightenment
inasmuch as they are identified with the pursuit of social and political honesty,
rather than with a rationalistic metaphysics of morality.v" Williams' concern,
then, is not to dislocate altogether the frameworks of Enlightenment. Indeed, to the
extent that they betray allegiance to the original 'spirit of Enlightenment' discussed
by Kant in Chapter Four, such frameworks ought to be supported. What Williams
seeks to propose by a return to Homeric Greek ethics is the eradication of those
metaphysical assumptions and claims to universality that have polluted the original
merits of the Enlightenment quest.
43 Williams, B. Shame and Necessity, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 1
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Pursuing that aim further, Williams suggests that MacIntyre's thesis is flawed even
in terms of this less radical project because of his fundamental reliance upon the
work of Aristotle. Williams warns that we should be wary of those theories (such
as MacIntyre's and Nussbaum's) that seek a return to the virtue ethics of Aristotle
in the name of denouncing the Enlightenment because Aristotle has himself been
influenced by the kind of 'ethicised' conception of the self that produces claims
towards rationalism and essentialism. Despite popular claims from members of the
virtue ethics tradition (such as MacIntyre) that Aristotelian ethics avoid the
deficiencies of rationalism that have plagued the Platonic account (that has been
heavily influential in subsequent Kantian theory), Williams suggests that Aristotle
has also fallen foul of such assumptions. With Plato, it was precisely because all
desirable conduct was motivated by the rational exercise of the mind that no other
features of the human agent (e.g. character) needed to be considered relevant in the
progression toward an ethical life.46 For Aristotle, on the other hand, the good
person requires a character formed centrally by contingent circumstances.F
However, Aristotle also implies that character is controlled by reason. Hence,
reliance upon Aristotelian virtue ethics is equally likely to revert to a psychology
structured in ethical terms around the dictates of rationalism, albeit in a more subtle
fashion than the Platonic self.
The tendency which Williams isolates within MacIntyre's thought to associate the
Enlightenment with ideas of total critique and rationalistic social imagery makes it
far from surprising that he is tempted to fall back on Aristotle to determine a
philosophical position that does not abstract humans, as pure moral consciousness,
from society, but instead sees them as contingently formed by society. However,
Williams suggests the threat of a different illusion within such trends of thought -
this illusion is encapsulated by "the idea that the relation of human beings to
44 Williams, B. Shame and Necessity, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 1, p. 159
45 Williams, B. Shame and Necessity, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 1, p. 159
46 Williams, B. Shame and Necessity, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 1, p. 160
47 Williams, B. Shame and Necessity, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 1, p. 160
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society and to each other, if properly understood and properly enacted, can realise a
harmonious identity that involves no real loss.?"
We have seen in our discussion of the strong poststructuralist thesis that many
commentators have recognised the existence of this metaphysical illusion, and are
struggling with mechanisms to remedy the paradox. In a sense, Williams suggests
that Plato, Kant and Aristotle are all on the same ethical side - each believing in the
possibility that the universe, history or the structure ofhuman reason, once properly
understood, can yield a pattern which makes sense of human life and human
aspirations.Y On the contrary, Homeric thought represents human agents as
dealing sensibly, foolishly and sometimes catastrophically in a world that is only
ever partially intelligible to human agency. In the final analysis, Williams
concludes that we should look to a reflection upon Homeric Greek thought before
the advent of Plato and Aristotle for an option that invokes neither a featureless
moral self, nor an absolute constitution of the self by society. Within these ethical
parameters, we will find a conception of the self that promises ultimate
reconciliation of these two epistemological extremes. MacIntyre's idea of the
narrative self and of a return to Greek ethics may have a level of merit. However,
his reliance upon the virtue ethics of Aristotle makes his thesis difficult for
Williams to accept uncritically.
Feminism and Communitarianism
"Communitarians share with most feminist theorists a rejection of the abstractly
individualist conception of self and society so prominent in modem liberal
thought. This self- atomistic, presocial, empty of all metaphysical content except
abstract reason and will - is able to stand back from all the contingent moral
commitments and norms of its particular historical context. . .In contrast to this
vision of the self, the new communitarians pose the conception of the self whose
identity and nature are defined by their contingent and particular social
attachments.v'"
48 Williams, B. Shame and Necessity, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 1, p.162
49 Williams, B. Shame and Necessity, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 1,p. 163
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Even this relatively brief introduction to the principles of communitarian thought
should be sufficient to illustrate the existence of several potentially connected
arenas of concern between feminism and communitarianism. A social
constructionist thesis of the sort advocated by communitarianism has always been
central to feminism." Building upon that realisation, Nicola Lacey has noted that a
communitarian commitment to the construction of a rich conception of collective
values and the institutional public goods which would facilitate their realisation
resonates with the feminist political concern to achieve advancement in
considerations such as child-care provision and the environment where liberal,
market-based solutions are inappropriate and inadequate.52 What's more, the
communitarian concern with the community as a source of political value parallels
the powerful feminist critique of the arbitrary distinction between public and
private spheres imposed by liberal philosophy.53 Perhaps most significantly of all,
the communitarian recognition of the 'situated' and socially immersed self provides
a remit for accommodating as politically relevant the embodied and connected
aspects of human subjectivity that have historically been rendered peripheral to
issues ofpolitics and law.
Communitarianism, as we have seen, is a species of theory that recognises the
embodied and contextual nature of human subjectivity. Feminist theorists have
(with the potential exceptions discussed in Chapter Four54) largely argued that the
disembodied conception of selfhood employed by legal liberalism is implicitly
'male' because of the correlation between the atomism and autonomy of the legal
subject and the atomism and autonomy prioritised in male (but not female) social
development. While liberalism sees the individual as prior to social reality,
communitarianism sees the individual as its product. Such a social constructionist
50 Friedman, M. "Feminism and Modem Friendship - Dislocating the Community" (1989) 99 Ethics 275
r·277-8
I This concern dates back to 'first-wave' feminism, ego Friedan, B. The Feminine Mystique, Supra. Chapter
One, Note 52. See also discussion in Chapter One, "Feminism and Law's Disciplinary Power"
52 Lacey, N. Unspeakable Subjects, Supra. Preface, Note 2, p. 136. See Also Gavison, R. "Feminism and
the Public - Private Distinction" (1992) 45 Stanford Law Review 1
53 Lacey, N. Unspeakable Subjects, Supra. Preface, Note 2, p. 137
54 See Discussion in Chapter Four, "Feminism and the Revival of the Enlightenment"
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view of subjectivity has significant importance to the overall feminist enterprise,
because it enables the critical analysis and transformation of the social processes
through which gendered identities are constructed and perpetuated.
Furthermore, the communitarian thesis is resonant of feminist concerns to explicate
the role of connection and intersubjectivity in individual identity formation. The
traditional communitarian concern with the 'situated self in ethical theory brings
with it the possibility of accommodating as politically relevant differing embodied
aspects of human subjectivity. This is of clear importance to a feminist movement
concerned to illustrate the ways in which female bodies 'have been inscribed with
meanings inimical to autonomy in the legal sense, while male bodies have been
constructed as 'normal' and paradoxically disembodied.55 In our discussion of the
discourses of female embodiment in Chapter One, the centrality to the feminist
critique of the imposition of expectation and meaning upon corporeal
manifestations of gender was illustrated. Individuals, developing their identity and
conception of selfhood from their place within specific communities, are social
beings in every sense. Building upon this communitarian view of personhood,
many feminists have alleged that the woman who lives in a patriarchal culture is
peculiarly powerless because her position as a socially constituted being makes her
a victim of her own conditioning." The embedded nature of such conditioning
renders it difficult for the woman as a serious moral agent to transcend the social
expectations required of her because from her internal perspective such
expectations are 'natural' .57
Drucilla Cornell, in Beyond Tragedy and Complacency", has argued that this kind
of social constructionist account of the subject (which emphasises our development
of complex identities within concrete historical and social contexts) is the inevitable
55 Lacey, N. Unspeakable Subjects, Supra. Preface, Note 2, p. 136-7. See Also Discussion in Chapter Four,
"Feminist Concerns about the Legal Subject"
56 Frazer, E & Lacey, N. (ed.) The Politics ofCommunity, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 84, p. 151
57 This bears important similarity to the critique lodged by Foucault regarding the insidious nature of
disciplinary technologies discussed in Chapter One
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result of continued feminist allegiance to the conception of relational subjectivity.
Human life and human identity outwith the context of human society and human
interaction is not only impossible, according to Cornell, but also an eminently
unsuitable starting point for political theory. This commonly voiced feminist
proposition
"turns the tables on liberalism, as it suggests that the liberal conception of the
autonomous individual agent is itself a product of social construction, an ideal or
model of human life which has emerged in this particular form within the liberal
tradition. So if liberalism is true as a social theory, this is only because it is, in a
wider sense, false.,,59
Nonetheless, and despite an array of important arenas of parallel concern, building
a feminist ethics on the back of communitarian critique has proven far from
unproblematic. Communitarianism has often come under critical fire for the
potential conservatism inherent within its thought.60 More specifically, the failure
of communitarianism to generate an adequate account of the conditions under
which subjects gain membership within powerful, meaning-generating
communities presents a significant arena of potential conflict with feminist political
concerns". The tendency of communitarian theorists to afford considerable
deference to the role of tradition has perpetuated a failure to challenge those
communities that, although steeped in tradition, are also steeped in patriarchal
assumptions. As such, these communities have often exhibited reluctance to
include women as active participants and to promote their incorporation through
fair and equitable channels. This should be of real concern to a feminist movement
that has been dedicated to highlighting and overcoming institutionalised obstacles
58 Cornell, D. "Beyond Tragedy and Complacency" (1987) Northwestern University Law Review 81
59 Cornell, D. "Beyond Tragedy and Complacency", Supra.Chapter Five, Note 58. Quoted in Frazer, E &
Lacey, N. (ed.) The Politics ofCommunity, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 84, p. 57
60 Laey, N. Unspeakable Subjects, Supra. Preface, Note 2, p. 137
61 See, for example, the communitarian approach adopted by Michael Walzer in Spheres ofJustice (1983)
Basic Books. Walzer posits his ethics on the basis of the existence of an egalitarian community with
pluralistic principals ofjustice. The image he presents of an egalitarian, pluralistic, non-dominating society
is certainly attractive and inspiring but it leaves precariously open the question of how that society is to
grapple with the problems of moral diversity, and competing moral claims. Walzer hirnselfadmits that
under conditions of dominance, no shared meanings are possible.
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to equal opportunity between the sexes. In failing to challenge such inherited
prejudices, communitarian theory has thus become a subject of feminist critique.
Not only have feminists expressed concern regarding the failure of
communitarianism to question the means through which access is gained to certain
prioritised communities, many have also expressed concern regarding the very
nature of those prioritised communities themselves. In Unspeakable Subjects,
Lacey worries that, "normative appeals to communitarianism as a means of
escaping the limitations of liberal individualism present a dangerous potential for
the re-institution of excluding universalism in a new, and potentially more
damaging, way.,,62 This potential of communitarian critique has been highlighted
by Friedman who, in "Feminism and Modem Friendship'V" has taken
communitarian ethics to task for their tendency to invoke communities of the
family, or nation, which have consistently been established to be problematic by
feminist critique.
For both dialectical and premodern communitarian commentators the relevant
communities are those in which we are involuntarily bound - they are not simply
the 'associations' in which people 'cooperate', but more specifically, the
communities in which people 'participate"." Friedman proposes, however, that we
need to develop a far greater interest in those voluntarily entered into moral
associations (citing friendship as the paradigmatic case). Indeed, she suggests that,
"The constitution of identity and moral particularity, for the modem self, may
well require radically different communities from those so often invoked by
communitarians. The whole tenor of communitarian thinking would change once
we opened up the conception of the social self to encompass chosen communities,
especially those which lie beyond the typical original community of family-
neighbourhood-school-church.t'f
62 Lacey, N. Unspeakable Subjects, Supra. Preface, Note 2, p. 137-40 & 149
63 Friedman, M.. "Feminism and Modem Friendship", Supra. Chapter Six, Note 50
64 Friedman, M. "Feminism and Modem Friendship", Supra. Chapter Six, Note 50, p. 283-4. See Also
Sandel, M. Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 44, p. 151-2
287
Friedman asserts that by expanding communitarian analysis to incorporate also
such communities of choice, feminists are empowered to provide for the possibility
of an effective counter to the oppressive and abusive relational structures often
inherent in the non-voluntary communities cited by Sandel and Macintyre among
others.
"From such a perspective, the uncritically assumed communities of place invoked
by the communitarians appear deeply problematic. We can concede the influence
of those communities without having unreflectively to endorse it. We must
develop communitarian thought beyond its complacent regard for the
communities in which we once found ourselves toward (and beyond) an
awareness of the crucial importance of dislocated communities, communities of
choice.,,66 .
The remainder of this chapter will be dedicated to a more detailed examination of
these emerging tensions between feminism and communitarianism and to an
assessment of the merits of feminist attempts to rescue communitarian ethics from
the spectre of such conservatism. Within the confines of the preceding discussion,
what has become evident is that commentators of all persuasions ought to carefully
assess the manner in which the notion of community is being used in disparate
communitarian theories before uncritically advocating a communitarian position.
Hekman expresses this caveat to feminist theory in the following terms,
"If feminists are enjoined to jump on the communitarian bandwagon, to embrace
this alternative to modernist moral theory, then they must know exactly what
'community' entails. Embracing a romantic conception of community, without
scrutiny, will not solve the problems posed by the disembodied self of the liberal
tradition...What is required is a discourse about subjects and communities which
rejects not only the disembodied subject of liberalism, but also the
liberalism/communitarian dichotomy on which that concept rests.,,67
Feminism and Dialectical Communitarianism
It has been suggested above that feminist theorists have generally been concerned
by the level of conservatism deemed inherent in certain species of communitarian
65 Friedman, M. "Feminism and Modem Friendship", Supra. Chapter Six, Note 50, p.285
66 Friedman, M. "Feminism and Modem Friendship", Supra. Chapter Six, Note 50, p.290
67 Hekrnan, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p. 58
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thought. One of the major contributory factors involved in the perpetuation of such
conservatism relates to the common failure of communitarian theorists to
adequately characterise the various senses in which they use the notion of
community." We have discussed in preceding sections the tendency for
communitarian theorists to deal with the notion of community in one of two ways.
What's more, we have been introduced to the basic elements of both approaches
and have examined some of the shortcomings that have plagued each genre of
theory in tum.
In the dialectical version, we saw that an attempt has been made to fuse elements of
both liberal individualism and,communitarianism while simultaneously making the
claim to be rejecting the primacy of individualism inherent in liberalism. However,
we also saw that upon a closer inspection of such attempts at a dialectical affinity,
this averred rejection of individualism emerges as highly superficial. The
dialectical position, by its very nature, is plagued by difficulties inherent in seeking
a compromise between dichotomous ethical positions without thereby perpetuating
the very polarities in question. Furthermore, the position advocated by Sandel and
Taylor admits a disappointingly residual remit for communitarian values through its
continued privileging of the notion of a 'core self. By failing to reject the notion
of 'fraternity' that is rooted in the liberal tradition, i.e. the notion of community as
an association of rational individuals bound together by a mutual search for
autonomy and freedom, the dialectical approach presented by Sandel and Taylor
fails to present any serious alternative to the liberal tradition.69
Recognising the deficiencies of this dialectical account has led many
commentators, feminist and otherwise, to seek more progressive potential within
the frameworks of the premodern alternative. While it has been argued above that
this premodern account offers a more promising option for development by
communitarian theorists, the significance of the problems affecting this conception
68 Lacey, N. Unspeakable Subjects, Supra. Preface, Note 2, p. 138
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of community must not be understated. In particular, it ought to be recalled that the
premodern account poses some particularly problematic dilemmas for feminist
commentators seeking to appropriate its insights. This has led some to embark
upon a re-examination ofthe merits of the dialectical approach.
Such feminist commentators have felt confident that, subject to some necessary
revision, this branch of communitarian critique continues to offer the most
appropriate philosophical ally to feminism in its battle against liberalism. Marilyn
Friedman, for example, has argued that although a simplistic adoption of
communitarian principles by feminism would be inappropriate (largely due to the
sexist assumptions inherent in,the communities to which it traditionally appeals), a
more complex development of a dialectical interaction between self and community
would represent a favourable model for feminist political discourse."
Developing the critique lodged by Lacey in the preceding section regarding the
problematic nature of the communities which communitarian theorists generally
rely upon as constitutive of identity, Friedman has sought to develop an alternative
delineation of meaning-generating communities. Pursuant upon this
methodological aim, Friedman attempts to replace the traditional notion of a
community that is comprised of imposed associations (such as family, church,
state) with a vision of community comprised of voluntarily chosen relationships
(such as friendship). These voluntarily entered into 'communities ofwill' would be
necessitated by motivations arising from one's needs and desires, rather than by
motivations arising from social assignation, expectation or demand.
This heralds the advantage, from a feminist perspective, of liberating
communitarian critique from its previous connotations of sexism and gender-
exclusionary tradition. In requiring the incorporation of 'communities of will'
69 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra Preface, Note 24, p. 59
70 Friedman, M. "Feminism and Modem Friendship", Supra. Chapter Six, Note 50
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within the category of meaning-generating communities, Friedman's approach
presents the means through which women would be able to overcome the
institutionalised patriarchy that forms the framework of those communities that
have traditionally dominated communitarian critique. This in tum presents the
possibility for a more women-friendly form of communitarianism that allows
women equal participation in those attachments and affiliations that determine
one's status in society and one's conception of self.
Hence, the community that Friedman presents, being one in which the voluntary
choice of the individual, based on personal needs and desires, is given a central
role, offers a significant improvement upon previous communitarian theories.
However, her uncritical reliance upon the expectation that human agents are free to
choose between an unlimited range of social communities in determining their
communities of will lends implicit support to the liberal contention (criticised
within this work) that the individual has an unfettered remit for self-determination,
unconstrained by countervailing social imperatives as to the propriety of their
choices. We have noted in discussion throughout the preceding chapters that this
liberal ideal does not correspond to experiential reality. In developing her
legitimate critique of conventional conceptions of relevant meaning-generating
community, Friedman fails to attend sufficiently to equally legitimate feminist
critique of the artificial model of choice assumed in prevailing ideology. Placing
exclusive reliance upon the relevance of communities of will in this uncritical
manner perpetuates a failure to appreciate that social discipline operates to curtail
choice as to which communities human agents mayor may not choose to join.
Therefore, while communities ofwill, unlike communities of association, represent
communities into which agents have expressed some desire to enter, it overstates
the case to suggest that they represent thoroughly voluntary expressions of personal
will.
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This underlying perpetuation of liberal assumptions IS further augmented by
Friedman's having developed this conception of community in the dialectical form.
In framing her critique within the parameters of the dialectical account, Friedman
renders her thesis liable to the same problematic inferences that have troubled the
theses of both Sandel and Taylor. In both instances, the conception of community
that is developed remains closely tied to the epistemology and discourse of the
autonomous individual that is the foundation of liberalism." In real terms, all
these theses rely upon a presupposition that agents are individuals first and
community members second - after all, before one can have achieved the requisite
level of agency and selfhood from which to make a 'choice' regarding which
communities to attach oneself to, one must first have developed an individual locus
of identity. Hence, Friedman's account is equally guilty of assuming a notion of
fraternity that implies the primacy of the individual despite her expressed
communitarian disclaimers in this regard.
Recognition of such shortcomings in feminist attempts to revise the dialectical
approach has reverted many commentators back to the conclusion that a meaningful
challenge to the polarities upon which the liberal-communitarian, individual-
community debate is premised can only be lodged through a re-evaluation of the
premodern conception of community. In Hekman's critique of feminist genres of
dialectical communitarianism, for example, their inability to displace the modernist
dichotomy between the individual and society has been heavily challenged. The
significance of this inability is particular lamentable for Hekman who sees such
displacement as an epistemological prerequisite of the articulation of a moral theory
capable of accommodating the different moral voices with which feminism is
concerned.72
Hence, despite merited attempts at revision of the dialectical genre of
communitarianism, feminist commentators have generally continued to find
71 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra Preface, Note 24, p. 59
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inherent in such approaches an unsatisfactory allegiance to the dichotomies of
liberalism. That said, however, it should be noted that the criticism made by
Friedman in regard to the communitarian tendency to uncritically adopt
communities of necessity remains legitimate whether our method of resolution is
dialectical or premodern. Her concern with the kinds of community adopted by
communitarian theory as relevant and meaning-generating illustrates well an arena
of significant friction between the feminist and communitarian projects more
generally. In latter stages of this chapter, we will return to an examination of this
issue in order to determine whether feminist accounts can overcome the obstacles
thus presented to affiliation with communitarianism. Before going on to set the
scene within which this problematic interaction re-emerges, however, we ought
first to examine the attempts that have been made by feminist theory to re-develop
the premodern conception of community which has largely been attributed to
Alasdair Maclntyre.f
Feminism and Premodern Communitarianism
In the premodern conception of community developed by MacIntyre, a more
serious alternative to liberalism can be identified. MacIntyre's approach (although
not without its flaws) constitutes a genuine rejection of liberalism and modernism
in that it more meaningfully transcends the polarities of Enlightenment thought and
seeks to reject the notion of 'fraternity' that stands unaltered in the dialectical
thesis. Abandoning altogether the notion of a 'core' transcendent self as a mere
fiction of modernity, MacIntyre seeks a far more revolutionary alteration to
prevailing perceptions of subjectivity and agency. His thesis of the narrative self
lays particular emphasis upon the fact that identities are developed first and
foremost by the place of the agent within certain meaning-generating and
hierarchical communities. His insistence upon the primarily socially-situated
nature of the human self offers welcome support to the critique of feminist
72 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24
73 MacIntyre, A. After Virtue & Whose Justice, Which Rationality?, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 52
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commentators who have alleged that the connected and gendered role of women
has had a profound effect upon the development of conceptions of 'female identity'
and female autonomy.
While such affinities have encouraged an increasing tendency amongst feminist
commentators to appropriate selectively aspects of MacIntyre's thesis in support of
their own claims regarding relational subjectivity and socially constructed
identities, significant obstacles to a closer association between feminism and this
genre of communitarianism remain. One of the most commonly expressed feminist
concerns relates to the strong reliance that MacIntyre places upon the network of
virtues developed by Aristotle.i" Although it has been argued that there is nothing
in such virtue ethics which renders them inherently sexist, the troubling fact for
feminism remains that the narratives and virtues upon which MacIntyre's thesis are
developed constitute a discourse within which only one script is written for
women." That script confirms the social requirements of reproduction and
nurturance. Our discussion in Chapters Two and Three of the harmful effects that
such scripted expectations can have upon the lived experiences of women in
specific contexts (legal and otherwise) should serve as a stark illustration of why
such tendencies ought to ignite feminist concerns. Without the aid of feminist
reVISIOn to eradicate such oppressive expectations, this species of
communitarianism is likely to be of little real help in the pursuit of alternative
conceptions of female (and male) identity.
In our previous discussion of MacIntyre, we noted the problematic hierarchical
nature of his conception of community and we noted that in many respects this
inherent hierarchical conservatism could likewise be attributed to his reliance upon
the virtue ethics tradition originating in the work of Aristotle." Inherent in the
74 Nussbaum, M. "Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach" in Nussbaum, M. & Sen, A. (ed.) The
Quality ofLife, Supra. Preface, Note 22, p. 243
75 Deslauriers, M. "Sex and Essence in Aristotle's Metaphysics and Biology" in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist
Interpretations ofAristotle (1998) University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 139
76 Harraway, D. "Situated Knowledges", Supra. Chapter Five, Note 103, p. 592
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ethical frameworks of both Aristotle and MacIntyre is the notion that the human
self originates from a specific place in the social and communal order. These social
and communal orders are therefore hierarchically organised on the basis of
whatever characteristics are deemed virtuous. Within Aristotle's thesis women
were eternally relegated to the lower levels of the hierarchy because of their
perceived inability to exercise the capacities central to the achievement of a
virtuous life.77 While MacIntyre has improved upon this position through his
concession that individuals may be able to move beyond the limitations of their
social 'starting platform' in their search for virtue, his reluctance to develop that
concession further has alerted justifiable feminist concern. Indeed, given the
pervasiveness of the ranking tendencies of Aristotle (and the premodern species of
communitarianism built upon the foundation of Aristotelian virtue ethics), many
have expressed surprise that feminists should find anything of interest or utility in
the premodern account.78
Nonetheless, despite such feminist concerns regarding reliance upon Aristotelian
virtue ethics, there has been a significant contemporary drive amongst premodern
communitarians to define and promote a specifically Aristotelian approach to
ethics, and many feminist commentators have lent their support to this. 79 Amongst
the most celebrated exponents of such a women-friendly redevelopment is Martha
Nussbaum.80 Refusing the dichotomous framework implicit in the dialectical
approach, Nussbaum seeks an ethical theory that rejects any simplistic opposition
between universalism and particularism. In thus seeking to transcend the
dichotomies of modernist thought, Nussbaum appeals to the premodern conception
of community. We have noted above that this premodern thesis represents an
77 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII9, 1160b 32-74
78 Modrak, D. "Aristotle's Theory of Knowledge and Feminist Epistemology" in Freeland, C. (ed.)
Feminist Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra. Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 93
79 Aristotle, Politics I 5, 1254a 21-3. Discussed in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist Interpretations ofAristotle,
Supra. Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 171
80 Nussbaum, M. "Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defence of Aristotleian Essentialism" &
"Equity and Mercy" , Supra. Chapter Six, Note 42. See Also "Virtue Revived" (1992) Times Literary
Supplement 3rd July, 9, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 39 & Love's Knowledge - Essays on Philosophy and
Literature (1990) Oxford University Press
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attempt within communitarianism to move beyond the dualistic and polarised
assumptions that have weakened other species of communitarian critique. Pursuing
a similar methodological aim, Nussbaum has argued for the existence of a link
rather than a polarity between universal normative principles and contextual
factors. In defining the nature of that link, Nussbaum has relied heavily upon the
works of Aristotle and in so doing has rendered her support to the project of
premodern communitarianism.
In The Fragility of Goodness,81 Nussbaum explains the peculiarity of the
Aristotelian ethical position through its comparison with Socratic ethics. Where
Socratic ethics necessitate a, definition of virtue that entails abandonment of
responsive intercourse with others, resulting in the production of an ethical code
that is individualistic, abstract and disembodied, Nussbaum defines Aristotelian
ethics as recognising the fragility of human love in its central position within
human ethical life and achievement of happiness.Y Hence, Nussbaum suggests that
Aristotelian ethics produce an ethical code that is neither universalistic nor
particularistic, neither individualistic nor communal, and perhaps most importantly
of all is not a compromise between either of these opposing poles.
In her latter work, Love's Knowledge." these themes become more pronounced.
Explaining in more detail the nature of the resultant Aristotelian ethical code,
Nussbaum places specific emphasis upon the concept of 'perception' that she
considers central to the premodern virtue ethics tradition.84 The concept of
'perception' constitutes the ability to discern accurately and responsively the salient
features of one's particular situation and context. Nussbaum maintains that such
Aristotelian particularism provides a contrast to the dominant tradition in moral
philosophy while simultaneously escaping the pull of the dichotomous liberalism-
communitarianism debate through its continued ability to encompass normative
81 Nussbaum, M. The Fragility ofGoodness, Supra. Preface, Note 22
82 Nussbaum, M. The Fragility ofGoodness, Supra. Preface, Note 22, p. 195
83 Nussbaum, M. Love's Knowledge, Supra. Chapter Six, Note 80
84 Nussbaum, M. Love's Knowledge, Supra. Chapter Six, Note 80, p. 37
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principles ofbroad applicability. In developing the virtue of 'perception' therefore,
Nussbaum alleges that the human agent develops the capacity to see oneself
simultaneously both as a unit in a broader (perhaps even universal framework) and
as a specific identity with contextual attachments and affinities. Perception, when
actualised completely, seems to avoid occupying the terrain of compromise
between universalism and particularism because it offers the possibility of being
simultaneously both universal and particular, and as such encompasses the whole
spectrum rather than the terrain ofmiddle-ground.
In this regard, Nussbaum's expectations of the concept of perception bear strong
similarity to Aristotle's expectations regarding what constitutes good practical
judgement. Aristotle has argued that such judgement ought to be informed by a
detailed understanding of the whole history and context of the problem, including
the specific characteristics of the agents involved. Hence, general rules alone
cannot offer useful guidance in particular situations. On the other hand, however,
Aristotle has also recognised that in approaching a particular context, a good judge
is trying to fix in and for that context a general view of the human good that is
applicable to all human beings in all places and times, by virtue of their human
similarities. Aristotle's view thus is particularistic without falling prey to the
practical difficulties of relativism.85
The balance of the particular with the general that Nussbaum finds in Aristotle's
work represents the first arena of parallel concern that she suggests ought to unite
feminism and the premodern communitarian thesis that builds upon Aristotle's
ethics.86 Feminist critique has long-since struggled to find the mechanisms by
which to encourage a communal voice for the articulation of women's gender-
specific suffering without marginalising the particular claims of individual women
and without advocating an essentialised perception ofwomanhood. The disjunction
85 Nussbaum, M. "Aristotle, Feminism and Needs for Functioning" in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist
Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra. Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 253
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between the feminist political agenda that requires communal affiliation and broad
applicability and the feminist ethical agenda that requires attention to particularity
and context has provided the impetus for internal critique and external confusion
within feminist theory. Nussbaum's suggestion that feminism ought to re-evaluate
their position in regard to Aristotle to help remedy this dilemma should, therefore,
be given serious consideration. If she is correct in her claims regarding the ability
of Aristotelian ethics to transcend polarities and to attend to the universal and the
particular simultaneously, then feminism certainly has something to learn from
Aristotle and the premodern communitarian account.
While significant, this presents only one of the advantages that Nussbaum suggests
could be offered to feminist theory through a re-evaluation of their position in
regard to Aristotle and in regard to theneo-Aristotelian virtue ethics tradition that
has provided the impetus behind the premodern communitarianism of MacIntyre.
Another potential advantage to which Nussbaum draws our attention relates to
Aristotle's thesis in regard to the rationality of the emotions.Y In the Rhetoric,
Aristotle offers a subtle analysis of emotions such as anger, fear and pity to suggest
that their base is found in certain belief judgements that justify their recognition as
playing a crucial role in an individual's rational response to life contexts and
dilemmas.88 In short, Aristotle has argued that a human agent cannot think or act
virtuously (and implicitly, therefore, rationally) without also being possessed of the
passions appropriate to the situation. In so doing, Aristotle has initiated a strong
philosophical justification for treating emotions as rational and therefore relevant in
the sphere of legal and moral decision-making. In developing their conceptions of
narrative and virtue, premodern communitarian theorists have likewise placed
heavy emphasis upon the rationality of emotions. Should feminist theorists seek to
86 This cliam has been mirrored by Hirschmann, L. "The Book of A" in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist
Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra. Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 202
87 Nussbaum, M. "Aristotle, Feminism and Needs for Functioning" in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist
Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra. Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 250
88 Aristotle, The Rhetoric. Discussed by Nussbaum, M. in The Fragility ofGoodness, Supra. Preface, Note
22, p. 307 - "Far from seeing them as obstacles to good reasoning, Aristotle makes proper passivity and
passional responsiveness an important and necessary part of good deliberation."
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build upon this premise, they would become equipped with a strong counter-claim
with which to challenge the liberal assumption (attributable to Kant89) that
emotionality is antithetical to rationality and ought to be disregarded in making
legitimate use of one's autonomy.
The defence of the rationality of emotions initiated in Aristotle's work and
developed in the virtue ethics framework of premodern communitarianism makes a
significant contribution to feminist theory in terms of adding strength to their
experiential claims that emotionality constitutes neither a weakness of spirit nor an
indulgence best left to the 'private sphere'. Indeed this defence of the rationality of
emotion offers the potential for a redistribution of value to both rationality and
emotionality and for the logical inclusion of emotional motivation within the
frameworks of agency and consent. This has a profound implication at a variety of
levels for a feminist movement which has long-since acknowledged that women are
generally socialised to be more emotional than men, and that this female propensity
for greater emotionality has often been used against women to justify their
exclusion on the basis of their deficient powers of rationality. Furthermore, in
terms of the immediate project of this thesis, recognition of the role of the
emotional in rational and legitimate decision-making and self-determination could
offer a profoundly liberating effect upon the experiential account of female
subjectivity and could present the opportunity for a far more meaningful medium of
consent.
The third and final arena of common concern highlighted by Nussbaum relates to
the premodern challenge upon the traditional dichotomy between personal
separateness and communal affiliation." Although Aristotle recognises some
inherent degree of separation amongst individuals, to the extent that they must be
free to reflect upon and choose their own life plan, he also acknowledges that
89 See Discussion in Chapter Four - "Who is The Subject ofEnlightenrnent?" and "Feminist Concern
About the Legal Subject"
90 Nussbaum, M. "Aristotle, Feminism and Needs for Functioning" in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist
Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra. Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 252
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human beings are not separate in any hard or impenetrable way." This assertion
has been incorporated within the frameworks of premodern communitarianism and
is manifest in their claim that the reality of human life is such that we need, love
and care for one another in many ways. This resonates particularly strongly with
the feminist thesis, discussed at length in preceding chapters, that the nature of
human existence is not abstract and individualistic, but is rather relational and
communal." Where traditional theory has dealt with these elements of human
subjectivity as though they were inherently paradoxical, the premodern reliance
upon Aristotle has permitted the claim that, when properly understood, this
commitment to affiliation is not in tension with a commitment to the separation of
choice. Rather, the deepest and most valuable affiliations are between those
persons who are both separate choosers of life plans, and who respect one another
as such.93
This claim holds particular relevance for those feminist commentators who have
sought to explicate the reality that we experience our selves and our choices within
a network of close relationships with others that are mediated by bonds of mutual
emotion. What's more, it has the distinct advantage of allowing such claims to be
made while also maintaining a remit within which exercise of personal choice can
still be actualised and given meaning. This latter aspect benefits feminist theory
most strongly by providing a counter to those who have expressed concern that if
our ethical and legal codes accept the claim that our selfhood and agency are
implicated in relationship 'all the way down', we run the serious risk of dissolving
the moral agent who stands before us. In providing a remit for simultaneous
connection and separation, the Aristotelian account relied upon by MacIntyre
provides a means for feminism to challenge the neo-Kantian rhetoric of abstract
individualism while also maintaining a legitimate scope for the exercise of agency.
91 Nussbaum, M. "Aristotle, Feminism and Needs for Functioning" in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist
Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra. Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 252
92 See Discussion in Chapter Four, "Feminist Concerns about the Legal Subject"
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Despite the foregoing promises from Nussbaum, a number of feminists have
retained their scepticism regarding the possibility of such a feminist re-vitalisation
of premodern Aristotelian ethics." Although Nussbaum has made claims to be
changing the face of Aristotelian ethics to make them more women-friendly while
simultaneously standing true to the original impetus behind Aristotle's ideals."
many feminists find the whole Aristotelian tradition so fundamentally objectionable
that all attempts to build upon its foundations are unacceptable. Such feminist
critique has essentially centred around two main concerns. We will look at each of
these in tum because they relate not only to Aristotle's ethics, but also to that whole
school ofvirtue ethics and premodern communitarianismthat relies so heavily upon
a return to neo-Aristotelian premises.
,
The first criticism relates to the inherent sexism explicitly laid bare in Aristotle's
own work. According to Aristotle, the ultimate human function is rational activity
in accordance with the good. However, as we have mentioned above, he also
suggests that women are not fully rational and are deficient in the rational
capacities by comparison to men.96 Since, according to Aristotelian ethics, true
virtue and human flourishing depend upon the exercise of one's rational capacity in
an excellent manner, women are necessarily excluded from both virtue and
flourishing by their very nature. Hence, the role that Aristotle scripts for women is
one under the rule of men, singularly devoted to their service and care. For
feminist critics of Aristotle, manifestations of such blatant sexism simply cannot be
treated as a peripheral element within his work. On the contrary, the centrality of
his patriarchal assumptions to his overall ethical theory must be highlighted.
Having done so, it should become apparent that reliance upon the work of Aristotle
in any capacity is as ludicrous an option for feminism as is reliance upon the work
of any other blatantly misogynistic philosopher.
93 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII.l156b8-1158a1
94 Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra. Chapter Six, Note 75
95 Nussbaum, M. Virtue Revisited", Supra. Chapter Four, Note 39
96 Aristotle, Politics I5, 1254b 5-19. Discussed in Groenhout, R. "The Virtue of Care" in Freeland, C. (ed.)
Feminist Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra. Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 174
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Susan Moller Okin has built upon that critique to argue that Aristotle's account of
human nature, relying as it does upon the notion of function, is inherently
hierarchical and forces human relationships into oppressive moulds because of the
reliance it places upon the perpetuation of the hierarchical traditions of the virtuous
community." It has often been argued that a similar sexist conservatism plagues
the contemporary school of premodern communitarianism that seeks to adopt a
generally Aristotelian account of rationality and the virtues. MacIntyre's reliance
upon the Aristotelian assumption, that only those who have been properly brought
up in allegiance with the prevailing rules which structure society will be suitable
candidates to engage in moral reflection.f has already been criticised for its
tendency to build conformity with tradition into any account of rational deliberation
in ethics."
From the feminist perspective, of course, any ethical dogma that actively seeks to
protect and cement a tradition that has been characterised by exclusion is highly
problematic.100 As a recurring theme within our discussion of the relationship
between feminism and communitarianism, it seems that this issue of inherent
sexism has proven difficult to overcome altogether. The issue for feminist
commentators to determine must be whether those aspects of Aristotelian ethics
that seem profitable for feminist theorising can be distinguished from his
undesirable presuppositions about the abilities of the female gender. For those
feminists who believe this to be the case, the further issue must be whether the
advantages to be gained from a selective incorporation of Aristotelian ethics are
sufficient to justify this kind of selective blindness.
97 Okin, S. Women in Western Political Thought (1979) Princeton University Press, Chapter Four.
Discussed in Groenhout, R. "The Virtue of Care" in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist Interpretations ofAristotle,
Supra. Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 175
98 Groenhout, R. "The Virtue of Care" in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra.
Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 176
99 Groenhout, R. "The Virtue of Care" in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra.
Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 175-6
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In determining the answer to those questions, feminist theorists ought also to devote
attention to a second arena of criticism that has been lodged at the premodern
Aristotelian framework. This criticism relates less to the objectionable nature of
the specific content of his ethics in regard to the conception of women he employs,
and more to the political structure his theory necessarily produces. We have noted
elsewhere that Aristotle's ethics are perfectionist, and as such incorporate a
necessarily hierarchical conception of politics that is essentially at odds with the
general feminist rejection of hierarchies and imbalances of political power. 101
Where feminist methodology has sought to explicitly renounce the use of
hierarchical forms of organisation, MacIntyre's premodern communitarianism has
relied heavily upon such hierarchical forms to legitimate its foundations.
Placing those people deemed more capable of virtuous conformity in positions of
control over those deemed less capable, and therefore less fully human, it cannot be
disputed that Aristotle's ethical framework is intrinsically hierarchical. However,
this does not necessarily present an obstacle to the development of Aristotelian
ethics within a feminist campaign. In an attempt to defend Aristotle against
precisely this genre of critique, Groenhout makes the point that the question of
whether any and all hierarchies are objectionable is separate from the question of
whether a particular hierarchy is objectionable.i'f On that basis, Groenhout
suggests that the locus of feminist concern with hierarchy lies not so much in a
general concern to obliterate the logic of hierarchy, but rather only to deconstruct
those forms of hierarchy that have encouraged the subjection of women and the
perpetuation of phallocentrism. The concept of hierarchy is, Groenhout argues,
necessary to allow the possibility of making value judgements, and of evaluating
100 Frazer, E. & Lacey, N. (ed.) The Politics ofCommunity, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 84. Discussed in
Groenhout, R "The Virtue of Care" in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra.
Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 176
101 Aristotle, Politics I 5, l254a 21-3. Discussed in Groenhout, R. "The Virtue of Care" in Freeland, C. (ed.)
Feminist Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra. Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 171-2
102 Groenhout, R. "The Virtue of Care" in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra.
Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 177
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some societies, or some humans, or some abilities to be better than others'". These
are distinctions that many feminist theorists would wish to make and thus feminists
should be hesitant about rejecting all hierarchies out ofhand.
That said, however, Groenhout accepts that it remains appropriate for feminist
theory to critically examine the criteria and content of all hierarchies that are
discovered to remain vigilant against the perpetuation of prejudice. While it may,
on that basis, be fair to say that the criteria employed by Aristotle's hierarchical
framework are less than satisfactory, this does not preclude the possibility of
revision of those criteria towards the recognition of a more agreeable framework.
In Groenhout's opinion, the fact that the criteria employed by Aristotle in the
delineation of his hierarchy are (perhaps as a product of his time) misguided and
misogynistic, does not mean that feminist theorists should automatically abandon
the possibility of reformulating those hierarchies in a more compatible form.
These criticisms represent important arguments in regard to the potential alliance
between Aristotle and feminism upon which feminist appropriations of premodern
communitarian theory are necessarily parasitic. However, neither species of
criticism seems entirely conclusive. In terms of the first critique, it seems that the
possibility of treating Aristotle's sexism as peripheral cannot be altogether
obliterated despite the legitimacy of the concerns expressed by more sceptical
feminist commentators. Likewise, in terms of the second critique, Groenhout's
argument makes a convincing case for not abandoning out of hand the notion of
hierarchy and the possibility of a reformulation of Aristotelian frameworks in a less
objectionable manner. So long as these possibilities remain open, we cannot prima
facie dismiss the potential for a convincing revision of Aristotelian ethics along
lines that are not only compatible with feminism, but also supportive of it.
Furthermore, we cannot on these grounds dismiss the possibility of an enduring
allegiance between feminism and premodern communitarianism.
103 Groenhout, R. "The Virtue of Care" in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra.
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Nussbaum's Reformulation ofthe Premodern Account
Throughout this chapter, we have generally heralded Nussbaum as being the
foremost proponent of the potential for allegiance between feminism and the
Aristotelian ethics that form the foundation of premodern communitarian theory.
As an indicator of the general trend of such feminist theorising, the remainder of
this chapter will be dedicated to gauging the success of Nussbaum's enterprise and
to evaluating the merits and demerits of her thesis. It is possible to isolate two
significantly problematic areas within Nussbaum's theory. These have been
intelligently brought to light and examined by Susan Hekman in Moral Voices,
Moral Selves.104 In what follows, we will examine each area in tum.
The first problem that Hekman draws our attention to relates to the continued
polarisation inherent in Nussbaum's work. Although Nussbaum claims to revise
the communitarian and Aristotelian conception along lines that avoid traditional
polarities of thought, aspects of her thesis continue to pay credence to precisely
such dichotomies. Most notably, her entire argument is cast in terms of the
absolutist - relativist dichotomy characteristic of modernist approaches to moral
philosophy. 105 Essentially her thesis sets out to defend Aristotelian ethics against
charges of relativism by proposing that his attention to particularity and to the
concrete does not preclude the possibility of a universalisability within his work. In
an attempt to justify this claim, Nussbaum defines her position as one of 'internal
realism' - i.e. she claims to subscribe to the thesis that although reality is not given
to us independently of our moral convictions, within the world as perceived and
interpreted by human beings, it is still possible to discern universal truthS.106
Hekman suggests that in feeling the need to take a stance on this issue, Nussbaum
has made her claim self-defeating.
Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 178-9
104 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p. 39 ff
105 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p. 39
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Despite making the claim to be presenting an alternative to modernist moral theory,
Nussbaum clearly simultaneously feels herself confined by the epistemological
parameters of that theory (specifically the absolutist - relativist dichotomy). This
has significant implications in terms of our assessment of the first of Nussbaum's
claims for affiliation between feminism and Aristotle. Central to Nussbaum's
theory has been her assertion that Aristotle's ability to transcend polarities of
modernist thought not only justifies the project of premodern communitarianism
but also encourages an affinity between that project and feminism. However, if
Hekman is correct in her assertion that both Aristotle's and Nussbaum's theses fail
to transcend polarities in the way that Nussbaum claims, then Nussbaum's first
argument in favour of a feminist reliance upon Aristotle is undermined. What's
more, the advantages that the premodern communitarian thesis has claimed over its
dialectical counterpart are necessarily called into question.
In seeking a philosophical position that avoids the inadequacies isolated within the
dialectical genre, Hekman argues that feminism may also have to move beyond the
premodern conception initiated by Aristotle. To encourage feminist theorising in
that enterprise, Hekman has offered implicit support to an alternative and
contextual conception of moral theory that will be examined in detail in the
following chapter. One of the main advantages that will be claimed in favour of
this contextual thesis lies in its ability to meaningfully transcend the
epistemological confines of the dichotomies inherent in modernist thought in the
way in which Nussbaum's premodern theory can only superficially claim to do. 107
The second shortcoming highlighted by Hekman once again relates not only to
Nussbaum's own thesis but also to the theses of her fellow premodern Aristotle
followers (including MacIntyre). Hekman suggests that this whole line of thought
tends to ignore the important issues of power and the hegemony of dominant moral
106 Nussbaum, M. Love's Knowledge, Supra. Chapter Six, Note 80, p.223-4
107 Hekrnan, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, .p. 40
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discourses. 108 One of the principal themes to unite disparate members of such neo-
Aristotelian theory has been the claim that ethical systems are specific to particular
cultural and social settings. Nonetheless, such theories have consistently failed to
explore the hegemonic forces that operate to establish the dominant ethical systems
within any cultural setting. Although they argue for a particularised approach to the
constitution of morality, Nussbaum and her allies fail to problematise the dynamics
that have operated to construct the community that they idealise. This criticism
relates not only to the kinds of community celebrated by traditional communitarian
approaches (i.e. those of state, nation, family, etc.) but at a more fundamental level
to their uncritical acceptance of the dominant claims ofthat larger community in
the first place.
By assuming that only one moral discourse is voiced in a given community, both
Nussbaum and MacIntyre in their development of Aristotelian ethics have ignored
the hegemonic forces that have structured that discourse.i'" This is a failure
illustrated by Foucault in his discussion of such theory. Foucault consistently
demands that we must always question what 'we' means when it is used in
reference to ethical frameworks. 110 In the genre of thought developed by MacIntyre
and Nussbaum, the 'we' often referred to is simply the dominant moral discourse
within the community. Uncritically appealing to this 'we' in the way that
Nussbaum and MacIntyre have done perpetuates existing power relationships. The
significance of that criticism in terms of feminist theorising is considerable. We
have discussed at length in preceding chapters of this thesis the need for feminist
theorising to critically evaluate issues ofpower and power distribution within social
contexts. The failure of premodern communitarian theory to question the
communal voice deemed dominant in a particular context constitutes a potentially
dangerous omission within its methodology.
108 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p. 40
109 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p. 61
110 Rabinow, P. The Foucault Reader, Supra. Chapter One, Note 73, p. 385
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In The Quality of Life,III Nussbaum does appear to go some way towards
recognising the deficiency of this oversight. Indeed, she explicitly states that past
writers on virtue, including Aristotle, have lacked sensitivity to the ways in which
different traditions of discourse structure experience. She goes so far as to suggest
that "The Aristotelian should begin...by granting that with respect to any complex
matter of deep human importance, there is no 'innocent eye', no way of seeing the
world that is entirely neutral and free of cultural shaping.,,112
This may seem to suggest an important concession in Nussbaum's work that opens
the way for consideration of hegemonic power and the effect that it has upon the
experience of the singular voice of the community. However, Nussbaum's critical
zeal stops here. No discussion is afforded to the implications upon her overall
thesis of carrying this recognition of social constructionism to its logical limits.
Perhaps the reason for this omission lies in the fact that conjecture along this line
would prove highly damaging, removing the simplistic reliance upon unitary
community which is central to her own and MacIntyre's thesis.
This suspicion has been confirmed to some extent by Nussbaum's treatment of
similar issues within her recent work, Sex and Social Justice.i'? To her credit
within this work Nussbaum seeks to devote significantly more attention to the issue
ofhegemonic power forces that has been lacking in her material to date. While this
development is welcome in some respects, the effect that it bears upon the overall
tone of her claims within the book suggest that she has indeed encountered
difficulties trying to reconcile this new awareness alongside her previous
communitarian leanings. In attending to the particularity of community at the
micro as well as macro level, Sex and Social Justice finds itself struggling for
criteria with which to delineate communal concerns. In attending to issues of the
III Nussbaum, M. "Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelain Approach" in Nussbaum, M. & Sen, A. (ed.)
The Quality ofLife, Supra. Preface, Note 22
112Nussbaum, M. "Non-Relative Virtues" in Nussbaum, M. & Sen, A. (ed.) The Quality ofLife, Supra.
Preface, Note 22, p.260
113 Nussbaum, M. Sex and Social Justice (1999) Oxford University Press
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management of power forces within the constitution of a communal discourse,
Nussbaum recognises that her theory can no longer rely upon the singular and one-
dimensional communal voice that communitarianism's superficially context-
specific theory has tended to attribute to a particular community. Dealing
consciously with issues of sub-cultures within society, Nussbaum has been forced
in her most recent work to recognise the superficiality of the means through which
communitarian theory has generally sought to attribute communality.
However, recognition of the hegemonic power forces of the micro level leads
Nussbaum into an uncomfortable dilemma - committed to the development of
theory that attends to both the particular and the universal, the question becomes
one of how to incorporate this recognition without encouraging a disintegration of
theory into relativism. In struggling to achieve this aim, Nussbaum has somewhat
out of hand rejected her communitarian position in favour of are-evaluation of the
liberal tradition. Indeed, within the book, Nussbaum goes so far as to state that
"this volume is therefore centrally shaped...by the tradition of Kantian liberalism
represented, today, in the writings of John Rawls.,,114
While this change of position may be unexpected, it is certainly not surprising.
What it illustrates most clearly is the basic tension between standard communitarian
theory and recognition of the effects of structural power forces that operate behind
the scenes of even the most particularist and context-specific 'communal' voice.
The tum towards liberalism in Nussbaum's recent work is best explained by her
dawning recognition of the significance of the oversights regarding hegemony
inherent in the communitarian position and the tension which this recognition has
generated with her commitment to the confines of the absolutist - relativist
dichotomy discussed above.
114Nussbaum, M. Sex and Social Justice, Supra. Chapter Six, Note 113, p. 23-4
309
Although the implications of this oversight may have been less damaging for
MacIntyre in the development of his ethical enterprise, for Nussbaum (writing as a
feminist theorist) the implications are far graver. Exposition and destruction of the
hegemonic power dynamics structuring social existence has been a well-recognised
aim of the feminist movement yet Nussbaum's previous ethical approach remained
ill-equipped to perform such a task. Many communities are characterised by
practices of exclusion and suppression of non-group members, especially outsiders
defined by ethnicity and sexual orientation.I IS What's more, the practices and
traditions of many communities are exploitative and oppressive toward many of
their own members. It has been the averred project of feminism to illustrate the
existence of such oppressive mechanisms and to challenge their legitimacy.
Nussbaum's original Aristotelian thesis, however, demanded blind complicity to
the demands of such power networks and normative requirements on the basis of
their continued privileged status as the dominant cultural expression. Feminist
theory is necessarily rooted in recognition of the need to challenge those traditions
and practices which show arbitrary gender differentiation - many of these are
located in just the sorts of communities invoked by communitarians. As Friedman
notes, "any political theory that appears to support the hegemony of such
communities and which appears to restore them to a position of unquestioned moral
authority must be viewed with grave suspicion.v'" Recognising the merits of this
critique, Nussbaum has sought to redevelop her position to accommodate its
insights. In doing so, however, she has felt compelled to divest herself of many of
her original premodern Aristotelian leanings and to replace them with a strong
liberal influence.
While Nussbaum's recent position offers an improvement in terms of ensuring a
greater recognition of the important role of power forces, in many respects it is also
a considerable blow to those feminist theorists who have persistently maintained
the merits of a feminist reliance upon communitarianism. We have discussed at
115 Friedman, M. "Feminism and Modem Friendship", Supra. Chapter Six, Note 50, p. 281. See also
Young,1. "The Ideal of Community and The Politics ofDifference" (1986) 12 Social Theory and Practise
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length in Chapter Four the nature of feminist concerns regarding liberalism and the
liberal legal subject. By substantially flying in the face of such concerns,
Nussbaum's dramatic return to liberalism ought to generate some concern. What
she has gained in terms of recognition of the important factor of hegemonic power
forces, she has lost in terms of the benefits she had convincingly portrayed in
favour of reliance upon the situated self of communitarianism.
The fact that this is the end result of Nussbaum's attempt at reconciliation of
premodern communitarianism and the existence of hegemonic power forces in
given communities does not necessarily imply, however, that this is the only
possible outcome of such reconciliation. While Nussbaum's philosophical options
have been constrained by her implicit self-confinement within the polarities of the
absolutist - relativist dichotomy, such that a return to liberalism has been
necessitated by her desire to avoid relativism in the incorporation of issues of
hegemony, other theorists who have more genuinely transcended these modernist
dichotomies suggest the existence of a considerable scope within which to
incorporate a critical attitude to power relations into the communal concerns
highlighted over the duration of this chapter. What the discussion of Nussbaum's
recent work illustrates is that this incorporation is far from simplistic. However,
recognition of the difficulties involved in the project does not imply that feminist
theory should abandon its attempts at reconciliation in the way that Nussbaum has
done. Feminist critique has consistently established the liberal frameworks that
Nussbaum reverts to in her latter works to be hugely oppressive and problematic.
What's more, her tum to liberalism undermines the significance of the potential
benefits offered to feminism by communitarianism that have been highlighted
within this Chapter. These benefits are significant and the possibility for their
achievement ought to be examined in a more determined manner than that proposed
by Nussbaum in her latter works.
116 Friedman, M. "Feminism and Modern Friednship", Supra. Chapter Six, Note 50, p. 281
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The role of Nussbaum in preceding discussion has been to illustrate the potential
for feminist recapitulations of premodern communitarianism to remedy many of the
inadequacies highlighted within the Aristotlelian framework that is central to
MacIntyre's thesis. The fact that Nussbaum's latter works have rejected
communitarianism because of its inability to account for the role of hegemonic
power does not necessarily imply that all subsequent feminist commentary ought to
do the same. On the contrary, many feminist commentators have continued to
highlight the potential merits of a feminist recapitulation of premodern
communitarianism. Most particularly, emphasis has continued to be lain upon the
relevance for feminism of Aristotle's account of the role of emotion in rationality
discussed previously. Aristotle's recognition that knowledge itself is not separable
from emotional engagement has allowed Lorraine Code, for example, to develop a
conception of empathy as a way of knowing which emphasises that the capacity
that human beings have to understand and relate to other humans is an intellectual
trait as well as a 'merely' emotional response. I I? This has a palpable link with the
well-documented feminist methodology of practical reasoning'I'' and provides
valuable legitimation to the feminist enterprise of determining an ethical model
based upon values of 'care' alongside values ofjustice.119
Likewise, Homiak I20 has argued that Aristotle's account of the good life offers a
useful corrective to women who too often define morality in terms of what they
give to others. By providing theoretical room for the agent to be concerned about
her own self-definition and self-determination (through Aristotle's discussion ofthe
detrimental effects of humility which include lack of self-knowledge'<') such
women are liberated to reject other's claims upon them when to do otherwise would
117 Code, L. What Can She Know?- Feminist Theory and the Construction ofKnowledge (1991) Cornell
University Press.
118 For further discussion of the method ofpractical reasoning - See Bartlett, K "Feminist Legal Methods",
Supra. Chapter Five, Note 85
119 Gilligan, C. In A Diferent Voice, Supra. Preface, Note 23. See Discussion of Care Ethics in Chapter
Seven for more on link between Aristotle and care ethics.
120 Homiak, M. "Feminism and Aristotle's Rational Ideal" in Anthony, L. and Witt, C. (ed.) A Mind of
One's Own - Feminist Essays on Reason and Onbjectivity (1993) Westview Press
121 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IV 3, 1125a 19-28
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make their own self-definition impossible.lf This has important consequences in
terms of the dilemma discussed particularly in Chapter Three of this thesis where
we noted the trend towards self-denigration often assumed to be an integral part of
the social role ofmotherhood.
"Aristotle's general conception of rationality exhibits many of the features
contemporary feminist thinkers consider important. His account of moral
reasoning also has attractive features from a feminist point of view. Feminists
have criticised contemporary moral theory for its limitation of moral reasoning to
the production of abstract, universal, impersonal principles, often generated by a
contractual model of human relationships. Aristotle's accounts of moral
reasoning, on the other hand, offer a model that recognises the particularist nature
of ethical decisions, the importance of individual circumstances and the rejection
of abstract rules.,,123
These illustrations of continued allegiance to the notion of an association between
feminism and premodern communitarianism represent important statements about
the reticence amongst many feminist commentators to abandon the beneficial
insights of communitarianism out of hand. Determining a method that can re-
discover these benefits, without abandoning Nussbaum's dawning insights into the
operation ofpower forces, will be the aim of the following chapter.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined the affinities and tensions between
communitarianism and feminism. Most specifically, we have noted the significant
parallel in concern regarding the socially embedded and constituted nature of the
human self, which stands antithetically to the subject who populates the
Enlightenment realm of Kantian influence. Although this has provoked a belief in
the absolute compatibility of communitarianism and feminism within some
commentators, we have also examined claims that on a closer inspection of both
schools of theory, we can unearth many areas ofpotential divergence.
122 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra Preface, Note 24, p. 181
123 Groenhout, R. "The Virtue of Care" in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra.
Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 183
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Taking the categories of communitarian thought developed by Hekrnan as our
foundation, we have examined the superficiality implicit in the dialectical model's
uncritical reverence to the notion of 'fraternity'. What's more, we have noted that
subsequent feminist re-evaluations of that dialectical model (such as that offered by
Friedman) have continued to betray similar superficiality. Hence, the main focus of
the latter part of this chapter has centred around the premodern conception of
community, originating in the ethics of Aristotle, but most often associated today
with Alasdair MacIntyre.
It is impossible to critically examine a potential link between such premodern
communitarianism and feminism without also giving detailed consideration to the
strong foundations of Aristotelian virtue ethics within this tradition. Unfortunately,
however, the relationship between Aristotle and feminism has often been a difficult
one. Nussbaum's work on Aristotle has enabled us to assess the likelihood of
meaningful affinity between feminism and any version of communitarianism that
remains heavily reliant upon Aristotelian ethics. In the final analysis, however,
although it may be possible for a feminist reconception of Aristotle (and by
implication premodern communitarianism) to redress elements of hierarchy and
conservatism often found disagreeable in virtue ethics, problems continue to
abound in regard to the invisibility of power dynamics within the communitarian
framework.
One of the most valuable insights gleaned from the postsructuralist account that
formed the body of the preceding chapter is encapsulated in that spirit of permanent
critique that is necessary to enable us to invoke meaningfully any notion of
communal voice. Lamentably, this critique IS largely absent from
communitarianism, and once brought into play calls into question the very reliance
upon communal discourse that is central to the whole communitarian project. We
have seen that feminist attempts to develop poststructuralism have often been
crippled by the exhibition of too strong a critical zeal, which has perpetuated a
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fragmented and experientially difficult account of the self. Meanwhile it seems
that feminist attempts to build upon communitarian foundations have been crippled
by a lack of critical analysis of the forms of community which we take as central to
our identity formation and sense of self.
The dangers of such lack of critical zeal are particularly pertinent, as we have seen,
in terms of feminist ethical analysis. However, our discussion of Nussbaum's
recent attempt to eradicate such oversights illustrates well the difficulties inherent
in making such concessions while also seeking to maintain a communitarian
allegiance. Finding the conflicting impulses of such a compromise too
conceptually jarring to her continued negotiations of the absolutist - relativist
dichotomy, Nussbaum has abandoned her premodern communitarian roots in
favour of a modified embracement of Kantian liberalism. It has been argued,
however, in the previous three chapters that the Kantian model of the self-
legislating, rational and individualist human subject is epistemologically
inappropriate and philosophically misguided. In recognition of that critique, the
majority of feminist commentators have demanded the expression of a moral theory
that no longer hides behind the paradigms of liberalism and the polarities. of
Enlightenment, but instead offers a conception of selfhood that can be expressed
outwith the shadow of the juridical. Our discussion over preceding chapters of the
inadequacies highlighted by feminist critique within the liberal frameworks of
subjectivity and agency should illustrate the reasoning behind the well-founded
reticence of many feminist commentators to follow suit with Nussbaum in this
regard.
In the following chapter, we will reevaluate the possibility of arriving at a
conception of self and of self-determination that not only recognises the
constitutive role of the communal and the relational but also recognises the role of
hegemonic power in the determination of that communal voice. In so doing, we
will seek a fluid conception of the self that offers the benefits of both Foucaultian
poststructuralism and premodern communitarianism without falling prey to the
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shortcomings brought to light by previous feminist attempts to build upon such
'mainstream' foundations.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
A MODIFIED ETIDCS OF CARE AND
CONTEXTUAL SUBJECTIVITY
"The self in connection with others appears neither stranded in isolation
screaming for help, nor lost in fusion with the entire world as a whole, but bound
in an indissoluble mode of relationship that is ostensibly different but hard to
describe"!
In the preceding two chapters, we have examined the attempts which have been
made by certain contemporary feminists to develop the philosophical foundations
established by both poststructuralism and communitarianism towards the realisation
of a more progressive feminist ethics. The project of any such feminist ethics is to
recognise the artificiality of the individualist notion of Kantian subjectivity, and of
the imperatives of abstracted autonomy to which that subjectivity is directed. In
place of this modernist paradigm, an appropriate feminist ethical position would
give credence to the centrality of affective ties, social expectations and
relationships in the construction of identity and would seek the epistemological
ground for a more fluid version of self-determination which permits concrete rather
than abstract decision-making. In examination of some of the most influential
attempts at such re-directive processes, however, problems have come to light that
have illustrated the existence of significant tension between feminism and the
schools ofpoststructuralist and communitarian thought.
Although concern with the deficiencies of the Kantian subject of legal liberalism
represents an important arena of united concern between these disparate schools,
and although many of the insights characteristic of these schools can herald
significant merit for the feminist academy, a simplistic and wholesale adoption of
either of these theses has proven neither desirable nor appropriate. In the case of
poststructuralism, Judith Butler's attempt' to build upon and re-develop the
Foucaultian thesis on agency in a line more compatible with feminist theory has
1 Gilligan, C. In a Different Voice, Supra. Preface, Note 23 (2nd ed. 1993), p.47
2 Discussed in Chapter Five, "Butler's Reformulation of Foucault"
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encountered a structural fragmentalism that renders it an ineffective medium for the
pursuit of the feminist movement's very real political ends. In the case of
communitarianism, Martha Nussbaum's attempt' to develop the neo-Aristotelian
idea of virtue ethics (upon which MacIntyre's premodern communitarianism is
parasitic) has proven equally as unsatisfactory because of its continued cognisance
of modernist epistemological dichotomies and because of its inability to critically
examine the play of power relations in the construction of particular community's
dominant discourses.
However, the failure of the attempts made by Judith Butier and Martha Nussbaum
to accommodate feminist ,theory within the ideological frameworks of
postsructuralism and communitarianism respectively cannot simplistically be
attributed to any inherent incompatibilities between these frameworks. On the
contrary, the work done by these contemporary feminists has gone a considerable
way towards exposing the parallel concerns between these schools of theory. The
shortcomings of each of their attempts can, however, be attributed in large degree
to the manner in which they have likewise sought to marry their disparate schools
of concern. In both Butler's and Nussbaum's project similarly flawed
methodologies and ideological priorities have undermined their analyses. For
differing reasons, both theories have been found to be incompatible with the
original and enduring political and epistemological aims of feminism as a
movement. In both contexts, the end result of theorising has been the debilitation,
at least to some extent, of feminism's power to attend to its aims and concerns."
Despite significant arenas of parallel concern and resonant arguments, therefore, it
seems that more is required from a feminist conception of agency and self than can
be afforded by feminist modifications upon pre-existing poststructuralist and
communitarian positions. Nonetheless, it remains the case that much of great
3 Discussed in Chapter Six, "Nussbaum's Reformulation of the Premodern Account"
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import can be discerned through the employment of a process of selective
incorporation of specific poststructuralist and communitarian insights. Within the
confines of this chapter, it will be argued that the benefits of this process of
selective incorporation may remain an achievable end. However, a preliminary to
the satisfaction of that end is the re-evaluation of a dedicated feminist ethical
framework that will form the basis upon which alternative 'mainstream' insights
may be grafted. .We must remain vigilant in ensuring that, in our clamour to
borrow theory from alternative bodies of thought, we do not trample over well-
established feminist foundations. The surest way to ensure compliance with that
caveat is to base our incorporation of poststructuralism and communitarianism on a
pre-existing feminist base. Illustration of the merits of this approach, both in
general terms, and in terms of the implications for our critique of consent, will form
the body of this chapter. While Butler and Nussbaum graft feminist thought onto
the mappings of different schools of mainstream theory, it will be argued here that
we should be developing feminist ethics with different priorities in mind.
In Chapter Four of this work, we examined in some detail the primary claims of the
feminist critique of the Kantian subject and have drawn attention to the
characteristics of subjectivity that an adequate feminist theory of the self would
seek to accommodate. Within the confines of this chapter, we will examine in more
detail what many have considered to be the most celebrated feminist attempt to
theorise upon alternative conceptions of the self, namely the notion of care ethics
originating in the works of developmental psychologist Carol Gilligan.' In so
doing, we will draw attention to the inadequacies that have plagued this 'pure'
feminist framework of critique and we will examine the extent to which these
inadequacies can be remedied by selective incorporation of poststructuralist and
communitarian insights. The end result of this process will give rise to the creation
4 The feminist aims and concerns referred to relate to the skeletal agenda for feminist theory highlighted at
the outset of this thesis and explained most clearly in the work of Jaggar, A. "Feminist Ethics" in Becker,
L. & Becker, C. (ed.) Encyclopedia ofEthics (1992), Supra. Preface, Note 7, p.361
5 See, for example, Freeman's commentary on Feminist Though in Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence
(1994) Sweet & Maxwell, Chapter 13.
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of a stronger, more experientially appropriate conception of the self that, unlike
those conceptions discussed in the preceding chapters, has been designed
specifically to meet the feminist moral, legal and ethical agendas accepted at the
outset of our discussion.6
This approach of grafting poststructuralist and communitarian insights onto an
established core of feminist theory of the self offers the most progressive potential
for feminist ethics. Selective incorporation within a feminist framework will
continue to enable a reliance upon valuable poststructuralist and communitarian
insights while also allowing us to escape the double-bind of too strong a reliance on
these genres of thought which has led to the weakness exhibited by the positions
developed in both Chapters Five and Six. Furthermore, in employing such eclectic
methodology we will be able to remedy many of the inadequacies that have
traditionally plagued such 'pure' feminist theories of the self.
Feminism and Developmental Moral Theory
Carol Gilligan's influential work, In a Different Voice7, has been utilised in
feminist debate for its support of a variety of assertions. Her relevance to the
current discussion can be located specifically within her claims in relation to the
alleged differences that her research has uncovered between the traditional
development of male and female morality. Recognition of the existence of this
differential has prompted Gilligan to set up opposing models of gendered
psychological development - these have been referred to as an 'ethics of justice'
and an 'ethics of care,.8 Although, as we shall see, many of the assertions that
Gilligan makes have generated justifiable criticism, subject to some necessary
modifications her work continues to offer strong potential for the development of
an experientially appropriate and philosophically enriched conception of human
subjectivity (both male and female).
6 See Discussion in Preface and also Chapter Four, "Feminist Concerns about the Legal Subject"
7 Gilligan, C. In a Different Voice, Supra. Preface, Note 23.
8 Gilligan, C. In a Different Voice, Supra. Preface Note 23, p. 63
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The principal motivation behind Gilligan's project was to question the model of
psychological development originating in the work of Lawrence Kohlberg.9
According to this Kohlbergian paradigm, female moral development arrests at an
earlier stage than male moral development. Hence the reason why men are
inherently more capable of autonomous decision-making and meaningful operation
in the public and legal sphere and why women are inherently more suited to the
confines of the private sphere and the lifestyle it promotes. Gilligan's work has
sought to challenge these conclusions by questioning the implicit assumptions
about the context of completed moral development that informs Kohlberg's modeL
Kohlberg's theory is based on the notion that completed moral development is
exemplified by a subject's mastery of the life skills of autonomy, rationality and
free wilL Gilligan notices, however, that these are also the skills that have been
epitomised as characteristic of male subjectivity and the public realm. Those
characteristics that typify traditional female subjectivity are nowhere to be found in
Kohlberg's model. Gilligan seeks to redress the imbalance produced by this
cultural bias through examination of alternative models of moral coherence which
accept the significance of life skills of care and nurturance, and which no longer
uncritically take reason, determinism and formalism to be paradigmatic. As
Gilligan herself explains her project-
"Theories ofpsychological development and conceptions of self and morality that
have linked progress or goodness with disconnection or detachment and
advocated separation from women in the name of psychological growth or health
are dangerous because they cloak an illusion in the trappings of science: the
illusion that disconnection or disassociation from women is goOd."IO
This genre of critique of the Kohlbergian tradition in moral theory parallels in many
senses the critique that we have examined in preceding chapters in relation to the
universalist neo-Kantian ethical model of subjectivity. Reiterating Sandel's
concern that a polity based only on the procedural and judicial model of human
relationships would lack any serious depth of identity, II Gilligan has reported her
9 Kohlberg, L. The Philosophy ofMoral Development, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 90
10 Gilligan, C. In a Different Voice, Supra. Preface, Note 23, xxvii
11 Sandel, M. "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self' (1984) 12 (1) Political Theory
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female subject's bewilderment at a language ofmorality which poses even the most
personal dilemmas in the format of abstract rights. Susan Hekman has noted that In
a Different Voice is both an indication of, and a major contributor to, the shift in
contemporary analysis away from its previous aspirations towards universalism and
absolutism. 12 In developing a greater emphasis upon particularity and context, this
shift in analysis has encouraged an ascending attack upon a modernist epistemology
that perceives the legal subject as rational, abstract and autonomous.l ' Although
Gilligan is not a moral philosopher, and although she never explicitly attacks the
subject ofmodernist thought, her work forms a significant contribution towards this
deconstruction of the neo-Kantian moral and legal subject. Gilligan stipulates the
existence of a potential alternative to this traditional conception by articulating a
subject that is the product of relational and discursive experiences. It is this aspect
that renders her thesis so compatible with the current project of uncovering an
agenda for the ethical and legal treatment of the operation of consent that accounts
for the realities rather than the ideal abstracts of social living.
Like the communitarian thesis discussed in the preceding chapter, the relational self
envisaged by Gilligan accepts that the role played by relationships and context is
one constitutive of self-identity. In challenging the liberal presupposition that there
is a definitive and given 'core' self, Gilligan presents the potential for a fluid
perception of agency that sees the existence of autonomous selves as itself a
product of relationships. The essential claim that Gilligan seeks to make is that
woman's moral judgement tends to be contextual rather than formal such that when
making moral judgements women tend to combine "the recognition of
interconnection between self and other with an awareness of the self as the arbiter
of choice.,,14 Where Kohlberg has discerned a similar tendency within female
decision-making and has labelled it as evidence of moral immaturity, Gilligan has
attempted to promote this reasoning in a 'different voice', positing the ability to
12 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p. 2
13 See Discussion in Chapter Four, "Feminist Concerns About the Legal Subject"
14 Gilligan, C. In a Different Voice, Supra. Preface, Note 23, p.96
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consider context and the viewpoint of the particular, concrete other as an essential
component ofmoral maturity.
Most specifically, Gilligan's work exposes a certain relationship between moral
theory and models of identity. While a priority in favour of moral reasoning based
on rights and justice assumes an identity of atomised individualism, a priority in
favour of reasoning based on responsibility and care assumes an identity comprised
of an essential interconnection between self and others. Without necessarily
seeking to reject universalist moral theories based on atomistic individualism,
Gilligan proposes that we should at least give equally valid recognition to her
model of an 'ethics of care' based on the assertion of a fundamental connection
between self and other.
This recognition of the interdependence between one's moral VOIce and one's
identity highlights a common nexus of concern amongst many of the commentators
discussed within this work. In taking seriously women's 'stories' as exhibitive of
women's moral frameworks and senses of self, Gilligan aligns herself alongside
many other contemporary anti-Enlightenment theorists who stress the role of the
narrative in the moral landscape. In the preceding chapter, we discussed at length
the role ascribed to narratives in the premodern form of communitarianism. While
concern has been expressed that the reliance upon narratives in this genre has posed
the spectre of conservatism, the use of narratives as a methodological tool for
substantial change has also been highlighted. Donna Harraway, whose
poststructuralist work was discussed in Chapter Five, for example, also places a
strong reliance upon the role of narratives as a means of exacting social change.f
The common reliance upon the concept of the narrative amongst these disparate
theorists illustrates the existence of a shared concern with the relationship between
one's experiences of morality and one's conception of self. This in tum highlights
15 While in our discussion in Chapter Five, specific focus was placed upon her assessment of the
possibilities of communal association for the fragmented self (Supra. Chapter Five, Note 103), particularly
relevant in this context is her discussion of the role of narratives in Harraway, D. Primate Visions-
Gender, Race and Nature in the World ofModem Science (1989) Routledge
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the specificity of the notion of the atomistic and abstract legal subject to the
Enlightenment moral framework of universality and objectivity that dominates
prevailing legal analysis.
While Gilligan's psychological hypotheses have undoubtedly provided much of the
inspiration behind the genre of care ethics, it ought to be noted that many disparate
theorists now align themselves with this school of theory. This remains the case
despite the existence of internal variations in their theoretical dispositions.
Nonetheless, a number of features are generally recognised as being constitutive of
this particular genre of thought. In the context of her discussion of care ethics,
Groenhout has isolated the main components that unite those disparate strands of
, ,
theory congregating under this ideological header" Their unity, according to
Groenhout, can be located in their common impetus towards the development of a
new ethical theory that will successfully articulate a female (caring) perspective on
ethics. Based upon the assertion that female moral reasoning is marked by a
concern to maintain nurturing relationships, rather than a concern to protect
individual rights or to obey abstract ethical principles, care ethicists have sought to
place care at the centre of moral life. The aim of this conceptual shift is the
realisation of an ethics that emphasises special relationships rather than
impartiality, and which recognises that human agents have a body, a history and a
socio-cultural background that heavily influence their self-conceptions and remit
for the exercise of agency.
In placing the affective value of care at the centre of ethical life in this way,
advocates are not necessarily requiring the abandonment of concepts such as justice
or rationality. On the contrary, many are simply requesting the supplementation of
the dominant justice voice of liberalism with the historically subjugated voice of
care. It is hoped by such theorists that this incorporation will redress the
imbalances that have encouraged a problematic one-dimensional conception of the
16 Groenhout, R. "The Virtue of Care" in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra.
Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 183-4
324
self in legal analysis as radically individualist and abstract. While liberal theory
has failed to question the epistemological veracity of that conception of self, the
care ethics approach suggests that the perpetuation of this abstract perception has
constituted an assault upon the realities of social living in a contextual framework
of relationships, responsibilities and affective ties.
Developing the care ethics impetus of Gilligan with specific reference to the liberal
legal system, Worden17 has argued that the incorporation of an ethics of care into
legal decision-making offers a pragmatic counter to the tendency exhibited by the
dominant frameworks of liberalism to generalise and class human beings as valid
only as part of the legal order, or as part of some category of persons within that
order. Building upon Gilligan's assertion that the masculine mode, deemed to be
unemotional, impersonal and objective, coincides with cultural expectations of
justice and sound moral judgement, Worden contends that this masculine mode has
been transposed in an idealised form into the liberal legal systems of modernity.
While the dominant rationality sees social reality as a set of hierarchically ordered
rules and normative truths, the rationality characterised by imperatives of care
perceives the same social reality in terms of interconnected dynamics held together
on a morality of continuity, communication and interdependence. In real terms,
therefore, the care ethics approach requires a more serious recognition of the
centrality of relationship both in terms of personal identity formation and in terms
of exercising personal and communal forms of agency. As we shall examine in
ensuing sections, the conception of self that thus emerges facilitates the creation of
a less restrictive model for the exercise of agency and self-determination than that
currently embodied within the prevailing liberal conception of consent.
17 Worden, C. "Overshooting the Target- A Feminist Deconstruction of Legal Education" 34 American
University Law Review 1141
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Criticisms ofCare Ethics & The Possibility ofTheir Strategic Eradication
While these ideological aims of the care ethics movement have been widely
applauded within the feminist community, the epistemological dichotomies upon
which the overall project is erected have been less well received. Concerns in this
regard have lead many commentators to adopt an unnecessarily sceptical position in
regard to the potential merits of care ethicist theorising. Within the confines of this
section, we will examine the nature ofmany ofthese concerns. Having done so, we
will go on to illustrate in each case the extent to which these concerns can be
significantly redressed through the incorporation into care ethics of the elements of
communitarian and poststructuralist theory advocated as relevant to feminist
critique over the duration of the preceding two chapters. Applying our foregoing
analysis of significant arenas of parallel concern between feminism and these
alternative schools of anti-Enlightenment theory, we will develop a more concrete
framework for the integration of these insights to remedy many of the most central
deficiencies that have been highlighted in regard to the care ethics tradition.
Care ethicists have often been criticised for their tendency towards essentialism,
and in this particular context, for their tendency to demand a dichotomy between
justice and care that is reminiscent of the problematic liberal division between
public and private spheres. In Justice, Gender and the Family,18 for example, Okin
has provided a criticism of such polarised logic, suggesting that the appearance of a
deep and abiding conflict between care and justice (which the care ethics tradition
has often been criticised for being supportive of) arises from a fundamental
misunderstanding as to the ways in which these two values may be related.
Questioning the assumption that justice necessarily takes away from intimacy,
harmony and love, Okin asks why the values of care and justice should necessarily
be seen as mutually exclusive and asks why we should feel compelled to choose
between two apparently dichotomous ethical frameworks.
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While claims that Gilligan's model establishes an intractable dichotomy between
male and female forms of moral reasoning have been met with debate from
subsequent defenders of her position," what has been challenged significantly less
is the assertion that her model establishes precisely this kind of dichotomy between
the values of care and justice. However, recognising the existence of this polarity
within Gilligan's theory necessarily requires recognition that her perpetuation of
this dichotomy offers implicit support to the dualistic ideological frameworks that
are characteristic of Enlightenment rationalism.i" Any theory that exhibits even
shades of reliance upon such problematic dichotomous categories offers itself up as
a conspicuous target for varying genres of feminist critique. This feminist critique
has attributed to such categories an integral place in the overall perpetuation of
social gender oppression"
While these criticisms of Gilligan's theory are, therefore, significant, they are far
from unsurpassable. There is nothing in Gilligan's position that renders an inherent
dichotomy between care and justice necessary in the sense that is often suggested.
Through the selective incorporation into Gilligan's account of certain aspects of the
premodern Aristotelian position discussed in the preceding chapter, it becomes
possible to conceive the relationship between the ethics of care and the ethics of
justice in a form other than the mutually exclusive framework attributed to her own
approach. In our previous discussion of premodern communitarianism, attention
was drawn to its reliance upon the Aristotelian ethical claim that exhibiting
emotionality constitutes an integral part of what it is to act rationally. By
employing this virtue ethicist approach in defence of the rationality of emotions in
this context, we furnish care ethicists with the conceptual ability to accept the
notion that care is not in fact antithetical to justice. What's more, we present the
18 Okin, S. Justice, Gender and the Family (1989) Basic Books
19 The nature of this debate will be discussed in more detail later in this section. See, for example, Worden,
C. "Overshooting the Target", Supra. Chapter Seven, Note 17
20 See Discussion in Chapter Four, "Feminist Concerns about the Legal Subject" & "Feminism and the
Revival of the Enlightement"
21 See, for example, Smart, C. Feminism and the Power ofLaw, Supra. Chapter One, Note 10 who lodges
scathing criticism of the binary system of logic that establishes such dichotomies between the emotional
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possibility for their reinsertion as complementary virtues existing at different
positions along the same continuum of social relations.
This reformulated position has been adopted in the works of many of the theorists
who continue to ascribe to the care ethics position. One of the most well-received
assertions of this altered position has been forwarded by Noddings through the
claim that care, rather than being antithetical to rationality, is actually amongst its
most important components.f Similar sentiment has also come from the more
unlikely source of John Rawls who has argued that,
"It is also the case that the sense of justice is continuous with the love of
mankind. . ... the difference between the principles of justice and the love of
mankind is that the latter is supererogatory, going beyond the moral
requirements ...yet clearly the objects of these two sentiments are closely related,
being defined in large part by some conception ofjustice.t'r'
In developing a feminist theory that borrows the notion of compatibility between
care and justice from the premodern communitarian framework, we alleviate many
of the concerns of feminist commentators regarding the fundamental dichotomy at
the base of Gilligan's thesis. While this is to be welcomed because of its ability to
counter an important field of criticism that has been lodged against the care ethics
tradition, incorporation of this Aristotelian insight into the care ethics framework is
far from unproblematic. In dissolving the legitimacy of the dichotomy between
justice and care that many have considered central to Gilligan's theory, the question
arises whether this incorporation ofjustice into care, and vice versa, will in the final
analysis also dissolve the legitimacy attributed to the care ethics approach itself.
and the rational while according priority to the side of the binary associated with traditional perceptions of
masculinity.
22 Noddings, N. A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (1984) University of California Press
23 Rawls, J. A Theory ofJustice, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 35 p. 476. Importantly, however, Rawls is here
discussing his peculiar conception ofjustice, namely justice as fairness, which in many respects differs
from more traditional liberal conceptions ofjustice specifically in regard to its heavy reliance upon notions
of fairness, etc. which by their very nature have a close affinity to the notion of love than more abstract
concerns such as equality, reciprocity, etc.
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Although at first sight it may appear that Gilligan's care ethics tradition necessarily
relies upon a support network of definitions and dichotomies which posit care and
justice as mutually exclusive, this perception is in fact illusory and recognition of
its artificiality does little to render the impetus of the care ethics tradition
insupportable. While accepting that care and justice are not necessarily antithetical
may slightly dilute the impact of Gilligan's critique, it does not dissolve the
importance of her insight that care and justice are perceived as typifying alternative
ethical frameworks. What's more, it does not alter the experiential validity of her
assertion that male and female agents are disproportionately encouraged to adopt
gender-specific moral identities. After all, it has never been Gilligan's concern to
act as a moral philosopher examining whether care and justice are actually mutually
exclusive ethical systems. Gilligan, as a psychologist, has been concerned instead
to examine the ways in which individual agents perceive these frameworks, and her
conclusion that people perceive them as mutually exclusive remains not only
feasible, but continues to gain support from the critique of the rational-emotional,
public-private dualisms which have formed the body of feminist theory.
Gilligan's theory does not seek to develop an emancipatory project. Rather, it
simply seeks to examine the ways in which human agents perceive their own
developmental processes. This project does not preclude the possibility that people
actually perceive justice and care as mutually exclusive and perceive their own
psychological development as entailing a choice between either care or justice.
This remains a valid assertion and it is only when we project our own pretensions
towards moral philosophy onto the framework laid bare by Gilligan that we are
presented with problems as to whether care and justice are in fact dichotomous. Of
course this is an issue that any adequate ethical theory must eventually encounter,
but it is not an issue that must necessarily be dealt with by Gilligan's project which
evolves around perceptions of reality rather than reality per ceo
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That said, however, we cannot build an ethical program from the foundation of care
ethics without giving detailed examination to this concern. Once again, however,
satisfactory treatment of the issue can be realised by a selective incorporation into
care ethics of specific communitarian insights developed outwith the feminist
academy and discussed in some length in the preceding chapter. Through
examination of the treatment of justice and care afforded by premodern
communitarian and neo-Aristotelian approaches comes the realisation that where
Gilligan's conclusions may represent our perceptions of the status quo, this is not
the only possible option. While the tenacity of the perceived dichotomy between
justice and care manifests the dominance of binary logic and rationalistic polarities,
it indicates nothing about their metaphysical legitimacy. Developing this
recognition further allows us to abandon the more deterministic ethical vision often
falsely attributed to Gilligan's psychological theory. Care ethicists, thus liberated,
are better equipped to examine potential means through which individual agents
can realise the parallel unity between care and justice which theory dictates to be
logically and ethically possible.
While the recognition that care and justice are not necessarily antithetical and
mutually exclusive may not affect the legitimacy of Gilligan's claim that social
agents continue to perceive them as such, it does forcefully highlight the need for
an appropriate definition of what it is to comply with the virtuous demands of
caring. Once disarmed of the possibility of defining caring as that which is opposed
to justice, care ethicists must develop determinate and identifiable conceptions of
the characteristics of 'caring'. Despite the centrality of this notion to the entire care
ethics tradition, however, the definition attributed to 'care' has often been less than
satisfactory.i" In fact, problems abound in relation to the exact definition of caring
employed by care ethicists. Although many propose the mother-child relationship
as being paradigmatic." this of itself is largely circular because it seeks to define
24 Groenhout, R. "The Virtue of Care" in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra.
Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 184
25 Held, V. Feminist Morality - Transforming Culture, Society and Politics (1993) University of Chicago
Press & Ruddick, S. Maternal Thinking - Towards a Politics ofPeace (1989) Ballantyne
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caring in terms of good mothering, while defining the good mother as one who
cares.i'' This lack of clarity in the definition of its central virtue has been seized
upon by more sceptical commentators as illustrative of another significant obstacle
to the meaningful development of this ethical tradition.
However, as has been the case in regard to the previous criticism discussed above,
much is offered to feminist theory of this genre by a selective incorporation from
the school of premodern communitarianism discussed in the preceding chapter.
With its strong reliance upon neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, this school of thought
has devoted a considerable amount of energy to the development of more adequate
definitions of notions reminiscent of care. For example, although care may not
have been dealt with specifically, much emphasis has been placed upon the
Aristotelian conceptualisation of the notion of friendship which shares many
common characteristics with what we perceive to be in keeping with caring." On
that basis, therefore, care ethicists of a feminist disposition would do well, once
again, to look towards a selective incorporation of some of these insights to furnish
them with a more adequate definition of the central component of their ethical
framework.
One of the most promising aspects of this turn to the Aristotelian analysis of
friendship in the pursuit of a more meaningful definition of care is the potential
thus discovered for the elaboration of an ethical theory of caring which does not
simultaneously establish a moral imperative of selfless altruism. The unmodified
conception of an ethics of care established by Gilligan has often encountered
vehement criticism over its tendency to prioritise the value of care above anything
else. However, as one feminist commentator has warned,
"when I reflect on the history of women I realise how much our caring has
nurtured and empowered others. I see how good it has been, for others.
26 Groenhout, R. "The Virtue of Care" in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra.
Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 184
27 Shollmeier, P. Other Selves - Aristotle on Personal and Political Friendship (1994) State of New York
University Press
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However, I also see how terribly costly it has been for women. And so the first
question that arises for me is one that arises for many of Gilligan's subjects. Can
an ethics of care avoid self-sacrificez'f"
Deficiencies inherent in the ethics of care tradition in this regard have been
commonly noted and built upon in the criticisms lodged against it. Catharine
Mackinnon among others has often expressed concern about the inability of an
ethics of care to politicise and problematise the ongoing subordination of women
through the valorisation of their social role as benevolent carers." The damaging
implications of such assumptions of feminine selflessness and altruism have been
well-established within this thesis, particularly within the discussion in Chapter
Three of the oppressive effects of ideologies of maternal subservience upon the
experiences and liberties of pregnant women. To critics of the care ethics tradition,
its inherent valorisation of the capacity to care seems to require the extension rather
than the elimination of the trends of cultural expectation discussed within that
Chapter. Understandably, this has provoked considerable concern amongst
feminist commentators." Accepting the legitimacy of these concerns, many
theorists within the care ethics tradition have conceded the need to establish a limit
upon the extent to which it is appropriate for a human agent to care. However they
have often encountered difficulties in establishing this limit in a non-arbitrary
fashion. After all, if caring is the central feature of one's ethical theory, it would
seem that only care itself could limit our ethical obligation to care for another.
Nonetheless, as Groenhout notes "It would be preferable...to have some way of
limiting the obligation to care short of complete self-sacrifice.t'" Through
incorporation of the premodern communitarian emphasis upon a neo-Aristotelian
conception of a rational life, we are enabled to distinguish healthy relationships of
28 Houston, Prolegomena to Future Caring, p.7. Quoted in Rhode, D. Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual
Difference (1990) Yale University Press, p.171
29 MacKinnon, C. "Difference and Domination - On Sex Discrimination" in Feminism Unmodified, Supra.
Preface, Note 9
30 Amongst such concerned critics has beenHarding, S. "The Curious Coincidence of Feminine and
African Moralities" in Kittay, E. & Meyers, D. (ed.) Women and Moral Theory, Supra. Chapter Four, Note
29, p.296-315
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care from unhealthy relationships of subordination and self-sacrifice. Hence, the
conceded need for a concern for the agent herself and her own development within
an ethical model of care can be satisfied by the incorporation of the Aristotelian
notion of care and friendship in the broader sense - i.e. as incorporating care for
oneself and one's own intellectual and moral development as a necessary balance to
one's concern with care for others. A definition of care that permits this broader
interpretatiorrf provides a much needed limit upon the operation of the obligation
to care and renders criticisms of an inherent call to self-sacrifice redundant. Self-
sacrifice is only implicated in an ethics of care position to the extent that the
definition of care involved implies only the narrow notion of offering care to
others. The premodern model ofvirtue, however, provides philosophical grounding
for the adoption of a broader notion of care which encompasses both care for others
and care for oneself, thereby imposing necessary limits on the level of care
demanded by the imperatives of this ethical tradition.
Similarly narrow interpretations of the ambit of care involved in the care ethics
tradition have resulted in the generation of another line of significant critique. It
has been contended that, by placing strenuous emphasis on a perilously vague
notion of care, this ethical tradition runs the risk of limiting the focus of the moral
agent to those people in close proximity to her.33 This presents an anomaly to a
feminist tradition that has been committed to a respect for the well-being and needs
even of those at a distance from oneself. Once again, however, the deficiencies
inherent in this aspect of the definition of care can be remedied through the
invocation of a broader conception of the practice of 'caring'. In developing this
broader and therefore more adequate definition of caring to answer this line of
31 Groenhout, R. "The Virtue of Care" in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra.
Chapter Six, Note 75, p.l94
32 'Broader" here is used to refer to that which is the opposite of the 'narrow' conception set out, for
example by Bubek, D. in Care, Justice and Gender (1995) Clarendon Press. As "Caring for is meeting the
needs of one person by another person where face-to-face interactions between carer and cared for is a
crucial element of the overall activity." (p.129)
33 Benhabib, S. Situating the Self, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 22, p. 178-202
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critique, care ethicists should again employ a selective incorporation of insights
from 'mainstream' premodern communitarian and nee-Aristotelian ethics.
Particularly relevant in this context is not only the communitarian reliance upon the
Aristotelian definition ofthe reminiscent virtue of friendship to encompass concern
for the needs of others, but also the notion discussed above that justice is an
element of caring, and caring an element of justice. By attending to the insights
asserted within the premodern virtue ethics school, feminist ethicists are able to
chart theoretical grounding for an account of the proper relations between people
unconnected by ties of affection within the ethical franieworks of both care and
justice. By incorporating the Aristotelian notion of the virtuous life to suggest that
true human excellence involves not only rational decision-making, but also caring,
it becomes apparent that the virtuous life cannot be understood as requiring the
distancing of oneself from those who are weak, or needy. Rather, it is precisely in
the maintenance of such relationships that one is able to develop part of what any
appropriate definition of caring must demand, namely a concern for the needs of
others, whether they are closely related or not.34 This would remedy the concern
with the limitations of care ethics by mediating relations between unrelated others,
without necessitating our abandonment to the fictitious pretensions of purely self-
interested, rational agents resorted to by alternative dynamic models.
This Aristotelian perspective is closely related to the conception employed by
premodern communitarianism regarding the relationships that exist between
different individuals. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, there is much in
that conception which renders it a valuable ally in the development of a feminist
ethical program. Briefly, this perception has been summarised by Nussbaum as
involving a belief that each human being is, and necessarily is, a definite individual
establishing her own track through life, with her own pleasure and pains located
34 Groenhout, R. "The Virtue of Care" in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra.
Chapter Six, Note 75, p. 190
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within the confines of her own body." Nonetheless, each human being is not
separate in the kind of hard and impenetrable way assumed by Kantian and
contractarian models. On the contrary, each human being needs and depends upon
others in a variety of complex ways and through a variety of relationships. The
value of this· model in transcending the difficulties inherent in both the staunch
individualism of Kant and the radical fragmentalism of poststructuralism is, as we
have seen in the preceding chapter, immediately observable to those feminists
involved in the project of seeking the realisation of a new ethical paradigm.
Against this theoretical background, the emerging definition of care that mediates
these relationships between ,distinct but dependent human agents necessarily
becomes more complex than the narrower conception of care permits. The
emerging definition becomes one of care in the broadest sense as involving care for
oneself alongside care for others, as involving care for those at a distance as well as
those in close proximity, and as involving care as an aspect ofjustice rather than an
antithesis to it. By the incorporation of the premodern communitarian reliance
upon Aristotelian premises within the definition of care in this manner the care
ethics tradition become equipped to counter criticism of its lack of clarity in the
nature of what is involved in care. What's more, it is also enabled to counter
concerns about its lack of limitation on the demands of care and its alleged
restriction of the ambit of human relationship to those of close proximity. This
takes the care ethics tradition a long way towards a stronger and more promising
model.
However, a less easily remedied line of critique of care ethics centres around the
potentially essentialist approach it takes towards the identification of a generic
woman's voice. Many care ethicists have been interpreted as suggesting that
women's moral experiences are naturally those of nurturing, self-sacrifice and the
maintenance of relationships even at high personal costs. This in tum lends support
35 Nussbaum, M. "Aristotle, Feminism and Needs for Functioning" in Freeland, C. (ed.) Feminist
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to the conclusion that women are naturally suited to a life of subservience to the
needs of others. This has to be questioned, however, because the traits thus
identified as feminine are common to women who are raised under restrictive
circumstances, and as such are perhaps better understood as mechanisms for
survival rather than virtues." The significance of the problem that this presents to
care ethics depends very much upon the interpretation afforded by these thinkers to
the roots of the gender differentials that they identify. Are the differentials that
Gilligan picks up on natural, or are they the result of social conditioning? What's
more if it is the case (as the dominant body of this thesis has argued) that these
differences are in main part the result of social construction, does Gilligan's
valorising an ethics of care in women as a complement to the masculine ethics of
justice not run the dangerous risk of entrenching further those familiar (but
constructed) gender stereotypes?
Although Gilligan shows some inclination towards the mothering theory of Nancy
Chodorow that exhibits a heavy reliance upon the notion of inter-personal and
social constructionismj" Gilligan herself never really examines the roots of the
gender differential that she isolates. The dominant tradition of feminist theory
suggests, however, that there is nothing natural or immutable about such gender
difference.38 On that basis, we may assume that any such differences in moral
reasoning can be attributed to some extent at least to the pressures of social
conditioning. Gilligan's theory never asks that we question the gender specific
forms of reasoning to which we as gendered subjects are assigned. This, however,
has difficult implications for the development of feminist ethics outwith the
demands of social constructionism and renders impossible the realisation of
meaningful autonomy (male or female) through continued compulsory ascription to
Interpretations ofAristotle, Supra. Chapter Six, Note 75, p.252.
36 Harding, S. "The Curious Coincidence ofFerninine and African Moralities" in Kittay, E. & Meyers, D.
(ed.) Women and Moral Theory, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 29, p.296-315
37 Chodorow, N. The Reproduction ofMothering, Supra. Chapter Three, Note 1
38 For a detailed analysis of this biological essentialism v. social constructionism debate within feminist
theory, See Sayers, J. Biological Politics - Feminist and Anti-Feminist Perspectives (1982) Tavistock
Publishing
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constructed gendered roles. Claudia Card has expressed this concern particularly
strongly in her claim that Gilligan's valorising of the morality of care and
responsibility produces a gender-specific version of Neitzschean slave morality."
In order to eradicate this tendency within the care ethics tradition, Card suggests
that theorists must recognise and try to accommodate an examination of the
underside ofwomen's ethics in line with the poststructuralist notion that the origins
of morality are the internalised controls and expectations imposed upon the
powerless by those wielding power.l" What such an examination would illustrate is
the extent to which the gender-specific traits manifest in Gilligan's opposing moral
voices are the result of heavily curtailed social constructionism in an environment
within which women are expected to care and gain their social status from their
continued role as carers.
Building upon this critique, many other feminist commentators have challenged the
superficiality of Gilligan's categories not only in terms of her affirmation of the
scripted role of women, but also her affirmation of the scripted role of men as
autonomous, rational and objective. Specifically in relation to female identities,
these theorists have expressed concern that Gilligan's reliance upon the role of care
in female morality denies the significance of other aspects of social living in which
female agents are involved. In so doing, it is alleged that Gilligan's theory
continues to implicitly marginalise the role of women in these political and
economic spheres. As Onora O'Neill has commented-
"even if we find commonalities in women's experiences, take them at face value,
and use them to construct a moral voice that is to replace the voice ofjustice with
the voice of care and concern for relationships, we will still need to say something
about the political and economic contexts of women's lives. An ethics of caring
and relationships will be adequate only ifwe assume lives that are confined to the
th b doi ,,41nursery or e ou OIL
39 Card, C. "Women's Voices and Ethical Ideals - Must We Mean What We Say?" (1988) Ethics 125
40 The legacy of this Neitzschean insight into the relationship between power and morality has been
discussed in some length both in Chapter One and Chapter Five of this thesis in regard to the work of
Foucault.
41 O'Neill, O. "Friends ofDifference" (1989) London Review ofBooks, September 14th
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In Situating the Self,42 Benhabib seeks to remove the need to address this problem
by suggesting that an ethics of care ought not to be seen as simply representative of
an alternative mode ofmoral reasoning characteristically the domain of women, but
should also be seen to represent a mode of moral reasoning that ought to be applied
alongside an ethics ofjustice in both male and female deliberation. In seeking new
ways to deal with gender difference, Benhabib theorises the inherently interactive
nature of self-other relations. Referring to the subject of Kantian premises as the
'generalised other', Benhabib posits the existence of a 'concrete other' who is
understood as an individual with a concrete history, identity and affective-
emotional constitution. Applying the Gilligan-inspired notion that mature moral
reasoning manifests itself in the ability to contemplate the specific interests of such
concrete others, Benhabib develops an interactive remit for communication
between the generalised other (who populates the justice realm) and the concrete
other (who populates the care realm). Hence, Benhabib develops a theory of social
interaction reminiscent of Gilligan's in its demands that in our dealing with others
we should operate our reasoning in ways that will allow our differences to
compliment rather than exclude others. Where Benhabib's theory differs from
Gilligan's, however, is in her recognition that the appropriate moral solution does
not lie in achieving equal social and legal treatment for a specifically female voice
of care, but in the actual inclusion of this morality of care within the ethical
parameters of each person's sense of self. Hence the ethics of care becomes a
mode of moral deliberation towards the recognition of which all social agents will
be educated.
While successful in its attempt to eradicate concern about the potential for
continued gender differentiation inherent in Gilligan's work, Benhabib's theory
suffers from significant shortcomings that render her thesis significantly less
credible at the level of operation. In our previous assessment of Benhabib's work
in Chapter Four, we noted that her insistence that some element of an ethics of
justice embodied within universalist principles ought to remain within all moral
42 Benhabib, S. Situating the Self, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 22
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reasoning renders her thesis incapable of achieving its averred aims. Although her
work is sufficient to illustrate that the models of justice and care originating in
Gilligan's work need not continue to be utilised along gender specific lines, her
claim to have established an improved and more holistic theory of selfhood may
hold more rhetorical than real value. Roslyn Diprose, for example, expresses
concern that,
"there is little in this proposal to integrate justice and care, formal principles and
context, which provides a safeguard against the possibility that the differences of
the 'concrete' other are subsumed within those of the 'generalised' other under
the guise of 'collective dialogues' .'>43
In making too many assumptions based upon the existence of inherent and
universal human rationalism, Benhabib fails to circumvent the submersion of the
identity of the 'concrete other' within the demands of the 'generalised other'.
Hence her claims to be attending to context and particularity become questionable
in a similar manner to the claims made by Nussbaum in the previous chapter
regarding her claim to be attending to the role of the communal. In both contexts,
the crucial shortcoming has lain in their respective failure to examine the
significance of power relations in determining the nature of the 'concrete' or the
communal voice. It seems that a similar methodological oversight plagues the care
ethics tradition that has been discussed within this chapter. Advocates of the care
ethics approach have likewise failed to attend sufficiently to the role of social
expectation and hegemonic power forces in determining the expressed desires and
moral voices of social agents. The critique discussed above in relation to Claudia
Card continues to highlight the inadequacies of the care ethics position in this
regard. If they are to avoid continuing charges of superficiality and essentialism,
care ethicists must involve themselves in the theoretically difficult ground of
constructionism and hegemony.
One care ethics theorist who has begun to attend to this deficiency in the theory's
traditional form is Worden. Although Worden's work represents only a very
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skeletal starting point from which the project of incorporating the role of power
forces and constructionism into care ethics is to commence, her work offers some
valuable insights into the direction that project should take. In "Overshooting the
Target",44 Worden develops the notion originating in Gilligan's theory that the
feminine mode of moral reasoning (which values connection and care) has been
repressed and undervalued in its expression by female agents. She takes this idea
of the repression of the feminine one step further, however, through her assertion
that male agents in society may also exhibit this feminine mode in their moral
deliberation. Challenging the assumptions often inherent in critique of care ethics
that the moral voices of justice and care are not only mutually exclusive but also
gender-specific, Worden makes the more complex assertion that their diversity
originates from the social and historical fact that the culturally expected masculine
voice has been associated with the dominant mode of liberalism while the culturally
expected female voice has been associated with all other forms of cognition and
expression. Hence, the prevalence of the care voice amongst female agents does
not relate to any assertion of a gender-specific social attribution of the propensity to
care. Rather, its prevalence is explained by the fact that female agents have
historically had their moral voices more significantly marginalised and repressed
than male agents. This is not, however, to imply that all women speak exclusively
in the care voice because certain women (specifically white, middle-class women)
have historically encountered less marginalisation than other cultural groups and as
such have enjoyed greater recognition in the realm where the justice voice is the
native tongue. Conversely, this is equally not to say that all men speak exclusively
in the justice voice because certain male groups (specifically ethnic minorities and
homosexuals) have similar experiences of repression and marginalisation affecting
their ability to speak and be heard.
While Worden's developments are to be welcomed because of their ability to
overcome any lingering notion of a gender-specific attribution of caring capacities
43 Diprose, R. The Bodies of Women, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 93, p13
44 Worden, C. "Overshooting the Target", Supra. Chapter Seven, Note 17
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within Gilligan's work, her introduction of notions of repression and
marginalisation into the care ethics tradition requires significantly more
examination. While such introduction offers the important potential to overcome
the criticisms lodged against the care ethics tradition by commentators like Card
and MacKinnon, recognising the role of power and constructionism within this
framework generates a variety of issues for consideration. It is in this regard that a
selective incorporation into the care ethics framework of the poststructuralist theory
discussed in Chapter Five of this work may prove particularly beneficial.
One of the main projects of the poststructuralist thought discussed previously has
involved an 'immanent critique' of identity politics and a concern to critically
examine social imperatives operating upon and constructing an individual's 'desire'
to conform to a particular model of being. Although it was noted in our discussion
that too vehement an allegiance to this status of perpetual subversion and critique
can prove inimical to the realisation of pragmatic ends, the tendency towards
essentialist distribution of identity exhibited by the care ethics tradition exemplifies
the problem facing a model with too little critical zeal. A selective incorporation of
some of the insight laid bare by poststructuralist critiques of the power of discourse
and the existence of disciplinary technologies would furnish care ethicists with the
mechanisms for a less superficial thesis of identity development.
Incorporation of some of this critique would eradicate much of the concern about
the degree of essentialism inherent in those models of care ethics that have assumed
the nurturant characteristics of women to be both natural and desirable. By
incorporating some more stringent element of the poststructuralist essence of
critique and challenge to existing attributions of identity, the ethics of care tradition
is enabled to combat those valid criticisms of its tendency to uncritically assume
and re-affirm prescribed gender roles and identities. Without unavailing itself of
the possibility of political cohesion through emphasis on situational affinities, the
care ethics tradition remains capable of formulating a theory adequate to the aims
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of feminist politics in a manner that is, however, no longer feasible for the purely
poststructuralist position.
Through a reliance upon poststructuralist insights and deconstructive
methodologies, members of the contemporary care ethics tradition will be able to
illustrate more securely their transcendence of any lingering gender-specific
assumptions within Gilligan's model. Incorporation of poststructuralist insights
into the pervasive and disciplinary nature of modem power provides theoretical
grounding for care ethicists to examine alternative ethical codes and alternative
forms of subjectivity without making any simplistic correlations between women
and care, and men and justice. On the contrary, invocation of deconstructive
methods will offer to care ethicists the potential for alternative emerging paradigms
that will recognise the genuine multiplicity of moral voices in a given social field.
This in tum will promote a greater recognition ofthe interdependence between care
and justice in personal identity and the ongoing competition between the dominant
and the marginalised forms of non-gender specific morality that exist in complex
and pluralistic societies.
While Gilligan's critique of the dominant liberal ideology's exclusive embodiment
of the justice voice is legitimate, her accompanying assumptions regarding the
masculinity of that voice are far more conceptually and experientially jarring.
Armed with poststructuralist methodologies and perspectives, contemporary care
ethicists will be able to challenge the gender specific attribution of the
characteristics of justice and care without abandoning the extremely astute
criticisms lodged by Gilligan in regard to the artificiality of the moral and ethical
models employed in prevailing liberal frameworks. This in tum allows care
ethicists to continue to challenge the legitimacy of the legal subject who populates
such frameworks without having to make any essentialist assumptions about the
gender of that subjeel. What's more, it allows a continuation of the care ethicists'
project of ensuring greater contextual awareness and greater accrediting of the role
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of relationships in personal and communal decision-making without perpetuating
the more problematic notion that only female agents currently experience the pull
of such contextual factors. The reality is that both male and female agents
experience the relevance of context and relationship in the exercise of agency.
Incorporation of poststructuralist critique into care ethics provides a remit for
recognition of this reality alongside a continued challenge to the artificiality of the
abstract and individualist ideal embodied within liberal frameworks. This seems to
stand well alongside the contemporary feminist proj ect discussed in preceding
chapters that seeks to avoid the simplistic correlation between the law and the male
subject that have dominated more radical feminist critiques.Y
Cumulatively, selective incorporation of communitarian and poststructuralist
critique into the framework of care ethics in the manner thus suggested provides a
far more promising option for feminist theory than has been offered by the accounts
discussed over preceding chapters. Maintaining a fundamental reliance upon the
care ethics framework ensures an enduring priority in favour of theorising feminist
ethical and legal agendas that has been lamentably lacking in both Butler's and
Nussbaum's positions. What's more, strategic incorporation of insights culled from
the parallel concerns of communitarian and poststructuralist critique provides the
mechanisms for a more complex and more satisfactory version of care ethics that is
equipped to challenge many of the serious criticisms that have been lodged against
it. The model of modified care ethics that emerges from this eclectic process offers
a valuable resource to feminist theorising and, as we shall see in the remainder of
this chapter, also offers an experientially appropriate and pragmatically viable
conception of the self with which to challenge the entrenched position of the neo-
Kantian individualist self within the liberal tradition.
45 See Discussion in Chapter Four, "Feminist Concerns About the Legal Subject", particularly discussion of
Littleton's emerging concept of 'phallocentrism', Supra. Chapter Four, Note 71
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The Merits ofModified Care Ethics
In the preceding sections of this chapter, we have tentatively established a
framework for an emerging conception of the self that offers an alternative to the
neo-Kantian subject that has proven so problematic to feminist theory. Building
upon the foundations of well-established feminist critique of the individualist
subject of liberalism through a fundamental reliance upon care ethics, we have
selectively appropriated the most beneficial aspects of both communitarian and
poststructuralist thought to eradicate the deficiencies that have previously been
highlighted in regard to the care ethics tradition. In developing this modified
version of care ethics, it has been suggested that we have arrived at a more
acceptable and experientially viable account of the self than has been offered
through an exclusive reliance upon any of the fields of anti-Enlightenment critique
discussed previously within this thesis.
In her recent work Moral Voices, Moral Selves,46 Susan Hekman highlights two
major inadequacies that she believes have plagued all contemporary attempts to
theorise an alternative to the dominant model of abstract subjectivity embodied
within the liberal tradition. Without challenging the legitimacy of Hekman's
criticisms in regard to previous attempts, such as those discussed in preceding
chapters, that seek alternatives to this Kantian model through an exclusive reliance
upon either postsructuralist, communitarian or feminist critique, we will spend
some time in this section examining the extent to which the emerging model of
modified care ethics, and the eclectic and holistic methodology it supports,
successfully overcome the more general deficiencies that Hekman's critique has
isolated.
46 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24
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Using the work of Thomas Nage147 to illustrate the two deficiencies in question,
Hekman suggests that Nagel's thesis offers a paradigmatic illustration of the
tendency of most contemporary theorists to evaluate inadequately the foundations
of their theorising. In terms of the first deficiency Hekman highlights, she is
particularly critical of the tendency amongst such theorists to perpetuate the
modernist dichotomies that have traditionally framed debate on the issue of
subjectivity. Hekman argues that in The View from Nowhere, Nagel exhibits
precisely the kind of confined theorising that has characterised previous attempts to
challenge modernism and liberalism. Nagel's own work originates with the
assertion that all people are both particular persons in the world and they are people
capable of taking an objective view of that world. The main project of Nagel's
work is to illustrate the tension between these two elements. Although he makes a
claim to be treating the elements of contingency and transcendence equally,
Hekman argues that it becomes clear that he is more interested in the formulation of
a positive account of objectivity than in the exploration of the contingencies of
morality." This is not to say, however, that he ignores the element of contingency
- he concedes that morality is socially ingrained, that it varies in disparate cultures,
and that the application of objective standards in certain personal relationships
would be self-defeating because it would destroy precisely what is valuable in those
1 · h· 49re ations IpS.
Nonetheless, according to Hekman, Nagel's work is illustrative ofthe general trend
discernable amongst most contemporary moral theorists who claim to be seeking
alternatives to the modernist, Kantian conception. Such contemporary theorists
predominantly seek to account for the situatedness of moral agents that they
consider an important, yet unrecognised, aspect of the modernist paradigm.
However, it is alleged that the manner in which they try to do this more often than
not defies their purpose. As a general rule, Hekman suggests, contemporary
theorists have pursued this end through an attempted negotiation of the absolute-
47 Nagel, T. The Viewfrom Nowhere (1986) Oxford University Press
48 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p. 45
49 Nagel, T. The Viewfrom Nowhere, Supra. Chapter Seven, Note 47, p. 147-55
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relative or objective-subjective dichotomies. Any such attempts at negotiation are
futile, however, because they merely perpetuate a false polarisation that presents a
distraction from the meaningful pursuit of improved moral knowledge.50 Despite
their appearance as immutable frameworks for the discussion of morality and
ethics, according to Hekman, such dichotomies and frameworks are in fact
ideological facades constructed by the master narrative to obscure from view
potential alternatives. In continuing to comply with the dictates of such
frameworks, Hekman suggests that most contemporary theorists have failed by
their own standards in their attempts to offer alternatives to this master narrative.
This first critique bears considerable similarity to the concerns raised in the
preceding chapters by those attempts at theorising the self (including dialectical
communitarianism) which fail to detach themselves entirely from the confined
parameters of the sterile dichotomy between absolutism and relativism that has
plagued modernist epistemology. What's more, it mirrors the criticisms that have
been lodged in the preceding section at advocates of an unmodified version of care
ethics. It has been alleged in that discussion that the attempts made by care
ethicists to develop an 'alternative' to Kantian individualism, have been marred by
continued ascription to the conceptualisation of justice and care as antithetical
moral values. The danger of this tendency has already been discussed and it has
been noted that an appropriate remedy to this critique can be found through a
selective incorporation of certain aspects of the premodern and neo-Aristotelian
communitarian thesis. Hence the modified version of care ethics advocated within
this chapter, in recognition of this deficiency within its original form, has moved
beyond such sterile dichotomies towards the realisation of a more complex notion
of care and justice as interrelated. In so doing, it has also successfully moved
beyond the sterile dichotomies between public and private and between objective
and relative that had previously been implicitly supported in its critique.
50 See Discussion in Chapter Six, "Dialectical Communitarianism"
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In discussing the lamentable nature of the deficiencies in Nagel's characteristic account,
Hekman has noted that unless and until we move beyond such dichotomies, specifically
through examination of moral voices and moral subjects, moral theory in general (and
feminist moral theory in particular) will never be able to abandon its modernist
boundaries. Hekman is undoubtedly correct in her analysis of the deficiencies of
previous attempts to transcend such modernist dichotomies and indeed in her prescriptive
claim that the only possible means of successful transcendence lies in accrediting greater
priority to the relationship between moral voices and moral selves. However, it is
precisely the nature of this relationship that has provided the common nexus between
c~e ethics, poststructuralism and communitarianism from which the emerging model of
modified care ethics has developed.
In recognising the close relationship between moral voices and moral subjects in
the way that Hekman suggests, contemporary moral theorising must also seriously
accredit- the significance of women's 'stories' within the moral framework.
Affording a greater role to such narratives has been a common concern amongst the
various strands of care ethics, poststructuralism and communitarianism discussed
within this work. Even by the standards of Hekman's own critique, therefore, the
contextual model of modified care ethics succeeds both in transcending the
dichotomies that have hitherto proven irrevocable in the determination of
alternatives to Kantian individualism and also in ensuring a greater ethical remit for
concern with the intimate relationship between narratives, moral voices and moral
selves. In thus successfully overcoming the first critique isolated by Hekrnan, it
seems that the model's selective collaboration between those aspects of care ethics,
communitarianism and poststructuralism that relate to moral voices and narratives
offers not only a promising vision for feminist ethical development, but also, as was
hoped.l' a promising vision for the ethical development of various divergent
groups.
51 See Discussion in Preface relating to the remit of the model of subjectivity identified within this thesis
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While this regeneration of interest in the role of narratives epitomised by the
modified version of care ethics delineated in the preceding section thus offers the
potential for substantial improvement upon previous theorising of the experiential
self, a second inadequacy in the dominant trend of theorising has been highlighted
by Hekman which must also be overcome by an adequate theory of subjectivity.
Again using Nagel's work as paradigmatic, Hekman illustrates the inadequacy of
the conceptualisation of the situated aspect of human subjectivity that has
dominated 'alternative' theoretical accounts. Nagel's characteristic account of
situated persons entirely fails to notice that they are involved in human self-other
connection and that their moral perspectives are thus communally grounded.
Indeed, Hekman argues that the treatment of the situated self in most contemporary
moral theory likewise tends to be radically one-dimensional, isolated and blessed
with the capacity to take the objective view even in the most personal of moral
dilemmas. As Hekman notes, "There are two points in Nagel's moral landscape -
the isolated individual and the perspectiveless observer. Communities of moral
belief do not make an appearance.Yf
Once again, this critique is reminiscent of the criticisms that have been lodged both
in the preceding chapter at premodern communitarianism and in the preceding
section at the unmodified version of care ethics. In terms of this latter focus, we
have seen that in seeking a conceptualisation of a different moral voice of care, care
ethicists have often failed to characterise adequately both the notion of care itself
and the nature of the caring social agent. Assuming a vague definition of their
central component and failing to attend to the power issues that encourage the
acceptance of caring positions within feminine moral development and the
acceptance of autonomous positions within masculine moral development, care
ethicists have been equally guilty of paying insufficient attention to the realities of
self-other relations. That said, however, we have also noted in the preceding
discussion the potential for a more critical reconsideration of these assumptions
52 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p.46
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through a selective incorporation of the attitude of 'permanent critique' provided by
poststructuralist accounts.
The more complex analysis thus offered to the modified version of care ethics
presents the possibility for a far more involved characterisation of the situated
subject. Armed with the mechanisms with which to examine issues of power
distribution and hegemony, the emerging ethical framework is able to develop a
significantly less abstract perception of the forces impinging upon the socially
immersed agent. What's more, it is able to challenge the superficial claims to
communality that have all too often lain behind the one-dimensional analyses of the
situated self which Hekman attributes to Nagel and which we, in our preceding
discussion, have attributed both to MacIntyre and Nussbaum.
Hence, it seems that the ethical model of care ethics, once modified by
poststructuralist and communitarian insights in the manner specified, is indeed
capable of overcoming the obstacles to effective theorising that Hekman suggests
have debilitated the majority of attempts that have gone before. While the self that
emerges from this ethical model may not offer a perfect characterisation of the
realities of social living, it does at least boast the advantage of being able to offer a
far more experientially appropriate model than that encompassed within the
Kantian transcendent self. What's more, it does so without offering any implicit
support to the frameworks that have accorded priority to that same transcendency.
In latter stages of her work, Hekman expressly accepts the arguments presented
within this section in favour of a model of selfhood encouraged by the collaborative
ethical framework developed over preceding chapters.53 Although Hekman does
not give detailed account of the nature and extent of the collaborative process that
she advocates, from the indications that she gives in this regard it seems that our
modified version of care ethics would certainly meet her demands of an appropriate
S3 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Mora Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p. 86 ff
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'alternative' moral theory. In particular, Hekman specifically praises the Gilligan-
inspired insight, central to the emerging model, that moral voices and moral selves
are inseparable. While Hekman's failure to pay sufficient attention to the fact that
this stance has been echoed both in the poststructuralist work of Donna Harraway
and the premodern cornmunitarian thesis of MacIntyre prevents her from fully
appreciating the merits to be gained from cautious and selective incorporation of
their insights within our moral framework, her insistence that we can only
deconstruct the foundation of modernist moral theory (i.e. the autonomous subject)
through the maintenance of a strong connection between morality and subjectivity
offers significant support to the modified care ethicist model developed within this
thesis.
The conception of self that emerges from the ethical framework advocated,
presents, therefore, a more serious challenge to the separate, autonomous self that is
the cornerstone of the modernist legal subject than has previously been offered. In
transcending the dichotomies and polarities of modernist epistemology, it is able to
avail itself of the insight that this dominant model of selfhood is itself a product of
relational forces. Building upon the objects-relations premise so influential in
Gilligan's work that "difference is not distinctiveness and separateness, but a
particular way of being connected to others,,,S4 the contingency of the neo-Kantian
self is recognised within the frameworks of modified care ethics. In its tum, this
recognition encourages the development of an ethical program that seeks to
definitively remove the separate self from its position as the paradigm of
subjectivity. Having illustrated the merit heralded by the modified version of care
ethics, not only over its unmodified predecessor, but also over previous attempts at
determining an alternative to the neo-Kantian liberal individual, we will devote the
remainder of this chapter to a specific characterisation of the nature of the
contextual selfwho populates this emerging analysis.
54 Chodorow, N. The Reproduction ofMothering, Supra.Chapter wee, Note 1, p.257. Discussed in
Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p.73
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An Emerging Contextual Subjectivity
The self who emerges from the confines of the modified care ethics position is
neither poststructuralist, communitarian, nor exclusively feminist because its
construction has sprung from a process of selectively borrowing disparate insights
from each of these schools of thought. In attending seriously to the role ofpeople's
'stories' within the moral landscape (through its common concern with the notion
of narrative discussed in the preceding section) the self expressed within this
tradition is a 'contextual self whose identity is defined by the relationships and
circumstances within which s/he is enmeshed. That said, however, this emerging
contextual self also recognises and accounts for the need to critically evaluate the
legitimacy of his/her choices in light of subtle power operations within those social
situations and to seek subversive positions when necessary to ensure strategic
agency.
The contextual self thus emerging seeks to redefine key elements that have been
central to dominant perceptions of legal subjectivity, most particularly identity and
agency. While for the Kantian subject of liberalism, identity is disembodied,
transcendent and ontologically prior to social influence, for the contextual self
identity is constituted, multiple and fluctuating. Recognising the relevance of
circumstance and relationship in the formation of self-identity allows the contextual
self to attribute significance to these influences in mediating interactions between
one's self and others. Furthermore, it allows the contextual self to articulate the
experiential reality that these factors matter in the moral and legal realm, thus
challenging the dominant liberal perception of their irrelevance and peripheral
status. In terms of these elements, then, it seems that the contextual self
successfully offers to feminist theorising what it has requested, namely an account
of subjectivity that, in seriously listening to the voices and stories of moral agents,
attends to, rather than denies, the realities of social living and experience.
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Fashioned from the discursive tools at its disposal as a situated and social subject,
the contextual self also retains a remit for the exercise of agency that permits the
creation of a variety of stories and moral voices to be utilised in various specific
human contexts. Conscious of its constituted and fluctuating identity, the
contextual self no longer attends to the abstract paradigms of liberal agency that
assume an unlimited remit for choice and an unconstrained individualist power of
self-determination. On the contrary, the contextual self provides a vehicle through
which to articulate the reality that living both in a network of relationships and in a
social framework infused with pervasive disciplinary regimes restricts one's remit
of choices. Once again, therefore, the remit for agency and resistance afforded to
the contextual self is a limited one. Without providing any grand liberatory claims
to transcend that restriction, the contextual self thus presents a more realistic
depiction of the operation of agency than that afforded by the idealised and
universally emancipated liberal contention.
Having thus successfully departed from the epistemological confines of modernist
dichotomies, recognition of the contextual self also necessitates the redefinition of
the concepts of agency and political action upon which much modernist thought has
been premised. We have noted in discussion of previous genres of 'alternative'
moral theory the existence of a marked reluctance to abandon the reliance upon
agency as a meaningful vehicle for self-determination.55 One of the most important
contributions of Hekman's work has been to illustrate that a large proportion of
such concern is unfounded. Those who insist that we must retain certain elements
of the modernist subject (specifically its capacity for agency) to provide the
grounding for feminist politics are mistaken. On the contrary, what we ought to
recognise is the illegitimacy of trying to 'borrow' agency from the modernist
subject in this way because the very conception of agency expressed by that subject
is itself a discursive product of modernist thought. The Kantian subject, although
now reified into the paradigm of all subjectivity, is in fact a historical product itself
55 As Discussed in Chapter Five, for example, concern about the abandonment of agency implicit in some
of Foucault's earlier work has caused many commentators to reject his theory out of hand.
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and its key characteristics (autonomy, rationality and agency) are products of a
particular discursive formation and not the transcendent elements of subjectivity
that they have often been taken for.
As has been discussed elsewhere.", we can continue to stand by the idea of some
conception of agency and self-determination, while recognising the possibility of
alternative discursive formations that define the concept of agency differently from
the dominant model and in a manner more appropriate to the feminist moral
enterprise. This feminist moral enterprise has sought to attend to experiential
realities and to listen to the 'stories' of particular women. However, the model of
agency specific to the Kantian subject fails to attend to experiential reality through
its continued reverence to abstraction and individualism. We have noted
throughout this thesis that ordinary people do not experience their lives in this
abstract and radically individualist framework. In reflecting more accurately the
manner in which social agents do in fact experience their lives and senses of self,
recognition of the contextual self also highlights the irrelevance of the liberal model
of unfettered and unconstrained agency for most subjects in the contemporary
world (particularly those marginalised on account ofrace, class or gender).
It has often been alleged that models of selfhood, such as the contextual, that attend
to the particular and the relational realities of social living actively preclude the
possibility of resistance because they strip the subject of any coherent sense of
identity. 57 While it is certainly true that the contextual subject presented here is
disarmed of those abstract principles of reason upon the invocation of which the
Kantian subject was empowered to express resistance, this in no sense means that
the contextual subject is without recourse to resistance. On the contrary, resistance
for the contextual subject comes, not from recourse to abstract principles, but from
56 See Discussion in Chapter Five on Foucault's prescriptive thesis and Butler's reformulation of Foucault
57 See, for example, Harstock, N. "Foucault on Power- A Theory for Women" in Nicholson, L. (ed.)
Feminism / Postmodernism, Supra. Chapter 4, Note 58
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the inhabitation, in particular contexts, of a subjectivity other than that which has
been scripted for them. As Hekman herself explains, this
"redefines agency in a way that explodes the boundaries imposed by the
constituting / constituted dichotomy. It does not entail reference to a prediscursive
'I' but, instead, entails that subjects find agency within the discursive spaces open
to them in their particular historical period."s8
The spirit of such resistance has been the fuel of the feminist movement over
previous decades. Offering women a spectrum of 'alternative' scripts of the
feminine has been the root of a large amount of contemporary feminist political
success. In pragmatic terms, what this illustrates is that resistance does not require
reference to a core, disembodied and autonomous self in the way that legal
liberalism tends to assume. .Rather, resistance can be crafted from within the
subjugated knowledges that we already possess as situated and discursive subjects.
We live in a highly diverse and pluralistic society within which no all-
encompassing and universally applicable master narrative can be articulated to
express the epistemological and experiential realities of each of the moral agents
present. It is time to recognise the superficiality and artificiality of attempts (such
as those ofmodernist liberalism) to impose such a narrative and to draw attention to
the exclusion of important moral voices that the imposition of any such narrative
entails. These are the demands which development of moral theory must seek to
meet in contemporary times. The Kantian centrepiece of the abstract, autonomous
subject is no longer the appropriate agent for that purpose. In seeking alternatives
to that paradigm, it seems that the contextual subject offered here provides the most
promise. Incorporating the insights of the communitarian idea of an affectively tied
and situated self alongside the postsructuralist concern to highlight issues of the
construction of power networks, the contextual moral subject remains capable of
the exercise of meaningful self-determination, resistance and agency. The project
of political theory which seeks to build upon the foundation of that contextual
subjectivity must now be to determine the form which that self-determination,
58 Hekman, S. "Subjects and Agents - The Question for Feminism" in Gardiner.J. (ed.) Provoking Agents
(1995) University of Illinois Press, p.202
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agency and resistance will take in specific circumstances where reference to
abstract principles and self-centred autonomy are no longer appropriate.
While the forms of agency employed by the contextual subject are reminiscent of
the forms of agency advocated by Butler in her recapitulation of the Foucaultian
thesis of the fragmented self, certain important differences distinguish the two
accounts. Although both seek to remove reliance upon the modernist conception of
agency as intrinsic to human subjectivity, the alternative formations that Butler
presents are radically fragmented in a way in which those of the contextual self are
not.59 Hence the contextual self remains free to employ a 'more far-reaching agentic
potential than the ever-imposed upon model of sporadic resistance necessitated by
Butler's more fragmented thesis. Although the contextual self is antithetical to all
forms of essentialism (be they modernist or feminist) and as such demands a focus
upon particularity reminiscent of the fragmented self, the ability of the contextual
subject to unite with others through historically structured affinities and choices
(rather than the essentialist considerations of female or human nature employed in
prevailing accounts) permits of the realisation of feminist political ends in a manner
obviated by too stringent a reliance upon the fragmentation thesis. At the other end
of the spectrum, however, the contextual self is a self eternally aware of its
constructed position and of its place within a network of social relationships and
meanings mediated by the kinds of power dictates ignored by the less critical
observations of communitarian critique. In this respect, the model of agency
emanating from the contextual self expresses a more obvious awareness of the
constructed nature of its origins and operation which attunes it towards an
application against hierarchy and arbitrary tradition.
59 Butler, 1. Gender Trouble, Supra. Preface, Note 20. See Discussion in Chapter Five, especially "Butler's
Reformulation of Foucault".
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Conclusion
"Once we recognise the complexity of human subjectivity - the way in which we
can hold multiple commitments, relationships, view, desires and roles together
without collapsing under the weight of incoherence - the idea of the unitary
subject becomes less plausible, just as the ideal of the unitary subject becomes
less attractive.v'"
With a reliance upon Gilligan's concepts of an ethics of justice and an ethics of
care, contemporary feminists have been enabled to posit the potential for an
improved model ofmoral deliberation which demands developments of both ethical
formats within the moral code of each human agent. However, such advocates of
the care ethics tradition have still met with substantial criticism in regard to other
aspects of their thesis. Within the confines of this chapter, we have examined the
possibility for care ethicists to overcome such criticism through the selective
appropriation of certain aspects of poststructrualist and communitarian thought. In
so doing, we have developed a hybrid ethical theory that, in maintaining a
foundational allegiance to the aims and agendas of feminist critique, offers the
benefits accredited to poststructuralism and communitarianism over preceding
chapters while successfully avoiding the shortcomings that have likewise been
identified within these frameworks.
The emerging model of contextual subjectivity that is promoted by the generation
of this hybrid ethical theory reconceives human subjectivity in its situated and
concrete reality and thereby challenges the dominant liberal ideal of subjectivity as
abstract and radically individualist. Utilising Hekman's assertions as to the
historically and discursively constituted nature of these liberal conceptions of
identity and agency to legitimate its alternative thesis, the modified version of care
ethics has offered a substantial improvement upon previous attempts to deconstruct
such paradigms. Removal of the modernist emphasis on the abstract individual
through a strong reliance upon the connection between narratives, moral voices and
60 Frazer, E & Lacey, N. The Politics ofCommunity, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 84, p.199
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moral selves enables recognition of the inherently socially constituted nature of
human selfhood. This in tum highlights the centrality of normative social
ascription upon the roles and identities inhabited by social agents in a far more
effective way than previously achieved.
In thus restructuring our conceptions of human subjectivity into the fluid and
relational format presented by the contextual model, the modified version of care
ethics has also successfully challenged the conceptions of autonomy, agency and
consent that have been considered intrinsic within the frameworks of liberal theory
as paradigmatic expressions of rational and individual determinism. This permits
the philosophical remit within which to promote a more fluid notion of self-
determination which no longer requires reference to abstract principle, but which
can be enunciated within the intricate web ofmeanings attributable to human life as
a 'situated' and 'relational' self. Within this chapter, we have begun to examine the
merits of this contextual approach to agency and we have highlighted the nature of
its divergence from the prevailing liberal model. In the following chapter, we will
develop that discussion in greater depth with particular reference to the application
of contextual agency within the specific arenas of rape and maternal-foetal conflict
and to the implications of that application upon the prevailing conception of the
legal notion of consent.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONTEXTUAL AGENCY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR CONSENT
"The question of consent also assumes and exacerbates a misleading
distinction between private and public spheres of behaviour. Consent is
conceived as the private exchange of permissions between isolated
individuals. Yet little about the permitted behaviour is private ...Our 'consent'
.... is not really free because it is not free in the sense of being the autonomous
choice of an atomistic individual...The social and cultural nature of choice,
per se, is not problematic...for we are all social creatures. What it is crucial to
acknowledge is that 'private consent' is nonexsitent and go on from there."!
Over the course of previous chapters, we have examined various conceptions of
subjectivity that offer potential alternatives to the dominant liberal notion of
Kantian individualism. In so doing, we have also examined the nature of the
forms of self-determination that would be encouraged by these alternative
perceptions. Having conceded the need for continued cognisance of feminist
political aims and agendas, it has been submitted within Chapter Seven that the
most satisfactory alternative vision of subjectivity can be located within the
modified care ethics model developed within that chapter from an eclectic and
strategic incorporation of poststructuralist and communitarian insights into the
pre-existing care ethics critique of the neo-Kantian subject.
Having thus arrived at a more pragmatically viable ethical theory towards the
end of the preceding chapter, we have begun to examine in more detail the
characteristics and capacities of the contextual self who populates that analysis.
We have noted at length the merit that ought to be accredited to the contextual
self because of its ability to attend to the relational and the experiential in a
manner denied to the abstract and artificial subject of liberalism. What's more,
we have noted the divergence both in terms of identity and agency between the
contextual self and the liberal subject. In maintaining allegiance in favour of
the former model, we have praised its capacity to reflect the realities of social
living rather than the idealised abstract. As noted elsewhere, these realities of
social living entail recognition of the communal and relational nature of
selfhood alongside recognition of the socially constructed and determined
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nature of certain prioritised desires and identities dominant m disciplinary
societies.
Accompanying this model of contextual selfhood, we have noted a peculiar
model of contextual agency that likewise attends to the realities of relationship,
embodiment and constructed choice. Challenging the pervasive liberal
assumption that valid agency is necessarily constituted by the self-legislating
choices of an abstract, rational and individualist agent, the model of contextual
agency recognises the particularity of that vision of agency to the model of neo-
Kantian selfhood upon which it is parasitic. Adopting the notion of restricted
agency common to the theses of both Foucault and MacIntyre, the contextual
model has proposed a conception of the operation of agency and consent as
restricted by the confines of circumstantial parameters and by the position of the
agent in the network of disciplinary requirements.
Within the confines of this chapter, we will examme the nature of this
contextual agency in more detail and will illustrate the advantages it offers over
more traditional forms of analyses. That examination, however, will take place
against the background of an implicit denunciation of the tendency amongst the
modernist and liberal theories challenged within this thesis to seek over-arching
and universal frameworks. Recognising that the end result of that grand
theorising has almost exclusively been the perpetuation of abstraction and
artificiality, our ensuing analysis of the fluctuating and complex forms of
identity and agency embodied within the contextual self will resist the
temptation to replace the meta-narrative of constituting agency with an
alternative meta-narrative of contextuality. Through a context-specific re-
examination of the operation of contextual subjectivity, agency and consent in
the specific legal arenas of rape and maternal-foetal conflict, this chapter will
not only bring the thesis full-circle, but will also ensure a greater understanding
both of the potential advantages of the contextual model over the liberal model,
and of the highly specific and particular nature of those advantages.
1 Archard, D. Sexual Consent, Supra. Chapter Two, Note 24, p. 149
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Contextual Selfhood and Consent
The conception of constituting agency and its peculiar model of the one-
dimensional vehicle of consent have become regarded as the paradigmatic
expressions of the liberal conception of self-determination and subjectivity.
However, as we have noted, this is not the only available manifestation of these
human capacities. On the contrary, despite the automatic credence afforded to
them, these models of agency and consent are nothing more than manifestations
of the discursive formations of self-determination that have proven most
complimentary to the Enlightenment pretensions towards universalism and
rationalism. The fact that these Enlightenment pretensions and the conception
of consent as a one-dimensional interchange between abstracted subjects which
these pretensions encourage have held the dominant position in our legal
perceptions for so long establishes nothing about their validity. The
tenaciousness of their hold upon our ethical imagination says less about their
entitlement to that position of undisputed truth than it does about the power of
the liberal discourse which has elevated them to the position of indisputable
doctrine for so long.
In challenging the entrenched nature of the notion of constituting agency and
unfettered self-determination through the individualist and dichotomous notion
of consent, the contextual form of agency illustrates the existence of an equally
viable alternative. Its existence provides an important counter to the scare-
mongering concerns of many commentators whose work has been discussed
throughout this thesis.' These commentators have argued that ifwe abandon the
problematic Kantian model of abstracted moral and legal subjectivity, we must
of necessity also abandon the concept of agency altogether. However, we have
seen that this is simply not the case. Throughout our discussion in Chapters
Five and Six the feasibility of a restricted form of agency has been continually
asserted. Furthermore, the merits of that restricted form of agency in terms of
offering a more experiential expression of the realities of the operation of
consent have also been noted.
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As Hekman has argued, our ethical enquiries have been paralysed by the kind of
polarised logic which suggests that an ideological shift from abstract
individuality to connected and situated personhood would necessitate the fusion
of the whole world into an indistinguishable mass of connected and merged
identities.' It is in fact not only logically possible, but also ethically desirable,
that we develop from the emerging conception of human subjectivity as
substantially relational and connected a vehicle of communication that retains
the capacity for executing self-determination. The contextual subject has as
much need of vehicles of self-determination as does its Kantian predecessor.
However, the realisation of that need does not require that we constrain
ourselves to compliance with the models of agency and consent which have best
suited that same predecessor. On the contrary, alternative conceptions of
agency and consent are required. These alternative conceptions originate from
alternative discursive formations, from formations which do not wield the
institutional support advanced in favour of the models prized by legal liberalism
but which nonetheless present equally as valid a vision of self-determination.
Originating from differing conceptions of what constitutes human subjectivity,
these alternative visions demand a more fluid and relational base for both
personal and communal decision-making. Liberated from a locus that centrally
evolves around dynamics of one-dimensional consensual interchange between
separate and distinct human entities, the conception of consent that emerges
from this process can demand consideration of context and connection to
present a more holistic view ofhuman agency and interaction.
Where the traditional conception of consent has relied upon an overtly
abstracted view of human subjectivity to ensure the elimination of issues of
social pressure, stereotype and bias from legal concern," this emerging
conception would require that issues of precisely this kind be drawn into the
centre of the decision-making arena. This emerging conception of consent
entails a sense of self-direction and self-determination that grows in relation to,
2 Harstock, N "Foucault on Power - A Theory for Women" in Nicholson, L. (ed.) Feminism /
Postmodernism, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 58 provides an illustrative example of such arguments.
3 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p. 45
4 See Discussion in Chapter One reo juridical legal operation and its capacity to marginalize and
conceal the operation of disciplinary power at the social level
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and with the help of, a sense of affiliation and connection with others, rather
than in competition against them. Adoption of this position does not necessitate
the abandonment of all models of justice and agency. On the contrary,
incorporation of this model into legal deliberation will actually operate to
strengthen the moral legitimacy of such models. A commitment to the
appreciation of contextual factors permits eradication of the Enlightenment-
based notion that the pursuit of fairness requires the adoption of a position that
stands aloft from the social realities of the cases at issue. Building upon the
ideas of compassionate and contextual judging introduced by Aristotle.i the
model of contextual agency promotes the development in the legal arena of a
relational concern about human flourishing. This yardstick of flourishing is not
determined abstractly, but in relation to concrete contexts about the material and
social conditions of people's daily lives and the relation of those concrete
conditions to their own hopes, fears and relationships. When the remit of
agency is expanded to accommodate context and relationship, the medium for
its articulation and expression must also become more expansive. Consent as
the prime medium for the communication of agency must become more deeply
imbued with context and particularity than the traditional one-dimmensional
model. This requires analysis of the context within which consent is alleged to
have been given or refused to determine the realities of any such exercise of
agency.
The project of this thesis has been to realise the kind of holistic view of human
consent facilitated by the recognition of such concerns. In so doing, our journey
has necessitated a lengthy excursion into the nature of the legal subject who is
to act as issuer of those self-determining dictates. Our analysis has established
the specificity of the Kantian subject celebrated in prevailing notions of
individualistic consent as one manifestation of subjectivity among others. Our
pursuit of a more experientially appropriate model of subjectivity has led us to
the propagation of the contextual self. It has been argued thus far that the
contextual model of selfhood presented heralds the most significant potential for
the development of a conception of consent that brings to the fore (rather than
5 See Discussion in Chapter Six, "Premodern Communitarianism" and "Feminism and Premodern
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conceals) the power forces and social imperatives within which the human
subject is immersed in her struggle for meaningful self-determination.
Contextual Agency and its Applicability to Law
It has been suggested that employing a more fluid standard of consent, such as
that embodied within the contextual form of agency advocated within this
thesis, provides a substantial improvement upon the manner in which the
dominant liberal legal framework deals with issues of agency and consent.
While that is certainly true, and continued support for that suggestion can be
located in the sections that follow, it would be naive to assume that ensuring
such improved fluidity and experiential validity in standards of self-
determination is sufficient to cause the demise of many other undesirable
aspects of the liberal form that have gained support from neo-Kantian premises.
Establishing a potentially alternative paradigm of subjectivity and agency for
application in specific moral and legal deliberation represents only the first step
in an overall project of deconstructing the liberalist assumptions inherent in the
legal arena. To be sure, the elimination of one-dimensional and abstract
individualism effected by the preceding critique constitutes an important attack
upon the centrepiece of modernist legal epistemology. However, various other
entrenched presuppositions regarding the nature of the modernist self remain at
least partially intact despite this critique. While accommodating a contextual
form of agency permits an impressive counter against liberal presuppositions
about the abstract, disembodied and radically individualist nature of the legal
subject, it offers only subsidiary critique of the other integral component of
liberal subjectivity, namely rationality.
It has been accepted throughout this thesis that the liberal legal subject can be
characterised primarily by its reliance upon artificial conceptions of its abstract
individualism and its attendant forms of rationality. While challenging the
former characteristic explicitly, the critique of preceding chapters and the
Communitarianism"
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emerging model of contextual agency have only implicitly challenged the latter
characteristic. While it is submitted that emerging forms of rationality can be
uncovered from within the psychology of the contextual agent that will provide
useful counters to dominant liberal forms, further exposition of those forms lies
outwith the scope of the current project. Nonetheless, it ought to be noted that
the model of contextual agency uncovered here offers significant potential in
this regard and as such offers subversive possibility beyond that which can be
claimed by the critique of individualism that has formed the focus of this thesis.
Linked to this concession that the effects of the contextual form of ethical
theory and agency upon prevailing liberal contentions can only be fully
appreciated when examined, not only in terms of its challenge to the abstractly
individualist frameworks of consent that form the concern of this thesis, but also
in terms of its challenge to attendant forms of rationalism, is the further
concession that in illustrating the influence of contextual agency upon specific
applications of legal consent within prevailing legal structures, other aspects of
its potential will be less observable. In challenging the cornerstone of legal
liberalism that assumes abstract and disembodied individualism, the contextual
model discussed over preceding chapters provides an important critique and
offers an improved model for re-evaluation. However, other cornerstones of
liberalism must also be challenged before the full benefits of the contextual
model can be appreciated. We have mentioned above that one such cornerstone
relates to liberal presuppositions regarding the nature of legal rationality and we
have suggested that the contextual model may present potential for challenge to
this presupposition within the confines of another project.
While the contextual model emerging within this thesis therefore represents an
important line of attack against the liberal legal subject and its attendant forms
of agency and consent, it must also be noted that it cannot singularly and
simplistically produce a radical effacement of existing models of law. To effect
this kind of ideological revolution, we would also have to be able to invoke
successfully not only varied and competing models of rationality, but also a
more mediatory rather than accusatorial legal structure. The structural conflict
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inherent in legal confrontation finds its manifestation III an adversarial
framework and an objectively projected and universally rationally founded
authoritative decision. We have noted in previous discussion'' the tendency for
such adversarial models to promote an abstract and overly-simplistic model of
conflict between the parties involved. This in turn promotes the perpetuation of
an exclusionary legal impulse through which issues considered central to the
agents involved are deemed peripheral because their complexity renders them
an inappropriate fit within the polarised legal conflict model. In providing the
mechanisms for a re-evaluation of what constitutes relevance in the legal arena
and for a more inclusive approach to concerns impinging upon particular legal
agent's choices, the contextual subjectivity and agency developed over
/
preceding chapters offers a meaningful counter to these entrenched tendencies.
However, it ought to be noted that the operation of contextual agency and the
operation of traditional legal frameworks are diametrically opposed in this
regard. As such, continued cognisance of these frameworks of legal liberalism
in the operation of contextual legal agency will necessarily dilute the impact of
this model.
Without arbitrarily positing a legal utopia within which these entrenched
standards can simply be abandoned in favour of a more flexible approach, it
ought to be noted that while changes can be made through the employment of
the contextual agenda within the pre-existing adversarial framework that will
benefit legal agents in significant ways, a more fundamental reconsideration and
restructuring of these frameworks would be required before the full impact of
the model of contextual agency can be realised. Once again, however,
expanding the potential for contextual agency to effect this fundamental change
must be the project for another thesis. Having developed the parameters of the
contextual subject over foregoing chapters, the concern of this thesis is to
illustrate how its forms of agency can improve the problematic operation of
legal consent in a pragmatic and concrete manner. While more revolutionary
changes may well be available through a more transformative incorporation of
contextual ethical and legal theory, the project of this thesis has been to attend
6 See criticism in both Chapters Two and Three in regard to the model of conflict encouraged by the
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to the realities of current social living and to devise the means through which to
improve that reality without positing abstract utopian notions of future
possibilities.
In light of that fact, it must be conceded that the application of contextual
agency within the arenas of rape and maternal-foetal conflict to be examined in
the following sections will not therefore produce the radical displacement of all
of the systematic biases and procedural inadequacies that presently plague
deliberation on these issues. Contextual agency working within the restrictive
confines of an adversarial court structure, for example, finds aspects of its
holistic impulse paralysed by external constraints. Nonetheless, the application
of contextual agency within these remits can still produce significant
improvements for many female agents and as a pragmatic starting point, this in
itself must be applauded. While without the additional support of an
accompanying critique of liberal rationalism and the adversarial legal model,
application of contextual forms of agency to challenge liberal presuppositions
about individualism and abstraction may never radically displace existing
frameworks. Nonetheless, its application does successfully alter the treatment
afforded to legal agents within those frameworks in positive and significant
ways. Amongst the most observable manifestations of such alterations relate to
the improvements thus rendered upon the interpretation afforded to consent
standards within legal deliberation.
Whether or not challenge to the remaining cornerstones of legal liberalism may
be available within the confines of the contextual ethical system remains to be
seen. What are already far more observable are the advantages offered to
human agents by the application of a contextual conception of agency in
specific legal arenas and the potential for expansion of those advantages as the
residual aspects of dominant liberalism face increasing challenge from a variety
of sources, all of which recognise the importance of the contextual model's
attendance to the real rather than the ideal of social and personal decision-
making.
legal system and its accompanying tendency to exclude relevant issues as peripheral
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Contextual Agency and Its Implications Upon
Consent in Specific Legal Contexts
The changes accorded to the legal notion of consent through the invocation of
contextual forms of agency offer the possibility of a more flexible medium for
the articulation of self-determination. This more flexible medium would not
only ensure a greater concern with the relationships and affiliations that mediate
the context within which consent is being issued or refused, but also with the
constructed identities and stereotypical expectations that influence the agent's
own perception of available choices. Given the inherently context-bound nature
of its application, the effects to be borne out by this more flexible and concrete
standard of consent will vary considerably from case to case. As mentioned
previously, we must be careful therefore not to frustrate its merits by attempting
too generalised an analysis of its operation. While it is imperative that we resist
the modernist temptation to make grand statements regarding the nature of
application and the potential advantages of its forms of agency, however, it is
equally imperative that we offer some more detailed analysis of the operation of
contextual standards of consent in specific legal arenas. Within the confines of
this work, it would be impossible to attempt a catalogue of legal forums within
which the application of contextual forms of agency would remedy many of the
deficiencies of the prevailing liberal consent I non-consent dichotomy, even
within those fields of particular concern to feminist analysis. In the remainder
of this chapter, therefore, we will restrict our analysis to an examination of the
implications of the application of contextual agency upon consent standards
within the specific arenas of rape and maternal-foetal conflict discussed in
Chapters Two and Three.
For various reasons, these arenas provide particularly illustrative examples of
the alterations effected by contextual agency. Within our discussion of previous
chapters, we gave detailed consideration to the inadequacies that have plagued
the operation of the prevailing model of consent in these arenas. Furthermore,
we noted the extent to which incorporation of anachronistic stereotypes about
'proper' social roles into legal evaluations of exercises of consent have made it
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difficult for agents in particular circumstances to communicate their will
without undue constraint. In the following sections, it will be alleged that one
of the most important advantages offered by the application of contextual
agency in these arenas lies in its ability to alleviate a significant amount of such
constraint. By allowing legal authorities to evaluate issues of consent from the
perspective of the agents involved, the fluid and context-specific approach of
contextual agency promotes the inclusion of issues of relationship and
expectation within the legal arena where previously they were ignored. The
significance of such inclusions in terms of the overall feminist ethical and
political project has been well-expressed by Benhabib who notes,
"To explicate women's oppression, it is necessary to uncover the power of
those symbols, myths and fantasies that entrap both sexes in the unquestioned
world of geder roles. Perhaps one of the most fundamental of these myths and
symbols has been the idea of autonomy conceived in the image of a
disembedded and disembodied male ego."?
In the previous section, we highlighted once more that the primary concern of
this thesis has been to attend to the realities of social living and to the
possibilities available for improvement upon those realities without invoking
grand liberatory critiques. In terms of the application of contextual agency
within the specific arenas of rape and maternal-foetal conflict, the concern has
been to devise mechanisms that will ensure a greater capacity for the female
agent to have her voice heard, her moral and ethical standpoint considered and
her consent or non-consent accredited. While greater transformative potential
may lie within the model of contextual agency than has been claimed for it
within the confines of this chapter, our concern with such experiential realities
promotes a more immediate interest in the pragmatic benefits of its application
in specific contexts that continue to be dominated by other aspects of legal
liberalism. Without excluding the possibility that greater benefits may yet
accrue, therefore, the following sections will illustrate the advantages that can
be offered to female agents confronting pre-existing legal frameworks and
ideology through the invocation of contextual agency. The employment of this
self-imposed restriction is significant because it illustrates the ability of the
7 Benhabib, S. Situating the Self, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 22, p.290
368
contextual model to operate both at an immediate and pragmatic level but also
potentially as a more long-term and revolutionary ethical vision.
Implications for Rape Contexts
"In focussing upon an individualised notion of consent, rather than the
conditions under which choices can be meaningful, the prevailing idea of
sexual autonomy assumes the mind to be dominant and controlling,
irrespective of material circumstances. Furthermore, the liberal discourse of
autonomy appears to leave no space for the articulation of the affective and
corporeal dimensions of certain violations of autonomy...While the idea of
autonomy as independence seems directly relevant to the wrong of rape, it
dominates at the expense of the development of a positive conception of what
kinds of sexual relationships matter to personhood.t"
Throughout our discussion in Chapters Two and Three, we repeatedly noted the
difficulties facing women seeking to have their intimation of non-consent
accredited by the legal system. In the particular context of the rape trial the
tenacity of the notion that women do not know their own minds and lack the
capacity to express their true desires has proven particularly problematic.
Meanwhile, and paradoxically, men have been accredited with the ability, not
only to give consent on their own behalf in the face of apparently overwhelming
sexual desires, but also to effectively give consent on behalf of their victim
through the defence of mistaken belief. Central to the critique of these issues
has been the idea that in real terms, the discourses thus structuring this
perception of consent deny the autonomy of both male and female agents by a
manipulative process of categorisation into normatively affirmed and
stereotypical roles. By constructing the agent into the abstract and individualist
form necessary for the articulation and communication of a one-dimensional
expression of consent, the legal discourse identified acts to frustrate the
realisation ofmore meaningful achievement of self-determination.
Critique over the foregoing chapters has suggested that implicit within the
prevailing notion of consent is a necessary privileging of the individuality of the
legal agent. The process of artificial abstraction embodied in this privileging
8 Lacey, N. Unspeakable Subjects, Supra. Preface, Note 2, p. 117
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denies the recognition not only of the embedded, situational and relational
nature of human subjectivity, but also of the importance of those contexts and
relationships to the agent's sense of self-determination. Models of contextual
agency draw in from the periphery these issues of personal attachment. What's
more, contextual agency privileges them in the legal decision-making arena
with the same centrality with which they are accorded in the arena of personal
decision-making.
The process of artificial individuation encouraged by prevailing neo-Kantian
models of subjectivity exists, in the sexual arena, alongside a network of
complex discursive strategies illustrated in Chapter Two that operate to control
and confine the expression of sexuality -
"Since our sexuality has been constructed for the most part through social
structures over which we have had no control, we all 'consent' to sexual
desires and activities which are alienating at least to some degree. However,
there is a vast difference between consent and self-determination. The latter
includes the former, but in addition, also entails (some sensation of) control
over the social structures which shape our lives.,,9
It is this wider notion of self-detemination that is brought to the fore by the
invocation of contextual agency. The prevailing model of consent not only
artificially removes the legal agent from its relational and affective connections,
but once it has completed this process, its operation imbues the legal subject
with an array of culturally imposed interpretations. The model of contextual
agency therefore must challenge not only the artificiality of the model of
individualism exhibited by consent, but also the artificiality of the cultural
expectations superimposed upon the individualist model. With its demands for
increased honesty in the legal system, exhibited by increasingly experientially
appropriate accounts of agentic decision-making, this is precisely what the
contextual model seeks to do. By a more extensive interest in the issues of
power and normative construction that operate upon the process of identity
formation, the proposed shift in legal emphasis towards contextual forms of
consent permits of the demarcation of a remit within which more meaningful
9 Linden et al: Against Sadomasochism (1982) Frog in the Well Press, p.94. Quoted in Sawacki, J.
Disciplining Foucault, Supra. Chapter One, Note 39, p.37
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control can be taken by the individual over the structures which frame her
personal experience.
By emphasising the need for direct recognition of the power forces, affective
relationships and demands for stereotypical conformity that operate to structure
the result of the agent's decision-making process, the model of contextual
agency highlights the fact that agents operate in everyday life under the spectre
of heavily constructed dictates regarding 'appropriate' behaviour. In
broadening the focus of judicial concern from the narrow remit of evidence of
force and resistance to a remit encompassing concerns about power imbalances
between the parties involved and within society more generally, and about the
significance of forces of social constructionism, the model of contextual agency
adopts an experientially sensitive expectation of consent.
The most significant and the most promismg effect of the application of
contextual agency in the rape trial arena will be the re-evaluation of which
issues are and are not relevant to deliberation. Matters, such as personal
attachments, relationships, power forces and expectations, currently considered
peripheral, despite their centrality in the mind of the agent whose consent is at
issue, will become significantly more accredited. Through the invocation of
contextual agency, we will be able to reassess what issues are considered
relevant and irrelevant so that concerns that were central to the agents involved
in issuing their decisions would be accredited relevance in the legal decision-
making arena.
It ought to be noted, however, that so long as contextual agency operates within
the enduring confines of the adversarial legal model, this will do nothing to
challenge the ongoing existence of some standard for determining legal
relevance and irrelevance. That remains the case despite strong criticisms of the
invocation of any such standard for determining relevance amongst certain
feminist commentators. Nonetheless, continued allegiance to the existence of
such a standard, subject to modification by the contextual framework, does not
necessarily entail the unsatisfactory consequences attributed to it by such
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feminist critique. In our discussion of Aristotelian hierarchy within Chapter
Six, we noted with approval Groenhout's argument that feminist concern to
challenge the legitimacy of dominant forms of hierarchy should not promote an
uncritical feminist renunciation of any and all hierarchies. In a similar fashion
within this context, while feminist concern regarding the manner in which
prevailing standards have determined issues of relevancy in the legal arena is
entirely merited, it would be a mistake to jettison altogether the notion of legal
relevance.
Our critique within Chapter Two has illustrated that more often than not it is the
issues central to the decision-making process and circumstances of the female
agent that are rendered peripheral in the legal arena. As such invocation of
contextual agency is likely to provide a more inclusive approach to the female
agent's voice that ought to be welcomed by feminist commentators. However,
this invocation ought also to be welcomed by commentators concerned with the
protection of the interests of male agents in the trial process because it affords
the opportunity for any issues that, despite their relevance to their experiences
of decision-making, are currently excluded from the legal arena to also be
considered relevant in the courtroom setting.
While these alterations to the standards of relevance are therefore to be
welcomed, this does not necessitate any kind of challenge to the existence of
such standards. On the contrary, maintenance of these standards (subject to
necessary modification by contextual agency) is crucial in enabling challenge to
anachronistic stereotypes regarding both the role of gendered sexual agents and
previous sexual history evidence. Within the discussion in Chapter Two, we
noted the hugely detrimental effect that the incorporation of such stereotypes
can have upon the course of rape prosecutions. By maintaining a standard with
which to judge relevance and irrelevance, feminist theorists are able to demand
its modification to render such admissions irrelevant. What's more, the
invocation of contextual agency permits such demands in a more meaningful
way than has currently been available to the feminist movement because in
attending to issues of relationship, embodiment and societal disciplinary power
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forces as legally relevant, the artificiality of stereotypes becomes far more
observable and their relevance within the legal arena becomes increasingly
questionable.
This process of simultaneously broadening and narrowing the field of legal
relevance in rape trials encouraged by the invocation of contextual agency will
in tum precipitate a need for re-evaluation of the standards employed in regard
to the admissibility of evidence in the trial procedure. Employment of standards
of contextual agency will require a more flexible approach to the admission of
evidence such that testimony will become less constrained by restrictive
demands on content and format. In maintaining its concern with allegiance to
experiential realities, satisfaction of standards of contextual agency will require
that the testimony offered to the court will be more directly admissible in the
form of the witness' own words.i'' As part of an ongoing modification to the
standards for determining legal relevance, models of contextual agency in the
rape arena recognise the artificiality of testimony that has been scripted into pre-
existing legal terminology. In so doing, their invocation will challenge the
dominant format of answering questions directed by counsel and will seek its
replacement with a more flexible forum within which witnesses will be able to
give account not only ofwhat counsel considers relevant, but also of factors that
they consider relevant. While not necessarily seeking to abandon the pre-
existing tendency for counsel to direct questions at witnesses, application of
contextual forms of agency would also require that witnesses be offered a
platform through which to add any other factors they deem relevant that may
not have been addressed by counselor may have been curtailed in the interview
format of testimony. I I The particular benefit of this in the rape trial arena will
be in allowing the female victim to give account of her experiences in language
and forms that express the reality of those experiences and therefore express
more meaningfully the circumstances in which her choice to give or refuse
10 The merits of a more flexible approach to the admission of evidence have been highlighted by Nicola
Lacey in regard to her model of relational autonomy - Lacey, N., Unspeakable Subjects, Supra.
Preface, Note 2, p. 121
11 It should be noted, however, that encouraging this more flexible approach to the format of testimony
does not in any undermine the need for such testimony to meet relevant legal standards of proof and
corroboration where appropriate.
373
consent was made. In ensuring a greater remit for more flexible testimony in
this manner, the model of contextual agency promotes a greater capacity for
empathetic judging of all agents involved because it encourages judicial
officials to place themselves more concretely than has previously been possible
in the position and context of each party.
This will bear out significant changes to the manner in which numerous rape
cases are heard, tried and deliberated upon. Amongst the most illustrative
examples of such changes relate to those cases within which the female agent
has exercised her choice to consent to or refuse sexual intercourse against a
background of contextual factors that prevailing analysis have historically
rendered peripheral. Imagine, for example, the caseofa woman who 'consents'
to sex in a relationship based upon a long-standing dynamic of emotional abuse.
Where the traditional model would conclude from the lack of physical
resistance or non-consent displayed that the act was consensual, application of a
model of contextual agency provides a remit for judicial enforcement of the
opposite conclusion. Although the woman in question may have submitted to
the sexual act, it is only within the peculiar framework of the prevailing
standards that this necessarily implies that she consented. In attending more
seriously to the circumstances within which the woman has issued her decision
through a hitherto unprecedented concern with factors of relationship and power
that affect her capacity for agency, the contextual model challenges the
conspicuously one-dimensional and superficial approach of that prevailing
consent standard. In circumstances such as this, where listening to the voice of
the woman in question illustrates that countervailing pressures have restricted
and impinged upon her assumed ability to freely issue or refuse consent, the
incompatibility of the liberal model and its assumptions regarding radically
individualist and autonomous consent becomes most observable.
In concerning itself more concretely with the broader issue of self-determination
rather than the abstract and artificial consent / non-consent dichotomy, the
contextual model is able to reconceptualise the relevant issues in such
circumstances. Taking into account the countervailing emotional pressures
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affecting her decision, the contextual model highlights that the crucial issue is
not one of whether she failed to express non-consent (and thereby effectively
consented) but one of whether, in the context in which the decision was made,
the female agent's submission can be considered a voluntary act partly
constitutive of the narrative unity of her fluctuating conception of self. Where
the perspective of the woman involved implies that the act does not accord with
this narrative requirement, the contextual model takes seriously the implications
of that moral voice and may well require a judicial conclusion that the sexual
act was therefore non-consensual in the legal sense.
Taking on board our previous criticism of the defence of mistaken belief,12 the
contextual model looks to the mental state ofthe victim whose consent is crucial
to the issue of criminality rather than to the assailant's perception of it. When a
model of contextual agency is applied to this kind of example, the interplay of
emotional abuse which frames the relationship does not remain a peripheral
issue of circumstance, but exhibits within the legal decision-making arena the
central position which it holds within the personal decision-making arena of the
female agent. The question is no longer one of what did the woman consent to
(or more accurately, what did the man think that the woman was consenting to),
but what acts would the woman, in light of a critical awareness of context-
specific affections and expectations, consider as acts determinative of a broader
sense of self-determination? Only these more internally motivated sexual acts
remain seriously consensual in the contextual framework because only these
acts are capable of withstanding its more involved and concrete motivational
analysis.
An analogous illustration could be drawn from the example of sexual
encounters against a background of disparate power relationships. Without
going to the radical extremes of Catharine MacKinnon's thesis that all sex is
rape because all sex occurs against a social background of profound power
imbalances.v' we can accept the notion that power dynamics affect the interplay
12 See Discussion in Chapter Two, particularly in relation to DPP v Morgan and liMA v Meek
13 MacKinnnon, C. Towards a Feminist Theory ofState, Supra. Chapter One, Note 33, p. 186
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of sexual relationships. Where disparities in power are exhibited between
victim and assailant under the traditional model of consent, such issues are
deemed peripheral to the determination of key issues unless the power in
question manifests itself physically." However, power can be manifest in a
range of other and more subtle forms. Where the traditional analysis ignores
such subtleties, the model of contextual agency invokes its concern with broader
social imperatives and issues of power distribution amongst disparate social
groupings to establish the centrality of non-physical power relationships within
the legal arena. For the woman who has not welcomed sexual interaction but
who has felt herself incapable of expressing refusal because of the
pervasiveness of power disparities or because of the expectation that women
should be passive and submissive in sexual relations, the application of
contextual agency offers a welcome opportunity for the legal system to
understand the difficulties of her situation. What's more, it allows a far more
engaged concern with the woman's experience of such expectations and power
imbalances that in tum frees up a judicial remit within which the tendency to
uncritically equate her submission with consent may be reevaluated.
In terms of broadening the scope of concern and the potential for more sensitive
understanding of victim and assailant, the more fluid and particularised
contextual approach developed over preceding chapters is indeed most
promismg. However, in terms of its specific application to the situation of rape,
certain issues require some clarification. Perhaps the most important caveat to
be noted is that the application of contextual agency in legal deliberation does
not imply that all sexual interactions that have not been consciously considered
and evaluated by the female agent should be condemned to illegality.
While the contextual model demands a far more involved critical interaction
between the female agent and countervailing factors impinging upon her agentic
capacity in determining the validity of her consent, this is not to imply that
consensual relations must necessarily demand this conscious level of
introspection on each and every occasion. The classic example of sexual
14 See discussion in Chapter Two, "Consent as a Threshold in Heterosexual Relations"
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relations between the long-standing and loving couple hardly become non-
consensual when the parties involved do not take the time to consider seriously
the level to which they accept each sexual interaction as a coherent exercise of
self-determination within their life narratives. The reason for that, importantly,
however'<, does not relate to the existence of any kind of 'habit' or 'convention'
that renders the existence of consent in these contexts in any way implicit. On
the contrary, consent ought never to be so simplistically implied. What is
significant in this case, however, is that when pressed on the issue of the
motivation behind the sexual act, the couples involved would still consider the
act a self-determining one in the overall concrete context of their relational
lives. The model of contextual agency does not require that consensual
relations must operate eternally under an artificial model of conscious and
explicit self-examination. However, when the issue of consent is raised, the
model does require serious examination of the extent to which the action has
been motivated by an informed concern with a sense of self-determination
rather than by a desire to avoid some harm or ridicule or other difficult conflict
within the relationship.
Concern that the contextual model demands a highly unrealistic level of
conscious self-examination to legitimate the consensual nature of the sexual act
is not the only potential objection that may arise in the rape context. There may
also be some concern that application of this standard will actually operate to
limit female freedom by necessarily restricting the number of sexual partners to
be chosen. To have consented meaningfully within the framework of the
contextual model, the female agent must have adopted a seriously self-engaged
approach to the sexual act in question. Some may find in this requirement an
implicit assumption that the female agent must therefore only become involved
in sexual relationships when the relationship itself is one constitutive of her
sense of self. This, however, is to misunderstand the requirements of the
contextual model. The model does not require that, in seriously determining her
sexual actions, the female agent should necessarily determine serious actions.
15 Especially in light of Husak and Thomas arguments about couple-conventions explicitly criticised in
Chapter Two. See Husak, D. & Thomas, G., "Date Rape, Social Conventions and Reasonable
Mistakes" Supra. Chapter Two, Note 23
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On the contrary, the female agent is equally as free to engage in frivolous sexual
relations as committed ones. To comply with the requirements of the contextual
model, the frivolous sexual agent must seriously engage with the decision to
define herself through frivolous sexual relations. However, this by no means
implies that the sexual agent must therefore engage only in serious sexual
relations.
The model of contextual agency thus applied heralds the potential for significant
improvement in the interpretation of the consent threshold in the rape trial
arena. It allows the serious treatment of the complex discursive and relational
circumstances that define the confines of the legal agent's decision-making
arena without submerging the agent's ability to speak within the structural
dictates of these circumstances. In providing the ideological grounding for a
more honest approach to the legal analysis of issues of choice and self-
determination, contextual agency enables an empathetic yet applicable standard
of consent to be realised. Recognition of the discursive and normalising
mechanisms that seek to tie women to particularly privileged categories
necessitates abandonment of the legal systems' spurious condemnation of
women who fail to comply with these standards. When the artificiality of these
constructs becomes apparent, and the erroneous nature of their demands is
accepted, as would be the case within the model of contextual agency, the legal
decision-maker no longer feels bound by any pressure to re-affirm these
constructs through the explicit and implicit disapproval of non-conformity.l"
Instead, the decision-maker is made aware of the confines within which the
operation of the choice to give or refuse consent to sexual relations is made. In
turn, this facilitates a more serious evaluation of issues of economic necessity,
emotional insecurity, etc. which operate upon the lived-out experience of giving
or refusing consent. Such issues have hitherto been rendered peripheral and
irrelevant by a legal system that has been structured by an interest in the
medium of choice exercised by the rational, self-determining individual.
16 For example through the judicial tendency noted in Chapter Two to imply that women who fall short
of approved standards of femininity (by walking alone, dressing provocatively, flirting with men, etc.)
have signalled sexual willingness to men and therefore cannot complain when men mistake their
behaviour as constituting a willingness for intercourse with them.
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This model of the rational, self-determining individual and the model of agency
which it privileges do not rest well alongside the issues brought to bear upon
decision-making in the complex and multi-faceted arena of sexual relations.
Abandoning this model in favour of the model of contextual subjectivity and
contextual agency permits this realisation within the .legal realm and paves the
way for a more serious analysis of these impinging complexities. The end result
will be the eradication of the confined and rigid notion of absolute consent or
absolute non-consent. Such eradication presents the possibility for its
replacement with a more realistic model of communication which demands that
agents not only issue their consent to certain acts in the sense traditionally
assumed, but also recognise the act in question as being constitutive of their
complex narrative life-plan or fluctuating sense of self. Only then can we be
confident that the act has been participated in out of an experiential sense of free
will rather than as the result of oppressive cultural imperatives.
While thereby seriously accrediting the role of social constructionism in the
character formation and choices of the individual, the model of contextual
agency resists the temptation exhibited in the work of many theorists who, in
seeking to reconcile perceived tensions between this constructionism and a
workable conception of agency, have implicitly reinserted the notion of a 'core
self into ethical theory. Given the centrality of normative formations in the
operation of modem power that was discovered in our Foucaultian analysis in
Chapter One, legal agents continually negotiate within frameworks of social
expectation. Often these expectations will be so internalised by the agents
involved that they will act to confirm those expectations while genuinely
believing those acts to represent a moment of self-determination. The dilemma
presented by this recognition lies in determining how best to accommodate the
pervasiveness of social constructionism without marginalising the experiential
voices of moral agents. Often theorists concerned with reconciling this
perceived conflict have sought to do so through an implicit reinsertion of a
notion of the 'core self into ethical theory. This reinsertion has implied that
social constructionism has produced a variety of forms of 'false consciousness'
that it is the project of ethical theories of agency to deconstruct. In employing
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this methodology, however, these theorists have afforded credibility to the
possibility of achievement of processes of self-formation outwith the confines
of such determinism. What's more, they have thereby marginalised the voice of
the experiential agent by denying the validity of its account of the reality of the
decision-making process.
In destablising the epistemological confines that have framed this dilemma,
namely the dichotomy between a core self and a socially constructed self, the
model of contextual agency heralds the benefit over existing liberal models in
that it not only recognises the existence and force of social imperatives, but also
simultaneously encourages the development of some critical attitude towards
them. Where the traditional model requires blind compliance, masked under the
guise of a restrictive format of consent, the contextual model opens up a remit
for evaluation and critique of social imperatives. To be sure, some such
imperatives will be more deeply ingrained in the consciousness of the agent
than others. However, by encouraging critique of those dictates which are less
integral, the model of contextual agency sets in motion a critique which will
gradually promote the critical evaluation of more cemented social imperatives.
Where the traditional model ignores the relevance of background factors of
social constructionism, and where more radical theories seek to impose a
paternalistic stance to overrule its effects upon the experiential consciousness of
the legal agent,17 the contextual model offers an approach which simultaneously
encourages critical awareness within the agent while also displaying a necessary
level of respect for that agent's felt convictions. Without ignoring its
significance or presenting a utopian model for its transcendence, the contextual
model's gradual escalation of critique and continued commitment to ongoing
subversion presents the most promising agenda offered to date for dealing with
the dilemma of social constructionism without implicitly paying credence to a
core selfbeyond the realm of such constructionism. •
17 For example, the radical thesis of MacKinnon which seeks to deal with false consciousness by
denouncing the voices of women who express its imperatives and by replacing their voices with those
of women who consider the perpetuation of such imperatives a sign of weakness. - See Discussion in
Chapter One, "Feminism and Disciplinary Power"
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Perhaps the most significant contribution of the application of a model of
contextual agency in the deliberation of the rape trial lies in its ability to
accommodate the insight that certain kinds of sexual relationship matter
profoundly to personhood alongside a serious treatment of the conditions under
which sexual choices are made. In the circumstances of life, agents often
succumb to pressures that encourage them to consent to acts that are not
necessarily welcome. This consent does not represent an articulation of self-
determination. While the aim of the legal notion of consent is to present a
medium for such articulation, application of the prevailing consent standard
within the confmes of the rape trial falls markedly short of achieving that aim.
By eliminating concern with a one-dimensional utterance of consent, the
contextual model demands more than simple consent. Its focus upon the life
circumstances and relationships of the agent involved encourages a concern to
establish that the act in question was of a self-determining quality. In
demanding a high level of critical awareness of countervailing relationships,
pressures and expectations that confine and construct each agent's perception of
choice, the contextual model of agency provides a far more experiential account
of the articulation of consent than has hitherto been offered. Furthermore, in
seriously accrediting the significance of these impinging factors, it offers a more
realistic manifestation of the nature of human subjectivity than that embodied in
the neo-Kantian model. Incorporating a concern with the reality rather than the
abstract ideal of agency in the sexual arena, the contextual model introduces a
far less superficial legal concern with whether the act in question was not only
not resisted, but also truly welcome, voluntary and non-alienating. The arena of
sexual encounter represents an arena intrinsically related to a person's sense of
self. In the context of sexual autonomy, no lesser a standard of consent should
suffice.
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Implications for Maternal-Foetal Contexts
"The problem about the biomedical model of the body is its implicit
understanding of identity and difference...By treating bodies as self-contained
and as either absolutely different or identitical, it effaces as it contributes to
the ambiguity inherent in embodied existence. At a general level, the
biomedical model of the body shares assumptions with the liberal and contract
models ofthe self...,,18
Where the situation in the rape trial arena has been complicated by the existence
of long-standing imperatives which have sought to dichotomise women into the
categories of 'good' and 'bad', depending upon the level of sexual initiative
which their conduct displays, the situation in the maternal-foetal conflict arena
has been complicated by the model of anatomy envisaged by the discourses of
bio-medical ethics. Mirroring the critique lodged throughout this thesis at the
traditions of thought that have framed our perceptions of consent in the legal
arena, Rosyln Diprose has highlighted the problematic nature of clinical
traditions ofthought and their implications upon the perception of consent in the
medical arena -
"biomedical ethics in general, in forgetting the body, and armed with its
universal rules, relies on an inappropriate model of the relations between the
individual and her body and misconceives the nature of the relationship
between the individual and the other.,,19
Female agents in the maternal-foetal conflict context do not only have to
overcome the abstract individualism that has been prioritised in prevailing legal
notions of consent, but they also have to overcome the inappropriate conception
of the relationship between woman and foetus that dominates prevailing
biomedical ethics.
The circumstances of maternal-foetal conflict established in Chapter Three
show this biomedical model to be not only logically incoherent, but also entirely
arbitrary in its division of the body of the pregnant woman. Carol Pateman has
been vociferous in her condemnation of such a division and has continually
demanded that in the case of the pregnant woman, the foetus is a part of the self.
Pateman notes that, "there is something fundamentally problematic about
18 Diprose, R. The Bodies ofWomen, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 93, p.127
19 Diprose, R. The Bodies ofWomen, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 93, p.2
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dividing a self, pregnant or otherwise, into a conscious agent and a passive,
divisible body.,,2o Iris Young has added veracity to this critique by suggesting
that in pregnancy, as in other models of embodiment, the self is her body.i'
Pregnancy, in fact, represents a model that offers significant challenge to the
model of the contractarian tradition, which demands separation of a distinct self
and a distinct other. In pregnancy, the assumption of a given border between
the inside and the outside of the self is challenged because it is no longer clear
where the body of one person ends and where the body of another begins.
Traditionally, both biomedical and legal ethics have noted the peculiarity of the
pregnancy context. However, instead of embracing this difference as providing
the potential for a revision of our overall perceptions of human existence, the
common tendency has been to seek to constrain the pregnancy experience
within pre-existing, but ill-suited, frameworks of abstract individualism. As
Diprose has noted,
"Through its atomised model of identity, biomedical science builds a single
model of a singular body with reference to familiar assumptions about what is
proper to bodies. And, as consituting any body as proper and self-contained
involves the negation of ambiguity, ofthoughtless gifts, difference can only be
understood in terms of deviation from this norm. Given this model of identity
and difference, it should not be surprising if the general tendency to identify
women's bodies against a male norm...gets reproduced within its specific
knowledge of society.,,22
In our discussion in Chapter Three of the strong inter-dependence between
dictates of medical discourse and dictates of law, the profound affect that these
conceptualisations have had in the legal arena has been noted. Indeed, it was
suggested that their incorporation into the legal arena has gone a long way
towards providing a prima facie justification for the growing ascription of legal
claims on behalf of the foetus.23 While it will be argued in this section that the
invocation of contextual agency in this arena will enable a transcendence of the
20 Pateman, C. The Sexual Contract, Supra. Preface, Note 5. Discussed in Diprose, R. The Bodies of
Women, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 93, p.7
21 Young, I. "The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference". Discussed in Diprose, R. The
Bodies ofWomen, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 93, p. 115
22 Diprose, R. The Bodies of Women, Supra. Chapter Four, Note 93, p.128
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problematic individualism and constructionism of the liberal legal framework of
consent, the ability of contextual agency to eradicate the deficiencies inherent in
this biomedical ideology will also be examined. It is specifically through its
concern with circumstance and its interest in the artificiality of the confines that
establish the relevance of such circumstance that contextual agency locates the
ability to deal with both these problematic models within its application.
It has certainly historically been the case that the context within which legal
issues in regard to maternal-foetal conflict arise has been that of the biomedical
model illustrated above. However, it can be convincingly established that this is
not the only possible framework available. Indeed, the critique examined in
Chapter Three and advocated here suggests that this uncritical reliance is in fact
highly inappropriate. The tenacity of the prevailing biomedical model lies less
in any claim to inherent good sense and more in a concern to avoid the
peculiarities presented by the pregnancy experience through the submersion of
its analysis within perceptions of anatomy that have been developed to
accommodate and privilege the distinct human body. In pregnancy, neither the
body of the woman, nor the body of the foetus are distinct in the way that the
model seeks to pre-suppose. Instead of dealing with the anomaly of pregnancy
as presenting the opportunity to question the assumptions of the overall context
of embodiment, biomedical ethicists have instead sought to superimpose this
model onto the antithetical experience of pregnancy. Aside from the debatable
presumption inherent in this that we can divide the pregnant body into two
autonomous entities, this analytical imposition also betrays a highly
questionable conviction in favour of the abstract individualism that has been
privileged in the legal realm. Implying that autonomous decisions are about
one's body rather than enmeshed in it, the model celebrates an arbitrary division
of the body and a distinction between the agent and her experiences of
embodiment that preceding critique has found to be hugely problematic.
23 See Discussion in Chapter Three, especially in relation to Shaw, M. "The Potential Plaintiff-
Preconception and Prenatal Torts" in Milinsky, Aubrey & Annas (ed.) Genetics and the Law II , Supra.
Chapter Three, Note 45
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The contextual model of agency offers the opportunity to challenge this pattern.
In line with its focus upon prevailing social imperatives which operate to
construct human identities, invocation of contextual agency can pennit critique
of the artificiality of the biomedical model, both in general terms and in terms of
its lack of fit with the pregnancy context. This is sufficient to challenge the
foundation that lies behind the legal privileging of sovereign rights and inter-
personal conflict that flow from this perception. By alleviating the need to
make the pregnancy context conform to the dictates of the self-legislating model
of Kantian individualism, the entire context of the embodiment of pregnancy
can be considered anew. Liberated to consider the alternative discursive
formations that may be constitutive of subjectivity, it becomes increasingly
feasible that we can analyse the foetus as related to the pregnant women, rather
than as an alien entity with potentially competing claims upon her body. This
not-one-but-not-two patient model represents a better and more truthful
articulation of the manner in which the pregnant woman herself experiences the
pregnancy.i"
As such, it is submitted that this should also represent the setting within which
the law considers her choice to give or refuse consent to medical treatment. In
adopting a perception of the foetus as of concern to the pregnant woman, it
becomes more logical to adopt a prima facie belief that the woman will act in
the interests of herself and her foetus as a connected (although not combined)
unit.25 As we shall see, the social imperatives that act to structure women as
mothers, and mothers as altruistic, may actually add support to this assumption
once it has been liberated from the two-patient model that has made these
assumptions so oppressive to women.
In offering potential liberation from the dominant two-patient obstetric and legal
model, invocation of contextual agency also allows us to examine more clearly
the nature of the factors that may influence the calculus of the maternal decision
24 I am grateful to Professor Seymour of Australian National University law school for his discussion
of the merits of this not-one-but-not-two patient model within the obstetric arena
25 We have examined the extent of that prima facie assumption in Chapter Three, "Consent as a
Threshold in Foetal Therapy"
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to issue or refuse consent to foetal treatment. To be sure, when the choice to
give or refuse consent must be made in terms of the best overall result for the
connected entity of woman and foetus, the calculus involved in the decision
becomes more complex. However, this is not a reason for the legal arena to shy
away from an examination of these issues. After all, that is the experiential
framework within which the female agent herself has had to make her decision.
Within this more complex analysis, a range of countervailing factors become
relevant to the woman's decision. Once again, the benefit of the application of
contextual agency lies in its ability to render these countervailing factors
relevant considerations in the legal arena where formerly their incompatibility
with the conflict model or their overtly affective and emotional origin rendered
them irrelevant.
Amongst the most illustrative examples of the advantages that may be gained by
the invocation of this contextual approach relate to those circumstances within
which the pregnant woman has refused her consent to treatment out of a concern
for the emotional, spiritual and relational framework within which the decision
must be made, rather than out of the assumed motives of selfishness or
disinterest for the foetus that have dominated legal analysis. Often III
circumstances such as these, the decision to refuse treatment is an agonisingly
difficult one for the pregnant woman to make. In continuing to frame that
decision in terms of a conflict between herself and her foetus, both the
prevailing legal and biomedical models perform her an extreme injustice.
Imagine, for example, the woman who has refused consent to treatment because
of a genuine concern for the welfare ofher living children. As we have noted in
Chapter Three, the surgical procedure of caesarean section is far from
uncomplicated and often carries with it the potential of serious illness and
complication, and even the possibility of death. 26 For the woman who already
has a family to consider, refusing treatment to ensure that she is fit, well and
present to care for her current children is an entirely justified, albeit often
difficult choice. In circumstances such as this, the countervailing and
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contextual factors involved in the decision, once accredited with the
significance that they accord within the personal deliberation of the female
agent, present the nature of the choice in an entirely new light. Not only does
this incorporation act to dispel the artificial conflict model, it also presents a
welcome opportunity for medical and judicial officials to reevaluate the
appropriateness of their commitment to intervene in such decision-making
arenas. By encouraging a more fluid remit of relevance in the legal treatment of
maternal-foetal conflict cases, contextual agency once more encourages a
greater capacity for empathetic adjudication and particularised
recommendations without entailing an over-simplified dichotomy between the
autonomy of the pregnant woman and the welfare of the foetal patient.
The instance of the pregnant woman who refuses consent to treatment because
of a concern with the welfare of other born children represents only one instance
amongst many in a range of experiential complexities that may become relevant
through the invocation of contextual forms of agency. This example is
particularly helpful, however, because it illustrates effectively the arbitrary and
over-simplified nature of the assumed correlation between complying with the
broader culture's demands upon a selfless maternal concern with the welfare of
children and giving automatic consent to foetal treatment. Surely the decision
to undergo medical surgery with potentially serious consequences upon the
health of the woman should require that the 'good' woman give serious thought
to the effects of that decision upon her living children. In refusing to give their
consent to treatment, women in this situation may actually be conforming in a
more serious sense to the maternal ideal. In drawing factors relevant to the
maternal decision such as these in from the periphery in legal decision-making,
contextual agency in this arena illustrates the artificiality of the presupposition
that women who refuse treatment do so out of malice or selfishness and offers a
far more experientially empathetic means of translating the realities of the
decision into the legal arena.
26 Annas, G. "Protecting the Liberty of Pregnant Patients", Supra. Chapter Three, Note 68
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A similar illustration of the potential advantages of the application of contextual
forms of consent in the legal treatment of maternal-foetal conflict cases arises
from our discussion in Chapter Three of cases where the pregnant woman has
refused consent to treatment on the basis of religious beliefs. While the
prevailing legal model has interpreted that refusal as a selfish insistence on the
part of the mother that her religious affiliations should accord priority over
ensuring the birth of a healthy child, once again this overtly abstract and
polarised form of analysis fails to take into account certain other important
factors involved in the decision. Often in cases such as these, the refusal of
maternal consent relates less to any concern regarding her own spiritual and
religious well-being and more to a concern with the spirituality of her child. In
many of the religions that prohibit the use of medical technologies, ensuring the
birth of the foetus through artificial medical means imposes upon any
subsequently born child the heavy burden of spiritual alienation and religious
reproach. For the mother who holds deeply-felt religious convictions, the
decision to refuse consent to treatment that may medically benefit the foetus is a
decision to refuse an interference that not only poses serious detriment to the
spiritual well-being of any child that may subsequently be born, but also poses
the threat of exclusion from a final resting place for any foetus that does not
survive surgery. It is overly-simplistic in cases such as these to suggest that the
mother is selfish in her desire to refuse treatment on religious grounds. From
the perspective of the female agent, that decision has been issued on the basis of
a complex calculus of competing imperatives and in the final and finn belief
that the decision offers the greatest possibility of spiritual redemption for the
foetus, born or unborn. While prevailing standards of consent render such
motivational factors irrelevant because of its continued adoption of a model of
conflict, contextual models not only challenge the uncritical inference of
conflict but also demand a more sensitive awareness of the various motivations
behind the maternal decision and the centrality of those motivations to the
belief-systems within which any subsequent child would be born and raised.
In a variety of other arenas, application of the more complex model of
contextual agency would similarly allow judicial officials to appreciate that the
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woman in question has made her decision to refuse consent to treatment on the
basis of a complex calculus of factors. The woman herself must surely be in the
best position to make that decision because the woman herself has the best
understanding of the relevant imperatives that ought to be considered. Our
discussion in Chapter Three has highlighted furthermore that there is little
objectionable in that proposition because the woman who has carried her foetus
to term despite the possibility of pursuing an abortion should be accorded this
prima facie assumption in favour of her legitimate concern with the welfare of
the foetus. In being compelled to consider and accredit the nature of those
complex and often contradictory impulses bearing upon the maternal treatment
decision in these cases, courts employing a more flexible contextual standard
should feel a greater willingness to give credence to the maternal decision.
By delimiting the focus of consent to the immediate moment of proposed
medical treatment, and to the medical opinion of the doctors involved, the
treatment of maternal-foetal conflict cases to date have barely permitted the
woman a voice to explain the factors bearing upon her decision. The case law
examined in Chapter Three exhibits a marked judicial tendency simply not to
attend to the explanations of the pregnant woman - rarely, does the judge take
the time to meet with the woman herself and even more rarely does the judge
pay serious attention to any opinion brought before the court other than the
interpretation of events offered by medical staff?7 Yet the concern of medical
staff remains firmly fixed within the present pregnancy and with what are
deemed to be the best medical interests of the foetus. The medical staff
involved have no concern for the welfare of other children, and nor should they
have, for their concern is with the clinical context.
The mistake of legal treatment to date has been to assume blindly that despite
the narrow focus of medical opinion, this presents the best evaluation of the
extremely complex issues involved in the decision. This is quite frankly
misguided. The person with the best awareness of the complex and
interconnected factors bearing upon the treatment decision is the pregnant
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woman herself. The first improvement which application of the contextual
model would demand, therefore, would involve the creation of a place within
which the voice and perspective ofthe pregnant women is to be heard.
This, however, does not take us far enough. Even if such a forum were
available within the trial procedure, the dynamics of the prevailing model of
legal consent examined in preceding chapters suggests that the relevance of the
factors involved in the calculus pursued by the pregnant women may still not be
accredited sufficiently. The prevailing model, as we have repeatedly seen, is
adept in the art of relegating issues of personal experience, relational
complexities and affective ties to the underside of the operation of consent. By
constructing the legal agent as abstract and individualist, by its very nature, the
prevailing model of consent systematically denies appreciation of the very
issues involved in the complex calculus suggested. In contrast, the application
of the contextual model of agency would draw these issues of affection and
circumstance to the fore. In the arena of maternal-foetal conflict, this would not
only give the woman a hitherto unrecognised voice in legal proceedings, but
would also allow for the serious consideration of concerns about the effect of
surgery upon other relationships, etc. which have a profound effect upon the
decision-making process of the woman herself. By removing the current
tendency towards the uncritical acceptance ofmedical authority exhibited by the
legal realm, the model of contextual agency takes us a long way towards
improvement.
Through its focus upon the nature and operation of prevailing discourse and
cultural imperatives, the model of contextual agency can establish the
constrained nature of the clinical context and can establish the existence of a
variety of more complex and more expansive imperatives that impinge upon the
pregnant woman's decision. Where the operation of legal and medical
imperialism implicated in the prevailing conception has tended to render these
imperatives irrelevant to the issue of consent to treatment, the contextual model
demands their serious examination. In establishing its premise that the legal
27 Rhoden, N. "The Judge in the Delivery Room", Supra. Chapter Three, Note 73
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arena must engage with all the issues, dictates and circumstances which the
agents have engaged with in their personal decision-making process, the
contextual model brings these more complex considerations to the centre of
legal analysis. This makes it impossible for a judge to issue an order for
enforced medical treatment without first not only hearing the voice of the
pregnant woman, but also engaging empathetically with the reasons why she
has decided to refuse her consent to treatment.
Having undergone this process of empathetic judging required by the contextual
model, it is increasingly unlikely that the judge in question will be so quick to
construe the maternal actions as selfish and to construe the maternal-foetal
relationship as one of conflict. Conversely, it becomes increasingly likely that
the judge will be inclined to accept the legitimacy of the decision reached by the
woman herself, recognising the reality that she is in the best position to evaluate
and adjudicate on the complex and inter-related imperatives involved. A
woman who has carried her foetus to the point where caesarean section is viable
can be assumed to have a genuine wish to bear the child. This should be
sufficient to establish the prima facie supposition that the pregnant woman has
engaged with her decision to refuse consent seriously on the basis of an
experiential belief that herself and her foetus are part of a connected unit and on
the basis of the desire to exact a calculus which takes this into account in
rendering the best overall result.
Replacing the prevailing model of individualist consent and abstract conflict
with a flexible and concrete model of contextual agency permits a significant
reconceptualisation of the maternal-foetal relationship. This in turn heralds the
potential for a marked improvement in terms of the fate of the maternal patient
who refuses consent to medical treatment through its insistence upon a greater
concern with attending to the experience of the pregnant woman and the various
complex factors that have framed the context within which she has made that
decision. The abstract liberal model and its rigid criteria for legal relevance are
particularly ill-suited to the pregnancy context within which identification of a
rigid differentiation between self and other is impossible and within which the
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motivational factors involved are commonly of a relational and emotional
nature. In presenting a workable standard of consent that acknowledges the
peculiarity of pregnancy and its attendant forms of experience, the contextual
model offers an alternative remedy to maternal-foetal conflict cases that can
diffuse the conflict involved and allow a more subtle and sensitive analysis
through the respect with which it deals with hitherto peripheral matters of
personal motivation.
Conclusion - Contextual Agency and the Disciplinary Agenda
It has been argued throughout this thesis that the current legal construction of
consent finds its roots firmly within that species of abstract individualism that
the alternative conceptions of situated subjectivity developed over preceding
chapters seek to displace. Recognition of the inherent superficiality of the
Kantian subject necessarily entails recognition of the artificiality of the present
one-dimensional notion of consent. Through our analysis of prevailing forms of
subjectivity and agency, it has become evident that the notion of an abstract and
disinterested communication of individual preference inherent in the notion of
consent is no longer the most appropriate vehicle for the self-determination of
the situated and discursive subject. In determining alternative forms of
subjectivity and agency, we have arrived at a hybrid ethical theory that
envisages a form of agency referred to as contextual agency.
Throughout this chapter, we have examined the potential implications heralded
by the application of standards of contextual agency in favour of prevailing
models of consent. In terms of the specific arenas of rape and maternal-foetal
conflict, we have recognised that despite the limitations inherent in its
application within the existing adversarial, objective and rationalistic framework
of legal liberalism, the model of contextual agency offers the opportunity for
considerable improvement upon the credibility afforded to female self-
determination. Our discussion in regard to both arenas in earlier chapters
highlighted, not only the obstacles to establishing non-consent at the individual
level, but also at the level of systematic bias and procedural inefficiency. While
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the application of the model of contextual agency within existing legal
frameworks may only allow for the recognition of some of its potential benefits,
the importance of employing this immediate form of analysis lies in offering
pragmatic options for improvement upon current operations of the consent
standard. In terms of the ethical dictates of this work, which require a concern
with experiential realities and improvements at the level of everyday life, this
localised form of analysis is crucial. As we have mentioned, however, this is
not to say that there is not considerably more dramatic potential within the
contextual model that may be developed in line with other projects to form a
more progressive and transformative prescriptive ethical and legal vision.
Recurring throughout our analysis of the application of contextual agency in
specific arenas has been the recognition that employing this model within
prevailing legal accounts will encourage a greater judicial concern with
circumstantial, relational and emotional factors. This is massively significant in
terms of improving the realities of interactions between the legal system and
female agents, particularly but not exclusively in the specific contexts of rape
and maternal-foetal conflict. Without seeking a grand meta-narrative with
which to replace the paradigms of liberalism, the contextual form outlined
within this thesis remains capable of application in a variety of social situations.
Its application, although inherently flexible and context-sensitive, will in all
such cases not only challenge the problematic and artificial presumption of
individualism that has dominated previous legal application and interpretation
of the consent standard, but will also ensure a far greater remit for determining
relevance that will encompass crucial factors of relationship, expectation and
power hitherto considered irrelevant in the field of legal deliberation. In so
doing, it will reflect far more satisfactorily the experiential reality encountered
by legal agents in their decisions to issue or refuse consent. As Hekman
comments, "there is nothing arbitrary, anarchic or idiosyncratic about this. It is,
. . I h d ,,28quite SImp y, w at we o.
28 Hekman, S. Moral Voices, Moral Selves, Supra. Preface, Note 24, p. 163
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In light of the Foucaultian assertion, advocated within Chapter One, that legal
power is increasingly taking the form of disciplinary power, the need for a
contextual agenda of the kind thus suggested becomes paramount. In a period
of modernity characterised by an increasingly insidious operation of legal power
with a increasingly transparent medium of articulation, the most appropriate
means of challenge and resistance itself becomes infiltrating and subversive.
With the explosion of discourse that is characteristic of modernity has come a
medium for the articulation of power that finds its roots firmly in the identity
formation of the legal subject. The legal subject is becoming increasingly over-
determined by the dictates of social discipline yet the trajectory of those dictates
becomes harder to isolate and identify. Subversive resistance remains the most
promising means of attack. Employment of contextual agency permits this kind
of subversive resistance through its insistence upon the relevance of
circumstance, power and relationship to all matters of self-determination, In a
disciplinary legal regime, the model of contextual agency sets its sights at the
most appropriate line of attack - the human agent. By broadening the perceived
identity of the agent in the legal arena to include a sensitivity to issues of
disciplinary power distribution, contextual agency acts as an integral part of an
overall framework of resistance that defies the tendency towards increased
marginalisation of the significance ofpower structures. Despite the necessity of
its immediate operation within the adversarial frameworks of legal liberalism,
therefore, the model of contextual agency represents a most promising challenge
to abstract individualism and the inadequacies that it has promoted in the legal
conception and operation of consent.
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